


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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXIX • No. 1788 • October 1, 1973

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

President Nixon Sends Message to the Congress on Legislative Goals for 1973

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from a message from President Nixon transmitted to the Congress on September 10.¹

To the Congress of the United States:

As the Congress reconvenes for the closing months of the 1973 legislative season, it returns to a critical challenge.

Our country faces many pressing problems which must be solved with dispatch.

Americans want and deserve decisive action to fight rising prices. And they want every possible step taken now—not a year from now or in the next session of the Congress.

Americans want and deserve decisive action this year to ensure that we will have enough heat for our homes, enough power for our factories, and enough fuel for our transportation.

They want and deserve decisive action this year to combat crime and drug abuse. The national rate of serious crime is now heading down for the first time in 17 years, and they want that downward spiral to continue.

There is also an immediate need to improve the quality of our schools, reform Federal programs for our cities and towns, provide better job training, revamp our housing programs, institute lasting reforms in campaign practices, and strengthen our position in world markets.

Of transcending importance is America's continuing commitment to building a lasting structure of world peace. Our people are now at peace for the first time in more than a decade, and they expect their leaders to do all

that is necessary to maintain the peace, including those actions which preserve the Nation's strong defense posture.

The First Goal: A Balanced Budget

No issue is of greater concern to the American public than rising consumer prices. The battle against inflation must be our first priority for the remainder of this year.

The executive branch is already actively engaged in this fight:

—We have imposed a strong, new set of economic controls which should help to bring a reduction in the rate of inflation by the end of this year.

—We have taken a series of measures to expand food supplies, so that production will keep up with growing demands. The farm bill passed by the Congress and signed into law last month will make a significant contribution to this effort.

—Thirdly, the Federal Reserve System has been working to maintain reasonable controls on the flow of money within the economy, which is essential to reducing inflation.

We are moving in the right direction, but we must recognize that we can reach our goal only if we also apply the single most important weapon in our arsenal: control of the Federal budget. Every dollar we cut from the Federal deficit is another blow against higher prices. And nothing we could do at this time would be more effective in beating inflation than to wipe out the deficit altogether and to balance the Federal budget.

In our joint efforts, however, I continue to be adamantly opposed to attempts at bal-

¹ For the complete text, see White House press release dated Sept. 10; also printed as H. Doc. 93-1.

ancing the overall budget by slashing the defense budget. We are already at the razor's edge in defense spending. In constant dollars, our defense spending in this fiscal year will be \$10 billion less than was spent in 1964, before the Vietnam war began. Our defense forces are at the lowest level since the days just before the Korean war, and a smaller part of our gross national product is being spent on defense than in any year since 1950. Further cuts would be dangerously irresponsible and I will veto any bill that includes cuts which would imperil our national security.

Strengthening the Economy

The fight against inflation must move ahead on many fronts. Even as we strive to hold the line on Federal spending, we must also take a number of additional actions to strengthen the economy and curb rising prices.

Trade Reform Act

One of the most important of all the bills now before the Congress is my proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973. It is important that final action on this measure be taken in the next four months.

This legislation represents the most significant reform of our approach to world trade in more than a decade. But it builds on a strong tradition, steadily maintained since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, of giving the executive branch the authority it needs to represent the Nation effectively in trade negotiations with other countries.

The weeks and months ahead are a particularly important time in international economic history. This month sees the formal opening of a new and highly important round of trade negotiations in Tokyo and the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Nairobi. The Nairobi meeting is highly important to international monetary reform negotiations. Decisions which grow out of both of these meetings will shape the world's economy for many years to come. The United States can be a much more effective participant in such dis-

cussions if the Congress provides the tools contained in my proposed trade reform legislation.

The United States continues to seek a more open trading world. We believe that artificial barriers against trade among nations are often barriers against prosperity within nations. But while the trading system should be more open, it should also be more fair. The trading game must be made equitable for all countries—giving our workers, farmers and businessmen the opportunity to sell to other countries goods which they produce most competitively and, as consumers, to buy goods which their counterparts in other countries produce most competitively. In bargaining for a more open and more equitable trading system, our negotiators must be equipped with authorities comparable to those of their counterparts from other nations.

My trade reform legislation would provide a number of such authorities and thus would strengthen our bargaining position. I emphasize again that the Congress should set up whatever mechanism it deems best for closer consultation and cooperation with the executive branch to ensure that its views are properly represented as trade negotiations go forward.

At the same time, I have also requested actions to ensure that the benefits of expanding international trade are fairly distributed among our own people and that no segment of our economy is asked to bear an unfair burden. My proposals would give us greater flexibility in providing appropriate relief from imports which cause severe domestic problems and would also liberalize our programs of adjustment assistance and other forms of compensation to help workers who are displaced because of rising imports. They would also equip us to deal more adequately with the unfair trading practices of other countries, and through expanded trade, to "sop up" some of the excess dollar credits now held abroad which can play havoc with domestic markets.

Other authorities contained in the bill would give us greater flexibility to use trade

policy in fighting inflation, correcting our balance of payments, expanding our exports, and advancing our foreign policy goals. One provision of this bill, authorizing the President to extend Most Favored Nation treatment to those countries which lack that status, would be particularly helpful in carrying out our foreign policy and I continue to give it my strong support.

Altogether, the proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973 represents a critical building block as we seek to construct a durable structure of peace in the world and a vibrant and stable economy at home. In the difficult negotiations which lie ahead, this legislation would enable us to assure more jobs for American workers, better markets for American producers, wider opportunities for American investors and lower prices for American consumers.

Export Administration Act

The Export Administration Act amendment which my Administration proposed on June 13th is another weapon which could be helpful in the fight against rising prices. One of the most important causes of the recent inflationary surge has been the extraordinary boom abroad and the additional demand which it has generated for our products. On the whole, this boom should be seen as a healthy, long-range development for our economy as well as for other countries. But as I said last June, when we have pressing shortages in this country and when we must choose between meeting needs abroad or at home, then "we must put the American consumer first."²

This is why I have asked for new and more flexible authority to establish certain controls on food and other exports when and where they are needed. I continue, however, to oppose permanent controls because they can upset and discourage our entire pattern of healthy trade relationships and thus complicate the fight against inflation. Our limited controls on soybeans were changed last Fri-

day to permit full exports on new contracts. This action was taken because we are convinced that stocks and new crop supplies are more than adequate to meet our own needs.

Nevertheless, I still seek the authority I requested last June to be sure we will be able to respond rapidly, if necessary, to new circumstances. I also emphasize that new controls will be imposed only if they are absolutely needed.

Stockpile Disposal Act

Another important action which the Congress can take in the battle against rising prices is to provide the necessary authority for selling part of our national strategic stockpile—materials which are no longer needed for national security. I requested such authority last April with regard to \$4 billion worth of goods in our stockpile. Such sales, by allowing us to increase supplies in the marketplace of major commodities, could help provide important relief for hard-pressed American consumers. Further, this bill could help to maintain and provide employment for workers whose jobs are dependent upon the availability of basic commodities such as aluminum, zinc and copper, all of which are in short supply.

Our country's strategic stockpile still reflects the economic and military realities of the 1950's—in fact, 95 percent of the current stockpile was acquired before 1959. In the 1970's, however, our military requirements have changed—and so has our economic capacity to meet them. My proposed new guidelines for the stockpile would carefully protect our national security in the light of these changing realities, while substantially enhancing our economic health.

I regret that this legislation has not moved forward more rapidly during the past few months. In the name of national efficiency, thrift, and price stability, I call again for its prompt and favorable consideration.

Other Economic Legislation

As I indicated in my message to Congress on August 3, I will shortly be submitting my

² For President Nixon's address to the Nation on June 13, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 18, 1973, p. 765.

legislation on the restructuring of financial institutions. This is a complex matter which requires thorough but prompt study by the Congress.

I call, too, for speedy enactment of legislation which has now emerged from conference which would establish the Council on International Economic Policy on a permanent basis.

Meeting the Energy Challenge

I have previously stated, and wish to restate in the most emphatic terms, that the gap between America's projected short-term energy needs and our available domestic energy supplies is widening at a rate which demands our immediate attention.

I am taking all appropriate measures within my authority to deal with this problem, seeking to increase our supplies and moderate our demands. Looking to the future, I have announced plans for a large scale increase in our research and development effort, and I have asked my top energy advisor, Governor John Love, to meet with State officials to seek temporary modifications of air quality standards. Such modifications would help to minimize fuel shortages this winter. In addition, I will soon be meeting with members of the Atomic Energy Commission to determine whether we can bring nuclear power plants on line more quickly. But the energy problem requires more than Presidential action; it also requires action by the Congress.

It is absolutely essential that the Congress not wait for the stimulation of energy shortage to provide the legislation necessary to meet our needs. Already we have seen some regional inconveniences this summer with respect to gasoline and this winter we may experience a similar problem with regard to heating fuels.

Over the long term, the prospects for adequate energy for the United States are excellent. We have the resources and the technology to meet our growing needs. But to meet those long-term needs and to avoid severe problems over the short term, we must launch a concentrated effort which mobilizes

the Government, American industry and the American people.

I have recently called for passage of seven major energy bills now before the Congress. Not all of those can be acted upon with equal speed, but four of these bills are of the highest urgency and must be acted upon before the end of this year. These four would provide for the construction of the Alaskan pipeline, construction of deepwater ports, deregulation of natural gas and establishment of new standards for surface mining. All four of these bills are addressed to both our short-term and long-term needs.

Alaskan Pipeline

Our first legislative goal—and one that should be achieved this month—is the enactment of an Alaskan pipeline bill. Construction of the pipeline would provide us with up to 2 million barrels of oil per day over which we would have full control and would simultaneously reduce by more than \$3 billion per year our need for oil imports. I have proposed legislation to avoid any further delay in the construction of the Alaskan pipeline and I am gratified that both Houses of the Congress have already passed variations of this proposal. I urge the earliest possible attention to these bills by the House-Senate Conference Committee, so that pipeline construction can begin.

Deepwater Ports

Until domestic resources are in full production and technological progress has reached a point where sufficient energy sources are within reach, we will have to rely upon imports of foreign oil. At the present time, however, continental port facilities are inadequate to handle our import requirements.

Because of our limited port capacity, the super-tankers presently used for petroleum transport cannot be off-loaded anywhere on our Atlantic coast. I have therefore proposed measures to authorize the construction and operation of deepwater facilities in a manner consistent with our environmental priorities

and consonant with the rights and responsibilities of the States involved.

We must not delay this important legislation. To do so would further delay the economical import of petroleum and would mean increased costs to the American consumer, unnecessary threats to our coastal environment, and further loss of revenues to Canadian and Caribbean ports which are already capable of off-loading large super-tankers.

Metric Conversion

Americans cherish tradition and our own way of doing things. Having been acculturated from childhood to the concepts of an inch, a mile, or a pound, we are understandably nonplussed when we consider the notion of a centimeter, a kilometer, a gram or a kilo. However, when we realize that the rest of the world is equally confused by our system of measurement, we must conclude, however sadly, that we are the ones who are out of step.

In a world of integrated commerce and increasing personal exchange, it is only prudent for us to adjust our own conceptions and devices for measuring and delineating quantity.

I have recommended to the Congress that it pass legislation to convert America to the metric system. This can be done in a reasonable manner, one which is not abrupt or disconcerting. I am pleased to note that the Administration's proposal is presently before the appropriate House subcommittee. I ask that the Senate give equally expeditious consideration to effecting this necessary change.

Keeping the Peace

For the first time in more than a decade, America is at peace. Now we must learn how to keep that peace—a task that is at least as demanding and in many ways even more subtle than the struggle to end a war.

There is always a temptation after war to enter into a period of withdrawal and isola-

tion. But surely we have learned from past lessons of precipitate disarmament that this temptation must be resisted. And surely we have also learned that our progress in securing peace is due in large measure to our continued military strength and to the steadfast, responsible role we have played in the affairs of our world.

Defense Spending

In recent years, it has been fashionable to suggest that whatever we want in the way of extra programs at home could be painlessly financed by lopping 5 or 10 or 20 billion dollars off the defense budget. This approach is worse than foolhardy; it is suicidal. We could have the finest array of domestic programs in the world, and they would mean nothing if we lost our freedom or if, because of our weakness, we were plunged into the abyss of nuclear war.

The world's hope for peace depends on America's strength—it depends absolutely on our never falling into the position of being the world's second strongest nation in the world.

For years now we have been engaged in a long, painstaking process of negotiating mutual limits on strategic nuclear arms. Historic agreements have already been reached and others are in prospect. Talks are also going forward this year aimed at a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe. But the point of all these negotiations is this: if peace is to be preserved the limitations and the reductions must be mutual. What one side is willing to give up for free, the other side will not bargain for.

If America's peace and America's freedom are worth preserving, then they are worth the cost of whatever level of military strength it takes to preserve them. We must not yield to the folly of breaching that level and so undermining our hopes and the world's hopes for a peaceful future.

Although my military budget—measured in constant dollars—is down by almost one-third since 1968, the Congress is now threatening further defense cuts which would be

the largest since 1949. To take such unilateral action—without exacting similar concessions from our adversaries—could undermine the chances for further mutual arms limitations or reductions. I will therefore actively oppose these cuts.

The arms limitations agreement signed with the Soviet Union last year has at last halted the rapid growth in the numbers of strategic weapons. Despite this concrete achievement, much needs to be done to ensure continued stability and to support our negotiation of a permanent strategic arms agreement. A vigorous research and development program is essential to provide vital insurance that no adversary will ever gain a decisive advantage through technological breakthrough and that massive deployment expenditures will therefore not become necessary. Yet the Congress is in the process of slashing research and development funding below minimum prudent levels, including elimination of our cruise missile and air defense programs. The Trident and B-1 programs, which are critical to maintaining a reliable deterrent into the next decade, are also facing proposals to cut them to the bone.

On top of this, the Senate has approved a staggering and unacceptable cut of 156,000 men in our military manpower. Such action would force us to reduce the number of ships in our Navy while the Soviet Union continues an unprecedented naval buildup and to reduce the size of our Army and Air Force while the Soviet Union and the Chinese continue to maintain far larger forces.

In addition to these cuts, there is also a major Senate proposal requiring substantial unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe, a mistake that could begin a serious unraveling of the NATO alliance. Negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions begin on October 30. On the very eve of negotiations, the troop cuts in Europe and the reduction in military manpower would destroy our chances of reaching an agreement with the Warsaw Pact countries to reduce troop levels in Europe on a mutual basis. If the Congress were to succeed in making these proposed

cuts, the United States would be making far-reaching concessions even before the talks begin.

Cuts in other defense programs are equally unacceptable. It is illogical to cut America's capabilities at the very time the Soviet Union increases hers. And it would be difficult to stabilize delicate situations in the Middle East and Asia if the Congress removes the influential tools which have made stability possible.

Foreign Assistance Act

Another matter of prime concern to me is our commitment to a sound program of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid. Last spring I sent to the Congress reasonable requests for our economic and military assistance programs. These programs represent a central element in America's ability to work with her allies to maintain peace and stability in the world. Unfortunately, the Congress has not treated these requests favorably.

The House has already cut about 25 percent from the military aid program and the Senate has cut it by one-half. Not only have extraordinary cuts been made in the funding, but restrictive amendments have been added in committee and others may be suggested on the floor. I cannot stand by while these crucial programs are gutted in haste and reaction.

Current foreign aid programs are being funded through a continuing resolution which ends on September 30. This approach is unsatisfactory, especially in light of demands resulting from North Vietnamese truce violations in Cambodia. Yet the Congress continues not only to provide smaller dollar amounts but also to make unreasonable requests for access to sensitive information and impose counterproductive conditions on specific programs. Such demands are unacceptable; they would badly compromise our ability to maintain security around the world.

I intend to make every effort to increase the funding for fiscal year 1974 security assistance requirements. I shall also strongly resist efforts by the Congress to impose un-

reasonable demands upon necessary foreign policy prerogatives of the executive branch. A spirit of bipartisan cooperation provided the steel which saw America through the Cold War and then through Vietnam. We must not jeopardize the great potential for peaceful progress in the post Vietnam era by losing that strong bipartisan spirit.

To build a truly durable structure of peace, our progress in reforming the world's trade and monetary systems must be accompanied by efforts to help the poorer countries share more equitably in the world's growing prosperity. To this end, I ask the Congress to support our fair share of contributions to the multilateral development banks—both the proposed contributions now pending in the Congress and other proposals about which I am currently consulting with the Congress and which will be formally submitted in the near future. Our bilateral assistance programs are also an essential part of our effort to stimulate world development and I urge the Congress to give them full support.

All these efforts represent short-range investments in peace and progress which are of enormous long-range importance. To try to save a few dollars on these programs today could cost us far more tomorrow.

Conclusion

With the Congress, the Administration and the people working together during the coming weeks, we can achieve many of the goals described in this message. And we will work together most effectively if we remember that our ultimate responsibility is not to one political party, nor to one philosophical position, nor even to one branch of the Government. Our ultimate responsibility is to the people—and our deliberations must always be guided by their best interests.

Inevitably, we will have different opinions about what those interests demand. But if we proceed in a spirit of constructive partnership, our varying perspectives can be a source of greater creativity rather than a cause of deadlock.

We already know that the year 1973 will

be recalled in history books as the year in which we ended the longest war in American history. Let us conduct ourselves in the next four months so that 1973 will also be remembered as the time in which we began to turn the blessings of peace into a better life for all.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 10, 1973.

U.S. Protests DRV Construction of Airfields in South Viet-Nam

Following is a U.S. note delivered to the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on September 10.

Press release 325 dated September 11

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam of January 27, 1973.

1. The United States calls the attention of the DRV to the fact that since January 28, when the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam went into effect, the forces of its side have built or repaired at least 12 airfields in South Viet-Nam. It notes that North Vietnamese anti-aircraft units with weapons have been introduced into South Viet-Nam after January 28 in violation of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement and emplaced at these fields.

2. The DRV will recall that the United States on April 20, in its note to the other signatories of the Act of Paris, protested the illegal placing of SA-2 missiles at Khe Sanh airfield in Quang Tri Province.¹ Despite the U.S. protest, the DRV has continued to introduce SA-2 missiles and anti-aircraft units into South Viet-Nam. The U.S. calls upon

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of May 14, 1973, p. 599.

the DRV side to remove to North Viet-Nam those missiles and anti-aircraft units which it has illegally introduced into South Viet-Nam since January 28.

3. The United States notes that on June 9 a press spokesman of the DRV side told the press in Saigon that the DRV side has the "right" to develop civil aviation in South Viet-Nam. A spokesman of the DRV side also told the press in Saigon on July 28 that its side would "not permit" the RVN [Republic of Viet-Nam] "exclusive control" of the airspace over South Viet-Nam. The above statements and the DRV side's repair and construction of 12 airfields in South Viet-Nam strongly suggest that the DRV intends to introduce aircraft into the airspace of South Viet-Nam in a way not authorized by the Agreement of January 27 or permitted under international law.

4. The GVN [Government of Viet-Nam] in its September 10, 1973, note to the DRV has clearly indicated that it will not tolerate any unauthorized intrusion by the DRV into the airspace of South Viet-Nam. The United States thus wishes strongly to emphasize the grave risks which the DRV would run by violating the airspace sovereignty of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

U.S. Responds to Pakistan's Need for Flood Relief Assistance

*Statement by President Nixon*¹

The American people have the deepest concern and sympathy for the people of Pakistan as they battle terrible floods, the most serious of this century, under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Whole

areas of Pakistan are being ravaged. Initial reports indicate that the number of people dead or missing is tragically large, that millions of people are homeless, and that the extent of property damage is mounting into hundreds of millions of dollars. The previously bright prospects for Pakistan's development have been temporarily dimmed.

In an immediate response to this situation, U.S. helicopters and boats with their crews are already engaged in helping with immediate rescue work and with the movement of vital relief supplies. Medical and other urgent needs are being met. Pakistan needs help, and I know its friends in the international community will respond generously.

In response to longer term needs, I have directed that 100,000 metric tons of U.S. wheat be made available to the people of Pakistan to provide some immediate relief before their next harvest.

Further, I am directing that the United States begin now in helping with the rehabilitation and recovery of Pakistan to assure prompt and effective action for immediate relief and for our contribution to an early recovery. I have asked AID Deputy Administrator Maurice J. Williams, my special relief coordinator for major disasters abroad, to go to Pakistan to review with the Pakistan Government immediate relief and longer range reconstruction needs. He will report to me, and after appropriate consultation with the Congress, we will continue to assure that the Government of the United States, in cooperation with other countries, will do all that it can to help our Pakistani friends recover from this terrible devastation.

¹ Issued at San Clemente, Calif., on Aug. 29 (White House press release).

Dr. Kissinger Gives Statement Before Senate Committee on His Nomination To Be Secretary of State

Following is a statement made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 7 by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Secretary of State-designate.¹

After talking to the chairman and most members of the committee, I have the impression that your purposes would best be served if we moved quickly to your questions. Therefore I shall confine my opening remarks to a statement outlining the attitude I propose to bring to the office of Secretary of State if the committee and Senate should confirm my nomination. I take this approach, moreover, because the close and cooperative relationship that we shall seek between the executive and the legislative branches in foreign affairs depends ultimately on the spirit with which it is implemented.

My first thought is of the past and the great Americans who have held the office to which the President has nominated me. I derive both inspiration and a sense of gravity from that impressive roster, whether at the dawn of this nation's history—Jefferson, Marshall, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay—or just since World War II—Byrnes, Marshall, Acheson, Dulles, Herter, Rusk, Rogers. These men, however different their styles and personalities, epitomized one fundamental reality: that the foreign policy of the United States transcends parties and administrations. It expresses our ideals, our purposes, and our hopes for the world. It must fulfill the best in America.

If confirmed, I shall always be conscious

that I hold in trust the legacy of some of our greatest and noblest men.

Let me pay tribute to my predecessor, who performed his duties with such dignity and decency for four and a half years. Secretary Rogers headed the Department of State during one of the most difficult periods in our history, when we had to adjust policies to new realities amid major domestic contention. His calm judgment and his humanity helped steer us through this passage and win the respect even of those who disagreed with administration policies. The President and I will continue to look to him for counsel and support.

Mr. Chairman, we have come to experience in recent years that peace at home and peace abroad are closely related. How well we perform in foreign policy depends importantly on how purposeful we are at home. America has passed through a decade of domestic turbulence which has deepened divisions and even shaken our national self-confidence in some measure. At the same time, profound changes have occurred in the world around us a generation after World War II. Our era is marked by both the anxieties of a transitional period and the opportunities of fresh creation.

These challenges, though they appear as practical issues, cannot be solved in technical terms; they closely reflect our view of ourselves. They require a sense of identity and purpose as much as a sense of policy. Throughout our history we have thought of what we did as growing out of deeper moral values. America was not true to itself unless it had a meaning beyond itself. In this spiritual sense, America was never isolationist.

This must remain our attitude.

This is why our international policies must

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

enlist the contributions of our best people, regardless of political persuasion. Our task is to define—together—the contours of a new world and to shape America's contribution to it. Our foreign policy cannot be effective if it reflects only the sporadic and esoteric initiatives of a small group of specialists. It must rest on a broad national base and reflect a shared community of values.

With good will on all sides, I deeply believe we can reach this goal. There is no dispute about many of the fundamental objectives of national policy. We are at a crucial point of transition in the international order, with major changes in the global structure promising a more peaceful world:

—Successful postwar policies have helped our friends to new strength and responsibilities. We shall work constructively and openly with our partners in Europe and Japan to give new impetus to associations based on shared purposes and ideals. We shall always remember that the vitality of our friendships is the necessary condition for the lowering of tensions with our opponents.

—We have developed fresh relationships with adversaries that can ease us away from confrontation toward cooperation. Tensions have been reduced in many areas. For the first time since the end of World War II, all great nations have become full participants in the international system. There is the hope that the arms race can be arrested and the burden of armaments reduced.

—Our most anguishing and divisive problem, the Viet-Nam war, is behind us. We achieved a negotiated settlement last January. The Congress has since expressed its view on how to terminate our military participation in the last area of conflict—Cambodia. As you gentlemen know, the administration differs with that view. But it will not attempt to circumvent it.

—We face unprecedented issues which transcend borders and ideologies and beckon global cooperation. Many traditional assumptions need adjustment. We have viewed ourselves as blessed with unlimited agricultural surpluses; today we must contemplate scar-

city in relation to world needs. We have assumed self-sufficiency in energy; now we face increasing needs for external supply at least for an interim period. Environmental problems used to be considered national issues, if they were considered at all; now many must be met internationally if they are going to be met at all. We need to explore new conceptual frontiers to reflect the new reality produced by both technology and human aspirations: that our planet has become a truly global society.

This administration will continue to adapt America's role to these new conditions. But we cannot take for granted what has been begun. We cannot let irretrievable opportunities slip from our grasp. Just as we have benefited from the efforts of our predecessors, so must we build for our successors. What matters to other countries, and to the world, is not so much the work of one administration as the steadiness of America. So the nation is challenged to render our purposes durable and our performance reliable. This we achieved during most of a generation after the Second World War. We need to continue to do so.

This will require mutual effort and mutual understanding. We will do our part. The President has charged me with helping him to shape a foreign policy that can endure because it is carried in the hearts as well as the minds of Americans.

The first necessity is a broader based participation within the executive branch. During the last four years, there were many delicate initiatives that required a high degree of secrecy and concentration of effort. Crucial foundations were laid. Now we need to build on these foundations a more permanent structure that we can pass on to succeeding administrations. Durability in foreign policy is achieved, in the final analysis, through the deep and continuing involvement of the dedicated professionals of the State Department and Foreign Service, who will manage our foreign affairs long after this administration has ended. Thus one of my principal responsibilities as Secretary of State will be to infuse

the Department of State with a sense of participation, intellectual excitement, and mission.

As you know, the President has asked me to retain my position as Assistant to the President if I am confirmed as Secretary of State. I believe this will benefit the coherence and effectiveness of our foreign policy. The Secretary of State will be clearly the principal foreign policy adviser to the President. The locus of authority and the chain of authority will be unambiguous. Bureaucratic friction will be minimized. As the President said in announcing my appointment, the unity of position will underline the traditional principal role of the Department of State in the policymaking process.

There must be, as well, a closer relationship between the executive and legislative branches. It is the President's objective to make policy more accessible to the scrutiny and the views of the Congress. This is the fundamental answer to the question of executive privilege. As you gentlemen know, over an extended period of time when I was fully covered by this principle, I met regularly with the members of this committee, both individually and as a group, and most frequently with the chairman. I did so partly because I valued this association on personal grounds but also because of my conviction that this nation faced no more urgent requirement than to promote mutual respect where a consensus was unattainable.

In my new capacity, I shall be prepared to testify formally on *all* my activities. In other words, I shall testify with respect to all matters traditionally covered by Secretaries of State and on my duties as Assistant to the President concerning interdepartmental issues. I will not claim executive privilege in either capacity except for the one area customarily invoked by Cabinet officers; that is, direct communications with the President or the actual deliberations of the National Security Council.

We will, of course, need to determine together which subjects should be treated in public and which in executive session.

In short, as a result of my combined posi-

tion, the Committee should receive substantially more information than it has in the past. We will have acted positively on one of your most central concerns.

This process of greater cooperation will not be confined to formal testimony. If confirmed, I will propose to meet immediately with the chairman and the ranking member to work out procedures for enabling the committee to share more fully in the design of our foreign policy.

I will follow a similar approach with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the leaders of both branches of Congress as well as with other congressional groupings of proper jurisdiction.

This prompts the question: What do we mean by bipartisanship? We do not ask for rubberstamping, and we cannot expect unanimity. Serious people obviously will continue to have differences. Where profound disagreements exist, it would be self-defeating to paper them over with empty formulae. We in turn cannot give up basic principles; nor can we promise to act only when there is bipartisan agreement, though this will be our preference. But we shall work to shape a broad consensus on our national goals and to confine differences to tactical issues. When our views differ, we shall strive not to press the debate to a point that tears the overall fabric of the national consensus. We will seek to maintain a climate of mutual trust so that arguments can center on methods, not motives. We hope that this restraint will be mutual. In this manner, our foreign policy debate can avoid the extremes of civil war and sterile accord for its own sake.

If our foreign policy is to be truly national, we must deepen our partnership with the American people. This means an open articulation of our philosophy, our purposes, and our actions. We have sought to do this in the President's annual reports to the Congress on foreign policy. Equally, we must listen to the hopes and aspirations of our fellow countrymen. I plan therefore, on a regular basis, to elicit the views of America's opinion leaders and to share our perspectives freely.

Mr. Chairman, I have sketched an agenda

for seeking a more durable peace abroad and a cooperative climate at home. Both objectives point to the urgent need for reconciliation. Americans have recently endured the turmoil of assassinations and riots, racial and generational confrontations, and a bitter, costly war. Just as we were emerging from that conflict, we were plunged into still another ordeal.

These traumatic events have cast lengthening shadows on our traditional optimism and self-esteem. A loss of confidence in our own country would inevitably be mirrored in our international relations. Where once we ran the risk of thinking we were too good for the world, we might now swing to believing we are not good enough. Where once a soaring optimism tempted us to dare too much, a shrinking spirit could lead us to attempt too little. Such an attitude—and the foreign policy it would produce—would deal a savage blow to global stability.

But I am hopeful about our prospects. America is resilient. The dynamism of this country is irrepressible. Whatever our divisions, we can rally to the prospects of building a world at peace and responsive to humane aspirations. In so doing, we can replenish our reservoir of faith.

This is our common challenge:

—To distinguish the fundamental from the ephemeral.

—To seek out what unites us, without stifling the healthy debate that is the lifeblood of democracy.

—To promote the positive trends that are the achievements not just of this administration but also of those who came before.

—To shape new initiatives that will serve not just the next 40 months but also the decades to follow.

A few years before he died, one of our most distinguished Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson, entitled his memoirs "Present at the Creation." He chose that title because he was one of the leading participants in the creation of the postwar international system. The challenge before our country now is whether our generation has the vision—as Dean Acheson's did more than two decades

ago—to turn into dynamic reality the hopeful beginnings we have made toward a more durable peace and a more benevolent planet.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am confident that working together we can speed the day when all of us will be able to say that we were "present at the creation" of a new era of peace, justice, and humanity.

Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra Visits People's Republic of China

The Department of State announced on September 7 (press release 324) that the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra was to depart September 10 to perform before audiences in Peking and Shanghai at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries of the People's Republic of China. The invitation was announced last February at a news conference by Henry A. Kissinger, following his visit to the People's Republic of China.

A joint U.S.-China communique issued at Shanghai on February 27, 1972, following President Nixon's visit, stated that the two countries agreed that it was desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples, specifically in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism, "in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial."

The 106-member orchestra arrived in Shanghai September 12. There were a total of 130 people in the party, including five media representatives invited by the orchestra and two escort officers from the Department of State. Also accompanying the orchestra was a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Inc., of New York City, a private, nonprofit organization which has been assisting the orchestra in arrangements for the trip.

The Department of State assisted with a grant to the Philadelphia Orchestra Association to help defray expenses and also facilitated arrangements with the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Department Discusses Proposed Fund To Assist Developing Countries and Promote U.S. Exports

*Statement by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

I appreciate this opportunity to present the administration's view on the United States Export Development Credit Fund (EDCF) from the vantage of the Department of State. This proposed Fund would help to finance U.S. exports to the poorest of the developing nations, with the dual purpose of promoting present and future U.S. exports while making resources available to these countries to promote their economic development.

I would like to discuss the EDCF in the context of our overall economic relations with the less developed countries (LDC's). We are talking about an extremely diverse group of countries, varying in size, natural resources, economic organization, and degree of present development, as well as a host of political factors that affect their economic situation. The economic interests and goals of the United States with regard to these countries cover a range of trade, investment, and development issues, with the relative importance of issues differing from country to country. We therefore need to approach the less developed countries with a variety of policy tools which will be responsive to their varying needs and our specific interests.

These countries differ fundamentally in their present degree of economic development. Some have achieved much economic development during the past decade and are

nearing or have attained a stage which will most likely carry them out of the ranks of the less developed countries within a few years.

For these "emergent" countries, concessional development assistance is less important than trade, export credit, and private investment as a source of the resources needed to carry on the development process. The United States has tried to meet the needs of these countries by encouraging trade and by bringing them more fully into the world financial system. We have introduced as part of the administration's trade bill a generalized system of preferences which would open export markets so that these developing countries can earn through trade the resources needed to support their development.

We have encouraged these countries to participate in multilateral trade negotiations. They and other developing countries participate in negotiations to reform the world monetary system. We have supported the growth of the World Bank and the regional development banks through which the emergent developing countries can obtain development financing on moderate terms.

While supporting the aspirations of these nations, we have also tried to encourage U.S. exports. The Export-Import Bank has been an important instrument for financing exports to these countries, assuring the availability of financing on terms commensurate with their ability to service external debts.

While our relations with the emergent nations are increasingly centered on trade and investment, development assistance still plays

¹Submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance on Sept. 6. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

a central role in relations with the large group of developing nations which remain desperately poor. Almost 70 developing countries still have per capita gross national products under \$375 a year, and for 42 of them per capita GNP is under \$200. Many of these countries are poor in natural resources and infrastructure and also lack the industrial base and skills necessary to take advantage of trade-promoting tools such as general preferences.

These countries can only hope to acquire the external resources necessary for development with the aid of concessional financing. The extent to which this is true is shown by the fact that official U.S. Government commitments from all sources—AID, P.L. 480, Eximbank—amounted in 1972 to 82 percent of the total value of U.S. exports to the poorer (per capita GNP under \$200) developing countries. This percentage decreases as per capita income increases. The composition of the official commitments also changes: In 1972 Eximbank commitments amounted to 57 percent of government-financed U.S. exports to countries with per capita GNP from \$200 to \$500, but only 9 percent of government-financed exports to countries under \$200, with the balance coming from more concessional AID and P.L. 480 programs.

The Export-Import Bank, as noted above, extends relatively little financing to most of the poorest developing countries. Eximbank authorized loans and guarantees of \$1,258,000,000 to countries with per capita gross national product under \$375 during fiscal 1973; but these authorizations were concentrated in a small number of countries (75 percent went to only five countries: Algeria, Indonesia, Turkey, Korea, Zaïre), and much of this financing was for special projects such as fuels development with a high short-term economic payout—not, unfortunately, typical of the poorest countries.

Eximbank's strict credit standards, dictated by legislation and policy, rule out many developing country credits. Eximbank terms, while softer than commercial terms, still carry interest rates which developing coun-

tries can ill afford and are for relatively short terms compared to concessional financing. Such near-commercial export credits impose a heavy debt-service burden on the importing country, and excessive use of export credits can easily carry a developing country into debt-service crises which require debt rescheduling.

Although the ability of the poorer developing countries to buy the resources they need for development is limited by the availability of concessional assistance, the flow of official development assistance from the United States actually decreased 7 percent from 1963 to 1971. Other major donor nations have been increasing their programs; official development assistance from all other Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries more than doubled over the same period, and most OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries now carry a higher assistance burden than the United States when assistance is compared to donor-country GNP.

U.S. Exports to Poorest Developing Countries

We welcome these contributions to the development of the poorer countries, but we are also concerned about the implications of this situation for the present and future trade position of the United States in developing country markets. With concessional support too limited to support expanding exports and Eximbank unsuited to the circumstances of the poorest developing countries, the growth in U.S. exports to these countries has lagged. In 1972, they totaled only \$4.8 billion out of total U.S. exports of \$49.7 billion. The U.S. share of the import market in these countries was 17.3 percent, compared to 28.6 percent in countries in the \$375–\$1,000 GNP category. In 11 of the poorest LDC's, comprising 89 percent of the population of the non-Communist countries with per capita income below \$200, U.S. exports fell from \$1.7 billion in 1966 to \$1.2 billion in 1972. At the same time, these same countries increased their imports from the other major DAC donors from \$2.9 billion to \$4.3 billion.

This decline in U.S. exports contrasts sharply with an increase of 44 percent in U.S. exports to all LDC's over the 1966-72 period.

This means that other developed countries are developing markets, distribution networks, brand familiarity, and financial relationships that will induce additional exports over a period of years. Since even the poorest (per capita GNP under \$200) developing countries represent a market of 1 billion people, with average GNP increasing about 5 percent annually, this represents a significant market.

The EDCF is designed to remedy this lag in export growth. It will help U.S. exports by:

- Permitting the poorest developing countries to import more from the United States by increasing financing on terms they can afford to service. Since debt servicing is an increasingly important problem for the LDC's, their import capacity is severely constrained under conventional harder term export lending. It is this limitation on import-financing capacity which makes the new soft-term export credit fund an appropriate vehicle for supporting U.S. exports to these countries.

- Offering financing to many more poor developing countries. AID is restricted to just 20 countries outside Latin America under the Foreign Assistance Act.

- Encouraging U.S. exporters to cultivate potential markets.

- Facilitating U.S. entry into markets still dominated by traditional colonial trading patterns.

- Giving priority to commodities with a follow-on export potential.

- Expanding developing country markets through long-term economic growth.

The dollars flowing out under this program are to be 100 percent tied to U.S. exports. To the extent that Fund dollars result in additional U.S. exports—i.e., purchases from the United States the recipient nations would not otherwise have made—there is no addition to free reserves that could be used to repay loans from other sources. On the other

hand, if the Fund dollars were used to finance purchases from the United States that would have been made anyway, the dollars originally intended for that purpose are thereby freed for other uses such as debt repayment, imports from third countries, or reserve accumulation. It is highly likely that the activities of the Fund will generate exports that are fully additional to the level of exports that would have otherwise occurred.

Experience has indicated that in the case of AID commodity financing, additionality is on the order of 90 percent for all countries but is higher than this—approaching 100 percent—in the poorest LDC's. This is due to the fact that in the lowest per capita income countries the U.S. share of the market tends to be smaller than in more developed countries. The opportunity for substitution is therefore much less. In view of the low and declining U.S. share of the imports of these countries, their continued growing need for goods in which the United States is otherwise competitive, and the heavy dependence of these sales on concessional credits, it is reasonable to expect that the leakage of Fund dollars to other uses would be minimal.

New Development Resources

Simultaneously with promoting U.S. exports, the EDCF would make new development resources available to the developing countries. Over the initial life of the EDCF, the developing countries would receive a flow of developmentally oriented goods and services worth approximately \$2.7 billion repayable on soft terms over a long period of time. The importance of imported goods to the poorest developing countries cannot be over-emphasized. The majority of people in these countries are still engaged in agriculture, often subsistence agriculture. Most of these countries have only a few established industries, producing basic consumer goods such as cotton textiles, shoes, and some processed foods. Even such basic items as light bulbs must typically be imported. Virtually all developmental goods, such as machinery, trucks, construction equipment, and most spare parts, need to be imported.

The availability of financing is at present the chief constraint on the level of imports and consequently on the size of development programs. The developing countries are looking desperately for financing, and a number of them—including some of the poorest, which can ill afford it—have had to resort to borrowing on the Eurodollar market.

The initial lending volume for the Export Development Credit Fund would be well within the "import absorptive capacity" of the countries with per capita gross national product below \$375. If the Fund were to commence operations January 1, 1974, as proposed by the administration, the approximate average annual lending volume over the four-year period would be \$675 million. Although loans would probably not be extended to all of these countries by the Fund, data for these countries provide an illustrative basis for measuring absorptive capacity. The total merchandise imports of these 70 countries in 1972 were approximately \$30 billion. If "import absorptive capacity" is defined as capacity to utilize increased imports productively, there can be little doubt that the \$675 million average annual flow could be "absorbed," since it would constitute less than 3 percent of the existing import level.

The EDCF would not only make resources available to the poorest countries, but it would do so in a way which would promote the mature partnership which the United States seeks with the developing countries. We recognize that the ultimate responsibility for development planning and financial management rests with the developing countries. The United States cannot dictate priorities or oversee all aspects of development planning and implementation. The EDCF would make resources available, but within reasonable guidelines to prevent abuse, the initiative would rest with the borrowing countries to decide which programs are most important and to allocate resources accordingly. The EDCF would be more flexible and less encumbered by redtape than traditional aid approaches. We would expect that it would also require less oversight, minimizing management costs.

Policy Coordination and Operation of Fund

The Advisory Committee established by section 805 of S. 2335—consisting of the Secretaries of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture, the President of the Export-Import Bank, and the head of the agency primarily responsible for administration of the Fund—will provide overall policy coordination. The presence of the President of the Export-Import Bank on the Committee will insure that the policies governing the operation of the Fund are consistent and compatible with the policies and activities of the Export-Import Bank.

Specific policies governing loan criteria and Fund operations would be set forth through the Advisory Committee, and these policies would be designed to insure that loans made by the Fund not infringe upon or compete with credit financing offered by the Export-Import Bank. These procedures could include, for example, an administrative mechanism to avoid Fund financing in cases where Exim financing is appropriate. In practice, the activities of the Fund should not conflict with those of the Bank since the Fund would operate primarily in the poorest of the LDC's—where Exim exposure is limited—and for the financing of development programs which do not obtain Exim financing.

In regard to coordination with AID activities, it is the current intention of the administration to lodge operating responsibilities for the Fund in that Agency. Because the Fund is to serve important export promotion objectives requiring flexibility and a swift response capability, detailed advance programming of Fund resources is not contemplated. However, AID, in the context of its overall economic assistance activities, would include consideration of the Fund's actual and contemplated commercial credits to a particular country in order to take into account the total flow of U.S. resources into that country.

Lending is contemplated, depending on circumstances, through government-to-government agreements, via intermediate credit

institutions, or directly to private borrowers. Credit judgments will be made in terms of the ability of the borrowing country to service the additional debt and the economics of the particular project. Factors involved in evaluating debt-servicing ability of an LDC include current level of debt, future debt-servicing burden, potential for earning foreign exchange, and possibility for economic growth and economic stability.

It is presumed as an initial matter that EDCF financing would not be extended to Communist countries and countries with whom the United States has no diplomatic relations. Within the \$375 category, general guidelines will be established to insure that the benefits of this program are not totally absorbed by a few countries and that special consideration will in fact be given to the very poor with per capita incomes under \$200 who can least afford the harder Exim terms. Exports financed by the Fund will be screened through simplified operational procedures to insure their consistency with developmental needs, promotion of U.S. markets, and U.S. employment objectives. The objective is to prevent abuse and misallocation of EDCF funds while at the same time avoiding the adoption of extensive and burdensome rules and requirements.

With regard to development, goods will be selected with an eye toward increasing the production capacity of the recipient country. Luxury goods and frivolous items of course will be excluded. With regard to export promotion, the emphasis will be on goods which require follow-on procurement, which would not otherwise be purchased from the United States, and which establish new markets.

The Congress will receive a detailed plan for the Fund before it begins operations. We would like to suggest a modification of the legislation in this regard, to permit the Fund to begin operations on January 1, 1974, or 60 days after submission of a plan of implementation, whichever last occurs. The administration would submit the plan of implementation on or shortly after November 1, 1973. We feel that it is important to establish the Fund and allow it to begin

operations as soon as possible, since there will inevitably be a slow startup period. With an earlier beginning date, we would be better prepared to submit requests for any needed legislative changes with the submission for FY 1976 authorizing legislation. If the Fund's effective date is not advanced from July 1, 1974, the actual startup of the Fund may be further delayed until action is completed on fiscal year 1975 budget requests, and the Fund would not be able to actually start lending operations until quite late in 1974. We feel that the purposes of the Fund can be better achieved with an earlier starting date.

If these principles are followed, and sound lending procedures with minimal essential controls are devised, the EDCF can simultaneously achieve its twin goals of export promotion and development assistance. We feel sure these conditions can be met and the Export Development Credit Fund can become a valuable addition to our foreign policy instruments.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

- Audit of the Export-Import Bank of the United States for Fiscal Year 1972. Communication from Comptroller General of the United States. H. Doc. 93-94. May 1, 1973. 37 pp.
- Audit of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation for Fiscal Year 1972. Letter from Comptroller General of the United States. H. Doc. 93-115. June 14, 1973. 36 pp.
- Committee on Internal Security. Annual report for the year 1972, together with supplemental views. H. Rept. 93-301. June 21, 1973. 193 pp.
- Extension of Existing Suspension of Duty on Certain Istle. Report to accompany H.R. 2261. H. Rept. 93-306. June 21, 1973. 3 pp.
- Suspension of Duties on Certain Forms of Copper. Reports to accompany H.R. 2323. H. Rept. 93-307; June 21, 1973; 5 pp. S. Rept. 93-313; July 13, 1973; 5 pp.
- Extension of Existing Suspension of Duty on Metal Scrap. Reports to accompany H.R. 2324. H. Rept. 93-308; June 21, 1973; 3 pp. S. Rept. 93-314; July 13, 1973; 3 pp.
- U.S. Oceans Policy. Report to accompany S. Res. 82. S. Rept. 93-296. June 29, 1973. 6 pp.

Department Supports Repeal of Legislation Permitting Imports of Rhodesian Chrome

Following are statements made on September 6 before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by John Scali, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.¹

AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 75 dated September 6

Mr. Chairman [Senator Hubert H. Humphrey], members of the committee: I would like to express my appreciation for the opportunity you have afforded me to speak to you about a matter that has been of great concern to me practically since the day I was sworn in as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations. The decision to permit the importation of chrome and certain other materials from Southern Rhodesia is a serious issue in our foreign relations. This is true not only as regards the United Nations. It affects our dealings with nearly all of Africa and the many other nations who feel strongly about the situation in Southern Rhodesia or, for that matter, about the rule of law in international affairs.

In November of 1971, when the U.S. Congress considered and passed section 503 of the Military Procurement Act, the Department of State expressed its conviction that this step would seriously prejudice important U.S. foreign policy interests. Now, almost two years later, we have abundant evidence on which to evaluate this prediction. We also have considerable data on the results section 503 has had in the economic and security areas which were of concern to its sponsors.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

I would suggest that the Congress is now in a good position to weigh the benefits and costs of section 503 and decide whether to keep this legislation.

First, I would like to discuss the positive side, the benefits the United States has received as a result of section 503. It won't surprise you to learn that I believe these benefits to be limited, but it may surprise you to learn how limited they really have been.

The principal commodity of concern to the sponsors of section 503 was chrome ore. The argument for the passage of this legislation was that the importation of Southern Rhodesian chrome ore would reduce our dependence on Soviet sources for this strategic material and at the same time lower the price of that commodity to U.S. importers.

Events since January 1973 demonstrate that these arguments, valid as they may have seemed in the abstract, have not stood up. Chrome is far from being a material in short supply; the U.S. Government now feels sufficiently confident as to the long-range availability of chrome ore to propose to the Congress the disposition of over 80 percent of our present stockpile. In this regard, the defense-related need for chrome constitutes only about 10 percent of the chrome ore processed in the United States each year. Further, adequate quantities to meet all of the U.S. defense needs are available from Turkey, Iran, and South Africa.

Nor has access to Rhodesian chrome ore been a significant factor in the pricing of that commodity. A reduction in the price of Soviet chrome ore has been cited by some defenders of section 503 as a direct consequence of our imports of Rhodesian ore. In actuality, a drastic decrease in our total imports of chrome ore probably had more to do with the

price cut. In any case, shipments from Rhodesia have only totaled 2,277 tons this year, and in 1972 constituted only 8.7 percent of our chrome ore imports.

Direct Economic Costs

So much for the benefits of section 503. Now with your permission I would like to discuss the costs the United States pays for keeping it on the books.

First, there have been direct economic costs. For, oddly enough, despite the very limited amount of material we import from Southern Rhodesia, this trade has had an impact on certain sectors of the American economy. Under section 503, the United States is importing from Rhodesia not only raw materials but also certain semifinished products—ferrochrome, in particular—which are also processed in this country. Imports of this product into the United States are rising rapidly. A large portion of this increase is coming from Southern Rhodesia, which accounted for 36 percent of our imports of ferrochrome so far this year. I understand that several U.S. firms, Foote Mineral of Steubenville, Ohio, Airco Alloys of Charleston, South Carolina, and Ohio Ferro Alloys of Brilliant, Ohio, now find that they are suffering serious losses as a result of the importation of Rhodesian products. Foote Mineral is having to close its plant, an installation which now employs 307 workers. Ohio Ferro Alloys is being forced to cease the production of ferrochrome altogether, and Airco Alloys is concerned about the effect imports of Rhodesian chrome will have on its business.

American labor generally and the United Steelworkers of America in particular opposed the Byrd provision when originally introduced. Shipments of Rhodesian products under the provision have been picketed by the International Longshoremen's Association. Demonstrations and boycotts have accompanied the arrival of ships carrying Rhodesian products.

I can speak to you from personal experience about the effect which section 503 of the 1971 Military Procurement Act is having on

our foreign relations. Unquestionably in the international arena we are paying a price far out of proportion to the benefits which section 503 has brought, or might ever bring, our country.

The U.S. importation of Rhodesian goods under section 503 has become an extremely serious issue in our relations with African countries. Mr. Newsom will be able to provide the committee with the benefit of his firsthand observations in this regard. I can state, however, that action has taken on a symbolic importance to the Africans far out of proportion to the minuscule amount of trade involved. We must recognize that the problem of the minority-dominated regimes of southern Africa is the number-one foreign policy concern of the rest of that continent.

The United States shares this concern, but we also believe that the world community has a limited capacity to affect the situation in southern Africa and that it can best use its influence by promoting peaceful change. We have tried to persuade others to share this view. Unfortunately, however, the force of our arguments on this subject has been weakened considerably as a result of the passage of section 503. Our ability to counsel moderation in the pursuit of change in southern Africa has been severely hampered.

I am well aware that one of the principal reasons why section 503 passed was concern on the part of many in both Houses of the Congress over what was seen as blatant hypocrisy in the application of sanctions by the world community. Rhodesian trade appeared to be proceeding normally except with a small number of nations like ourselves who followed through with laws and regulations to back up the U.N. resolution. Since passage of section 503, when criticized in the United Nations for our imports from Rhodesia we have repeatedly pointed out the injustice of the exaggerated attention given to our trade while the other 95 percent of Rhodesian trade was ignored. We have also called for practical steps to plug up the holes in the sanctions program.

Some of our argumentation seems to have actually convinced our fellow members of the

need to tighten up the program. In response to a directive from the Security Council, the Council's Sanctions Committee on April 15, 1973, produced an agreed report on new ways to improve sanctions. The Security Council later endorsed the report in a resolution for which I was unable to vote because it called upon us to repeal section 503.²

One of the side effects of a better sanctions program will be to highlight our imports as others are seen to be moving finally to repair gaps in sanctions. Unless sanctions end or the effects of section 503 are removed, I can see ahead only a continuing cycle of difficulties for ourselves with the Security Council.

Effect on Issues Before the U.N.

The effects of section 503 extend well beyond our relations with Africa. In issue after issue before the United Nations, we are finding it increasingly difficult to marshal the votes necessary to sustain our position. Quite frankly, if we are not to encounter major setbacks on items of much greater concern to our country than Rhodesian chrome, we must have many of those 41 African votes. At the moment, the feeling in many African governments is that if the United States is going to take a position detrimental to their interests on an item of little concern to us but of great importance to them, they will do the same to us when they get the opportunity. Such an attitude is likely to result not only in blocking constructive international action on such problems as terrorism or the environment. It may cause the United Nations to adopt measures positively prejudicial to our interests. I am not speaking here about esoteric resolutions of only academic interest. I am talking about actions with effects in the real world.

Only last week a committee of the United Nations passed a mischievous resolution on Puerto Rico. Several of the swing votes on this committee were those of African states, who were moved in part by their resentment against the United States.

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1973, p. 40.

A dramatic shift in voting patterns will not follow immediately upon passage of S. 1868. The situation is too complicated for that to happen. Nevertheless, passage of this bill will substantially clear the atmosphere in our dealings with many other U.N. members and give us a better chance for persuading others to accept our point of view on many vital questions.

The African states are not the only ones concerned about America's importation of Rhodesian goods. The British Government has impressed on us their conviction that the repeal of section 503 would help bring an acceptable negotiated solution to the Rhodesian impasse.

Other nations, regardless of their feelings as concerns southern Africa, can only be alarmed over the challenge to international law, to the sanctity of treaties, and to the concept of collective security offered by section 503 of the 1971 Military Procurement Act.

International Legal Implications

The United States signed, and this Senate consented to, the Charter of the United Nations. In doing so, we voluntarily and knowingly undertook a commitment to comply with binding decisions of the Security Council. We did not reserve the right to comply only if everyone else did nor to review and reject Security Council decisions unilaterally. We could undertake this commitment in relative confidence, secure in the knowledge that under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council could not make a binding decision without the compliance of the United States.

We have not in this instance lived up to our commitment. The United States, rightly, I believe, voted for the Security Council resolution which imposed mandatory sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. In permitting the importation of certain categories of Rhodesian products, we have, for what at the time appeared to be overriding reasons of the national interest, put ourselves in contradiction with the terms of that resolution, our treaty obligations, and our obligations under international law.

Gentlemen, I take no pleasure in calling into question any act of the U.S. Congress. On the contrary, I have always been the first to defend the policy of my government, no matter whether the policy may have originated in the executive or the legislative branch. I assure you I will continue to do so regardless of the decision the Congress makes in this matter.

However, now is a time for stocktaking. In balancing the pros and cons of retaining section 503 in effect, I feel you should consider its impact on the U.S. image, at home and abroad. You should consider its impact on the general tenor of international relations. I would be less than frank and less than responsive to your needs if I did not put before you the conclusions that I and my advisers have reluctantly arrived at concerning the international legal implications of section 503.

I do not question the authority of Congress to act as it did. The administration has had its case sustained in the courts that the Congress has the authority by subsequent legislation to modify or suspend treaties and that section 503 should be interpreted as such a modification. It is, however, a unilateral modification of a collective decision or agreement; and we should consider very carefully whether this is a practice we would want, by our example, to encourage.

The U.S. Government and the American people have long stood for the rule of law in international affairs. I believe that they continue to feel this commitment to international law. I believe that our actions resulting from section 503 are a limited and temporary aberration. If it is not, if our conduct represents a settled, confirmed U.S. policy, then we are going to find it increasingly difficult to convince others to live up to their legal obligations, whether these obligations be to compensate expropriated U.S. firms or to suppress international terrorism. We could find that America's friends begin to doubt the dependability of an ally that is willing to disregard its obligations under a treaty central to the whole concept of collective security, as is the U.N. Charter. And we may find that other nations, many of

which do not even have a vote in the Security Council, will be disinclined to obey its decisions when we, who have the veto, will not.

I know it seems difficult to realize that an issue of such minor import in the United States, a piece of legislation so trivial in comparison with the many generous actions this Congress has taken on behalf of nations in Africa and elsewhere, could assume so much significance in so many other countries. Even in terms of the Rhodesian economy, that country's exports to the United States are not large. However, the psychological boost given the [Ian] Smith regime by passage of section 503 should not be underestimated.

Paradoxically, it is just the limited nature of U.S. interest in this matter that so frustrates our friends abroad and leads them to misconstrue our motives. Many foreign diplomats and observers might be prepared to understand, if not to applaud, a U.S. violation of the Rhodesian sanctions if in so doing we were securing important benefits for our economy or our security. The apparent fact that section 503 is of no great benefit to either leads these people to believe that the economic and security arguments under which this legislation is defended are specious. The conclusion many reach is that the real intent of Congress in passing this legislation was to lend aid and assistance to the Smith regime and to help perpetuate minority rule throughout southern Africa.

We know that this is not the case. We know that section 503 was passed in the sincere belief that there were important economic and security issues at stake. We now also know that the economic and security impact of section 503 was greatly overestimated, that its repeal would cost the United States little and benefit it greatly. And, finally, we know that the American people's commitment to international law, and to the orderly settlement of contentious issues through the United Nations and other international forums, remains intact. In passing S. 1868 you will convince others of these facts. You will in doing so restore the traditional image of the United States, an image in which the American people have always taken a just pride.

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to follow my distinguished colleague Ambassador Scali and to speak on this very important measure introduced by you to place the United States once again in full compliance with its international obligations.

As Ambassador Scali has indicated, we fully support S. 1868 to halt the import of Rhodesian chrome and other materials. We consider the sanctions program a legal commitment under the U.N. Charter and see it clearly as a measure necessary to bring about an equitable and peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem. The Africans feel keenly about our lapses in observance of sanctions because they feel that our move has a particularly strong influence since we, the United States, did it. Whatever may be the feelings of various segments of our population toward the regime in Rhodesia and toward the sanctions program, it should be recognized by all that a settlement is in everyone's interest. All Rhodesians would welcome a resolution of the problem, and all would benefit by it. We believe our compliance with sanctions is a vital element in contributing to pressure for a settlement. This is also the single most important current irritant in our relations with African countries.

The African nations themselves often observe sanctions in spite of real economic costs to them. Zambia recently discontinued use of the Rhodesian Railways and is involved in a costly rerouting of its trade. Other countries boycott Rhodesia entirely and forgo any trade. The net effect of sanctions in eight years has admittedly not forced the Smith regime to make a settlement, but economically it has inhibited growth in an economy which was booming prior to UDI [unilateral declaration of independence].

But more importantly, not one country has formally recognized Rhodesia in those eight years. Neither Portugal nor South Africa has extended diplomatic recognition.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, our economic interests in certain African countries have grown significantly in the past few years.

A case in point is Nigeria, where direct American investment now approaches \$1 billion and which has become an important source of America's imported petroleum. Nigeria, under General Gowon, is assuming an important role in Africa and feels particularly strongly about southern African issues. As economic interests expand, the frequency of our diplomatic contacts in these countries inevitably increases. More and more we are finding that as we approach them—even when our approaches are on strictly bilateral issues of mutual interest—we are being subjected to criticism for our failure to abide by our international obligations with regard to Rhodesia.

We are told that our position on chrome is a deliberate political affront in disregard of African public opinion, a persuasive illustration of U.S. disinterest in Africa, and an obvious diminution of America's interest in the United Nations. One African leader has charged that the United States had opted for money, investment, and the will to save a white minority regime over simple morality and humanity and therefore that the United States cannot be trusted on southern African issues. There is no doubt that the chrome issue has affected the attitude toward us in many African countries. This can directly affect our economic and commercial interests.

Over and above individual protests, the United States has been strongly condemned at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meetings for our chrome imports under the Byrd provision. Resolutions called upon the United States in particular to end its "flagrant violation of sanctions" and expressed concern for the deleterious effects our actions could have for the enforcement of sanctions on a worldwide basis. Speaking at the close of the 1972 meeting, the President of the OAU, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, said the lesson to be drawn from this situation is that the great Western Powers seem to prefer to follow their immediate interests rather than long-term interests and international conscience. These, of course, were in addition to the condemnations received in U.N. forums and in other international meetings and conferences. Our position makes us

vulnerable to attack from all quarters.

In Britain, where the responsibility for Rhodesia lies, we have also received widespread criticism for our breach of sanctions. In Parliament this spring the Foreign Minister reported that he had made representations to the United States on our imports of goods under the Byrd provision. We are being accused of contracting out of our obligations in the United Nations. We have only been able to respond that we are unable to prohibit these importations.

To appreciate the problem, we must try to understand how our actions on the Byrd provision look historically to Africans. In 1971, U.K. efforts to reach a political settlement with the Rhodesian regime seemed on the verge of success. Rhodesia was suffering from the effect of sanctions and appeared ready to come to an agreement. At that point, the Byrd provision, although unrelated to these specific events, looked to the African like a deliberate attempt to frustrate a settlement. Again in 1972, when the attempt to repeal the Byrd provision was defeated, the Africans in Rhodesia were in the midst of their repudiation of the proposals agreed to by Smith and British Foreign and Commonwealth Minister [Sir Alec] Douglas-Home. Africans interpreted the failure of the repeal as U.S. indifference if not a direct slap to the African majority in Rhodesia. Now, under pressure of sanctions, there again appears to be some stirring toward settlement, this time internally between the Smith regime and the African parties in Rhodesia. Repeal of the Byrd provision now could have critical influence on movement toward agreement by demonstrating U.S. interest, sympathy, and support for a fair solution. Conversely, another defeat in the Congress of an effort to repeal could give heart to those in Rhodesia who want no accommodation of any sort with the African majority.

Within Rhodesia and in the rest of the world, people are keenly aware of past attempts to repeal the Byrd provision. All will be watching closely the results of this effort. While we are not unmindful of the complex problems for all Rhodesians, we genuinely believe that unless a solution takes into ac-

count the rights and aspirations of the African majority, the present situation in Rhodesia will continue as a festering international problem. As the level of violence in Rhodesia and around its borders increases, it becomes ever more vital that the search for solution be fostered by steadfastness of the international community in enforcing sanctions. We would hope that the deliberations of this committee will result in passage of the proposed legislation and demonstrate our commitment to self-determination and racial equality in Africa and our readiness to fulfill our international obligations.

Special Meeting Called To Discuss Fisheries Off U.S. Atlantic Coast

*Department Announcement*¹

The United States has communicated its willingness to participate in a special meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) to be held at Ottawa October 15-19. The special ICNAF meeting will deal with critical fisheries conservation problems off the Atlantic coast of the United States, problems which were not resolved at the annual meeting of ICNAF which was held at Copenhagen in June.

U.S. agreement to the special meeting was conveyed in personal letters in late August from then-Secretary of State William P. Rogers to the Foreign Ministers of the 15 other members of ICNAF. In doing so, Secretary Rogers expressed his deep concern over the special aspect of the current global imbalance in the demand for and supply of food commodities, particularly protein, with respect to the substantial declines in the fisheries resources off our Atlantic coast. In 1972 the total fishing effort in this region was approximately 45 percent above the level permissible to assure maximum sustainable yields over the long run. Research vessel surveys indicate that since 1967 the finfish population in the region has declined by more than 65 per-

¹ Issued on Sept. 13 (press release 329).

cent. The popular haddock has been fished virtually to extinction, and the once very abundant herring populations have been reduced by some 95 percent.

Secretary Rogers called the fisheries situation in the Northwest Atlantic a "crisis" and expressed the hope that the relationship between this crisis and the importance of assuring an adequate and orderly global supply of food commodities is taken fully into account at the special ICNAF meeting.

At the same time, Secretary Rogers also expressed his full agreement with the expressions of concern conveyed to him by Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent in a recent letter about the problems of conservation of our fish stocks in the face of failure of ICNAF to adopt adequate controls. The National Marine Fisheries Service is part of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Ambassador Donald L. McKernan, Coordinator of Ocean Affairs and Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of State, recalled that the level of agreement which could have been reached at the June ICNAF meeting would not even halt the declines in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries which we have been experiencing since the midsixties. The United States had insisted that the declines be halted and that a restoration program be started. He emphasized that this remains the goal for the October special meeting. "Not only is this essential to insure a continuation of this important contribution to the global supply of protein," he said, "but it is essential to the restoration of economic stability to the hard-pressed American fishing industry and the well-being of the countless American sport fishermen." In the face of ever-increasing foreign fishing effort, U.S. catches in the ICNAF area have fallen from over 500,000 metric tons of fish per year in the 1950's before the intensive foreign fisheries commenced in the region off the U.S. coast to less than half that amount in 1972.

ICNAF members are Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the Soviet

Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All significant fisheries in the region off the U.S. coast are conducted by members of ICNAF except that of the German Democratic Republic, which conducts a large fishery in the region. The GDR has not yet become a member of ICNAF, but the United States favors such membership.

Senate Asked To Approve Customs Convention on Transit of Goods

*Message From President Nixon*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Customs Convention on the International Transit of Goods (ITI Convention) opened for signature at Vienna June 7, 1971.

For the information of the Senate, I am also transmitting the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

The Convention is designed to meet the present need to facilitate international transport while, at the same time, providing the customs control arrangements necessary for such transport. The Convention provides for new, uniform control and documentation procedures which carriers of Governments party to the Convention would be able to use at their option.

The Convention would help open the way for United States exporters and carriers to benefit in Western Europe and other markets of the world from the simplified and uniform procedures for which it provides.

I recommend that the Convention be given early and favorable consideration by the Senate.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 23, 1973.*

¹ Transmitted on July 23 (White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. P, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the convention and the report of the Department of State.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences¹

Scheduled October Through December

OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	Oct. 1
OECD Informal Meeting on Proteins	Paris	Oct. 1-3
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Grains: 16th Session	Rome	Oct. 1-5
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions	Rome	Oct. 1-5
CCC Permanent Technical Committee: 81st and 82d Sessions	Brussels	Oct. 1-5
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 61st Statutory Meeting.	Lisbon	Oct. 1-10
ECE/RID Joint Meeting of the Safety Committee and Group of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Oct. 1-12
NATO Group of Experts on the Middle East	Brussels	Oct. 2-5
ICAO Review of General Concept of Separation Panel: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 2-19
International Rubber Study Group	London	Oct. 3-5
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Brussels	Oct. 3-5
FAO Advisory Committee of Experts on Statistics: 6th Session	Rome	Oct. 3-11
GATT Working Group on Quantitative Restrictions	Geneva	Oct. 4-5
NATO Group of Experts on Maghreb	Brussels	Oct. 8
OECD Maritime Transport Committee Ad Hoc Group on Flags	Paris	Oct. 8
GATT Working Party on the Tariff Study	Geneva	Oct. 8-12
UNHCR Executive Committee: 25th Session	Geneva	Oct. 8-16
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 48th Session	Rome	Oct. 8-19
PAHO: 22d Meeting of the Directing Council of PAHO; 25th Meeting of the Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas.	Washington	Oct. 8-19
WMO Commission on Special Applications of Meteorology and Climatology: 6th Session.	Bad Hamburg	Oct. 8-20
IMCO International Conference on Marine Pollution	London	Oct. 8-Nov. 2
NATO Disarmament Experts	Brussels	Oct. 9-10
ISVS Council: 15th Session	Geneva	Oct. 10-11
ECE Working Party on Rail Transport	Geneva	Oct. 10-12
ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians: 12th Meeting.	Geneva	Oct. 10-16
FAO North and Latin American Regional Meeting Industry Cooperative Program.	Washington	Oct. 12
GATT Budget Committee	Geneva	Oct. 15
UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 6th Session	Geneva	Oct. 15-16
U.N. Economic and Social Council: Resumed 55th Session	New York	Oct. 15-18
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution	Geneva	Oct. 15-19
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning	Geneva	Oct. 15-26

¹ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on September 14, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period October-December 1973. Nongovernmental conferences are not included.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; EC, European Community; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IATC, Inter-American Travel Congresses; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ISVS, International Secretariat for Volunteer Service; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; NEA, Nuclear Energy Agency; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; RID, European Convention on Transport of Dangerous Goods by Rail; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNIDROIT, International Institute for Unification of Private Law; WHO, World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled October Through December—Continued

U.N. Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Far East: 7th Meeting.	Tokyo	Oct. 15-27
OECD Environment Committee	Paris	Oct. 16-17
CCC Valuation Committee: 62d Session	Brussels	Oct. 16-26
UNIDROIT Diplomatic Conference on Uniform Law on the Form of Wills.	Washington	Oct. 16-27
OECD Development Assistance Committee	Paris	Oct. 18-19
GATT Working Group on Export Subsidies	Geneva	Oct. 18-19
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 12th Meeting	Lima	Oct. 18-25
GATT Working Party on the India/Yugoslavia/Egypt Tripartite Agreement.	Geneva	Oct. 22-24
WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty Interim Committee	Tokyo	Oct. 22-27
ICAO All Weather Operations Panel: 5th Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 22-Nov. 2
NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society	Brussels	Oct. 23-24
OECD Ad Hoc Expert Group on Statistical and Methodological Problems in the Public Sector.	Paris	Oct. 24-26
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee	Geneva	Oct. 25-26
International Institute for Cotton	New Delhi	Oct. 26-27
GATT Trade and Development Committee	Geneva	Oct. 29-30
OECD/NEA Governmental Experts on Third-Party Liability in the Nuclear Field.	Paris	Oct. 29-31
UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign To Save the Monuments of Nubia: 22d Session.	Egypt	Oct. 29-31
UNCTAD Committee on Tungsten: 7th Session	Geneva	Oct. 29-Nov. 2
UNCTAD Preparatory Committee on a Convention on Intermodal Transport.	Geneva	Oct. 29-Nov. 2
International Cotton Advisory Council: 32d Plenary Meeting	New Delhi	Oct. 29-Nov. 3
ICAO North Atlantic Ocean Stations Committee: 8th Meeting	Paris	Oct. 30-Nov. 16
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committees: 38th Plenary Session.	Rome	October
OECD Consumer Policy Committee	Paris	October
UNCTAD Working Group on Rules of Origin	Geneva	October
UNESCO Directing Council/International Geological Correlation Program.	Paris	October
PAHO Executive Committee: 71st Meeting	Washington	October
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Cocoa Sub-Group on Statistics	Rome	October or November
FAO Intergovernmental Group of the World Food Program	Undetermined	October or November
WMO Tropical Experiment Board: 5th Session	Geneva	October or November
GATT Working Group on Import Documentation and Consular Formalities.	Geneva	Nov. 1-2
2d U.N. ECOSOC Asian Population Conference	Tokyo	Nov. 1-15
UNESCO/IOC Executive Council: 3d Meeting	Paris	Nov. 2-3
GATT Working Party on Packaging and Labeling	Geneva	Nov. 5-6
ILO Governing Body: 191st Session	Geneva	Nov. 5-6
FAO Council: 61st Session	Rome	Nov. 5-8
ECE Inland Transport Committee Group of Experts on Road Traffic.	Geneva	Nov. 5-9
GATT Textiles Committee	Geneva	Nov. 5-9
2d Inter-American Conference on Cooperatives	Santiago	Nov. 5-9
UNIDROIT Committee of Governmental Experts on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways.	Rome	Nov. 5-9
WIPO/Strasbourg Agreement Joint Ad Hoc Committee on International Patent Classification.	Geneva	Nov. 5-9
UNESCO World Science Information System Steering Committee: 1st Session.	Paris	Nov. 5-9
International Lead and Zinc Study Group	Geneva	Nov. 5-14
UNESCO/IOC: 8th Assembly	Paris	Nov. 5-17
NATO Joint Communications/Electronics Committee	Brussels	Nov. 6-7
NATO Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial Meeting	Brussels	Nov. 6-7

ICAO Automated Data Interchange Systems Panel	Montreal	Nov. 6-23
GATT Council	Geneva	Nov. 7
OECD Environment Committee Urban Environment Sector Group	Paris	Nov. 7-9
GATT Working Party on the EC/Norway Agreement	Geneva	Nov. 8-9
OECD Executive Committee in Special Session	Paris	Nov. 8-9
International Committee of the Red Cross: 22d All State Meeting	Tehran	Nov. 8-15
FAO Conference: 17th Session	Rome	Nov. 10-29
ECE Inland Transport Committee Group of Experts on Construc- tion of Vehicles.	Bangkok	Nov. 12-16
International Coffee Organization	London	Nov. 12-16
GATT Contracting Parties	Geneva	Nov. 12-23
ICAO Assembly: 8th Session	London	Nov. 12-25
UNCTAD Conference on Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences .	Geneva	Nov. 12-Dec. 14
Conference on Conservation of Polar Bears	Oslo	Nov. 13-15
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	Nov. 19
ECE/RID Joint Meeting on Transport of Dangerous Goods . . .	Geneva	Nov. 19-23
ECAFE Typhoon Committee	Bangkok	Nov. 19-26
WIPO and Paris Union Administrative Meetings	Geneva	Nov. 19-27
WMO Commission for Atmospheric Sciences: 6th Session . . .	Versailles	Nov. 19-30
International Wheat Council	London	Nov. 23
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 27th Session (Re- sumed).	Geneva	Nov. 26-27
ECE Working Group on Inland Transport	Geneva	Nov. 26-30
2d UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of European States.	Bucharest	Nov. 26-Dec. 1
UNESCO Government Experts To Review the Applications of Agreements on Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials.	Geneva	Nov. 26-Dec. 3
ILO African Regional Conference: 4th Session	Nairobi	Nov. 26-Dec. 7
ICAO Obstacle Clearance Panel: 4th Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 26-Dec. 7
Colombo Plan Consultative Committee	Wellington	Nov. 27-Dec. 6
ICEM Executive Committee: 44th Session	Geneva	Nov. 29-30
WMO Regional Association IV: 6th Session	Guatemala	Nov. 29-Dec. 7
FAO Council: 62d Session	Rome	Nov. 30
Inter-American Permanent Executive Committee of the Council for Education, Science, and Culture: 7th Meeting.	Washington	November
UNESCO Government Experts on the International Recognition of Higher Education Studies and Diplomas in Latin America and the Caribbean.	Santiago	November
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	November
U.N. Organizational Session of the Law of the Sea Conference: 3d Session.	New York	November
OECD Consumer Policy Committee	Paris	November
Hague Conference Commission on Bankruptcy	The Hague	November
Hague Conference Commission on Evidence in Criminal Matters .	The Hague	November
ICEM Council: 36th Session	Geneva	Dec. 3-5
GATT Textiles Committee	Geneva	Dec. 3-7
ECE Inland Transport Committee Working Party on Road Trans- port.	Geneva	Dec. 3-7
IMCO Legal Committee: 21st Session	London	Dec. 3-7
Technical Conference on Fishery Products	Tokyo	Dec. 4-11
FAO Executive Committee of the Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Eastern Region of Its Distribution Area in Southwest Asia: 8th Session.	Rome	Dec. 5-7
IATC Technical Committee on Travel Promotion: 6th Meeting .	Argentina	Dec. 5-7
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 12th Ordinary Session.	Paris	Dec. 5-11
NATO: 52d Council Meeting at Ministerial Level	Brussels	Dec. 10-11
FAO Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Eastern Region of Its Distribution Area in Southwest Asia: 9th Session.	Rome	Dec. 10-13
FAO Codex Alimentarius Committee on Food Additives: 9th Session.	Netherlands	Dec. 10-14
IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications	London	Dec. 10-14
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety of Motor Coaches and Buses.	Geneva	Dec. 10-14
UNESCO Regional Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Asia.	Jogjakarta	Dec. 10-20

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled October Through December—Continued

WIPO Technical Coordination Committee for International Cooperation in Information Retrieval Among Patent Offices.	Geneva	Dec. 10-21
GATT Balance of Payments Committee	Geneva	Dec. 10-21
ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians	New Delhi	Dec. 10-22
ECE Ad Hoc Meeting on Problems Relating to Transport by Ship Borne Barge.	Geneva	Dec. 17-21
IMCO Subcommittee on Standards and Training of Watchkeeping: 3d Session.	London	Dec. 17-21
OECD Consumer Policy Committee	Paris	Dec. 18-20
UNCTAD/FAO Consultations on Hides and Skins	Geneva	December
UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for Cooperative Investigations in the Mediterranean.	Monaco or Malta	December
ICAO Facilitation Division Area Meeting	Rome	December
WIPO Committee of Experts on Patent Licensing	Geneva	December
WIPO Committee of Experts on International Classification for Designs and Committee on Locarno Agreement.	Geneva	December
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 9th Annual Meeting.	Undetermined	December

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668.

Acceptance deposited: Mali, September 7, 1973.

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6584). Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973.¹

Acceptance deposited: Kenya, August 15, 1973.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 27, 1973.

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of

that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 27, 1973.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 27, 1973.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.

Accession deposited: Ethiopia, August 6, 1973.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptances deposited: Kenya, August 22, 1973; Zaire, August 16, 1973.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for signature at Washington March 29 through May 3, 1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with respect to other provisions; for the United States July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.

Accession deposited: Malta, September 11, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to September 10 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 324 of September 7.

No.	Date	Subject
325	9/11	U.S. note to Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Sept. 10.
*326	9/12	Law of the Sea Advisory Committee, Sept. 21-22.
*327	9/12	Advisory Committee to U.S. Section, International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Sept. 24-25.
*328	9/12	Study group 7 of U.S. National Committee for CCIR, Sept. 27.
329	9/13	U.S. agrees to special ICNAF meeting, Oct. 15-19.
*330	9/14	Program for official visit of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan.
†331	9/14	U.S. statement on signing of Lao protocols.
*332	9/14	Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Kearney, Neb., Oct. 11.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXIX

• No. 1789 •

October 8, 1973

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF GATT AGREES ON FRAMEWORK FOR MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

Ministerial Meeting of GATT Agrees on Framework for Multilateral Trade Negotiations

The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) met at ministerial level at Tokyo September 12-14. Following is a statement made before the Contracting Parties on September 12 by Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz, head of the U.S. delegation, together with the text of a declaration approved unanimously on September 14.

STATEMENT BY TREASURY SECRETARY SHULTZ

Department of the Treasury press release

This is a historic meeting, and I am honored to participate in it. We join here in the first formal step toward a major expansion and improvement of global trading relationships. While these negotiations build upon what has been achieved in the past, in the Kennedy Round and earlier, they are also a bold step beyond our past. Our present undertaking is broader in scope, more ambitious in objective, and guided by a clearer view of economic and political realities.

I was told before I came that Tokyo would be the occasion for many speeches on the benefits of open international trade. I expect that will be true. And I consider it entirely appropriate that it should be true. As we embark upon a course of negotiations to last for many months and involving details of endless complexity, we should remind ourselves of the principles that should underlie our efforts. However obvious these principles may seem to us, the process of putting them into practice has always been difficult and is far from complete.

The basic principle that brings us here is simple and needs no great elaboration. When

there is voluntary exchange, both parties—the buyer and the seller—gain. If they did not, one party or the other would refuse to exchange. This principle is as valid when the parties are in different countries as when they are in the same country. Obstacles that governments place in the way of trade, internally or externally, prevent people from doing business that would be beneficial to all participants.

What is involved is more than one country trading what it produces most efficiently today for what another country produces most efficiently today. Open trade forces and stimulates all of us to become more efficient. The wind of foreign competition drives businesses in all countries to more innovation, greater research and development efforts, and better adaptation to the wants of consumers.

Our generation has more cause to recognize the force of these ideas than any before us. We have been living through the greatest and most widely shared economic advance in world history and the greatest expansion of international trade. This combination of developments is of course no coincidence.

The growth of world output has contributed to the rise of trade, but the rise of trade has also contributed to the growth of world output. Greater access to markets has promoted specialization in production and thereby the better use of each country's resources. Competitive pressure from foreign firms has stimulated the growth of technology and business acumen.

As a result of greater openness in the world economy, economic opportunities have been substantially broadened for the citizens

President Nixon Outlines U.S. Objectives in Trade Negotiations

Following is a statement by President Nixon issued on September 8.

White House press release dated September 8

Today, at my request, an American delegation of 20 persons will leave for Tokyo for a major new round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Later this month another delegation from the United States will leave for Nairobi for the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, where we hope to build on recent progress toward fundamentally reforming the world's monetary system.

The fact that the United States will be represented by our highest ranking economic officials at these meetings is a demonstration of our commitment to these vital efforts to improve the international economic system.

We have been working to reform that system since August of 1971. It is clear that some basic reforms are long overdue. It is equally clear that while substantial progress has been made, there is much still to be done. That is why we particularly welcome these meetings in Tokyo and Nairobi.

The United States has four basic objectives in trade negotiations:

First, we desire to continue the 40-year movement toward freer trade, to achieve for Americans the benefits of expanding world commerce.

Second, we seek to overcome problems in the trade field which have become a source of friction between the United States and our major

trading partners. In this sense, the trade negotiation is one part of a broader effort to build a stable and lasting peace.

Third, we want to reform some of the present trading guidelines and practices which reduce trading opportunities for U.S. producers, as well as those of other countries, and which favor some at the expense of others.

Fourth, and finally, we, along with other industrialized nations, are seeking ways to improve trading relationships with the less developed countries and with countries with differing economic and political systems.

In order to attain these goals, we need the legislative authority contained in the trade bill which I proposed to the Congress last April. I am particularly pleased and encouraged by the progress which the House Ways and Means Committee is now making on this legislation.

I am confident that the major international effort which my delegation will help to launch can lay the foundation for an improved world economic order which can help increase the prosperity of all Americans and of people throughout the world. I am heartened by the international consensus which has led to these negotiations. The way is now open for an historic effort of joint statesmanship. If we approach these negotiations in this spirit, there will be no losers—we can all benefit. And their success, by helping to create a more stable and more prosperous world, will be an essential ingredient in achieving our goal of world peace.

of all nations and the standard of living has improved throughout the world. Freer trade has led to higher real wages for working men and women and a wide choice of goods to consumers.

One recent development in economic policy holds a useful lesson for all of us. Governments in many parts of the world, such as Australia, Japan, Canada, some European countries, and the United States, have been led by compelling domestic reasons to reduce unilaterally their tariffs or quotas, without asking for reciprocal concessions from others. Although the circumstances in each case may have differed, this is a reminder that we should not think of every reduction of our own restrictions as a concession made for the benefit of others and worthwhile only

if there is a greater or at least equal concession by others. The general principles that guide our work suggest that we gain from reduction of our own barriers as well as from reduction of the barriers of others.

Of course, there are qualifications to the basic ideas of trade liberalization. The participants in this conference, who live in the governmental and political process, are especially aware of these qualifications. Substantial reduction of trade barriers may cause local and temporary difficulties that cannot be ignored, however great the longer run and more general benefits may be. Transitional protection may sometimes permit the achievement of efficiencies that would not be possible without it. Other reservations can be thought of.

These qualifications constitute the case for gradualism, selectivity, and mutuality. No doubt, much of the time in the negotiations now beginning will be devoted to these qualifications. But let us, as we say in the United States, keep our eye on the ball—the liberalization and expansion of trade—and seek to deal with the problems in ways most consistent with that overall objective.

I see a number of important challenges for these negotiations. In listing them, I do not mean to imply they encompass the full range of issues that we expect these negotiations to cover nor that they will necessarily appear as specific items on the agenda for the negotiations.

Guidelines and Procedures

The central challenge for these negotiations is, as I see it, to develop guidelines and procedures that will permit the elimination of barriers to trade while preserving the ability of governments to carry out their domestic responsibilities. Many of the important barriers that still hamper international trade result from the efforts of individual governments to achieve a variety of domestic economic, social, and political objectives. We must develop the means whereby these barriers can be eliminated or minimized. Because national needs and policy preferences frequently differ, we need to develop rules that will give each government considerable leeway in forming and pursuing its own policies. At the same time, we need to encourage countries to devise policy measures that minimize disruption of the economic interests of other nations.

In an interdependent world, the policies pursued by any one government in carrying out its domestic responsibilities are bound to conflict at one time or another with the policies pursued by other governments. We therefore will have to focus on the procedures and arrangements that are designed to minimize these conflicts and effectively to resolve disputes that may arise. Our common institutions, such as the GATT, have performed this role well. These institutions are aging, however, and while they may be

structurally sound, it is important that we look closely at our recent experiences in dealing with trade problems to see where the rules and procedures can be updated and improved.

Safeguards Against Disruptive Imports

Our recent experience would indicate that we need particularly to look at the rules and procedures that deal with problems of import disruption. Every country represented here has at one time or another found it necessary to limit imports temporarily in order to permit domestic industry enough time to adjust. Frequently the current rules and procedures covering such actions have proved unsuitable, and governments had to work out informal arrangements. While such arrangements have proved expedient, they have not been able to cope with all problems and have been accompanied by an unnecessary degree of international friction. It is time that we face this issue squarely and together design a mutually acceptable safeguard system.

Agricultural Commodities

Another area where common action would be desirable is the area of agriculture. The current shortage in agricultural supplies and the danger that it will be repeated in the future gives great urgency to the need to find a more rational pattern of production and trade in agricultural commodities. If we take advantage of this occasion to expand opportunities for world trade in this area, we will be able to make available more food at cheaper prices for everyone. A number of thoughts have been expressed on how this might be accomplished. We are willing to examine any serious proposal.

In the past year, we have seen how international trade in agricultural commodities can help to avoid what would otherwise have been critical food shortages. The decline in world grain production was alleviated for many countries by the ability to import, especially from the United States. Despite poor growing weather and poor harvests in

our own country, we have supplied greatly enlarged quantities of goods and feeds to countries in every part of the world, partly at the expense of a substantial reduction in our own stocks.

Our exports of wheat in fiscal year 1973 reached 32 million metric tons, almost double the amount shipped in FY 1972, and equivalent to three-fourths of U.S. production. Exports of feed grains jumped sharply from 21 million tons to 35 million tons. And soybean exports rose to 14 million tons, an increase over the previous year of 2 million tons. More than half of our soybean crop went into export. Indeed, all of the increase in our soybean crop was exported last season.

Although our stock position has been sharply reduced, we anticipate that an excellent feed grain and record soybean crop this season will permit us to meet foreign demand for these commodities in FY 1974 with exports at levels higher than the record levels of last year and that our wheat exports will be close to last season's very high level. To meet anticipated world needs this year, we have put millions of acres back into production, and for 1974 all our reserve acreage has been removed from set-aside restrictions. We have proved that in the pinch, the United States is, indeed, a dependable supplier—and that its market-oriented system can be relied upon.

Regional Integration and the MFN Principle

Now let me turn to a development that has been a source of increasing concern to the United States. Over the past few years we have seen a tendency to move away from the notion of a single world trading system in which all nations are treated equally. The most-favored-nation principle has been the cornerstone of our global system. Now we are seeing that principle increasingly disregarded. At a time when the circle of nations participating in the world trading system is increasing, we need to rededicate ourselves to the ideals of a single nondiscriminatory trading order.

I should say in this respect that we con-

tinue to support the many efforts to achieve political and economic integration. This makes sense where neighboring countries, sharing common traditions, find their economic affairs increasingly linked. We feel compelled to insist, however, that such efforts not undermine the global system that we have built together and from which we have derived great benefit. It is thus important that countries in regional groupings organize themselves in such a way that they can effectively discharge as a unit the responsibilities to which they have committed themselves individually as nations.

Support for Less Developed Countries

We support efforts to give the less developed countries special access to foreign markets. We believe that such arrangements will benefit the industrial nations as well as the developing nations. We also recognize that it would not be appropriate or desirable for us to insist that these countries assume the same responsibilities as we expect from those countries that have achieved a relatively high degree of economic development. At the same time, however, we do expect commitments appropriate to a nation's stage of development and to a sharing of the responsibility for the effective working of the global system. No international undertaking can succeed if those who derive a benefit from it do not contribute to it. And the system as a whole cannot work unless all nations contribute to its effective functioning.

Monetary and Trade Interrelationships

Lastly, let me say a word about the relationship between our efforts here and those related to the reform of the world monetary system. We recognize the interrelationship between monetary affairs and trade matters. A primary goal of an international monetary system, on the one hand, is to facilitate trade; that objective is seriously jeopardized when monetary relations become unstable. On the other hand, the logic is equally strong that the adjustment process in the monetary system is less effective and less responsive when

trade is restricted by direct measures and can respond only slowly, and in a partial and distorted way, to the forces of the monetary adjustment process. In short, actions in one field can, but should not be allowed to, frustrate the solutions reached in other fields. There is thus a need for simultaneous improvement in all elements of the international economic system.

Although concrete progress in one area of negotiation should not be held hostage to specific negotiations in another, overall success in one area will ultimately be dependent on success in another. Where specific overlaps do occur, work in one area ought to supplement rather than frustrate work in other areas.

Negotiating Mandate of the United States

My government believes it is important to take advantage of the opportunity presented by these negotiations and is anxious to participate vigorously. In implementing negotiated changes and in strengthening our commitment to the basic objectives, of course we will need the support, advice, and concurrence of our Congress. President Nixon submitted his Trade Reform Act to the Congress in April of this year. That bill has received thoughtful and highly constructive consideration in the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives and will likely remain under consideration in the Congress for a few more months. The ranking Democratic and Republican members of that committee issued a statement last week expressing their "hope and belief that we will complete work on the bill by October 1." They also said:

We believe that the committee will report a bill that will provide sufficient scope for comprehensive negotiations aimed at removing trade barriers and substantially expanding world trade. It is our hope and purpose that the Congress will act on this legislation in ample time to facilitate these negotiations.

The fact that our trade bill is still under congressional review does not impede our ability to participate actively and fully at this stage. The negotiations which begin at

this conference will, at the outset, concentrate on preparing the way for the detailed bargaining process to come. We remain committed to the start of substantive work on these negotiations in late October of this year and to the pursuit of that work on an intensive and continuous basis without any interim delay.

I must call to your attention the fact that the attitude of the Congress toward these negotiations—and therefore the mandate they will be willing to give our negotiators—will be influenced by the manner in which we are able to settle in coming months some outstanding issues with our trading partners. We have already reached satisfactory agreements recently with some of our major trading partners to eliminate longstanding trade restrictions inconsistent with the GATT. This has been a very positive development and clearly demonstrates to domestic observers that the GATT does work. There are, nonetheless, some other issues pending at this time. We view the settlement of these issues as an indication of the confidence we can have in the ability of the international community to reach an agreement on a more open and improved world trading order, and we know that it is essential to demonstrate the basis for this confidence to the Congress.

U.S. Approach to the Negotiations

In a few words, the U.S. approach to these negotiations will be based on the following ideas:

1. We desire to expand the opportunities for international trade and are willing to participate fully in the common effort to eliminate or reduce barriers to all trade, agricultural or industrial.

2. We seek an agreement that will be beneficial to all the participants and recognized as such by them. This will require that the agreement be balanced from the standpoint of each participant. However, we believe that to insist on a balance in every individual component of every agreement is unnecessary and would undesirably limit what can be achieved.

3. We believe that there should be a substantial expansion of duty-free trade as well as a substantial reduction in the average tariff on the remaining dutiable items.

4. We consider it one of the main objectives of these negotiations to remove as many nontariff barriers as possible and to reduce as far as possible those that cannot be removed.

5. Reduction of barriers to agricultural trade is a major goal, and negotiations to that end should move forward together with negotiations on industrial products. We should agree that where we find domestic actions necessary to assist our own farmers, those actions should not be of a kind that injure farmers in other countries.

6. We believe that the maximum liberalization of trade will be achieved if we can agree on a multilateral safeguard system that will allow governments to take appropriate actions when a rapid rise of imports threatens to disrupt domestic production in a particular industry but at the same time will assure that such measures will not be any broader or continued any longer than necessary for the domestic adjustment process.

7. We have an open mind about the specific techniques or arrangements to be employed in achieving the common goals of the negotiations.

8. We are eager to see the negotiations begin promptly and proceed rapidly and pledge our maximum cooperation to that goal.

We look to the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) to play an important role in guiding these negotiations toward their desired ends. We hope that the TNC will begin its work as soon as possible, setting up procedures for subgroups, and moving them promptly toward continuous, effective work on the substance of the negotiations. We hope that the participating governments can focus on trade negotiating plans, undertake the basic analytical work which needs to be done at the earliest possible date, and begin this process in the TNC no later than November 1. Once we have begun, we should work

in earnest, continuously, so that the target of finishing in 1975 can be met.

In our view, the declaration negotiated by the preparatory committee in July represents a sound basis for beginning these negotiations and provides useful political guidance for our negotiators to follow. While we recognize that there are some disagreements with the declaration based on specific points of substance or emphasis, the declaration does provide a framework for achieving ends desirable to us all. To translate that declaration into change in our trade relations is the task which will be before us throughout these negotiations.

The progress we all want in these negotiations can only be accomplished by a joint effort in which all of us make appropriate contributions and receive appropriate benefits. Let this Declaration of Tokyo serve as a starting point and a point of inspiration. Let the vision which has in the past inspired nations to achieve great goals guide us in a common effort to construct a durable order that will contribute to international harmony and prosperity for us and for future generations.

TEXT OF TOKYO DECLARATION

1. The Ministers, having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Trade Negotiations and having noted that a number of governments have decided to enter into comprehensive multilateral trade negotiations in the framework of GATT and that other governments have indicated their intention to make a decision as soon as possible, declare the negotiations officially open. Those governments which have decided to negotiate have notified the Director-General of GATT to this effect, and the Ministers agree that it will be open to any other government, through a notification to the Director-General, to participate in the negotiations. The Ministers hope that the negotiations will involve the active participation of as many countries as possible. They expect the negotiations to be engaged effectively as rapidly as possible, and that, to that end, the governments concerned will have such authority as may be required.

2. The negotiations shall aim to:

—achieve the expansion and ever-greater liberalization of world trade and improvement in the standard of living and welfare of the people of the

world, objectives which can be achieved, *inter alia*, through the progressive dismantling of obstacles to trade and the improvement of the international framework for the conduct of world trade.

—secure additional benefits for the international trade of developing countries so as to achieve a substantial increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the diversification of their exports, the acceleration of the rate of growth of their trade, taking into account their development needs, an improvement in the possibilities for these countries to participate in the expansion of world trade and a better balance as between developed and developing countries in the sharing of the advantages resulting from this expansion, through, in the largest possible measure, a substantial improvement in the conditions of access for the products of interest to the developing countries and, wherever appropriate, measures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices for primary products.

To this end, co-ordinated efforts shall be made to solve in an equitable way the trade problems of all participating countries, taking into account the specific trade problems of the developing countries.

3. To this end, the negotiations should aim, *inter alia*, to:

(a) conduct negotiations on tariffs by employment of appropriate formulae of as general application as possible;

(b) reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures or, where this is not appropriate, to reduce or eliminate their trade restricting or distorting effects, and to bring such measures under more effective international discipline;

(c) include an examination of the possibilities for the co-ordinated reduction or elimination of all barriers to trade in selected sectors as a complementary technique;

(d) include an examination of the adequacy of the multilateral safeguard system, considering particularly the modalities of application of Article XIX, with a view to furthering trade liberalization and preserving its results;

(e) include, as regards agriculture, an approach to negotiations which, while in line with the general objectives of the negotiations, should take account of the special characteristics and problems in this sector;

(f) treat tropical products as a special and priority sector.

4. The negotiations shall cover tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other measures which impede or distort international trade in both industrial and agricultural products, including tropical products and raw materials, whether in primary form or at any stage of processing including in particular products of export interest to developing countries and measures affecting their exports.

5. The negotiations shall be conducted on the

basis of the principles of mutual advantage, mutual commitment and overall reciprocity, while observing the most-favoured-nation clause, and consistently with the provisions of the General Agreement relating to such negotiations. Participants shall jointly endeavour in the negotiations to achieve, by appropriate methods, an overall balance of advantage at the highest possible level. The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in the negotiations to reduce or remove tariff and other barriers to the trade of developing countries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course of the trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. The Ministers recognize the need for special measures to be taken in the negotiations to assist the developing countries in their efforts to increase their export earnings and promote their economic development and, where appropriate, for priority attention to be given to products or areas of interest to developing countries. They also recognize the importance of maintaining and improving the Generalized System of Preferences. They further recognize the importance of the application of differential measures to developing countries in ways which will provide special and more favourable treatment for them in areas of the negotiation where this is feasible and appropriate.

6. The Ministers recognize that the particular situation and problems of the least developed among the developing countries shall be given special attention, and stress the need to ensure that these countries receive special treatment in the context of any general or specific measures taken in favour of the developing countries during the negotiations.

7. The policy of liberalizing world trade cannot be carried out successfully in the absence of parallel efforts to set up a monetary system which shields the world economy from the shocks and imbalances which have previously occurred. The Ministers will not lose sight of the fact that the efforts which are to be made in the trade field imply continuing efforts to maintain orderly conditions and to establish a durable and equitable monetary system.

The Ministers recognize equally that the new phase in the liberalization of trade which it is their intention to undertake should facilitate the orderly functioning of the monetary system.

The Ministers recognize that they should bear these considerations in mind both at the opening of and throughout the negotiations. Efforts in these two fields will thus be able to contribute effectively to an improvement of international economic relations, taking into account the special characteristics of the economies of the developing countries and their problems.

8. The negotiations shall be considered as one undertaking, the various elements of which shall move forward together.

9. Support is reaffirmed for the principles, rules and disciplines provided for under the General Agreement.¹ Consideration shall be given to improvements in the international framework for the conduct of world trade which might be desirable in the light of progress in the negotiations and, in this endeavour, care shall be taken to ensure that any measures introduced as a result are consistent with the overall objectives and principles of the trade negotiations and particularly of trade liberalization.

10. A Trade Negotiations Committee is established, with authority, taking into account the present Declaration, *inter alia*:

(a) to elaborate and put into effect detailed trade negotiating plans and to establish appropriate negotiating procedures, including special procedures for the negotiations between developed and developing countries;

(b) to supervise the progress of the negotiations.

The Trade Negotiations Committee shall be open to participating governments.² The Trade Negotiations Committee shall hold its opening meeting not later than 1 November 1973.

11. The Ministers intend that the trade negotiations be concluded in 1975.

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 28th U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the nominations of the following to be Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the 28th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Representatives

John A. Scali

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

William F. Buckley, Jr.

John H. Buchanan, Jr., U.S. Representative from the State of Alabama

Robert N. C. Nix, U.S. Representative from the State of Pennsylvania

Alternate Representatives

Margaret B. Young

Mark Evans

William E. Schaufele, Jr.

Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr.

Richard M. Scammon

¹ This does not necessarily represent the views of representatives of countries not now parties to the General Agreement. [Footnotes in original.]

² Including the European Communities.

U.S. Welcomes Signing of Protocols Implementing Lao Peace Agreement

Following is a U.S. statement issued at Washington and Vientiane on September 14, together with the text of a message from President Nixon to Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos.

U.S. GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

Press release 331 dated September 14

The United States welcomes the successful completion of the negotiations on the implementing protocols to carry out the February 21, 1973, Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos.

We hope the agreement will secure the peace and freedom from aggression for which Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Lao people have sacrificed so much in years past.

The United States stands ready to continue cooperation and assistance to the new provisional government which is expected to be formed shortly in Laos.

The United States will, of course, be guided by the provisions of the agreement and its implementing protocols and by the wishes of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the new provisional government. We expect all other parties to do the same and to respect the sovereignty of Laos.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO PRINCE SOUVANNA PHOUMA

YOUR HIGHNESS: On behalf of the American people, I am pleased to congratulate you on the successful completion of negotiations to carry out the February 21, 1973 Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos. On this historic occasion, allow me again to assure you that the United States will continue to support your efforts to perfect the neutrality, independence and unity of the Lao Kingdom.

The protocol which has just been signed will, I earnestly hope, secure the peace and freedom from aggression for which you and your people have sacrificed so much in years past. For our part, the actions of the United States Government with respect to Laos will, of course, be guided by the pro-

visions of the agreement and the wishes of the new provisional government under your leadership. We expect that others who have participated in this conflict similarly will keep faith with all aspects of the Lao Accords and we are resolved that henceforth the sovereignty of your country shall be universally respected.

The path to peace and national reconciliation has, I know, not been easy. I am truly gratified that your steadfast pursuit of these goals has culminated in the agreement just signed, and I am confident that with your persistent and vigilant leadership and the support of all true Lao nationalists, you will surely surmount whatever difficulties may lie ahead. As you set about implementing this new agreement, you can be sure that the United States is as ready to support you in assuring peace and healing the wounds of war as we were in assisting with your self-defense.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

United Nations Day, 1973

A PROCLAMATION¹

Each year the peoples of the world celebrate October 24 as United Nations Day, recalling the date in 1945 when the United Nations Charter came into force. This is an appropriate occasion for people everywhere to renew their adherence to the Charter ideals of peace and human rights, and their determination to promote economic and social progress and a greater measure of justice and freedom for all.

This year the anniversary occurs at a time of dramatic change in world affairs. We sense the promise of a more peaceful world and the opportunity for new strides in international cooperation.

As the world climate improves, the prospects will grow for using the United Nations to alleviate political disputes and for broadening its constructive activity in the social, economic and technological fields.

In some areas, international cooperation is already a longstanding tradition—moving the international mails, regulating international communications and transportation, preventing the worldwide spread of disease, developing international standards of practice in labor, and many others.

More recently, the United Nations and other international agencies have begun to work in other areas—devising safeguards, for example, for the production of nuclear energy and rules concerning man's use of outer space; extending the rule of law over the exploitation of the oceans; protecting the environment; protecting the rights of refugees and prisoners of war; and inhibiting the international traffic in narcotic drugs. Efforts are also underway to cope with the problems of population growth and with the hijacking of aircraft and other forms of international terrorism.

In the years ahead the growing interdependence of nations will inevitably require international institutions to be even more effective in dealing with this new agenda. We need to create new arrangements to control new technologies for the common good. We must bridge the interests of rich and poor countries on matters of trade and aid. We must facilitate the exchange of technical and scientific knowledge and encourage modes of cooperative behavior which will permit nations to live together in concord.

Within this framework I hope all Americans will continue to appreciate and analyze, soberly and realistically, the benefits they and all peoples gain from international cooperation—within the United Nations and other institutions—to meet the challenges of the modern world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Wednesday, October 24, 1973, as United Nations Day. I urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day with community programs which will promote understanding and support for the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.

I have appointed Donald S. MacNaughton to be United States National Chairman for United Nations Day and, through him, I call upon State and local officials to encourage citizens' groups and agencies of communication—press, radio, television, and motion pictures—to engage in appropriate observances of United Nations Day in cooperation with the United Nations Association of the United States of America and other interested organizations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-eighth.



¹ No. 4240; 38 *Fed. Reg.* 24193.

Cooperation To Meet the World's Energy Needs

*Address by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

Last week in Tokyo 101 nations embarked on a broad cooperative effort to expand world trade by scaling down barriers.

Next week at Nairobi 126 nations will review and set the future course of a broad cooperative effort to reform the world monetary system.

Today, at international meetings of this type, a great deal of the discussion in the corridors and before and after plenary sessions turns to energy and how to assure an adequate supply to meet the world's growing needs at prices which will not prove damaging to trade, monetary stability, and consumer living standards.

In the discussion on all three of these vital subjects, trade, money, and energy, there is a common need to arrive at an agreed system which will distribute burdens among nations and avoid the kind of heavy pressure which can disrupt the system.

In the trade negotiations, we look for a safeguard system to provide time for firms to adjust to sharp breakthroughs in technology or other forces suddenly altering patterns of trade.

In a monetary system, we need an adjustment process which will provide assurances that both surplus and deficit nations will alter either exchange rates or economic policies promptly enough to bring their reserves and currencies into line and avoid distortions to trade. The adjustment process must also operate gradually enough and with enough predictability as to time and unpredictabil-

ity as to method to make speculation on exchange rate changes less attractive in the future than it has been in the past.

The structure of international cooperation is not as well developed in energy matters as it is in trade and monetary matters. But the need has become manifest to most nations, both consumers and producers. Work has begun to define how international cooperation can reduce the risk of disruption and provide the basis for diversifying and expanding our sources of energy.

In energy, each nation has different assets. These assets will be natural, technological, financial, and managerial. The really important cooperation will be to determine together, frequently on an ad hoc basis, how those assets can most effectively be combined to meet specific and agreed-upon common needs.

To provide a basis for this kind of cooperation among governments, companies, and technologies, several types of broad cooperation can be useful. First, there is the sharing of oil in an emergency. This is something we and the European nations did on an ad hoc basis when the Suez Canal was closed in 1956 and for a while after the six-day Arab-Israeli war in 1967. The international oil companies which bring most of the oil out of the Middle East, Africa, and South America have an obligation to treat their customers equitably. The economies of the major energy consumers—Europe, the United States, and Japan—have become so interdependent that a sharp reduction in energy supply inflicted on any one of them would automatically inflict damage by disrupting the trade, the supply sources, and the markets of the others. So we can view

¹ Made at Washington on Sept. 18 before the conference for corporation executives on "The Mounting Energy Crisis and the Middle East" sponsored by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

an equitable emergency sharing arrangement as a safeguard in the energy trade which can build confidence and lead to cooperation in other areas.

An emergency oil-sharing plan has been in effect among European nations for 17 years without being called upon. What we are now studying, along with the European nations and Japan, Canada, and Australia, is extending the existing emergency sharing plan to other members of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development].

This broader emergency sharing plan can be viewed as a modest step toward dealing with the prospect of supply and price instability in a world which finds its economic growth dependent on what appears to be a finite and dwindling reservoir of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons. All consumers are deeply concerned about a tendency of some countries to take without adequate compensation, and contrary to commitments, the oil-producing properties which private oil companies discovered and developed and to sharply increase the price at which this oil can be marketed to consumers.

These policies may bring shortrun advantages but, as the more experienced leaders of the oil-producing governments see clearly, they are counterproductive and likely to undermine the ability of the oil-producing governments to build a diversified and sustainable economic future for their people.

Filling U.S. Energy Requirements

Although the world will have to count heavily on the rich oil reserves of the Persian Gulf for the remainder of this century, it is clear that no time can be lost in supplementing them. The United States has the ingredients to meet its own energy requirements over time. As the oil-producing states increase prices, alternative sources of energy will become economic more swiftly, the search for oil and gas in the United States and offshore will be intensified, and wasteful uses of energy will be eliminated more vigorously.

The United States sits in the same position in hard hydrocarbons as the Middle East does on oil. We have almost half the coal reserves in the world. Of the almost 2 trillion barrels of oil locked up in shale deposits in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming, a recent report of the National Petroleum Council indicates that over 100 billion barrels can produce crude oil at \$6 a barrel.

At that level, we can get synthetic natural gas and oil from coal by processes significantly advanced over those which converted coal into gas to fly Hitler's planes and roll his tanks a quarter of a century ago.

That level would bring gas to the tanks of American motorists at lower prices than European and Japanese motorists pay today. It would also generate design changes and habit changes which would slow down the rate at which our energy consumption is growing.

Before we reach that level, the higher prices already being telegraphed from the oil-producing capitals, together with the tax and wellhead price incentives President Nixon has called for, will find us a lot of additional gas and oil offshore and onshore in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

While this is going on, a \$10 billion research and development program funded by the Federal Government, together with corporate laboratories and pilot plants, will be working to make energy from coal more economic, more efficient, and more environmentally acceptable and to augment and ultimately replace hydrocarbon energy with the atom and the sun. In much of this, we will be improving and adapting known technology. As for the rest, we will be betting on the qualities that split the atom in four years, created synthetic rubber in less than that, and put a man on the moon in nine years.

Much of the talk about the energy crisis, the wringing of hands about the shortages and the enormous balance of payments burdens ahead, has failed to recognize the degree to which we do have destiny in our hands. The National Petroleum Council last year took a look at our energy needs and the

various ways to meet them between now and 1985. It assumed that there would be an average 4.2 percent increase in annual demand for energy in the United States. This is some 16 percent greater than the 3.6 percent actual growth rate which we experienced between 1955 and 1970.

Projecting a continuation of present price and environmental restraints on the growth in output of all fuels, and no better than the recent level of activity and success in oil and gas exploratory efforts, indicates that 38 percent of our energy consumption would have to come from oil and gas imports by 1985. But on a more optimistic outlook, overcoming environmental obstacles to bringing in Alaskan oil, nuclear power, and synthetic fuels, availability of more offshore sites and government land for exploration, better economic incentives, and success in locating undiscovered oil and gas, we would depend on imported gas and oil for only 11 percent of our energy requirements for 1985.

President Nixon has already taken or recommended steps which go a long way to establish the conditions needed for a vigorous effort to get these results. The difference between the optimistic and the pessimistic projection is \$24 billion in additional annual balance of payments outflow in 12 years. On the optimistic projection, our energy balance of payments deficit would be about \$7 billion, not alarmingly more than it is running today.

These National Petroleum Council projections were based on prices for crude which have already been exceeded. This would increase the balance of payments outflow to meet our energy needs, but it can also bring out more production from new and existing domestic sources than they have projected.

Possible Changes in Consumption Patterns

To emphasize further that we do have control over our energy destiny in our own hands if we work at it, all we have to do to substantially eliminate the need for foreign oil and wipe out any balance of payments deficit and any supply dependency arising from our energy needs would be to bring our

growth rate in use of energy down to 3.4 percent, a shade below the 3.6 percent growth rate experienced between 1955 and 1970.

A report just issued by the California Institute of Technology indicates how this could be accomplished by a single shift in our energy-consuming habits. The automobile, considered as a total system all the way from raw materials through production, distribution, roadbuilding, servicing, and repair, consumes 25 percent of all U.S. primary energy, over 8 million barrels of oil a day, or about half of our total use of oil. Automobiles consume more energy than all other forms of transportation combined. With the addition of trucks and buses, the consumption of all road vehicles represents about 75 percent of the overall energy needs for transportation purposes. Increasing by 10 percent a year the production of gas-efficient cars (20 miles per gallon or better) would mean that in 10 years these cars would represent 50 percent of the vehicle population. This shift would reduce the projected national annual energy growth rate from 4.2 to 3.2 percent over that 10-year period.

If we do all the other things necessary to achieve the optimistic projection of the National Petroleum Council, this degree of movement toward more gas-efficient cars would eliminate our need for oil and gas imports. Higher prices in the Middle East may already have provided enough impetus to bring on smaller and more efficient cars at this rate.

Let's take another example of how we can change our energy consumption pattern. It requires almost six times as much energy to transport a ton of freight by truck as it does by rail. If we convert half of the truck haulage to rail freight over the next 10 or 12 years, the savings in oil would be about 900,000 barrels per day by 1985. This assumes that the amount of truck freight will grow by some 40 percent during that period if not otherwise restrained.

When I present figures like these, I fully appreciate that such major changes in our way of life cannot be brought about by ad-

ministrative fiat in our society. The social, economic, and logistic alterations required would be serious and large. However, our situation demands that we examine alternatives such as these and take the initiatives or create the incentives to put some of them into effect to a greater or lesser degree.

Domestic Sources and Substitution

As I said earlier, there is plenty of oil, gas, and coal within our nation's boundaries to satisfy our immediate and even many of our long-term requirements. It has been estimated that 50 percent of the oil and two-thirds of the natural gas ultimately discoverable remain to be found. In addition, our domestic coal resources represent an asset of great potential value.

Many variables influence the supplies of these domestic sources of energy that can be developed. Some of the most probable areas for new reserves are located on Federal land or controlled by the government. The administration has already initiated action to permit the eventual development of these resources. Another major determinant is the price level of alternative fuels required to make their development and production economically feasible. As I indicated earlier, the price constraint seems to be decreasing in importance as the cost of imported oil continues to rise. This should stimulate a substantial increase in exploration for new gas and oil.

I have mentioned the possibility of substituting one primary energy source for another. One possibility would be to streamline and accelerate the rate at which nuclear power plants could be brought on line. A look at this by the Atomic Energy Commission indicates that if the present projection of 300,000 megawatts of installed nuclear electric generating capacity by 1985 could be increased by 50 percent, annual oil imports by that year could be reduced by one-third. Oil and electricity are not completely interchangeable, so the substitution cannot be pushed too far, and it would have to accommodate public concerns about environmental and safety risks.

Alternatives to Conventional Gas and Oil

I also want to say a few words about alternatives to conventional gas and oil. The recent sharp increase in the price of oil does have certain positive aspects. One of these is its effect as a stimulant to the development of domestic substitutes for conventional fuels.

Much has been said recently about reverting to coal in place of oil for certain uses. This is certainly feasible, provided that our environmental concerns can be accommodated. We have several options available to us in this area which could, in the next few years, result in a significant shift back to the use of this, our most abundant fuel resource. It has been estimated that an acceleration in the current rate of mining would provide us with an additional 15 million tons of coal by 1975. Opening new mines in presently exploited areas and in the West could give us an additional 40 to 50 million tons in the next few years. Obviously, capital investment costs in this case would be substantial, but current prices may now make this economically justifiable. We would also have serious environmental concerns at such a sharp increase in the use of this essentially "dirty" fuel, but recent technological advances in the desulfurization of coal and the substantially increased research funds committed to coal research should help us meet these legitimate concerns.

In a somewhat longer time frame, the numerous research projects now underway for conversion of coal to pipeline gas or high-quality synthetic crude oil show great promise of providing us with significant quantities of clean energy in the post-1977 period.

An additional source, which has not been used commercially in the United States, is oil shale. Our deposits are mainly in the West and are estimated to contain the equivalent of 600 billion barrels of oil, of which 80 billion barrels are fairly accessible. The technological development to produce oil from shale has reached the pilot plant stage. The Department of the Interior earlier this month announced the completion of a lengthy environmental impact study. Secretary

[Rogers C. B.] Morton is now considering whether to permit the leasing of Federal lands for an experimental commercial program. It is estimated that if a favorable decision is made, the first commercial plant would be on stream by 1977 producing about 250,000 barrels a day. If the environmental effects of this limited program indicate that full-scale production would not result in unacceptable long-term damage to the ecology of the region, a full-scale oil shale production program could be providing us with as much as 2 million barrels a day by 1985.

International Technology and Capital

The major consuming nations have technological and capital resources. The U.S. Government has inventoried the areas in which additional research and development effort seems capable of bringing on additional sources of oil and gas and power, of making energy sources safer and more environmentally acceptable, of conserving on the use of energy and making it more efficient. We are working with other nations in the OECD to develop a catalogue of such prospects to which other nations can contribute and which will help identify where contributions to the effective development of these projects are most likely to be found. We are preparing to review these prospects with other governments and consider cooperative research and development projects where they seem promising. We already have a number of joint research and development projects underway.

We encourage similar activities on the part of corporations involved in energy production and conservation and are interested in their views on how public policy can accelerate their progress. Similarly, we are encouraging, and where appropriate facilitating, joint ventures between governments and companies to apply capital and know-how to exploration and transportation projects which seem likely to find oil and gas onshore or offshore and bring it to markets.

To meet our energy needs and attain greater self-sufficiency will require enormous amounts of capital, upward of \$300 billion

over the next 10 or 12 years. These efforts will be reflected in our capital markets, and one major task we face is to see that these projects and our capital markets are developed in a way which makes them attractive to oil-producing states seeking long-term assets to replace the wealth they take out of the ground. They have farsighted leaders who see that their young people will live in a world in which oil will share the burden of meeting the world's needs with other sources of energy. They want to diversify their economies and to endow their people with some participation in the broader world energy system which the future requires.

This process is in progress right now. Many of the world's companies and entrepreneurs are busy analyzing the low-cost fuel gas and feedstocks available in the Middle East to determine the feasibility of putting capital and know-how to work there to bring fertilizer, petrochemicals, and various energy-intensive products to world markets.

It is our policy to encourage and facilitate this process as an essential element in a worldwide bargain in which all of us work for more and better energy and move together to a more diversified participation in a broadening and more satisfactory world economy.

Obviously, the United States—given the sheer magnitude of our demand for energy, almost one-third of total world consumption—does not need nor want to be completely without foreign oil. However, by focusing harder on domestic oil and gas production and accelerating the development of alternative or new sources of energy, our dependence on imports can be kept under control. We need an aggressive attack on these problems now, integrating action by all sectors of our society—government, business, and the consumer. The President has indicated the direction this administration believes we should take. The total cooperation of American industry is essential to the achievement of our objectives. I hope your discussions today and tomorrow contribute to an understanding of the role you must play and the urgency of our common task.

Import Quotas for Nonfat Dry Milk Increased by President Nixon

A PROCLAMATION¹

AMENDING PART 3 OF THE APPENDIX TO THE TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPORTATION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), limitations have been imposed by Presidential proclamations on the quantities of certain dairy products which may be imported into the United States in any quota year; and

WHEREAS, the import restrictions proclaimed pursuant to said section 22 are set forth in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States; and

WHEREAS, the Secretary of Agriculture has reported to me that he believes that additional quantities of dried milk provided for in item 950.02 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (hereinafter referred to as "nonfat dry milk") may be entered for a temporary period without rendering or tending to render ineffective or materially interfering with, the price support program now conducted by the Department of Agriculture for milk or reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic milk; and

WHEREAS, under the authority of section 22, I have requested the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation with respect to this matter; and

WHEREAS, the Secretary of Agriculture has determined and reported to me that a condition exists with respect to nonfat dry milk which requires emergency treatment and that the quantitative limitation imposed on nonfat dry milk should be increased during the period ending October 31, 1973, without awaiting the recommendations of the United States Tariff Commission with respect to such action; and

WHEREAS, I find and declare that the entry during the period ending October 31, 1973, of an additional quantity of 100,000,000 pounds of nonfat dry milk will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price support program which is being undertaken by the Department of Agriculture for milk and will not reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic milk; and that a condition exists which requires emergency treatment and that the quantitative limitation imposed on nonfat dry milk should be increased during such period

without awaiting the recommendations of the United States Tariff Commission with respect to such action;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President, and in conformity with the provisions of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby proclaim that subdivision (vi) of headnote 3(a) of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States is amended to read as follows:

(vi) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, 25,000,000 pounds of dried milk described in item 115.50 may be entered during the period beginning December 30, 1972, and ending February 15, 1973, 60,000,000 pounds of such milk may be entered during the period beginning May 11, 1973, and ending June 30, 1973, 80,000,000 pounds of such milk may be entered during the period beginning July 19, 1973, and ending August 31, 1973, and 100,000,000 pounds of such milk may be entered during the period beginning the day after the date of issuance of this proclamation and ending October 31, 1973, in addition to the annual quota quantity specified for such article under item 950.02, and import licenses shall not be required for entering such additional quantities. No individual, partnership, firm, corporation, association, or other legal entity (including its affiliates or subsidiaries) may during each such period enter pursuant to this provision quantities of such additional dried milk totaling in excess of 2,500,000 pounds. The 100,000,000 pound additional quota quantity authorized to be entered during the period ending October 31, 1973, shall be allocated among supplying countries as follows:

<i>Supplying Country</i>	<i>Quantity in Pounds</i>
Australia	25,000,000
New Zealand	25,000,000
Canada	10,000,000
Member States of the European Economic Community	40,000,000

The 100,000,000 pound additional quota quantity provided for herein shall continue in effect pending Presidential action upon receipt of the report and recommendations of the Tariff Commission with respect thereto.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-eighth day of August, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-eighth.



¹ No. 4238; 38 *Fed. Reg.* 23309.

Department Discusses Legislation To Modify Antitrust Exemptions for Service Industries in Export Trade

*Statement by Willis C. Armstrong
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs¹*

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you Senate bills S. 1483 and S. 1774, which would amend the Export Trade Act of 1918 and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The former act is known as the Webb-Pomerene Act, and that is the designation I will use in my testimony. I will first deal with the substance of these bills and then proceed to a discussion of the operation of foreign export cartels, in which the committee in its letter of July 19, 1973, has expressed a particular interest.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that this hearing is to be directed to S. 1483 and title II of S. 1774, as they generally pertain to antitrust exemptions of the Webb-Pomerene Act. The Department supports the concept behind these bills, which is to modernize our legislation concerning export associations.

S. 1483 and title II of S. 1774 would expand the scope of the antitrust exemptions of the Webb-Pomerene Act from the current coverage of the export trade in goods, wares, and merchandise by including what are generally termed the service industries. S. 1483 would also remove the criminal penalty and treble damage sections of the antitrust provisions as they relate to the export activities of associations formed under the Webb-Pomerene Act. Title II of S. 1774 would accomplish the same purpose through the

establishment of a registration procedure which would clearly define the operational limits of such associations. Associations meeting the definitional requirements would be exempted from our antitrust laws so long as they act within the scope of the registration statement. This title also makes a slight change in the extent of antitrust exemptions for approved associations in export trade. Thus, the present act exempts Webb-Pomerene associations from antitrust action unless their acts and practices are in restraint of trade within the United States or in restraint of the export trade of U.S. nonmembers. Title II of S. 1774 would exempt associations unless their acts or practices were in "substantial" restraint of trade within the United States or in substantial restraint of the export trade of U.S. nonmembers.

Clarification of Definitions and Jurisdiction

The Department of State finds either the S. 1483 or S. 1774 approach acceptable but would prefer that taken in S. 1774 because it would provide a more uniform, clearly defined structure. The Department endorses the extension of Webb-Pomerene protection to the service industries listed in S. 1774. This bill would clearly permit firms in these industries to act jointly in such areas as preliminary studies, feasibility studies, and bid preparation, as do many of their foreign competitors at the present time.

Webb-Pomerene associations have not been widely used in the past. Reasons given by

¹ Submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce on Sept. 6. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S. exporters for nonuse of this tool are that the parameters within which these associations might act have not been as clearly defined as business firms would like. Further, our exporters say that Webb-Pomerene associations have been subject to antitrust action by more than one U.S. agency and thus potentially subject to differing standards of enforcement. S. 1774 would serve to answer the first of these complaints by establishing a uniform registration procedure and exempting association actions within the defined limits of the approved registration from antitrust enforcement actions. The second complaint is answered by granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Trade Commission for the first step in most antitrust actions against approved associations.

As regards the clarification of jurisdiction, this matter is dealt with in section 4 of S. 1774. Subsection (a) of section 4 grants the Federal Trade Commission exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether export association acts or practices are in conformance with its registration statement. There have been some changes in section 4 proposed in the revised administration bill to clarify further this question of jurisdiction, which the Department of State wishes to support.

The Department of State would expect that several of the service industries will find the joint export approach useful and several other industries might find the more clearly defined structure now permits them to make use of the act. We do not, however, view the Webb-Pomerene concept as a major solution to our international trade problems. Most of our vital and competitive industrial sectors will continue to find this method of international trade inappropriate because of product differentiation, high-level specialized technology, and individualized services offered. The Department of State is convinced that competition and innovation in management and product will continue to be more important factors in improving the U.S. international trade balance.

Finally, in endorsing S. 1774, the Department of State wishes to emphasize that there has been no change in our traditional policy

in favor of competition. Essentially the United States is a free enterprise economy in which competition has been a strong stimulus to productivity and innovation. We believe that foreign, like domestic, trade should generally be conducted on a competitive basis in a free and open world trading system. Our foreign trade policy is consistent with U.S. antitrust laws. The intent of these laws is to prevent private restraints on our foreign commerce. These laws are a logical corollary to our foreign trade policy, which seeks to reduce both governmental and private restraints on commerce.

OECD Country Approaches to Export Cartels

While the Department has a good deal of economic and commercial information, unfortunately there is little information on the "organization and activities of foreign export cartels." In an effort to ascertain the reason for the dearth of information and source material, the Department commissioned a research study in 1964 which examined all types of cartel activity in Western Europe, including domestic cartels, export cartels, and international cartels. The study, which was carried out by Professor Corwin D. Edwards of the University of Oregon, found that only a small number of countries require the registration of export cartels and an even smaller number make public the information on these cartels. The United States is one of the few countries that does publish information on export cartels. As a matter of fact, we have found no detailed study of the subject comparable to the comprehensive report published in 1967 by the Federal Trade Commission, which I am sure the committee has in its files.

Another source of information on export cartels is the annual reports on developments in the antitrust field of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. An OECD "Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices" also contains information on laws dealing with export cartels. In addition, this

committee has established a working party to study export cartels. The program is relatively new and has not yet issued any final reports or findings.

We believe the following general information on foreign export cartels and the approach of various member states of the OECD toward such cartels may be of interest to the committee.

Among the OECD member states, only the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom require notification of export agreements or associations which have no effect on domestic commerce; that is, so-called "pure" export cartels. Only the United States and Japan disclose this information. Germany does publish generalized empirical data. The Netherlands and Spain also publish some generalized data on certain types of exempted restrictive activity.

As the committee knows, under the Webb-Pomerene Act, associations of American firms registered with the Federal Trade Commission may undertake cooperative activities "for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade." They may, for example, agree on export prices and terms of sale, act as export sales agents, arrange transportation and distribution, and engage in joint promotional activities. On the other hand, Webb-Pomerene associations may not restrain trade within the United States, restrain the export trade of U.S. nonmembers, or "artificially or intentionally enhance or depress" domestic prices. Further, court decisions have prohibited these associations from cooperating with foreign firms or cartels with respect to such restrictive practices as division of markets and price fixing. Currently there are 34 Webb-Pomerene associations.

Under its Law Against Restraints of Competition, the Federal Republic of Germany approaches this problem very much as the United States does. Germany has a relatively comprehensive antitrust law which covers export activity but then specifically exempts much of this activity. "Pure" export associations must register with the Federal Cartel Office, but these registrations are not made

public. As of March 1973, the Federal Cartel Office reported 64 "pure" export cartels registered. The very limited analysis of the German law, which has been in existence only since 1957, provides some interesting background information on these export cartels. Thirty-one of the registered export cartels have domestic market shares of more than 75 percent, thus indicating that the sectors utilizing the law might have enough strength to operate successfully without cartels. The Federal Cartel Office has also found that while these associations have engaged in the traditional restrictions on pricing, rebates, quotas, and terms of sale, they have not made joint efforts to increase efficiency by adapting products and marketing to the requirements of export markets.

Japan has also adopted an approach based on exemption for export associations. Their Anti-Monopoly Act prohibits generally "any unreasonable restraint of trade," but the Export and Import Trading Act of 1952 provides an exemption for national export cartels. All these cartels must be notified to the Minister of International Trade and Industry. The Japanese law contains some interesting items which must be considered in approving these associations in addition to the usual concerns over possible violations of international treaties and effects on the domestic market. The Minister is required to consider the interests of the importers or enterprises concerned in the country of destination, injury to international confidence in Japanese exporters, and the sound development of export trade. Details of the products involved, export markets affected, types of restrictions agreed upon, and the reasons for the establishment of the cartels are published annually. At the end of 1972, Japan had 167 export cartels registered.

The United Kingdom exempts export associations in its Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956. The act states specifically that its provisions are not applicable to agreements which relate solely to exports. All restrictive agreements in the United Kingdom must be notified to the government. However, the "pure" export cartel notifications

remain confidential, and there are no legal sanctions for failure to register such agreements. As the United Kingdom does not require notification of abandoned agreements and revisions may be notified as new agreements, there is no public measure of the number of export cartels currently in operation. The only figure available is that there have been 288 notifications since the law came into effect in 1956.

Most of the other OECD member countries that have antitrust laws exempt "pure" export cartels from the application of these laws. These include Austria, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, France, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. The laws of Belgium and Denmark provide that any abuses of cartels must take place on national territory to come under their laws. The laws of Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland are silent with regard to joint practices relating to exports.

Regionally, the treaties of the European Communities—the treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community—are applicable to cartels within the Common Market. They do not apply to export cartels whose activities relate only to exports from the Common Market.

Supervision of Export Cartels

Interest has been expressed by the committee in the relationship of foreign governments to export cartels. This relationship is dependent in large part upon the nature of the legislation whereby governments supervise or control export cartels. A few examples will illustrate this point.

As noted above, in the Federal Republic of Germany, "pure" export cartels are exempted from the basic antitrust law. However, they must be reported to the Federal Cartel Office, and they remain under the supervision of that Office even though no domestic restraints are involved. If the export cartel abuses the exemption granted to it, the Federal Cartel Office may direct the member firms of the export association to stop the restrictive practice or to amend the export

agreement, or the Office may invalidate the entire association. The control and supervision over export associations by the Federal Cartel Office is quite similar to that exercised by the Federal Trade Commission over Webb-Pomerene associations.

In Japan, export associations come within the jurisdiction of the Anti-Monopoly Act and the Export and Import Trading Act. Since one of the objectives of the latter act is to avoid serious impact of Japanese exports on the industries of other countries, these export associations are generally regarded as playing an important role in Japan's trade policy. These associations are closely supervised by the Fair Trade Commission and by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, both in terms of possible abuses and their contribution to the sound development of exports. This contrasts with certain other countries where the supervision is largely in terms of dealing only with abuses of export cartels.

For countries which do not have specific provisions in their antitrust laws on export associations and do not require any notification of such associations, as for example, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, any relationship between governments and their export associations would be informal.

On the matter of relationships between foreign cartels and U.S. firms or export associations, I can be very brief. U.S. firms or Webb-Pomerene export associations are prohibited by our antitrust laws from establishing formal relationships with foreign cartels or from acting in concert with such cartels. In other words, the Webb-Pomerene exemption does not apply to international export cartels; that is, arrangements among the exporters of more than one country. The leading case in this respect is the Alkali Case (1949), in which the Federal District Court said that agreements which divide world markets and fix international prices are not legitimate activities "in the course of export trade," as defined in the Webb-Pomerene Act.

The lack of detailed information on the nature and activities of foreign export car-

tels makes it very difficult to assess the competitive capabilities of foreign export cartels as compared with American export associations and the impact of export cartels on the ability of the United States to compete in world markets. For example, the OECD Working Party on Export Cartels concluded after a survey of existing export cartels, which covered such items as the number of participating firms in the cartel, the products and markets covered by the cartel, and the types of restrictions agreed upon, that the data available in different OECD member countries proved to be either incomparable in too many respects or too fragmentary to allow the establishment of comparative tables.

As for the competitive impact of export cartels on world markets, the data are so limited that it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has estimated that the percentage share of total U.S. exports accounted for by Webb-Pomerene associations averaged about 2.4 percent during the period 1958-62. Currently this percentage has declined to about 1-2 percent. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the value of exports under the German equivalent of the Webb-Pomerene Act in 1965 was estimated at less than 3 percent of total German exports. A comparable estimate for the United Kingdom in 1968 was 2-5 percent of total exports. As far as the United States is concerned, even though the ratio of cartelized exports to total exports is small, nevertheless the export associations may have an impact on the world market with respect to particular products. The Federal Trade Commission report (1967) does bring out the fact that export associations can play an important role as bargaining agents for U.S. products where there are only a few domestic producers, membership coverage by the association is high, and the U.S. position in world trade is large. Examples of such products cited in the report include sulfur and motion picture films.

This completes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Department Discusses Recent Events in Chile and U.S. Policy

Following is the basic statement for introductory remarks made before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on September 20 by Jack B. Kubisch, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.¹

I am very happy to appear before this committee today and discuss recent events in Chile and U.S. policy. Although this is my first formal appearance before the committee since becoming Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs several months ago, I have maintained contact with the chairman and have had opportunities to meet informally from time to time with other members of the committee.

I appreciate this opportunity to make a few opening remarks and will of course be glad to try and answer as many questions as you may care to ask. I will also be most interested in any views you care to express and can assure you they will be carefully considered.

There may be some matters you will wish to cover that should not be taken up at this time in a public session because of the still-evolving situation in Chile. However, I want you to know that I am prepared to discuss as fully and as candidly as I can all pertinent issues and if it appears that some of these would be inappropriate for public session I would be more than willing to continue this hearing in executive session. Subsequently, of course, we could release publicly all of the testimony that did not need to be classified.

If you wish, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to give you a brief summary of the current situation in Chile as we understand it, although I assume that most of the members present have a good idea of the general con-

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

ditions in the country now and events leading up to the coup.

However, perhaps I should take this opportunity at the outset to comment on false charges from some quarters that the U.S. Government had advance knowledge of or participated in some way in the overthrow and death of President Allende.

Gentlemen, I wish to state as flatly and as categorically as I possibly can that we did not have advance knowledge of the coup that took place on September 11. In the light of what I consider to be some rather imprecise reporting on the matter, I want to distinguish between our receiving reports about the *possibility* of a coup in Chile and our having advance *knowledge* that a coup would take place.

The facts are that we had received many reports over a long period of time about the possibility of a coup in Chile. Such reports and speculations were rife in Chile itself. Indeed, President Allende himself had commented publicly about them, and there was even a report in a Santiago daily newspaper on September 11 that a coup by the Chilean armed forces was scheduled for that very day.

All of the earlier reports that had speculated about or predicted coup attempts turned out to be false except the last one, which was received in our offices Tuesday morning, September 11, after the coup had already begun.

However, there was no contact whatsoever by the organizers and leaders of the coup directly with us, and we did not have definite knowledge of it in advance.

In a similar vein, either explicitly or implicitly, the U.S. Government has been charged with involvement or complicity in the coup. This is absolutely false. As official spokesmen of the U.S. Government have stated repeatedly, we were not involved in the coup in any way.

I would at this point like to comment also on the subject of U.S.-Chile economic relations during the past several years.

In my opinion, the position of the U.S. Government was quite correct and fully un-

derstandable. The United States had no desire to provoke a confrontation with the Allende government. On the contrary, strong efforts were repeatedly made to seek ways to resolve our differences, although there were expropriations without compensation by the Chilean Government of over \$700 million of American private investment during this period. In addition, Chile defaulted on over \$100 million in debt to the U.S. Government in the same period.

The facts are that there were no embargoes or restrictions placed on trade with Chile. U.S. firms continued to be major suppliers of food, parts, and equipment for the Chilean economy. Bilaterally, we continued a variety of programs, such as AID people-to-people activities, Food for Peace assistance, the Peace Corps, and scientific and cultural exchanges. We continued to disburse normally on the remaining AID loans after Dr. Allende ascended to office. While there were no new bilateral development loans, it should be noted that we had cut back sharply on AID development lending in Latin America, including Chile, even before the Allende government took office. In any case, the Chilean Government did not request any new development loans.

In the international field, multilateral banks continued to disburse existing loans to Chile totaling \$83 million from August 1971 to August 1973, this sum representing an increase in annual disbursements as compared with the three years prior to Dr. Allende's coming to power.

However, the economic policies themselves that were pursued by the Allende government resulted in the steadily deteriorating economic situation. The unwillingness of the government to modify its policies made it inevitable that international lending agencies would curtail their programs for Chile, and in any case, the United States could not have voted favorably for some of this assistance because of legal restrictions.

The Paris Club, consisting of various creditor nations, concluded there was little that could be done for Chile unless the government adopted policies they could support. I

repeat, however, that it was not the United States, but the institutions themselves, which made their decisions.

In sum it is untrue to say that the U.S. Government was responsible—either directly or indirectly—for the overthrow of the Allende regime.

Much concern has naturally been shown for the human tragedy that has resulted from recent events in Chile. The American people and their government have traditionally demonstrated such concern for the suffering of others throughout the world. The United States has given active support in numerous ways to alleviating suffering and furthering the respect of human rights. With regard to Chile, we have already expressed regret at the loss of human lives and at the death of President Allende.

We have also been concerned with reports of violations of human rights in Chile. However, to my knowledge, many of these reports are unsubstantiated and not necessarily indicative of the policies to be followed by the new Government of Chile once the situation there has fully stabilized.

Moreover, I understand that the Chilean authorities have already given the U.N. Human Rights Commission assurances with regard to the refugees in that country.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in closing I would like to emphasize once again that the situation in Chile is an evolving one. As the new government begins to set out its economic, social, and other policies, we will endeavor to formulate our own policies to respond to the realities of the new situation.

We were not responsible for the difficulties in which Chile found itself, and it is not for us to judge what would have been best or will now be best for the Chilean people.

That is for Chileans themselves to decide, and we respect their right to do this. If in the tasks that face them now, we can be of help, and if our help is wanted by Chile, I am sure we will do our best to provide it in the spirit of understanding and friendship that the American people have long felt for the people of Chile.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Hong Kong Sign Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on September 19 (press release 336) that notes had been exchanged at Hong Kong on September 18 which amended and extended the U.S.-Hong Kong bilateral cotton textile agreement. The term of the agreement is extended by one year to September 30, 1974. The aggregate level specified for exports of cotton textiles from Hong Kong during this period will be 511,022,059 square yards equivalent as compared with 477,144,780 square yards equivalent in the previous 12-month period. (For texts of the notes, see press release 336.)

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with annex. Done at New York October 26, 1956, as amended. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668.

Acceptances deposited: German Democratic Republic, September 18, 1973; Mongolia, September 20, 1973.

Aviation

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.

Acceptance deposited: Greece, September 20, 1973.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, September 21, 1973.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-

logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, September 19, 1973.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973.¹

Ratified by the President: September 13, 1973.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, July 3, 1973.

Cultural Property

Statutes of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. Adopted at New Delhi November-December 1956; as amended. Entered into force May 10, 1958; for the United States January 20, 1971. TIAS 7038.

Accession deposited: Paraguay, June 21, 1973.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Accepted by the President: September 13, 1972.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.

Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, El Salvador, September 5, 1973.

United Nations

Amendment to article 61 of the United Nations Charter, as amended (59 Stat. 1031, TIAS 5857, 6529), to enlarge the Economic and Social Council. Done at New York December 20, 1971.¹

Ratified by the President: September 13, 1973.

BILATERAL

Mexico

Agreement relating to the provision by the United States of communications equipment to combat contraband and especially the illegal flow of narcotics across the border. Effected by exchange of notes at México and Tlatelolco August 31, 1973. Entered into force August 31, 1973.

Pakistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of May 11, 1967 (TIAS 6258). Signed at Islamabad September 10, 1973. Entered into force September 10, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 (TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon August 15, 1973. Entered into force August 15, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Germany and Austria Released

Press release 312 dated August 28 (for release September 4)

The Department of State released on September 4 "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1948, volume II, "Germany and Austria." Two volumes, dealing with China and the Western Hemisphere, have already been published for the year 1948, and five more on other areas and subjects are in preparation. "Foreign Relations" has been published annually since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy.

This volume of 1,575 pages presents previously unpublished documentation on the efforts of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom to establish a viable and democratic German government in the portion of Germany under their control and to bring about the rehabilitation of German economic life. Much of the volume is devoted to the London Conference on Germany (March-June 1948) and to efforts to carry out the decisions reached there. The volume also includes documents on American policy with regard to reparations, restitution, and controls on German industry. Of particular interest is the section on the Berlin crisis, including the breakdown of Four Power authority in Germany, the blockade, the airlift, and the discussion of the Berlin problem at the United Nations in New York. The concluding sections of the volume deal with the protracted negotiations to draw up a treaty on Austria and on American policies aimed at achieving political stability and economic recovery in that country.

The "Foreign Relations" volumes are prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Volume II (listed as Department of State publication 8660; GPO cat. no. S1.1:948/v.II) may be purchased for \$8.75 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to "Superintendent of Documents" and sent to the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Recent Releases

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$16.35; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$14.50; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 20¢ each.

New Zealand	Cat. No. S1.123:N42Z Pub. 8251 6 pp.
Nigeria	Cat. No. S1.123:N56/2 Pub. 7953 8 pp.
Oman	Cat. No. S1.123:M97 Pub. 8070 5 pp.
Rwanda	Cat. No. S1.123:R94 Pub. 7916 5 pp.
Saudi Arabia	Cat. No. S1.123:SA8 Pub. 7835 8 pp.
Seychelles	Cat. No. S1.123:SE9 Pub. 8246 4 pp.
Spain	Cat. No. S1.123:SP2 Pub. 7800 8 pp.
Sudan	Cat. No. S1.123:SU2 Pub. 8022 6 pp.
Trinidad & Tobago	Cat. No. S1.123:T73 Pub. 8306 4 pp.
U.S.S.R.	Cat. No. S1.123:UN33 Pub. 7842 16 pp.
Upper Volta	Cat. No. S1.123:UP6V Pub. 8201 4 pp.
Venezuela	Cat. No. S1.123:V55 Pub. 7749 8 pp.

1973: The Year of Europe. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series is the text of an address given by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, before the annual meeting of the Associated Press editors at New York, N.Y., on April 23, 1973. Pub. 8710. European and British Commonwealth Series 78. 5 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S1.74:78).

The Necessity for Strength in an Era of Negotiation. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series is based on the text of an address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on April 23, 1973, on the occasion of the annual awards ceremonies of the Overseas Press Club at New York City. The journalists paid special tribute to the activities of the U.S. Committee of the International Committee to Free Journalists in Southeast Asia. Pub. 8718. General Foreign Policy Series 278. 4 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S1.71:278).

Fisheries—King and Tanner Crab. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7571. 15 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7571)

Fishing Operations—Northeastern Pacific Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7572. 14 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7572)

Fisheries—Northeastern Part of the Pacific Ocean off the United States Coast. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7573. 32 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7573)

Fisheries—Certain Fishery Problems on the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics extending the agreement of December 11, 1970, and the protocol of February 2, 1971, as extended. TIAS 7574. 5 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7574)

Fisheries—Consideration of Claims Resulting from Damage to Fishing Vessels or Gear and Measures to Prevent Fishing Conflicts. Agreement and annex and protocol, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7575. 44 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7575)

Military Mission to Iran. Agreement with Iran extending the agreement of October 6, 1947, as amended and extended. TIAS 7576. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7576)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Korea amending the agreement of February 14, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7578. 2 pp. 10¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7578)

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on September 21 confirmed the nomination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of State.

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the following nominations:

James E. Akins to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Ellsworth Bunker to be Ambassador at Large.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., to be Ambassador to Afghanistan.

Roger Kirk to be Ambassador to the Somali Democratic Republic.

Carol C. Laise to be an Assistant Secretary of State [for Public Affairs].

Robert G. Neumann to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 17 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 312 of August 28 and 331 of September 14.

No.	Date	Subject
*333	9/18	Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Oct. 5.
†334	9/18	Office established to coordinate law of the sea matters (rewrite).
*335	9/18	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Oct. 1.
336	9/19	U.S. and Hong Kong sign cotton textile agreement, Sept. 18 (rewrite).
*337	9/20	Jordan selects chancery site in International Center.
*338	9/20	U.S. Advisory Commission on International and Cultural Affairs, Oct. 5.
*339	9/21	Law of the Sea Advisory Committee, Sept. 21-22.
*340	9/22	Biography of Secretary Kissinger.

Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXIX • No. 1790 • October 15, 1973

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A Durable Peace

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*¹

I come before you today—confirmed in office but two days ago—as probably the world's most junior Foreign Minister. That President Nixon should ask me as my first official act to speak here for the United States reaffirms the importance that my country attaches to the values and ideals of the United Nations.

It would be idle to deny that the American people, like many others, have sometimes been disappointed because this organization has not been more successful in translating the hopes for universal peace of its architects into concrete accomplishments.

But despite our disappointments, my country remains committed to the goal of a world community. We will continue to work in this Parliament of Man to make it a reality.

Two centuries ago, the philosopher Kant predicted that perpetual peace would come eventually—either as the creation of man's moral aspirations or as the consequence of physical necessity. What seemed utopian then looms as tomorrow's reality; soon there will be no alternative. Our only choice is whether the world envisaged in the charter will come about as the result of our vision or of a catastrophe invited by our shortsightedness.

The United States has made its choice. My country seeks true peace, not simply an armistice. We strive for a world in which the rule of law governs and fundamental human rights are the birthright of all. Beyond the bilateral diplomacy, the pragmatic agreements, and dramatic steps of recent years, we en-

visage a comprehensive, institutionalized peace—a peace which this organization is uniquely situated to foster and to anchor in the hearts of men.

This will be the spirit of American foreign policy.

This attitude will guide our work in this organization.

We start from a bedrock of solid progress. Many of the crises that haunted past General Assemblies have been put behind us. Agreement has been reached on Berlin; there is a cease-fire in the Middle East; the Viet-Nam war has been ended. The rigid confrontation that has dominated international life and weakened this organization for a quarter of a century has been softened.

The United States and the Soviet Union have perceived a commonality of interest in avoiding nuclear holocaust and in establishing a broad web of constructive relationships. Talks on strategic arms limitation have already produced historic accords aimed at slowing the arms race and insuring strategic stability; we have, today, resumed negotiations on this subject. The positive results we hope for will enhance the security of all mankind.

Two decades of estrangement between the United States and the People's Republic of China have given way to constructive dialogue and productive exchanges. President Nixon has met with the leaders of that nation; we have agreed to a historic communique that honestly sets forth both our differences and our common principles; and we have each opened a Liaison Office in the capital of the other.

¹ Made before the 28th session of the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 24 (press release 343).

Many other countries have seized the initiative and contributed—in substance and spirit—to the relaxation of tensions. The nations of Europe and North America are engaged in a conference to further security and cooperation. The two German states have taken their place in this Assembly. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have begun to move toward a welcome reconciliation. North and South Korea are at last engaged in a dialogue which we hope will lead to a new era of peace and security.

Yet these achievements, solid as they are, have only made less precarious the dangers and divisions inherited from the postwar era. We have ended many of the confrontations of the cold war; yet, even in this room, the vocabulary of suspicion persists. Relaxation of tensions is justified by some as merely a tactical interlude before renewed struggle. Others suspect the emergence of a two-power condominium. And as tension between the two original blocs has eased, a third grouping increasingly assumes the characteristics of a bloc of its own—the alignment of the non-aligned.

So the world is uneasily suspended between old slogans and new realities, between a view of peace as but a pause in an unending struggle and a vision of peace as a promise of global cooperation.

From Détente to Cooperation

In 1946 James Byrnes, the first Secretary of State to address this Assembly, spoke of how the United Nations could help break down habits of thinking in national isolation and move toward universal understanding and tolerance among all peoples.

The United States will never be satisfied with a world of uneasy truces, of offsetting blocs, of accommodations of convenience. We know that power can enforce a resigned passivity, but only a sense of justice can enlist consensus. We strive for a peace whose stability rests not merely on a balance of forces, but on shared aspirations. We are convinced that a structure which ignores humane values will prove cold and empty and unfulfilling to most of mankind.

The United States deeply believes:

—That justice cannot be confined by national frontiers.

—That truth is universal and not the peculiar possession of a single people or group or ideology.

—That compassion and humanity must enable all our endeavors.

In this spirit we ask the Assembly to move with us from détente to cooperation, from coexistence to community.

Moving Toward Greater Stability

Our journey must begin with the world as it is and with the issues now before us. The United States will spare no effort to ease tensions further and to move toward greater stability:

—We shall continue, in the spirit of the Shanghai communique, our search for a new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

—We shall work to promote positive trends elsewhere in Asia. The uncertain peace in Indochina must be strengthened; the world community cannot afford, or permit, a relapse into war in that region.

—We shall continue to pursue vigorously the building of constructive relations with the Soviet Union.

—We shall strive to promote conciliation in Europe. In the negotiations beginning next month we shall seek a reduction of the military forces that have faced each other for so long across that divided continent.

—We shall give new vigor to our policy of partnership in the Western Hemisphere.

—We shall honor our pledge to promote self-determination, economic development, and human dignity across the continent of Africa.

—We shall press on with strategic arms limitation talks. We consider them crucial for security and stability in this period.

—We shall search for solutions to the worldwide problem of conventional weapons, which drain our resources and fuel the fires of local conflict.

In these efforts, the United States will be guided by fundamental principles:

—We have no desire for domination. We will oppose—as we have consistently opposed throughout this century—any nation that chooses this path. We have not been asked to participate in a condominium; we would reject such an appeal if it were made.

—We will never abandon our allies or our friends. The strengthening of our traditional ties is the essential foundation for the development of new relationships with old adversaries.

—We will work for peace through the United Nations as well as through bilateral relationships.

We recognize our special obligation, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to assist in the search for just solutions in those parts of the world now torn by strife, such as the Middle East. While we cannot substitute for the efforts of those most directly involved, we are prepared to use our influence to generate a spirit of accommodation and to encourage the parties toward practical progress.

The Quality of Life

But progress on the traditional agenda is not enough. The more we succeed in solving political problems, the more other and perhaps deeper challenges emerge. As the world grows more stable, we must confront the question of the ends of détente. As the threat of war recedes, the problem of the quality of life takes on more urgent significance.

We are, in fact, members of a community drawn by modern science, technology, and new forms of communication into a proximity for which we are still politically unprepared. Technology daily outstrips the ability of our institutions to cope with its fruits. Our political imagination must catch up with our scientific vision. This is at the same time the greatest challenge and the greatest opportunity of this organization:

—The pollution of the skies, the seas, and the land is a global problem.

—The increased consumption of cereals

and protein has reduced world food reserves to dangerously low levels.

—The demand for energy is outrunning supply, and the need for technological innovation is urgent.

—The growth of the world's economy is inhibited by restrictive trading blocs and an insufficiently flexible international monetary system.

—The exploitation of the resources of the ocean beds, which is essential for the needs of burgeoning populations, requires global cooperation lest it degenerate into global contention.

Challenges of this magnitude cannot be solved by a world fragmented into self-contained nation-states or rigid blocs.

Areas of Common Action

I do not intend today to cover the whole agenda of international cooperation. Rather, I shall speak briefly of some illustrative areas of common action. I pledge the readiness of the United States to solve these problems cooperatively and to submit proposals aimed at their resolution.

1. *A world community requires the curbing of conflict.*

The United Nations, in its 28-year history, has not always been idle in this sphere. In Indonesia, the Indian Subcontinent, the Middle East, the Congo, and in Cyprus, it has shown its ability for effective factfinding, mediation, and peacekeeping missions. This central aspect of the U.N.'s work must be strengthened. On a small planet, so bound together by technology and so interdependent economically, we can no longer afford the constant eruption of conflict and the danger of its spread.

Yet, in recent years we have found ourselves locked in fruitless debates about the inauguration of peacekeeping operations and over the degree of control the Security Council would exercise over peacekeeping machinery—an impasse which insured only that permanent peacekeeping machinery would not come into being. Each peacekeeping unit we have formed to cope with an emergency

has been an improvisation growing out of argument and controversy.

We should delay no longer. The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, confidently, and effectively in future crises. To break the deadlock, the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. If all countries concerned approach this problem with a desire to achieve a cooperative solution, the United Nations can achieve a major step forward during this session.

2. *A world community must have the widest possible membership.*

The exclusion of any qualified state denies representation not only to governments but to peoples. Membership in this body should be a step toward reconciliation, not a source of conflict. The time has come for North and South Korea to be offered their rightful places here, without prejudice to a future evolution toward unification.

In this spirit also, we support the permanent membership of Japan in the Security Council.

3. *A world community must assure that all its people are fed.*

The growing threat to the world's food supply deserves the urgent attention of this Assembly. Since 1969, global consumption of cereals has risen more rapidly than production; stocks are at the lowest levels in years. We now face the prospect that—even with bumper crops—the world may not rebuild its seriously depleted reserves in this decade.

No one country can cope with this problem. The United States therefore proposes:

—That a World Food Conference be organized under United Nations auspices in 1974 to discuss ways to maintain adequate food supplies, and to harness the efforts of all nations to meet the hunger and malnutrition resulting from natural disasters.

—That nations in a position to do so offer technical assistance in the conservation of food. The United States is ready to join with others in providing such assistance.

4. *A world community cannot remain divided between the permanently rich and the permanently poor.*

Let us therefore resolve that this Assembly, this year, initiate a search—drawing on the world's best minds—for new and imaginative solutions to the problems of development. Our search must be candid and realistic, but it must also be free of peremptory demands, antagonistic propositions, ideological confrontation, or propagandistic rhetoric—or we will surely fail.

The United States is prepared to join in this new search, providing freely of the experience gained over two decades. We have learned not to exaggerate our capacity to transform nations—but we have also learned much about what progress is possible.

We will participate without preconditions, with a conciliatory attitude and a cooperative commitment. We ask only that others adopt the same approach.

In this spirit the United States is willing to examine seriously the proposal by the distinguished President of Mexico for a Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States. Such a document will make a significant and historic contribution if it reflects the true aspirations of all nations; if it is turned into an indictment of one group of countries by another, it will accomplish nothing. To command general support—and to be implemented—the proposed rights and duties must be defined equitably and take into account the concerns of industrialized as well as of developing countries. The United States stands ready to define its responsibilities in a humane and cooperative spirit.

5. *Finally, a world community must harness science and technology for the benefit of all.*

We must begin to match our remarkable technological skills with our equally remarkable technological needs. We must find the means for the cooperative and judicious development of our energy resources. We must responsibly confront the problems of population growth, which are fast pushing humanity toward the limits of what our earth

can sustain. We must embark on a new scientific revolution to increase agricultural productivity in all lands. No field of human endeavor is so dependent upon an open world for its advancement; no field is so in need of international cooperation to cope with its potential dangers.

Mr. President, fellow delegates: Are we prepared to accept the imperatives of a global society and infuse our labors with a new vision? Or shall we content ourselves with a temporary pause in the turmoil that has wracked our century? Shall we proceed with one-sided demands and sterile confrontations? Or shall we proceed in a spirit of compromise produced by a sense of common destiny? We must move from hesitant cooperation born of necessity to genuine collective effort based on common purpose.

It is a choice no country can make alone. We can repeat old slogans or strive for new hope. We can fill the record of our proceedings with acrimony, or we can dedicate ourselves to dealing with man's deepest needs. The ideal of a world community may be derided as unrealistic—but great constructions have always been ideals before they can become realities. Let us dedicate ourselves to this noblest of all possible goals and achieve at last what has so long eluded us: true understanding and tolerance among mankind.

President Calls for Maintenance of Strong Defense Posture

Following is the text of a letter dated September 20 from President Nixon to Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott. Similar letters were sent to Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Senator John C. Stennis, Chairman, Armed Services Committee.

White House press release dated September 22

SEPTEMBER 20, 1973.

DEAR SENATOR SCOTT: I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have sent to Chairman Stennis indicating my specific concerns about

the Defense Procurement Bill now on the the Senate floor. I thought it might be useful to explain to you the reasons for those concerns.

Current efforts in the Congress to reduce the FY 74 Defense budget are deeply disturbing to me. Prior to submission in January, that budget was carefully reviewed, both within the Department of Defense and within the National Security Council system. During this review, the strategic and diplomatic implications of lower budgets were thoroughly assessed. Difficult choices had to be made because we were mindful of the need to hold down spending in order to combat inflation. Marginal defense programs were eliminated and other programs trimmed. I was convinced then, and I am convinced now, that the request I finally sent the Congress was the minimum level consistent with the Nation's security interests and our foreign policy objectives.

There is no doubt in my mind that a strong defense posture is closely linked to the past success and future development of our foreign policies. A strong military posture was a key factor in our opening of contacts with the Chinese and efforts to improve our relations with the Soviets—steps which were in the interest of the entire nation. A strong defense posture will continue to be a crucial ingredient as we try to maintain close relations with our traditional allies and to prevent conflicts and crises that could undermine efforts to continue to strengthen relations with the potential adversaries.

It is ironic that in this critical period in which the United States has so much at stake in the international arena, arguments to erode our military posture have gained such currency. We are now engaged in crucial efforts to improve our trade relationships, to reform the international monetary system, and to obtain oil supplies from parts of the world fraught with tension. Strong American military forces, by making a vital contribution to international stability, provide us with the influence and leverage we need in negotiating with both our allies and our

potential enemies. All of our efforts to secure a more peaceful and prosperous world will be endangered if we unilaterally erode our defense posture.

Unilateral reductions would be particularly destructive for two sets of negotiations that will begin soon and will have a profound effect upon the future. Within a matter of about a month, we will be embarking on a new and extremely important phase of the strategic arms limitation talks. The SALT talks will focus on ways of controlling the qualitative aspects of the arms race. This would be a most inopportune time to weaken our position unilaterally by cutting back on new U.S. weapons systems that demonstrate to the Soviets we will not stand aside while they continue to make qualitative improvements to their forces.

The second set of negotiations—discussions with the Warsaw Pact regarding mutual troop reductions in Europe—should also begin shortly. A strong defense capability and a visible posture of unity on the part of the American public, its Congress and Executive are an essential ingredient in the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] negotiations. We cannot expect the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously if they believe that by slowing negotiations they can get troop reductions at no cost to themselves.

But the issue of national defense goes beyond issues of foreign policy. It goes to the heart of the question of our priorities as a Nation. My judgment is that in today's world this nation cannot afford less defense. We have in the past tried to shrug off the burden of defense only to find that conflict reached us nonetheless. We paid a tragic price for that unpreparedness.

Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger, Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] and many other military advisers can provide you with all the necessary details on the specifics of the programs I have recommended and the particular reasons why the cuts the Congress is considering will be a serious blow to the national interest. While I

will leave to them the discussion of the details, I would like to mention several areas of particular concern:

—A unilateral cut in our NATO troops would begin a serious unraveling of the fabric of NATO. It would completely disrupt our MBFR and burden-sharing negotiations.

—A reduction in military assistance for South Vietnam and Laos would be unwise during this delicate period of transition to peace. Our request was the minimum funding necessary and I ask your support in restoring the cuts.

—Failure to develop and produce new weapons would cripple our efforts to provide the forces and equipment we will need for our security five to ten and even fifteen years into the future. Our potential adversaries continue to press ahead with their weapons development programs. If we fail to do likewise, our national security could be threatened at some point in the future.

—Severe reductions in authorized manpower, as proposed in the Senate bill, would gravely jeopardize our efforts to maintain adequate force levels for both present and future needs. Adequate manpower is the most critical input to our Defense posture and should not be reduced below current levels, which are already the lowest in 23 years.

An adequate defense must not become a partisan issue. A strong and ready military force is an asset to all Americans and supports all of their interests. Therefore, the Congress and the Executive Branch must work together to provide the funds, the manpower and the leadership needed to assure this capability. I ask for your support in this most critical effort.

I am sending similar letters to Mike Mansfield and John Stennis.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

The Honorable HUGH SCOTT
Minority Leader, United States Senate,
Washington, D.C.

Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at New York

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on September 26.

Press release 349 dated September 27

Ladies and gentlemen: I wanted to give you a brief account of what I have been doing here and then answer your questions, hopefully relating primarily to my activities in New York.

You know my schedule, so there is no point in repeating that. My activities consisted of the speech to the General Assembly, meetings with various Foreign Ministers, and meetings with my staff in preparation for entering the State Department on Thursday, where I still haven't been.

Now, about my speech to the General Assembly, the intention was to convey the tone, philosophy, and the attitude of the administration in its conduct of foreign policy for the remainder of this term.

We wanted to convey, beyond the specific initiatives that might be proposed, that the task which is before us now is to consolidate what has been achieved, to construct something that can endure, both within our country—because it has popular and governmental support—and above all, something that can endure internationally—because it is seen to be in the common interest.

This attitude and general philosophy, we felt, was more important at this stage than a list of specific proposals—although some were made—because you are familiar with the main outlines of many of our policies.

So for the President's second term, our agenda is to try to create an international consensus to international order that is seen to be just by all or at least the greatest number—something that embodies humane and progressive ideas.

In my conversations with the Foreign Ministers, I obviously had to deal primarily with the current agenda. On my trip this week I saw a great many of our allies. I saw many of the Foreign Ministers from Europe. I saw, of course, the Foreign Minister of Japan. I spent some time with Foreign Minister Gromyko and today with the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China. I had a long and fruitful talk with the Foreign Minister of Brazil to underline the great importance we attach to reinvigorating our relationships in that area. And I saw the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Korea.

Let me say a word about the conversations with our European friends and also the relation of Japan to that process.

There has been a great deal of speculation tied to a possible trip of the President to Europe. We still, of course, plan this trip, but its exact date will have to be determined by the pace of our preparation.

Much of the speculation has been in terms of an adversary relationship between us and the Europeans and great difficulty in coming to an agreement. I would like to correct this impression. What we are confronting in the dialogue with the Europeans is the merging of several processes. There is the process of European integration. There is the process of the debate on security within NATO. And there is the redefinition of the Atlantic relationship, which covers all these areas.

As you know, on behalf of the President, I proposed a new Atlantic Declaration of Principles in a speech I gave in April.¹

There was some uncertainty in Europe on how and in what forum to respond; several months were spent in internal discussions within Europe—whether the proper forum

¹ For text of the address, see BULLETIN of May 14, 1973, p. 593.

would be NATO, a series of bilateral negotiations with the Europeans, or a series of talks between the United States and the Common Market.

The result has been that after some months of going all these routes European opinion crystallized. It was decided that those economic matters—and political considerations relevant to economic matters—relevant to Europe as an entity should be discussed by the Nine, as a unit, with the United States. It was also decided that security issues—and those political issues relevant to security matters—should be discussed in the NATO Council. And then of course bilateral channels have remained open throughout this process.

With respect to the declaration that the European Nine have developed and that was presented to me yesterday on behalf of the Nine by Foreign Minister Andersen of Denmark, let me say that the United States recognizes that this first attempt by Europe to speak with one voice on a political matter of transatlantic relationships is an event of the greatest significance.

The United States in the postwar period has constantly supported the emergence of a European identity, and we therefore welcome the fact that Europe has now organized itself well enough so that it can speak to us with one voice. It may be that in historical retrospect this meeting of the European Nine in Copenhagen will be seen as one of the decisive events of the postwar period.

At the same time, the United States of course reserves the right to its own opinion with respect to the outcome of these deliberations. They were not presented to the United States on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. They were presented to us in a spirit of partnership as the opening of a dialogue. Therefore, this Saturday the Political Directors of the Nine and Assistant Secretary [of State for European Affairs Walter J.] Stoessel are going to meet for a discussion in which we will blend our ideas—or attempt to blend our ideas—with those of Europe in this declaration of economic and political principles.

Secondly, as you know, there are discussions taking place right now in NATO dealing with the definition of future allied relationships. They concern security and the political aspects of security. There is general agreement that these discussions will be energetically pursued within the context of the NATO Council. We expect to make a significant contribution to this. And so will other countries.

What I want to underline here is that we are not engaged in an adversary procedure. We are engaged in a process in which we intend to give traditional friendship new vitality.

The trip of the President is not an end in itself. The trip of the President will certainly take place in the near future, but our concern is to produce documents that will have some historic significance. We believe that we are now well on the way toward accomplishing what we set out to do earlier this year. The discussions have been useful, and they will proceed in a constructive spirit.

It was of course inevitable in the conversations with Japan that its relationship to these various efforts would be a subject of conversation.

Since the Japanese Foreign Minister and Prime Minister are going to be visiting Europe in the next few weeks, it would not be appropriate for me to comment, except to say that in my speech of April 23 we outlined the American point of view. We believe that at some stage of this process, in some manner, it is important for Japan to participate.

The manner and the kind of declaration remains to be discussed. I think it will continue to be discussed between the Japanese and ourselves and between the Japanese and the Europeans on the trip of senior Japanese officials through Europe.

I will make no comment about the conversations we had with the Representative of the People's Republic of China and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet the President on Friday in Washington, and after that he and I will have a lunch. Therefore, we are still in the middle of our dis-

cussions, which cover the entire agenda of U.S.-Soviet relationships.

While I was here, I also met with the Representatives of African nations and with the Representatives of Arab states here at the United Nations. These meetings were not intended as pronouncements of new policy, but as expressions of our profound concern. We do not want to pretend to answers that have not yet been found. But we can pledge in both areas that we will make an effort at understanding and an attempt to find just solutions.

I think now it would be best if I took your questions.

Emigration Policy of the Soviet Union

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is not patently your talk with Andrei Gromyko, which you ruled out, but I would like to ask a question about his public speech in the Assembly, in which he demands that Western nations stop meddling in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union—and I think something in connection principally with the emigration policy of the Soviet Union. The manner in which he spoke of it left us uncertain as to whether this really meant any lessening of the spirit of détente or whether it was simply a public gesture in a private game. Could you—

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, during my confirmation hearings I was asked extensively about this issue. It is also an issue about which I plan to make a formal statement sometime in the next month or six weeks. But for now, let me reiterate what I said then.

The United States of course has its own deeply held views about the human values at stake—both in emigration policies and in internal policies.

The foreign policy question we face is: first, the degree to which our foreign policy can directly affect others and, secondly, the alternatives we in fact confront if our direct actions are ineffective.

There is a great tendency to assume that everything that has been achieved is now automatically permanent and can be drawn

upon as if its capital were inexhaustible.

We have taken the position that we would not, as a government, take a formal public position. But we have also taken the position that insofar as we have influence in other ways, we would use it to the limit of our capabilities.

Now, you are all familiar with the fact that the emigration tax is not being enforced. On an unofficial basis we have brought many hardship cases that were submitted to us by various organizations here to the attention of various officials. Many of those have been permitted to emigrate.

So the choice we have to make is between a public stance and the influence that our general relationship gives us.

We believe that we have been quite effective. But we should keep in mind that there is a point beyond which one cannot press a situation as it exists.

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a sworn affidavit made public in Washington yesterday, your former National Security aide David Young cited your name as authority in requesting the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. Can you tell us whether you authorized Young to use your name in such a manner?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I do not know whether David Young used my name in such a manner, because all his affidavit said is: "This is the impression of the man making this affidavit." And I want to add that I have to choose my words here carefully, because you know David Young is under indictment and I do not want to complicate his case.

In my confirmation hearings, both in public and in executive session, I stated my position very clearly. I did not know of any of the activities of David Young after he left my staff and joined Mr. [John D.] Ehrlichman's staff, except for one project on declassification which was publicly announced.

I did not know about the request for a profile. I never saw this profile. I never discussed this subject with David Young. And therefore, if my name was used, which I

cannot confirm, it was used without authority.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what significance does your upcoming African trip have, specifically for black Americans who identify themselves very closely with Africa and its problems?

Secretary Kissinger: My upcoming African trip was promised for the year 1974; it is not a trip that I will take in the very immediate future.

The significance is that, at the highest level in the State Department and in the administration, we are going to take a new look at our African policy. We want to see what useful role the United States can play in a continent which is undergoing very rapid change and which has many problems, some of which I mentioned yesterday.

Q. You say there is a point beyond which the détente should not be pressed. I wonder if you could outline what you think might happen if the Congress revokes or blocks the most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union in the new trade bill.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speculate about Soviet actions. I have stated previously that the most-favored-nation clause was part of a general arrangement with the Soviet Union in negotiations extending over a period of many years. If now the most-favored-nation clause is blocked, then the most serious question has to be raised about the degree to which other countries—in this case the Soviet Union—can rely on a complex negotiation and about the performance of the United States, over a period of time, of its commitment. There was no reason to suppose at the time that this most-favored-nation issue was discussed with the Soviet Union that the type of problem that is now blocking it could be the subject of conditions in Congress. It had never been so used in any previous case where most-favored-nation status was requested for a Communist country. Therefore it would certainly be a significant setback in the policy that we are pursuing.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there's been some talk about the convocation of a special conference on the Middle East. I was wondering whether the United States favors such a conference in the near future.

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. position on the Middle East has been that we should avoid at this time any very dramatic moves until we have had an opportunity to discuss with the parties what the possibilities are and how far they are prepared to go in moving toward a just peace in the Middle East. I think the calling of a conference before one has determined the framework and has some understanding as to objectives would be putting the cart before the horse.

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

Q. Mr. Secretary, the other day in the General Assembly you said the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Can you tell us more precisely what you meant by that "more central role"?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, the issue of peacekeeping has been deadlocked in these negotiations between the belief of some—that has included us—that the Secretary General should have very wide discretionary authority and the belief of others that the Security Council should control even the day-to-day operations of such a force.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute; I'm not finished yet—or do you want to comment on my remarks?

Q. No! [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared now to take into account the view of those who want the Security Council to take a more active role, although we cannot go all the way with them into the detailed day-to-day supervision. So my speech was to signal to the other parties concerned—permanent members of the Security Council, countries

that have traditionally supplied forces, and other interested parties—that if they are willing to meet us in a cooperative spirit, if they are willing to work for a force that can act expeditiously, they will make a major effort to meet their common concerns. We are prepared to give the Security Council a greater role, but not such a role that it can hamstring day-to-day operations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some of your views on the prospect of the Korean question debate this year at the United Nations, particularly if the question begins to fall into another long series of international delays? Then would you welcome any chance of a higher dialogue negotiation between the major nation countries—namely, among the Security Council members—to avoid confrontation at the United Nations of the problem?

Secretary Kissinger: Our view with respect to all issues is that there should be a great deal of private diplomacy—that the United Nations can be most effective if no side pushes its view to an absolute and public extreme. Then standard positions harden and compromises become extremely difficult.

So, with respect to the Korean question, we believe that the South Korean Government, in its June 23 proposal, has made some very constructive initiatives; it has advanced some very constructive initiatives. We believe they deserve the most serious consideration.

On our part, we would welcome quiet discussions—among the permanent members as well as among other interested parties—and we hope that everyone concerned will use this debate as a means of conciliation rather than of confrontation.

New Atlantic Relationships

Q. Mr. Secretary—Dr. Kissinger, you said the President's speech would take place in the very near future, and you say—

Secretary Kissinger: The President's what?

Q. Excuse me—the President's trip would take place in the very near future—and it

was hoped that it would produce documents of very major significance. Should we link the two at the same time?

Secretary Kissinger: No. Of course, a great deal depends on what you mean by "very near future." What I'm saying is we now have a process and we have the outline of the ideas that can form the outcome of that process.

You should clearly link in your mind that the President's trip will have to result from progress in these talks. And again I want to stress: We're not looking for a publicity maneuver; we're not simply looking for a document that everyone can sign—because that's relatively easy to achieve and we're within sight of achieving this already.

We have made a very serious proposal. It is based on our conviction that Atlantic relationships have basically changed in the last 25 years, partly as a result of the success of previous policies. We think that in order to give a new impetus to them—in order in a period of détente to reaffirm the significance of friends—we have to develop a new vision of the future.

This is not done in the American interests; it is done in the common interest. That is what we consider a "document of historic significance."

We believe that it is achievable; we believe that some progress has been made; that process will now continue. As I think Mr. McCloskey [Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey] has already pointed out, I plan to be in England about October 15 to give a speech to the Pilgrims. On that occasion I plan to meet with several of my colleagues of the European Foreign Ministers. And we believe that we are now well underway, but we're not setting up any artificial deadlines. The outcome of the deliberations will determine the timing of the President's trip.

Q. Dr. Kissinger—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes?

Q. —if there is a delay in arriving at a consensus between the United States and Europe on shared goals, are you concerned at all that this will have an effect in slowing

détente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the sense that the subjects of détente are basically the question of European security and mutual and balanced force reductions, which are the matters being discussed between the United States and Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe, as détente progresses, that the redefinition of relationships with our friends in both Europe and Asia becomes very important, because so much of the original relationship was based on the fear of military aggression, which presumably would be lessened by the progress of détente.

Now, whether you can reverse this and say that if these negotiations slow down—that, I think, is much more problematical. Therefore I would rather phrase it positively: that it is the duty of statesmanship in this period to see to it that relations among friends keep pace with relationships among former adversaries. And it does not make any sense that we should make slower progress with our friends than we are making with our adversaries. We don't accept that proposition, and there's no reason for you to believe that that is what is going to happen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you envisage détente with Cuba as part of your definition of the policy force in Latin America?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I've stated our view with respect to Cuba before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think we will first have to discuss this question fully with our friends in Latin America before we can address this question.

U.S. Role in the Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, the average American regards the efforts of Dr. Henry Kissinger as being a prime motivation for working toward a resolution of the Viet-Nam war. Now, as you become Secretary of State and you turn your attempts to an area of the world like the Middle East, the average American might think that you could go in again and

bring about what other people have not been able to accomplish. As you look toward that troubled spot as you looked toward Viet-Nam, how do you see your role and could you bring about something like that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, while I think it has been pointed out that humility is not my most distinctive trait [laughter], I do think it is important that foreign policy in this phase not be identified with one individual or with virtuoso performances.

When this administration came into office, we faced a series of emergency situations that had to be dealt with by emergency measures. But if we are going to build truly, we have to construct a more permanent peace through more regular procedures and in a less personalized way.

Now, with respect to the Middle East, it would be a great mistake to assume that any one man can pull a rabbit out of the hat. The difficulties in the Middle East occurred not because the parties don't understand each other but, in some respects, because they understand each other only too well. [Laughter.]

And we cannot substitute ourselves for the parties concerned. Even in Indochina—as our critics have often pointed out—it took four years to bring about a settlement, which also, incidentally, was the period of time that it took France to disengage in Algeria.

In the Middle East, we are prepared to use our influence to urge the parties toward a spirit of compromise—to encourage them in the process of negotiation. But you cannot expect—and no one should ask us—to produce all the formulas and all the will as a substitute for that of the other parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Senate voted today to reduce U.S. forces abroad 40 percent in the next two years. Is that a good idea, and how will it affect the U.S. position and negotiating capability in the talks on the mutual and balanced force reductions and the limiting of strategic weapons?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, the administration strongly opposes this type of resolution. It will be impossible to nego-

tiate an agreement for the reduction of forces when the United States unilaterally accomplishes what the negotiations are supposed to bring about. It will be very difficult—if not impossible—to convince our allies of the steadiness of American policy when the United States, again unilaterally, before our discussions have well advanced, reduces its forces in Europe.

And I might point out that it is somewhat contradictory to be asked at one and the same time to conduct a foreign policy designed to bring about a transformation of the Soviet system and to cut one's forces for defense.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, you mentioned—in your growing relationship with Europe, you mentioned your concern with the countries of Japan and in Asia. Canada is one of the largest, if not the largest, trading partners with the United States today. Where do we fit in with your plans for Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know—shall I repeat the question? As you know, I met with your Foreign Minister, and this obviously was a subject of conversation.

Procedurally, Canada—as we are now envisioning the procedure there will be at least two declarations: one between the United States and the Common Market and another dealing with the United States and NATO. Of course Canada is part of NATO and will be a full participant in the discussions concerning NATO.

With respect to the U.S. association with the Common Market, Canada is technically not part of it. We will proceed in closest consultation with Canada with respect to this, and we are openminded about an association that Canada may wish to make to such a declaration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now what are your relations with Nigeria?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, obviously, it was impossible to cover every country in the world in the speech. I tried to convey that we will deal with Africa with understanding and with concern. Nigeria is, of course, one of the most important countries in Africa. It was visited by the Secretary of State two years ago.

We understand that your President is visiting here, and we are hoping that he can also pay a call on us in Washington.

So we consider Nigeria a very important, potentially decisive country in Africa.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

Dr. Abshire Named Special Consultant on Congressional Affairs

The Department of State announced on September 27 (press release 351) that Secretary Kissinger has asked David M. Abshire, chairman of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, to conduct a series of interviews with a broad and representative cross section of the Congress. (For biographic data, see press release 351.) The purpose of the interviews is to obtain an authentic expression of congressional expectations and needs in connection with Secretary Kissinger's expressed intention to work very closely with the Congress on national security and foreign relations problems. Dr. Abshire will seek the views of the Congress on the means by which a nonpartisan atmosphere and continuing program of close cooperation and broad understanding can be maintained between the executive and legislative branches. The interviews will take place over the next several weeks, after which Dr. Abshire will report to Secretary Kissinger his findings and recommendations.

Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan Visits the United States

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan made an official visit to the United States September 17-24. He visited Washington September 18-20, where he met with President Nixon and other government officials. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Nixon and Prime Minister Bhutto at a welcoming ceremony in the East Room of the White House on September 18, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, and the text of a joint statement issued on September 20.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 24

President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Bhutto, all of our distinguished guests from Pakistan, and all of our other distinguished guests from the United States: Mr. Prime Minister, you are no stranger to our country. You not only have made many visits here; we are very proud of the fact that in my native State of California you attended the great University of California for three years.

I am no stranger to your country. I have visited it with Mrs. Nixon when I was Vice President on two occasions, on two occasions or three occasions when I was out of office, and then again in 1969.

As you come to our country today, however, you come in a different capacity. For the first time, it is my honor on behalf of all our guests and the American people to welcome you as the head of your government. In welcoming you, it gives me an opportunity to remind the American people and the people of Pakistan, and for that matter the people of the world, of the friendship that has bound our two countries together for over a

generation. You, who have seen our country, know that friendship. I, who have visited your country, know it well.

I can only say that it is a friendship that will continue in the years ahead. And I can add this: that the independence and the integrity of Pakistan is a cornerstone of American foreign policy.

I can also add that our hearts have gone out to you in the difficult times through which Pakistan has passed over the past few months—and years, for that matter. And certainly you deserve the congratulations of the whole world for the way that you have guided your country in this era of trying to restore the nation after the ravages of war.

And as if that were not enough, then to have come upon your country one of the worst floods in history would seem to have been too much for a brave people, as your people are brave, but also for a new leader.

But even in that period, too, your people have shown that whether it is war or whether it happens to be the ravages of nature, you will survive and you will come through stronger in the end; and with your leadership, you have demonstrated that over and over again.

In our meetings, we will of course discuss the bilateral issues which we have between us in which we find ourselves on basic agreement in so many areas. We will discuss what contribution we can make to an era of peace in the whole subcontinent, as well as in the balance of Asia. And I trust also we will have the opportunity to get your views on world problems generally, because no country in the world can any longer be apart from the rest of the world and what happens halfway around the world, in Pakistan, for example, affects us and what happens halfway around

the world from you affects you. And so together, I am sure that our talks will contribute to not only better relations between our two countries but also a more peaceful world for our children in the years to come.

And finally, on one, shall we say, symbolic note, as you know, we are having this ceremony in the East Room and only a few of those who wanted to welcome you could be here. I woke quite early this morning, at 7:30, and it was raining, and all of the splendid honor guard that had trained for weeks for your arrival were gone, and I thought of the fact that on your previously scheduled visit that I contracted pneumonia and you were unable to come at that time, and the rain was coming down and I reluctantly gave the order, because we could not tell how long the rain would last, that we would move inside.

But now as you arrive at 10:30 today, the skies have cleared. And so your country, which has had the ravages of floods, you now see clear skies—and I think these clear skies indicate that for the time ahead Pakistan and the United States can look forward to a better time, a time of peace and a time of progress.

Prime Minister Bhutto

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, distinguished friends: Mr. President, your kind and generous words of welcome are heartwarming, and I am overwhelmed by the sentiment you have expressed.

As you have said, I have come to these shores before as a student and on many occasions as a representative of my country. I have seen the magnificent evolution of the relations between your great country and my country; vast oceans and continents separate our two peoples, and yet there is an ease of communication and of understanding.

Our relations are not burdened or encumbered by modern postulations and sermonizations to each other. We share a host of common affinities despite the diversities and the distances that separate us.

I can assure you, Mr. President, that the

people of Pakistan warmly cherish their relationship with your country and your people.

We are aware of the wholesome contribution that your country and your government have made to the cause of peace and to the normalization of relations in the subcontinent. We value your contribution, and as we admire the search you are making for a new international structure based on the concept of lasting peace which has eluded us so far, we feel confident that with the imagination you have demonstrated and the tenacity you have shown to evolve this structure of peace, that your efforts will succeed. And to whatever extent Pakistan can travel with you on this magnificent search for a lasting peace, we will wholeheartedly offer that cooperation to the extent that our limited goal traverses with your worldwide responsibilities.

The memories of the past are many, but I can assure you that these memories do not in any way displace or dispel the newness of this occasion when I come here to represent my country as its Prime Minister.

I am looking forward to our discussions. We know that you are well acquainted with our problems. At one time it was said that in the recent past your administration tilted toward Pakistan. That, Mr. President, was a tilt for justice and a tilt for equity, which is characteristic of your distinguished career as a statesman and a builder of peace.

I am sorry that the ceremonies were somewhat marred by the rains, but nothing can mar the eternal friendship and warmth between our two peoples and that is more important. It has augured well by the sudden reappearance of the blue skies, and I am glad that the blue skies are smiling at us.

Thank you.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 24

President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Bhutto and our distinguished guests from Pakistan and the United States: We are very honored, Mr. Prime Minister, to have you, Mrs. Bhutto,

the members of your official party here in this room tonight, and we only regret that the room is so small that all of the friends that you have—and there are legions in this country—could not be here to honor you and to express their friendship for Pakistan and the people of Pakistan.

On this occasion, I would like to speak in somewhat personal terms since this is essentially a dinner honoring you personally and your wife personally. I think of all of the leaders of great nations that have visited this country since I have had the privilege of being here as President, and in a way I think I have known you longer—although we did not meet at the time—than any other, because in the year 1950, when I was a very young Congressman campaigning for the United States Senate, you were a very young student at the University of California. And so, while we did not meet, we knew each other, in a way. [Laughter.]

Much has happened since then. Neither of us would have guessed that, in 1950, in 1953 we would meet again in Pakistan, when you were still very young. You and Mrs. Bhutto had been married only two years, and Mrs. Nixon and I were so honored to meet you then at the residence of our Ambassador on our first trip around the world.

In 1964 there was another meeting. I should not really disclose this to such a large group, but this is a group that is so small that a secret can be kept. [Laughter.] And in Washington that is saying a very great deal today. But in 1964, I met Mrs. Bhutto again, at a private party at which her husband was not present and my wife was not present. [Laughter.] I was traveling around the world by myself with a friend on a business trip, and the Prime Minister was on his official duties traveling abroad.

And then, of course, again we have had the occasion of meeting, particularly just two days before the Prime Minister assumed his present duties.

Now, what I have just referred to is not meant to be simply a personal recounting of our association but is to make a point. And it is this: Pakistan and the United States of

America have been friends since the time that Pakistan became an independent nation.

I, as an American, sometimes in office and sometimes out—out not at my own choice [laughter]—but nevertheless, I can assure you that Pakistan and the people of Pakistan have always been very close to my heart. I admire them, I respect them, as do all of the people, Mr. Prime Minister, in this room and many others across this nation. That friendship has lasted through a generation, and it will continue to last, and it will last for reasons that we do not need to go into now. But one of the reasons that appeals to me particularly to mention on this occasion relates to what could have been a total national disaster for your nation, a natural and national disaster of the past few months. I refer to the floods that have been ravaging your country just at a time that with your leadership the nation was moving on after the very difficult and traumatic experience of war.

I asked your wife, Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Bhutto, what was the spirit of the people. I said none of the leaders, none of the Members of Parliament, but the peasants, the others, the people that worked the land—were they discouraged, were they giving up after a war and after all of the bloodshed and the tragedy and now the flood.

And her answer, it seems to me, tells us something about Pakistan and also something about human nature generally that is quite profound.

She said, no, as she visited the areas most ravaged by the floods and talked to the farmers and their wives, they did not talk about the past. They said, yes, the floods had destroyed their crops for this year, but the floods had brought new silt into the land and the land would be richer for the crops next year.

And so, rather than looking backward, they were looking forward. Rather than letting adversity destroy them, they were proving the profound truth that from adversity grows strength.

And this is the story of Pakistan and of many other countries, including our own,

from time to time. Pakistan has had more than its share of adversity in recent years, but out of that adversity has come a strong people, 65 million in numbers, and out of that adversity has come a strong leader, our Prime Minister, who is our guest today, his wife, and the members of his official party.

And in paying our respects to him, to his people, we do so because we have an official obligation to do so which we welcome, but also because of a deep personal respect which I have tried to convey, because of a deep personal friendship which I have tried to convey.

And so I know all of you in this room and many others who could not be here would like to join me in our toast to the friendship between the people of Pakistan and the people of the United States and express that friendship by raising our glasses to the health of the Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Bhutto

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, distinguished guests and friends: Mr. President, you have been most gracious in your remarks, and you have said that this is an intimate gathering of friends. I will proceed from that point.

Since it is an intimate gathering of friends, with your permission I would like to tell them about our discussions, the inner truth of our talks.

We discussed three matters: economic matters, cultural matters, and military matters. I don't know how, but cultural and military matters got intertwined, perhaps because Dr. Kissinger was there. [Laughter.] And we discussed these highly complicated problems. We were told that since military and cultural matters are interrelated, we must know that Jill St. John is booked for the Soviet Union [laughter] and Raquel Welch is earmarked for China [laughter]—as far as our old friend Pakistan is concerned, Talullah Bankhead is there, available for Pakistan.

President Nixon: What do we get? [Laughter.]

Prime Minister Bhutto: So we said we are old friends, but not in that sense. [Laughter.] And then we were told that that is all we can do. And that also is true of either Saudi Arabia or Iran. So we told our friends candidly that what we are interested in is not obsolete spare parts, but in red-hot weapons. [Laughter.]

Mr. President, I have been in your great country as a student. You have made mention of it, and my sojourn here was a warm one. It is here that I came to respect the vitality of the people, and I remember that on one occasion in 1949 I was standing outside your White House—this distinguished house, resplendent with history—and I was standing by the rails looking at it—its architecture, its beauty. And a Negro friend, a gentleman passing by, stood by as well. And we both had our hands on the railing. He looked at me and asked me from which country I came, and I told him from where I came, and he said that, "If you were an American, what would you like to be?"

So I said, "If I were an American, I would like to be inside that house." [Laughter.]

So he told me that, "You better get the hell out of this country because we are going crazy picking the man for the house itself in our own country."

But that is how the past is, and it is remembered vividly. We know that you have been a good friend of our country, not in the subjective sense, because you have known that Pakistan has been a good friend of the United States, and I don't use this word in its chauvinistic sense, in the sense of its past chivalry.

The world has changed, and we must learn to adjust ourselves to the changes.

If you ask me, sir, what we have to offer to your great country, I would tell you candidly: nothing. We are not a nuclear power; we are not a technologically advanced country. There is nothing we can offer in that sense; but there is something which we can offer to you as your friends, and that is that our country stands by its pledges. Our country is dedicated to its principles according to its

own light, and we have shown in the existence of Pakistan that in the last 25 years no matter what the price—and sometimes we have had to pay a very heavy price—but we have stood by our principles and our pledges.

And if there is any place for us in your big wide world, please do remember that, that although you might not need the friendship, or the assistance, or collaboration of my country far away from yours, it is a country which is allied to your country. It is a country which has stood by its commitments and pledges with your country throughout the vicissitudes and buffets of life, and we have every intention of doing so in the future.

This is our outlook, and this is our conception of our relationship with the United States. We have admired, Mr. President, your own contribution to a new world order, and when the history of this country is written, and when the history of the great Presidents of the United States is penned, what will they say of President Nixon?

As far as we are concerned, not only as a Pakistani but as an Asian coming from Asia, I can tell you that at least my history books, the history books of my country, will say here was a great and a lofty President who broke the barriers of prejudice and who chalked out a bold new policy according to the finest traditions of American history and brought peace to a tormented part of the world.

There will be a stamp on the Viet-Nam chapter; there will be your mark on your relations with the People's Republic of China; there will be your image and your sign on your relations with the Soviet Union.

To us in Asia, these are very important pillars, and we feel that the world would have been further tormented if you had not taken these splendid initiatives for peace in that part of the world where most of the humanity lives in. And this is not how we alone feel; this is how many of the other countries in Asia feel.

So history will pay rich and glowing tributes to your statesmanship, not only as an American President but as a world statesman.

When we look on the future in this light, the present trivialities will be brushed aside and a more glorious people dedicated to the cause of eternal peace will emerge. And in that struggle and in that quest, you, Mr. President, will be in the forefront.

This is how we see your role, as the leader of the free world—if that expression is used any more—as the leader of Western civilization and international tranquillity.

So, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of my friends from Pakistan, let me salute the American people and their great President for their everlasting contribution to world peace and international tranquillity.

Thank you.

TEXT OF JOINT PAKISTAN-U.S. STATEMENT

President Nixon and Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan have held two cordial and wide-ranging working discussions during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington September 18-20. The meetings gave the President and the Prime Minister an opportunity to renew their personal friendship and to discuss matters of common interest to Pakistan and the United States. Both President Nixon and Prime Minister Bhutto reviewed and welcomed the progress made in the past eighteen months in enhancing peaceful relations throughout the world and in reducing tension between the major powers. The leaders pledged their continuing efforts to build a just and lasting peace, based on principles of national sovereignty and equality, respect for territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of any state. They also reaffirmed the close ties of friendship that have long characterized relations between the United States and Pakistan. President Nixon assured Prime Minister Bhutto of strong U.S. support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity, which he considered a guiding principle of American foreign policy.

President Nixon took the opportunity to congratulate Prime Minister Bhutto on the progress Pakistan has made over the past twenty months. He noted the successes of the Prime Minister of Pakistan in establishing representative government under a democratic constitution recently adopted by the National Assembly, and in restoring the war-shattered economy of Pakistan, which has unfortunately received a serious set-back in the recent unprecedented floods.

Prime Minister Bhutto voiced his warm appreciation for the generous American response to Paki-

stan's severe flood losses. The two leaders discussed additional needs and ways in which the United States and the international community might be responsive. President Nixon pledged additional assistance and vigorous support for international relief efforts.

The two leaders also discussed Pakistan's long-term assistance needs. They reviewed the substantial assistance which the United States has extended to Pakistan. President Nixon noted the importance which the United States attaches to Pakistan's stable development and reviewed for the Prime Minister plans for future assistance.

Prime Minister Bhutto reviewed for the President the Simla Agreement of July 1972, and the New Delhi Agreement of August 28, 1973, calling for repatriation of prisoners of war and other stranded persons from the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. The President congratulated Prime Minister Bhutto on his statesmanship in reaching the agreements. President Nixon reiterated the United States' warm support for the process of reconciliation underway in South Asia, and expressed the United States' interest in expeditious implementation of the agreements and in the resolution of other outstanding issues in South Asia through peaceful means in accordance with internationally recognized principles.

There was also a discussion of international narcotics problems. President Nixon welcomed Prime Minister Bhutto's recent statement pledging efforts to control narcotics traffic and progressively to eliminate poppy cultivation. The President assured the Prime Minister of strong U.S. support for Pakistan's efforts.

U.S. Alternate Governors of IMF and International Banks Confirmed

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the nomination of Arthur F. Burns to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the International Monetary Fund for a term of five years.

The Senate on that day confirmed the nomination of William J. Casey to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of five years; U.S. Alternate Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank for a term of five years and until his successor has been appointed; and U.S. Alternate Governor of the Asian Development Bank.

U.S. and Europe To Cooperate in Space Shuttle Program

Following is a Department announcement issued September 24, together with the text of a communique signed at Washington that day by Acting Secretary Rush and Charles Hanin, Chairman, European Space Conference.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 342 dated September 24

At a ceremony at the Department of State on September 24, Acting Secretary Rush and Charles Hanin, Belgian Science Minister and Chairman of the European Space Conference, signed a communique noting the completion of arrangements for European participation in the Space Shuttle program and marking the beginning of a new era in U.S.-European space cooperation. In the same ceremony Dr. James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, and Dr. Alexander Hocker, Director General of the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), signed a memorandum of understanding to implement this unprecedented international cooperative project.

Nine European countries, through ESRO, undertake to design, develop, manufacture, and deliver a "Spacelab" flight unit which will be an important element of the U.S. Space Shuttle system. The Spacelab will be carried in the Space Shuttle Orbiter, which will look like a delta-winged airplane about the size of a large jetliner. The Spacelab will have two elements: a pressurized manned laboratory module permitting scientists and engineers to work in a normal shirt-sleeve environment and an instrument platform, or pallet, to support telescopes, antennas, and other equipment requiring direct space exposure.

The Spacelab module and pallet will be transported, either separately or together, to and from orbit in the orbiter payload bay and will be attached to and supported by the

Space Shuttle Orbiter throughout missions lasting seven to thirty days. At the end of each flight the orbiter will make a runway landing, and the Spacelab will be removed and prepared for its next mission.

The NASA-ESRO agreement represents a major step in the sharing of space costs between the United States and European countries participating in this cooperative project. The estimated cost of \$300-\$400 million for the Spacelab will be borne by the ESRO countries involved.

The European Spacelab represents a significant contribution to the space transportation system in an area not funded by the United States. It provides for the timely availability of a supporting system important to realizing the full potential of the shuttle; it will also facilitate joint use programs, many entailing the activities of U.S. and European astronauts.

Under the terms of the memorandum of understanding, NASA will procure from ESRO any additional Spacelab units of the same basic design which may be needed for U.S. programs. The United States will not develop any unit of its own which would substantially duplicate the design and capabilities of the first Spacelab.

It is currently planned that the first operational space flight of the shuttle will occur in late 1979. To permit adequate time for experiment integration, checkout, and compatibility testing, the Spacelab unit will be delivered about one year earlier.

Subsequent to the delivery of the Spacelab by ESRO, NASA will manage all operational activities, including crew training and flight operations. Flight crew opportunities will be provided in conjunction with flight projects sponsored by ESRO or by governments participating in the Spacelab program and utilizing the Spacelab. It is contemplated that there will be a European member of the flight crew of the first Spacelab crew.

While it is too early to define detailed terms and conditions for subsequent operation and use of the shuttle with the Space-

lab, the United States will make the shuttle available for Spacelab missions on either a cooperative (noncost) or a cost-reimbursable basis. In the latter case, the costs of the launching services provided would be charged as they are at present for reimbursable launches of foreign satellites.

The memorandum of understanding is subject to and implements a government-level agreement between nine European nations and the United States which was opened for signature at Paris August 14.

Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States have signed the intergovernmental agreement. The agreement makes provision for participation by additional nations.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Today marks the beginning of a new era in space cooperation between the United States of America and member nations of the European Space Conference as arrangements are completed for European participation in the Space Shuttle Program.

The extensive cooperation achieved in space activities in the past has already brought great satisfaction to the international community. The contributions to science and the welfare of man that have resulted are of considerable significance. It is our conviction that further cooperation will result not only in additional scientific, technical and economic benefits, but should further strengthen the ties of friendship between peoples.

The Agreement between participating member nations of the European Space Conference and the United States of America signed in Paris August 14, 1973, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European Space Research Organization signed this date in Washington, D.C. pertaining to the development, procurement and use of a space laboratory in conjunction with the Space Shuttle extend US/European space cooperation to the Post Apollo era in a closer and even more promising form.

CHARLES HANIN
*Chairman,
European Space
Conference*

KENNETH RUSH
Acting Secretary of State

Department Reports to Congress on Visa Operations

Statement by Curtis W. Tarr

Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Management¹

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to meet with you and the other members of the committee to discuss the visa operations of the Department of State and its Foreign Service posts abroad, a subject that we in the Department of State consider of the utmost importance. I might add that the Deputy Secretary is aware of this problem because I have talked with him about it numerous times in the past and he shares my concern. My colleagues and I will be happy to try to answer any questions the committee may have about our visa operations. I believe, however, that it would be useful initially to describe some aspects of these operations, particularly as they relate to the illegal alien problem. I believe such a description may provide a better understanding of our role and our responsibilities in this matter as we see them.

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. consular officers abroad are responsible for, among other things, the granting or refusing of both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to aliens seeking to come to the United States. The issuance of visas is a major consular function both in terms of importance to various U.S. interests and in terms of the allocation of resources for consular functions. I might add here that I attach great importance, as the members of

the committee do, to the image of the United States as presented by visa officers. When I was the Director of the Selective Service I felt the same way about our Selective Service local boards, who in their contact with young 18-year-old Americans made the first real relationship between the U.S. Government and the young Americans.

I think it is critically important that we try to impress people with the kind of nation we are in the immediate contact that we have both with our own citizenry and those abroad who may become citizens or, hopefully, friends of the United States for some time to come.

Under the law, certain quantitative and qualitative restrictions are placed upon aliens seeking to become permanent residents of the United States. There is an annual numerical limitation of 120,000 on immigration to the United States by natives of independent countries of the Western Hemisphere. Likewise, there is an annual numerical limitation of 170,000 on immigration to the United States by natives of all other countries and areas of the world. The only aliens not subject to such numerical limitations are those who come within the definition of "immediate relatives" in the law (for example, the spouse or child of a U.S. citizen) and certain other narrowly defined and numerically insignificant classes of aliens (for example, returning resident aliens, ministers of religion).

An alien who does not qualify as an immediate relative nor, in the case of Eastern Hemisphere natives, come within a pref-

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Sept. 13. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

erence category for close relatives of U.S. citizens or permanent residents must obtain a certification from the Department of Labor that there is a shortage of qualified workers in the United States with the skills possessed by him and that his employment will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. Therefore the first step for a would-be immigrant is to establish his status in relation to these requirements.

Some of these determinations are made by agencies other than the Department of State. For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service is normally responsible for determining the relationship of the applicant to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident that would entitle him to immediate relative or some preference status. The Department of Labor is responsible for determining whether there is a shortage of the applicant's skills in the United States. But ultimately all the documentation is submitted to a consular officer at one of our 178 Foreign Service posts that issue immigrant visas. It is the consular officer who must pass on the validity of most of the documentation submitted and who must determine the numerical limitation to which the alien is subject as well as whether he comes within any of the 30-odd categories of ineligibility. These cover, for example, aliens who are insane, have been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, are or were members of a Communist organization, or are likely to become a public charge.

Because of the numerical limitations on both Eastern and Western Hemisphere immigration, the immigrant visa workload, in terms of numbers of immigrant visas issued, does not show wide annual variations. In recent years an average of some 300,000 immigrant visas have been issued annually. However, this figure does not accurately reflect the immigrant visa workload of our consular officers. In addition to cases in which the applicant is determined to be ineligible for an immigrant visa, many more qualified immigrants apply than there are visa numbers immediately available. For example, a Western Hemisphere applicant now

faces a waiting period of almost two years from the date he qualifies. Although immigrant visas constitute about 10 percent of all visa issuances, because of extensive documentary and other requirements the immigrant visa function consumes more than half of the manpower resources allocated to the visa function.

In contrast to the relatively stable immigrant visa workload, the nonimmigrant visa workload has been increasing dramatically, particularly in the last decade. In fiscal year 1963 some 800,000 nonimmigrant visas were issued to aliens to come to the United States temporarily for purposes such as business, pleasure, study, or temporary employment. In fiscal year 1973, 10 years later, this number approached 3 million, an increase of some 275 percent. As with immigrant visas, the number of nonimmigrant visas issued does not necessarily give a true picture of nonimmigrant visa workload. While nonimmigrant visa issuance was increasing 275 percent over this period, refusals of nonimmigrant visas rose some 400 percent. Indeed, more time normally is required to decide the case of the applicant ultimately determined to be ineligible for a nonimmigrant visa than that of the eligible applicant.

The nonimmigrant visa application process itself is relatively simple. The alien completes an application form and submits it, together with his valid passport and any appropriate supporting documents, to one of our 242 posts that issue nonimmigrant visas. After a name check is run, the application is submitted to the consular officer for a decision. In some cases, primarily those involving applicants for visitor visas, the personal appearance requirement may be waived. But in such instances, the applicant must complete the application form which contains most of the questions that the consular officer would ask in an interview. The consular officer, after examining the application form and supporting papers, decides whether he should interview the applicant personally.

Our visa procedures are intended to insure, so far as is possible, that only those aliens who intend to come to this country

temporarily will receive a nonimmigrant visa. The problem faced by the consular officer is to determine that these are indeed the intentions of the visa applicant. This is of course an extremely difficult task. In considering an application for a nonimmigrant visa, the consular officer must be satisfied by the evidence presented, including the applicant's own statements, that the applicant is not someone who will need or is likely to seek employment while in this country and that he has a residence abroad to which he intends to return after completing his visit, his studies, or other purpose of his trip. The consular officer normally has only a short time to try to ascertain what is in the mind of a person he usually has never seen before. Moreover, even if the consular officer has judged correctly, the alien who applied in good faith as a visitor may later, at the urging of relatives or friends, change his mind and decide to remain here.

The kinds of misrepresentation encountered by consular officers in visa work vary greatly. However, they usually consist of different types of verbal misrepresentation and, as is also the case in connection with immigrant visa applications, various kinds of fraudulent documentation. Some applicants may simply misrepresent or omit facts which would result in refusal of the visa. Others present false letters from employers, false bank statements, false birth or marriage certificates, or other false documents indicating ties that would normally compel them to return to their home country.

The instances of would-be immigrants seeking to enter the United States as temporary visitors or in some other nonimmigrant status vary markedly from one foreign area to another, as do the instances of visa refusals. Many circumstances enter into this picture: local economic conditions, the length of waiting period for an immigrant visa, the cost of travel to the United States, the presence or absence in the United States of sizable numbers of fellow countrymen. Consequently the volume of visa refusals varies from country to country. For example, in fiscal year 1973 some 44 percent of all non-

immigrant visa applications at Guadalajara were refused, as were 35 percent at Santo Domingo. However, the refusal rate was only 1.5 percent at Brussels and 0.1 percent at Tokyo. These variances point up the fact that because of different economic, cultural, and other conditions in different countries it is not possible to judge the efficiency of different Foreign Service posts merely by looking at the number of visas issued per officer assigned.

Each time a visa is refused, a record of that refusal is made at the post where the alien applied. This information may also be disseminated immediately to other nearby posts in case the alien who has been refused seeks to apply for a visa elsewhere. To assist high-volume posts, the Department in 1966 established an electronic name-check file in which refusal data is stored on a current basis in a computer and can be immediately retrieved by posts connected to the system. Thus far twelve posts in Europe, two in Canada, seven in Latin America, and three in East Asia are connected to the computer.

We also work closely with the Immigration and Naturalization Service both in Washington and in the field to insure that our respective efforts to deal with the illegal alien problem in its various aspects are mutually reinforcing. In the final analysis, however, it is undeniable, as stressed by one consular post after another, that the principal incentive for the illegal alien is the prospect of finding a comparatively high-paying job in the United States. We believe that H.R. 982, formulated by this committee and enacted by the House of Representatives, is an important first step in dealing with this aspect of the problem. But we also believe that we can and must do a better job on our part.

It has been suggested by some that in our enthusiasm to facilitate travel to the United States for balance of payments reasons, we have put too much emphasis on the issuance of a high volume of nonimmigrant visas at the expense of the quality of decisions made by consular officers in individual cases. Some point to statistics showing that, as compared

with 1963, our Foreign Service posts are now issuing 275 percent more nonimmigrant visas with 8 percent fewer personnel. Of course some of this increased productivity is attributable to measures we have taken over the last decade to streamline visa procedures, such as the waiver of personal appearance in certain cases, the indefinite validity visa, and the automated visa name-check system. But it is still argued that the constantly increasing nonimmigrant visa workload simply requires more consular officers to perform the job in order to give each consular officer more time to consider each case. There is no question in my mind that more personnel are needed to perform the visa function, and we are seeking additional consular positions in our present fiscal 1974 budget and intend to do so for fiscal 1975 in our recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget.

In August of this year, we organized a special nonimmigrant visa survey team to visit selected posts abroad and to report to me on steps that might be taken to enhance our performance in this area. The team, under the direction of a senior State Department officer, has returned and is preparing a series of recommendations which would improve local management of the program, strengthen our capacity to meet increased visa workload requirements, and introduce new approaches to insure a high standard of professionalism among consular officers.

Of course the visa function must compete in the resource allocation process not only with other parts of the Department but with other consular functions. In addition to the Visa Office, the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs encompasses the Passport Office and the Office of Special Consular Services. The Passport Office is responsible for the issuance of passports to U.S. citizens, both in this country and abroad, and the determination of U.S. citizenship of persons outside the United States. The Office of Special Consular Services is responsible for a wide range of services to American citizens abroad including assistance to Americans under arrest, payment of Federal benefits

such as social security, veterans pensions, et cetera, to Americans abroad, and the return to the United States of remains of Americans who die abroad. As more Americans travel and live abroad and, unfortunately, are arrested or die abroad, the manpower requirements of these consular functions increase. And it is not a simple matter to separate these functions for purposes of workload measurement and resource allocation, because at some 65 percent of our posts the individual consular officer divides his time among the three consular functions depending on the demand for particular consular services.

In the past two years we have sought to improve our workload measurements in order to provide as accurate a picture as possible of resource requirements in the consular field. But no yardstick—such as visas or passports issued or refused or man-hours expended on a particular consular function—will accurately measure quality. Nor, I submit, is quality to be insured merely by providing more consular officers.

Prior to the Rogers Act of 1924 the consular service and the diplomatic service were separate entities. The Rogers Act combined the two into the Foreign Service, and this move toward unification was fully reaffirmed in the Foreign Service Act of 1946. All officers in the Foreign Service today are Foreign Service officers and assignable to any Foreign Service position. At the same time, we recognize that some degree of specialization remains desirable if we are to achieve the high degree of professionalism we seek. To this end we have four major fields of specialization, or cones, as we call them: These are consular, administrative, economic, and political. We now recruit officers specifically for one of these four fields. Entrance examinations vary somewhat depending on the field for which an applicant opts. The careers of successful candidates will be developed primarily in the fields they have chosen, but they will also be given training and assignments designed to give them a broad exposure to other facets of Foreign Service work.

We believe that we are much more likely to obtain high-quality personnel for the consular as well as other fields if officers are recruited on the basis of their interest in, and a commitment to pursue, a career primarily in the field of their choice. In addition to this threshold step, we have taken other measures to enhance the consular career. We have designated a number of constituent posts—that is, consulates general, not Embassies—where the consular function is the most important of the post's responsibilities as posts which should be headed by consular specialists. We have already filled a number of these with senior consular officers. We believe that reserving such positions for consular officers will insure high quality in the performance of consular functions at these posts. In doing this, we are also mindful of the frequent criticism that there are too few senior positions in the Foreign Service to which an officer specializing in consular affairs can aspire.

We plan to put added emphasis on professional enrichment for consular officers, including management and midcareer university training. We are considering reinstituting the requirement that every new Foreign Service officer, whatever his intended specialty, take basic consular officer training. We are also considering increased language training for consular officers; for the consular officer, perhaps more than any other, needs and can utilize a host country language capability.

In short, we believe that we not only need to increase the number of consular officers available to meet the rising demand for visas and other consular services but need to improve the quality of these services by improving the quality of officers who perform them. Such improvement is inevitably a gradual process. But I am hopeful that we have taken the appropriate first steps to achieve it.

Mr. Chairman, we are mindful of the committee's concern with this aspect of the Department's operations not only in the context of the illegal alien problem but also in connection with the committee's other oversight responsibilities. I can assure you

that we will be responsive to the committee's concern and receptive to any suggestions it may wish to make for improving the way in which we carry out our responsibilities under the law.

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1972

Following is the text of a message from President Nixon dated September 6 transmitting to the Congress the annual report on U.S. participation in the United Nations for calendar year 1972.¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress the 27th annual report on United States participation in the work of the United Nations during calendar year 1972.

This report reflects the increasing range of global concerns with which United Nations agencies are dealing. It highlights not only the opportunities but also the limits of operating through the United Nations system during an era of growing international interdependence.

In recent years, United Nations agencies have come to deal increasingly with the economic and technical agenda of the world in addition to the long-standing agenda of peace and security questions. Indeed, as this account makes clear, these agencies are now engaged in some manner in virtually every governmental activity that crosses national lines.

The United States participated actively in these cooperative efforts to help safeguard peace and lessen world tensions, to foster economic and social progress, and to cope with a wide array of legal and technological problems.

¹ "U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1972"; for sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 (Department of State publication 8731, GPO cat. no. S1.70:8731, 232 pp., \$1.75).

Three themes characterized our participation during 1972:

(1) Even though we recognized the limitations of the United Nations in solving or even abating many political disputes, we supported its participation where appropriate to reconcile such disputes, to curb international terrorism and outbreaks of violence, and to devise workable arrangements for peacekeeping operations. In order to serve the long-term interest of the international community, we worked in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and subsidiary bodies to have the United Nations deal evenhandedly and pragmatically with such politically-charged issues as the Middle East, decolonization, and human rights.

(2) We took the lead in seeking new arrangements and institutions to deal with worldwide social and technological concerns. Although we encountered some resistance, we pressed forward toward the goals of assuring the safety of civil aviation, protecting the environment, checking the illicit flow of narcotics, organizing relief for victims of disaster, strengthening the law of the sea, and slowing world population growth.

(3) We stressed the importance of having the United Nations act responsibly, equitably, and efficiently in ordering its financial and administrative affairs so that it could carry out its tasks more effectively. Progress was made in holding down the budgets of some agencies, budgeting procedures were improved, and the principle of a lower maximum ceiling for the United States assessment was endorsed. Nevertheless, the underlying financial problems were not solved and further administrative and procedural reforms are needed in the United Nations.

This report shows that, despite political and administrative shortcomings, multilateral agencies connected with the United Nations offered practical responses to worldwide problems of pressing concern to the American people. Given the fast pace of political, social, and technological change in recent years, it is not surprising that the record of accomplishments was uneven and there were setbacks as well as successes.

During 1972 developments at the United Nations were affected by certain long-term trends which both hold promise and pose problems for effective United Nations action.

—The loosening of old antagonisms, the entry of the People's Republic of China into the mainstream of United Nations work, and the growing importance of powers such as Japan could in the long run enable a near-universal United Nations to become a more effective instrument for dealing with serious world political and security problems.

—However, we also have to recognize that the continuing tendency to use the United Nations for propaganda advantage and to pursue political rivalries makes accommodation more difficult. For the near term, where the interests of its strongest members are engaged, the organization can deal only in a limited way with highly contentious political issues.

—The emergence in United Nations bodies and conferences of an active majority led by a number of the developing nations continued to make for some distortions in determining the areas of greatest United Nations attention. While we fully recognize the inherent right of all member nations to be heard, the voting weight of this majority, with its sometimes narrowly defined preoccupations, has tended to create imbalance and to place strains on the effective functioning of the organization.

This report reflects the growing cohesion which has taken place among the third world countries, notably with respect to colonial issues and to demands that rules of international trade and aid be altered in their favor. We were particularly concerned when, under the pressure of bloc voting, the organization adopted one-sided resolutions on certain political issues or failed to take concrete action on such important matters as international terrorism. To call this trend disturbing is not to depreciate the value to the United States of multilateral institutions in which all nations can be heard on matters that affect their security and welfare, conciliation can be pursued, and vital public services can be provided for the international community.

We attempted to adjust our policy during 1972 to take account of these changes. It became increasingly clear that for the present the most productive possibilities for United Nations action are on global problems of an economic, social and technological nature. United Nations system expenditures reflected this concentration, with some 95 percent of the resources in 1972 going for programs designed to transfer techniques and skills to less developed nations, set standards for international behavior, and provide public services of benefit to all nations.

The following developments during the year were especially noteworthy:

We were gratified by the General Assembly's endorsement of the reduction of our United Nations budget assessment from 31.52 percent to 25 percent. We believe this to be a healthy development for the organization, which should not be unduly dependent on the contributions of one member. The maximum assessment ceiling beginning next year is expected to fulfill the requirement enacted by the Congress that the United States should pay no more than 25 percent in the United Nations and in certain specialized agencies after January 1, 1974. The vote of over two-thirds in favor of our position reflected a widespread recognition of the equities involved and of political reality as well as concern for the maintenance of generous United States voluntary contributions to United Nations development programs.

Following the landmark conference in Stockholm in June, the institutional foundation was laid for international action to protect the environment and a work program was initiated for this purpose. Measures were taken to deal with environmental problems such as pollution from ocean dumping and the preservation of natural, cultural, and historic heritage areas, and a United Nations fund for the environment, which I had recommended earlier, brought pledges from a number of nations.

On the other hand, a major setback was the United Nations failure to take strong and speedy international legal action to combat international terrorism and provide ade-

quate protection for diplomats—measures advocated by the United States and other concerned nations. The Assembly did, however, set up a committee to study the comments of governments on the problem of international terrorism and submit a report to the next session. While we regret the delay, we hope that the Assembly can make progress on this issue this fall. Progress was made in the International Civil Aviation Organization on the matter of aircraft safety.

The United Nations also advanced its programs for delivering technical assistance to developing nations and setting standards for international behavior in specific fields.

—Management reforms (notably adoption of a country programming system) were implemented which will enable the United Nations Development Program to handle an expanded program of technical assistance more efficiently.

—The organization's capacity to respond to disaster situations was strengthened by the establishment of a United Nations Disaster Relief Office in Geneva, largely as the result of a United States initiative in 1971. The United Nations carried out an unprecedented number of relief activities, notably in Bangladesh and the Sudan.

—There was growing cooperation in outer space. A United Nations working group cooperated in making available to other nations data from our first experimental satellite designed to survey earth resources, and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, which had been negotiated by a United Nations committee, entered into force on September 1.

—The momentum of international action against drug abuse was furthered in several ways: with the drafting of an amending protocol to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, through increased activity by and contributions to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and through a more active role by the International Narcotics Control Board.

—The population program was placed on a sounder administrative footing by linking the United Nations Fund for Population Activi-

ties to the United Nations Development Program. Preparations were continued for the World Population Conference in 1974, which is expected to be as important as the 1972 environment conference.

—Perhaps of the greatest potential significance were the steps taken to accelerate preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, which will come to grips with such matters as the nature of the international regime for the deep seabed, the breadth of the territorial sea, free transit through international straits, fisheries, marine pollution, and scientific research. A successful resolution of these very difficult issues would help to prevent conflict and assure that the resources in and under the oceans will be equitably and rationally utilized.

The “quiet side” of the United Nations also produced important accomplishments which are covered in this report. Especially noteworthy were the International Atomic Energy Agency’s expanded “safeguards” program to prevent the diversion to weapons use of nuclear materials intended for peaceful uses; the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization’s efforts at spurring agreement to control pollution from ocean dumping; the International Civil Aviation Organization’s efforts to devise effective measures for safe and efficient air travel; the World Health Organization’s continued campaign to suppress communicable diseases and raise the standards of health care; the Food and Agriculture Organization’s work to expand agricultural production and improve nutrition; and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s activities to expand scientific communication and protect the world’s cultural heritage.

All these activities clearly demonstrate the stake we have in United Nations efforts to control new technologies for the common good, to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries on matters of trade and aid, to facilitate the exchange of technical and scientific knowledge, and to set standards of behavior for international activity. To these concerns—and to the need to improve the functioning of all multilateral in-

stitutions—our nation must give increasing attention in the coming years.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 6, 1973.*

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Convention on Taxation Transmitted to the Senate

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON¹

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Matters of Taxation, with related letters, signed at Washington on June 20, 1973.

For the information of the Senate, I transmit also the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

The primary purpose of this Convention is to promote economic and cultural relations between the two countries by eliminating tax barriers to the extent possible. The general content of the Convention is similar to conventions between the United States and other countries on the avoidance of double taxation on income. However, because of dissimilarities between the tax systems of the two countries and the limited experience of each with the tax system of the other, in this Convention somewhat more emphasis than usual is given to tax exemptions.

Through its system of exemptions, the Convention should largely insulate the entities and citizens of the respective parties from income tax in the other state. As with most tax conventions a principal benefit is to free to a great extent the companies and persons involved from the compliance and ad-

¹ Transmitted on Sept. 19 (White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. T, 93d Cong., 1st sess. For text of the convention, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1973, p. 169.

ministrative problems of dealing with a foreign tax system. This, in turn, can be expected to contribute to the smooth development of United States-Soviet Union trade, cooperation, and exchanges. I recommend that the Senate give prompt consideration to the convention and consent to its ratification.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 19, 1973.*

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE *

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 10, 1973.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, the Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Matters of Taxation, with related letters, signed at Washington on June 20, 1973.

The Convention was formulated as a result of technical discussions between officials of this Government and officials of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Department of State and the Department of the Treasury cooperated in the negotiation of this Convention and it has the approval of both Departments.

The primary purpose of this Convention is to promote economic and cultural relations between the two countries by eliminating tax barriers to the extent possible. The Convention deals primarily with taxes at the Federal level in the case of the United States and with All-Union taxes in the case of the Soviet Union.

Because of limited contact in the past, the citizens and commercial enterprises of each country have had little exposure to the tax system of the other country. Taking into account the tax problems which are likely to arise in conjunction with less restricted intercourse between the two countries, the Convention outlines the circumstances under which each country may tax the business firms of, and visitors from, the other country.

The general content of the Convention is similar to conventions between the United States and other countries on the avoidance of double taxation on income. However, because of the dissimilarities between the taxation systems of the two countries, in this Convention somewhat more emphasis than usual is given to tax exemptions. Examples of the types of

payments made between the two countries which will be exempt from taxation in the source country are: (a) rentals or royalties for the use of patents, copyrights, equipment, and know-how; (b) payments for engineering, architectural, and other technical services; (c) interest on indebtedness in connection with the financing of trade between the two countries; (d) reinsurance premiums; and (e) income from the sale of goods effected through a commission agent.

The Convention provides reciprocal exemption from tax for shipping and aircraft operations. It also provides that an individual will be exempt from tax on income from personal services if he is present in the host State for six months or less, and will be exempt for longer periods if he falls into a specified category such as teacher or student. In the case of students, the exemption may be for as long as five years.

The Convention departs from the pattern of the usual tax convention in its provisions relating to specified types of business income and to the earnings of newspaper, radio and TV correspondents. Ordinarily, United States treaties provide that a foreign firm having a place of business in the United States continues to be subject to tax on business profits "effectively connected" with the United States place of business; otherwise, the income is often exempt. The same principle applies in this Convention, but income from several types of activity is exempt whether or not the Soviet or United States enterprise has a place of business in the other country. One such exemption is income from sales through a broker. Taking into account the Soviet system, income of United States companies from sales to Soviet Trading Organizations will be treated as tax exempt income from sales through a broker. The reciprocal two year income tax exemption granted journalists and correspondents in this Convention is a departure from prior practice made to accommodate one of the principal Soviet desiderata.

At present, the Soviet tax structure is less developed in respect to foreign entities and persons than is the United States tax structure. United States tax rates on individual income, especially for employed persons, are presently generally higher than those in the Soviet Union. Further, United States companies dealing with the Soviet Union, according to available information, have generally dealt adequately with potential taxation in their agreements with Soviet trading organizations. As a result of these factors, the present tax benefits of this Convention will appear to be more in favor of the Soviet Union. However, the Convention provides a significant potential benefit for the United States and its citizens in limiting the tax impact of the expected development of the Soviet tax system, which is almost certain to treat foreign persons and entities on the basis of reciprocity. Further, the Convention contains a non-discrimination clause which should

* S. Ex. T, 93d Cong., 1st sess.

provide significant protection to United States interests. Through its system of exemptions, the Convention should largely insulate the entities and citizens of the parties from income tax in the other state. As with most tax conventions, a principal benefit is to free to a great extent the companies and persons involved from the compliance and administrative problems of dealing with a foreign tax system. This, in turn, can be expected to contribute to the smooth development of United States-Soviet Union trade, cooperation, and exchanges.

This Convention enters into force thirty days after the exchange of instruments of ratification. The provisions of the Convention shall, however, have effect for income derived on or after January 1 of the year following the year in which the instruments of ratification are exchanged. The Convention will remain in effect for a minimum of three years after which it will continue in effect indefinitely, but may then be terminated by either country by notice given at least six months before the end of any calendar year.

A technical memorandum explaining the principal features of this Convention is being prepared by the Department of the Treasury for the use of the Senate. It is hoped that the Senate will consider and approve this Convention at an early date.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH RUSH,
Acting Secretary of State.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Extension of Existing Suspension of Duty on Certain Copying Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 8215. H. Rept. 93-312. June 21, 1973. 3 pp.

Amending the Export Administration Act of 1969, To Protect the Domestic Economy from the Excessive Drain of Scarce Materials and Commodities and To Reduce the Serious Inflationary Impact of Abnormal Foreign Demand. Report, together with supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 8547. H. Rept. 93-325. June 25, 1973. 17 pp.

Prohibiting Environmental Modification as a Weapon of War. Report to accompany S. Res. 71. S. Rept. 93-270. June 27, 1973. 7 pp.

Extending Certain Privileges and Immunities to the Organization of African Unity. Report to accompany H.R. 8219. H. Rept. 93-349. June 28, 1973. 3 pp.

East-West Trade Policy Resolution. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 131. S. Rept. 93-282. June 29, 1973. 2 pp.

Endangered Species Act of 1973. Report to accompany S. 1983. S. Rept. 93-307. July 1, 1973. 42 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668.

Acceptance deposited: Hungary, September 20, 1973.

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973.

Acceptance deposited: Colombia, September 4, 1973.

North Atlantic Treaty—Status of Forces—Germany

Agreement to amend the agreement of August 3, 1959 (TIAS 5351), to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Bonn October 21, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 27, 1973.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.¹

Ratified by the President: September 25, 1973.

Postal Matters

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

Ratification deposited: Guyana, June 21, 1973.

Accession deposited: Libyan Arab Republic (with a declaration), August 8, 1973.

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agreement, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 1971. TIAS 7236.

¹ Not in force.

Accession deposited: Libyan Arab Republic (with a declaration), August 8, 1973.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Austria, September 5, 1973.

Space

Agreement for a cooperative program concerning the development, procurement, and use of a space laboratory in conjunction with the space shuttle system, with memorandum of understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European Space Research Organization. Done at Neuilly-sur-Seine August 14, 1973. Entered into force August 14, 1973.

Signatures: Belgium, August 14, 1973;² Denmark, September 21, 1973;² France,² Federal Republic of Germany, August 14, 1973; Italy, September 20, 1973;² Netherlands, August 17, 1973;² Spain, September 18, 1973; Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, August 14, 1973.

United Nations

Amendment to article 61 of the United Nations Charter, as amended (59 Stat. 1031, TIAS 5857, 6529), to enlarge the Economic and Social Council. Done at New York December 20, 1971.

Ratification deposited: United States, September 24, 1973.

Entered into force: September 24, 1973.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement concerning the launching from the Australian Woomera Range of Aerobee sounding rockets for scientific investigations. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra September 18, 1973. Entered into force September 18, 1973.

Ethiopia

Agreement amending the treaty of amity and economic relations of September 7, 1951 (TIAS 2864), to terminate notes concerning administration of justice. Effected by exchange of notes at Addis Ababa September 16, 1965, and October 20, 1972. Entered into force May 3, 1973.

Proclaimed by the President: September 21, 1973.

Hong Kong

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of December 17, 1970, as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles, with related letter. Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong September 18, 1973. Entered into force September 18, 1973.

Jamaica

Agreement extending the agreement of September 29, 1967, as amended and extended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 26, 1973. Entered into force September 26, 1973.

Japan

Understanding modifying the arrangement of January 3, 1972, concerning trade in wool and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 26, 1973. Entered into force September 26, 1973.

Understanding extending the arrangement of January 28, 1972, as amended, concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 26, 1973. Entered into force September 26, 1973.

Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of June 20, 1968, relating to a program of technical assistance in the field of tax administration. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-of-Spain April 18 and August 30, 1973. Entered into force August 30, 1973.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 29, 1972 (TIAS 7452). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon September 5, 1973. Entered into force September 5, 1973.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on September 26 confirmed the following nominations:

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., to be U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations, with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., to be U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador.

Kingdon Gould, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

William R. Kintner to be Ambassador to Thailand.

William E. Schaufele, Jr., to be U.S. Representative in the Security Council of the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador.

Barbara M. White to be U.S. Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs in the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador.

² Subject to ratification or approval; however, provisionally applicable upon signature.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

Youth Travel Abroad—What to Know Before You Go. This booklet, which contains information useful to all Americans traveling overseas, is directed particularly to the interests of young travelers. Included are tips on visas, charters, consular aid, and study abroad as well as suggestions for avoiding problems. Pub. 8656. General Foreign Policy Series 263. 20 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S1.71:263).

U.S.-African Interests: A Frank Appraisal. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series is based, with minor editorial revisions, on an address by David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, made before the Royal Commonwealth Society at London, England, March 14, 1973. Pub. 8701. African Series 54. 6 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S1.116:54).

Air Transport Services. Agreement, with exchange of notes, with the Hungarian People's Republic. TIAS 7577. 20 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7577)

Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses. Agreement with Cuba. TIAS 7579. 13 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.12:7579)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 7580. 16 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7580)

Status, Privileges and Immunities of the Delegations to the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation. Agreement with Switzerland. TIAS 7582. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7582)

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 7583. 54 pp. 55¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7583)

Earthquake Relief. Agreement with Nicaragua. TIAS 7585. 13 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7585)

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended. TIAS 7587. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7587)

Peace Corps. Agreement with the Yemen Arab Republic. TIAS 7588. 5 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7588)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia. TIAS 7589. 5 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7589)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of August 29, 1972. TIAS 7592. 2 pp. 10¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7592)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with the Republic of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of October 2, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7593. 6 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7593)

Air Charter Services. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 7594. 5 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7594)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 24–30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*341	9/24	Regional foreign policy conference, Milwaukee, Oct. 27.
342	9/24	Europe to build Spacelab for U.S. Space Shuttle.
343	9/24	Kissinger: U.N. General Assembly.
*344	9/26	Eliot sworn in as Ambassador to Afghanistan (biographic data).
*345	9/26	Kirk sworn in as Ambassador to Somali Democratic Republic (biographic data).
*346	9/26	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Oct. 25–26.
*347	9/26	Program for the official visit to Washington of Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk of New Zealand.
†348	9/26	U.S. and Japan sign cotton textile agreement (rewrite).
349	9/27	Kissinger: news conference, New York, Sept. 26.
†350	9/27	U.S. and Jamaica sign cotton textile agreement (rewrite).
351	9/27	Abshire named as Special Consultant on Congressional Affairs (rewrite).
†352	9/27	U.S. and Yugoslavia sign non-scheduled air service agreement (rewrite).
*353	9/28	Advisory Committee on the Foreign Service Institute, Oct. 29–30.
†354	9/28	Kissinger: remarks to Department employees.
*355	9/28	Arena Stage to tour U.S.S.R. Sept. 29–Oct. 17.
†356	9/28	U.S. and Indian scholars to meet at New Delhi.
*357	9/28	Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, Oct. 24–25.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXIX, No. 1791

October 22, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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President Nixon's News Conference of October 3

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon in the press briefing room at the White House on October 3.¹

The President: Won't you be seated, ladies and gentlemen. I guess I should say all those who can find seats.

Dr. Kissinger, as you know from an announcement that I understand got out about 30 minutes ago from Peking, will visit Peking on October 26 to 29. This is part of the continuing dialogue between the People's Republic of China and the United States which began with my visit to China last year.

The subjects that will be discussed include those that have been discussed on previous occasions—trade, for example, where it is interesting to note that the amount of bilateral trade between the two countries, which was approximately \$6 million in 1971, will be an estimated \$800 million in 1973. Scientific and cultural exchanges will be a major subject for discussions and of course other matters of mutual concern to the two nations.

In addition, Dr. Kissinger has been invited by the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Ohira, to stop in Japan on his visit to the Far East. He will do so. The timing of that visit, however, has not yet been agreed upon and will be announced as soon as we hear from the Japanese.

Incidentally, I learned that 12 to 15 members of the press will be invited, if they desire to go, to go on the trip with the Secre-

tary of State, and if you would put in your applications at the State Department in this instance, I think that they will be honored in the order in which they are received.

Q. In view of your sidewalk remark the other night about travel plans, can you pinpoint for us any better your timing of your trip to Europe?

The President: Mr. Theis [J. William Theis, Hearst Newspapers], it is difficult to pinpoint the timing of a trip to Europe, but in order that all of you can make your plans a little better: The trip to Europe will be made within the next few months, and the timing will be based on these factors—first, the progress which is made on the discussions now going on with regard to a Declaration of Principles with regard to the alliance, and with regard to economic matters as well. The latter, as you know, I discussed with Mr. Ortoli [François-Xavier Ortoli, President of the Commission of the European Communities] when he was here. That progress is going on, incidentally, well ahead of schedule, according to Dr. Kissinger.

As soon as those preliminary negotiations are completed and as soon as it is clear on both sides of the Atlantic that this will be a trip not for protocol purposes but one that will have real substance in it, then we will work out a date.

Now the second factor, however, which enters into this is the congressional schedule. I cannot take a trip to Europe or anyplace else at a time when there are matters before the Congress of very great significance. That is why I cannot pinpoint this in terms of saying that just as soon as the Europeans

¹ For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 8.

are ready we will go. If the Europeans are ready at a time that we have a heavy calendar in Congress, I shall have to postpone the trip until that.

But I would say I am thinking in terms of the next three or four months but it might be sooner than that, probably not much later.

Now, with regard to Japan, I agreed with Mr. Tanaka when he was here that I would visit Japan before the end of 1974. We will of course make those plans again consistent with our developments on the bilateral side and at a time when we think that there is a matter of substance to be discussed, or matters of substance to be discussed, and at a time which is consistent with my responsibilities on the domestic front.

Q. Do you have any comment to make on the Austrian decision to close the Russian-emigrant facilities?

The President: Yes, I have. The Austrians are in a very difficult position here. As you know, I stopped in Austria on my way to Moscow and for the first time—no, the second time—met the Prime Minister, Mr. Kreisky, and anybody who knows his background knows that he is certainly not anti-Semitic. But Austria is in the eye of a hurricane, and Austria, therefore, being a relatively small country and relatively weak militarily, et cetera, is making a very—what I am sure for Mr. Kreisky—painful decision in this respect.

I recall, for example, that at the time of the Hungarian revolution Austria opened its arms very generously to thousands of refugees, and I know that is the Austrian tradition and custom. I would hope—and I would express this—I would hope that the Prime Minister would reconsider his decision, even though I know he has even lately reiterated it, reconsider it for this fundamental reason that goes far beyond his country and even ours, and that is that we simply cannot have governments—small or large—give in to international blackmail by terrorist groups. That is what is involved.

Not to mention, of course, the fact that we all have a concern for the emigres. They

must have a place to come. So, on humanitarian grounds and on geopolitical grounds of the highest order, I believe that that decision should be reconsidered, but naturally I am not going to put my friend Mr. Kreisky in the position of trying to dictate to him what it should be.

Q. Mr. President, just a point of clarification.

The President: Sure.

Q. In your discussion of the Declaration of Principles, there was an intention to include Japan as well as the European Communities. Is that still the case, or has that been changed?

The President: Let me explain what we feel now with regard to including Japan.

I have told all of our foreign visitors, Chancellor Brandt and of course Prime Minister Heath, President Pompidou, that it is vitally important that Japan—which is now the second major economic power in the world, and, of course, in the Pacific a potential very great force for peace and stability—that Japan not be out of the club.

Now, they all agree. The difficulty is in writing a declaration with regard to the Atlantic alliance which fits Japan; the difficulty is writing one with regard to the European Economic Community which fits Japan.

So what we are presently thinking of is three declarations, one for the Atlantic alliance, one for the Economic Community, and then a more general declaration to which the Japanese might be willing to adhere.

Now, I have gone beyond what we have worked out, but that is what we can expect.

Let me say finally that in that respect, I know that these declarations may not seem too important when we consider the domestic problems that presently obsess us, but it is essential at a time that we are having negotiations with the Soviets and with the People's Republic of China, it is essential that we breathe new life and new purpose and new spirit into the American Atlantic alliance and into the free world community,

which includes Japan, and unless we do so, unless, for example, the Atlantic alliance speaks to our times rather than to the times 25 years ago, it is going to fragment. Our European friends realize this, and I am glad to note that even the economic experts like Ortolini recognize it, too.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

Prime Minister Kirk of New Zealand Visits the United States

Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk of New Zealand made an official visit to Washington September 26-29, during which he met with President Nixon and other government officials. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Nixon and Prime Minister Kirk at a dinner at the White House on September 27.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 1

PRESIDENT NIXON

Mr. Prime Minister and our distinguished guests: Mr. Prime Minister, you are no stranger to our country; this is your fifth visit. But we are very honored and very proud that this is the first time we have had the opportunity to welcome you as the head of government of your country.

We say that because New Zealand and the United States have been allies in war as we are now allies in peace. And I say it, too, from a personal sense, because as I have often pointed out to many visitors from New Zealand and to you this morning, I have very pleasant memories of serving with New Zealand forces in the Solomons, your Third New Zealand Division. And then also Mrs. Nixon and I have the most pleasant memories of the year 1953—it was 20 years ago—when on a trip around the world the first country we visited, as Vice President of the United States, was New Zealand.

We shall never forget the warmth of the

welcome we received, not only in Auckland but in the South Island as well. And we brought back from that trip an affection for not only your country but your people which has never left us.

To our distinguished guests tonight, I have had an opportunity that most of you have not had, and that is to talk to the Prime Minister at some length this morning about some of our mutual problems and our concerns in the world.

Most of you probably read of his speech in the United Nations yesterday when he said that he spoke for the little countries of the world. When he rises to respond to my remarks, you will see that the man who represents the little countries of the world is a big man. [Laughter.]

Prime Minister Kirk, however, is not only a big man physically, as he is, but I can tell you from our rather brief acquaintance that he is also a big man in terms of his love of his country, his pride in his background in that country, and also in the idealism with which he approaches the problems of building a structure of peace in the Pacific, in Asia, and in the world. And the world is fortunate that a man with his background, with his idealism, with his strength, with his concern for little countries, as well as little people, is leading this nation which is in a way, we think, so far away from us.

And I would simply say, Mr. Prime Minister, that perhaps it would be hard to find any two countries in the world that are further apart geographically than New Zealand and the United States. But it would be hard to find, also, any two countries in the world that in terms of what we seek in the world, in terms of our common ideals, in terms of what we believe, are closer together, because we both seek a world of peace, we both seek a world in which not only great powers but small powers and small nations are safe, independent, and respected.

And we both seek a world in which all people in the world—all people in the world, wherever they may be, not only in our countries, which are fortunate to be far above

the average in terms of our income—shall have the opportunity to move forward toward a better life.

In this room in which for over 150 years leaders from other governments have spoken, these words, I know, may sound now almost trite. But I would say that we are entering an era when the opportunity not only to build a structure of peace which will last for perhaps the balance of the century and beyond but also to build a new world in which all nations and all people go forward together to a better life, where that opportunity is better than it has ever been, and we are very proud that we have the opportunity, Mr. Prime Minister, to work with you, your people, your government, toward that great end.

Ladies and gentlemen, I know you will want to rise and drink to the health of the Prime Minister: To the Prime Minister.

PRIME MINISTER KIRK

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Agnew, ladies and gentlemen: I feel a little out of place. Though I come from a small country, I have to confess that we produce the most excellent food anywhere in the world, and that is what I am advertising by my presence. If you want to live in a small country but be big, there is a very simple trade solution to it.

But, Mr. President, I want first to thank you for the consideration and for the kindness and cordiality that you have shown to me during this visit to Washington, and I want to assure you that that is greatly appreciated.

And I want to say that it has been a very fine tribute, and one that I appreciate very much, that among those who were invited here tonight are special personal friends in the United States of America, and I want to thank you very much for that consideration.

And I want to say how moved I was, knowing how difficult it is for a European to speak good Maori, to hear someone singing flawless Maori and without an accent of any sort. That really was a very nice touch.

Our country, of course, is called New Zealand. It is also called "Aotearoa," the Maori name for the country, "The Land of the Long White Cloud," and it conjures up a vision of peace, blue skies, pleasant living, and indeed that is true of the country.

We are a long way from any other part of the world, and even our nearest neighbors are quite some distance from New Zealand shores. We would be, I think, the most remote country in the world. We are also on the bottom of the world.

And Mr. President, if I talk about what small countries can do and should do in the world, you should remember that we help hold it up. [Laughter.]

But for me it is a great privilege to be here, and it is a considerable honor to our country to be received in the way that I have been received here today. And I am mindful that it is now 20 years since you visited New Zealand and longer since you helped defend it. And the relationship between our country and the United States of America is based on some very important considerations.

And we remember, all of us, the part, the work, the sacrifices made by U.S. servicemen that enabled us to have the future we have. And in those days and in those years, a special partnership was forged out of a common concern and a common danger, and we have great pleasure each year in welcoming back to New Zealand people who were stationed there during that time, who come with their New Zealand wives, their children, and now their grandchildren. But it reminds us that the relationships between countries are not just matters of treaty or of political relationship; the relationship between the peoples of the countries helps build a bond that enables us to work on the things we see differently and to develop those that we see the same.

And our objectives are precisely those that have been pursued in this country. We believe in freedom; we believe in democracy; we believe that each person should have an equal opportunity to develop themselves, to participate in society, to take their place and to take it on their own initiative and on their own contribution. And so, we both work for

the common goal of extending the quality of life and the quality of the societies in which we live.

And we see perhaps a little more clearly, because in a small country there is no question of imposing your will or dominating or of seeking anything other than a political solution. More and more we see that while there are many nations, there is in fact just one human family, and more and more we are compelled to consider the fact that though we are one human family, we work as though we are several.

And now the opportunities are extended in the new atmosphere that is being created for all countries to pursue those avenues and opportunities with the objective of uniting the human family in common concern for peace, for prosperity, and for the development of their peoples.

So, since we share these objectives, it is not surprising that we have welcomed the new opportunities that a more relaxed international atmosphere has brought. And, Mr. President, the opportunities that your work has helped to create in Asia and in Southeast Asia is at once a challenge and a chance, a real chance, to improve relationships to the point where we can look forward to a long period of stability and peace in that region.

And for our part we want to play an effective role, and we want to develop as an independent country the initiatives that we believe are right and proper.

So, sir, to come today and to have the opportunity to talk with you about these objectives, about the changing scene in Asia, and about those things which we can do which help pull us together in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, has been indeed a very important opportunity so far as I am concerned. And I am pleased that one result of the discussions today was that we were able to meet a very large measure of agreement about cooperation in science and technology.

Our problem has been that we have produced a number of people who have been talented but when they reached their matu-

rity they go off to work for others. When we see Americans on the moon, we know that in New Zealand they helped put them there—Dr. William Pickering—and what we are talking about is a basis of cooperation that allows scientists and technologists to stimulate each other with their ideas, to develop new fields, to bring new benefits that can be employed usefully for the benefit of our countries and for the benefit of other peoples. And sir, we welcome very much this opportunity to share, to cooperate, and indeed, in the case of our skilled people, retain their skills in our service as well as in the service of the people.

I don't want to say any more except what a great honor it has been to be received here, the opportunity to talk with you, to discuss the matters that are so important to the South Pacific and to Southeast Asia at the present time. And I want to remark that 20 years is a long time. We have changed a lot in 20 years. The fish are bigger and the horses a little faster [laughter], and the country has changed and developed.

And I want to take this opportunity of saying that the President of the United States will always be a welcome visitor to New Zealand, and if the President of the United States brings the graceful First Lady with him, then, sir, you will be doubly welcome.

And I know that there are some things you must attend to that do not permit endless travels, but I hope you will consider an invitation to the President of the United States that remains open for exercise at his convenience.

Sir, thank you very much for the reception, thank you very much for the cordiality with which I and my party have been received. We do hope as a continuant to this brief visit, with the understanding we have achieved, that it will be possible to go on and develop the pursuit of peace and prosperity for all people.

Ladies and gentlemen, can I ask you to join me in a toast to the President of the United States of America: To the President.

Secretary Kissinger Addresses Department Employees

Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger on September 28 before employees of the Department of State. William J. Porter, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, introduced Secretary Kissinger.

Press release 354 dated September 28

UNDER SECRETARY PORTER

The distinguished public servant who has come here to meet you today needs no introduction. He comes to State with unprecedented credentials for achievement in foreign affairs. Those achievements, as you know, have received worldwide acclaim, and they have placed our country in the forefront of the effort to bring about a global peace. We have truly acquired an extraordinary leader.

Without further ado, therefore, on behalf of the 22,000 of us here and around the world I extend a warm welcome to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. [Applause.]

SECRETARY KISSINGER

Mr. Porter, ladies and gentlemen: When it was suggested that I meet so large a group, some of my colleagues advanced the argument that this would make me feel at home. I've been puzzling about this remark, and I have concluded that based on the newspaper accounts of how I am supposed to have treated my staff at the White House, my new colleagues here had thought that this was the closest thing to a Nuremberg party rally that they could organize. [Laughter.]

In convincing me of the wisdom of doing this, they also pointed out that Secretary Dulles met a similar group. They forgot to mention that this was the last time anybody in the Department saw Secretary Dulles. [Laughter.]

I wanted to talk to you briefly about what I think we can do together.

When I was appointed, I mentioned that there was a need for the institutionalization of foreign policy, and this is true in many respects.

First of all, the whole nature of our foreign policy has changed. For the greater part of our history we really did not participate on a day-to-day basis in foreign affairs, and therefore more emphasis was placed in our diplomacy on reporting than on policymaking.

And when at the end of World War II we did conduct foreign policy on a global scale, the disproportion between our resources and those of most of the rest of the world was so great we could overwhelm every problem and we could always substitute resources for thought.

But now we are in a situation where we have to conduct foreign policy the way many other nations have had to conduct it throughout their history. We no longer have overwhelming margins of safety, and we no longer have overwhelming margins of resources. Therefore we have to be good, and we have to be thoughtful. I think this is the most important aspect of the institutionalization of foreign policy.

In the making of foreign policy, we have a number of tasks: We have reporting, analysis, policymaking, and education. And I think it is safe to say that in the past we may have been better at the reporting functions than at anything else.

When I met yesterday with my colleagues on the seventh floor, I told them that it was essential in the months and years ahead that we ask ourselves not only where we are but where we want to go. In discussing the policy issues and in reporting events around the world, you help us on the seventh floor not only by reporting what is happening but by telling us what it means.

A great deal of time in this building and in Washington is spent on clearing cables and in working out understandings between various groups concerned with policy. I would like to have the opportunity to work out these understandings on the seventh floor, and not

throughout this building. We are much better off being told clear choices—to be told what the alternatives are, to be told what choices we confront. I have asked every Assistant Secretary, when making his recommendations to us, to tell us both his recommendations and the alternatives that have been rejected. We would much rather see a clear-cut statement of choices than a negotiated document from which we cannot tell what the real arguments were that went into it.

In other words, as we try to restore the Department of State to its principal role of advising the President and future administrations on the making of foreign policy, the way to achieve that preeminent position is not to debate in the abstract or to determine where in the bureaucratic hierarchy one should be placed, but to do the best work in town.

And having worked with many of you, I know that there is no reason in the world why this building and this organization should not produce the best and most thoughtful work in town. And indeed, if we are going to have a long-term foreign policy, it must produce the best work in town—and not just for this administration, but for the administrations to come.

I have talked to some of the officers in the Foreign Service Association, and I take their concerns extremely seriously.

What we will try to do in addition to the normal administrative concerns which you must have, however, is to make sure that the ablest people get put into the key positions as rapidly as possible.

And in writing your memoranda, you should consider that successful foreign policy depends not only on difficulties avoided but on opportunities seized.

I asked every Bureau yesterday to let us have by the end of next week a statement of all the problems that they perceive over the next year as well as a statement of those

things we ought to do—even if they are not problems. That is to say, we should know where we want to go if we want to do the right thing.

And this gets me to my final point. In working out policies at the various levels, at some point it is inevitable that some compromises will have to be made. But in thinking about policy it is not necessary to make those compromises as the papers are being written. In this current state of America and of America's relations to the world, we have an unparalleled opportunity to help bring about a peaceful international structure, a world which the major participants feel that they have had a share in creating and which therefore they have an interest in maintaining.

It is an opportunity that comes not often in a century and then through a combination of historical events that cannot inevitably be repeated.

At this state in America's relations with the world and in this stage of America's concern with itself, our primary concern ought to be to ask ourselves what is right, and not to worry about political pressure, about bureaucratic expediency, or the short-term considerations.

I think with this attitude, and with your help, we can do great things together with some joy and some enthusiasm and some hope.

Thank you very much.

Senate Confirms Mr. Mays as President of OPIC

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the nomination of Marshall Trammell Mays to be President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

The United States and Korea: A Community of Interests

*Address by William J. Porter
Under Secretary for Political Affairs¹*

It is an honor to meet with you tonight and to be able to observe on this side of the Pacific Ocean the close economic cooperation between the United States and Korea that I used to see in Seoul. It is especially gratifying that the "Sell to Korea" mission is able to be with us this evening.

This a momentous time in international life—for the Republic of Korea, for the United States, and for the world community. In his address to the General Assembly on September 24, Secretary Kissinger expressed our confidence that the rigid confrontation which has dominated international life for a quarter of a century has been softened.² He outlined a program by which the nations of the world can start to move from co-existence to community.

The ending of the war in Viet-Nam, in which both of us were deeply engaged, is the most dramatic example of a world crisis surmounted. The settlement in Berlin and the cease-fire in the Middle East also provide concrete evidence that the era of confrontation is passing.

The changing climate of relations between the United States and the two major Communist powers—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—has made an important contribution to this evolution. The United States and the Soviet Union are finding a common interest in avoiding nuclear war and in carefully and pragmatically establishing a broad range of constructive relations. The United States and China have

ended two decades of estrangement and begun—again slowly, realistically—a dialogue and a productive exchange of Liaison Offices, visitors, and trade.

The United States seeks to build with each of our adversaries a framework of mutually beneficial relationships. By this process we hope to create what President Nixon has called a structure of peace. The President has defined this as a "network of relationships and of interdependencies that restrain aggression and that take the profit out of war."³ We are seeking to bring about a vested interest in mutual restraint and in mutual cooperation. The agreements we have made with Moscow and Peking are part of this effort.

Our security commitments in Europe and in Asia have contributed significantly to the progress we have been able to make with Moscow and Peking. These commitments, and the conviction of both our allies and our adversaries that we have both the will and the ability to honor them, encourage the pattern of restraint upon which true détente must rely. We believe that all parties benefit from these arrangements and that the interaction of restraint and cooperation can contribute to a reliable détente and eventually to a sound peace.

The evolving situation in the Korean Peninsula provides another dramatic example of the relaxation of international tensions. The Republic of Korea came into existence at a time of rigid confrontation between the

¹ Made before the U.S.-Korea Economic Council at New York on Oct. 3.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 15, 1973, p. 469.

³ For an excerpt from President Nixon's address to the Nation on Nov. 2, 1972, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1972, p. 605.

Soviet Union and the United States. It was the Second World War and its aftermath, the North Korean invasion of 1950, which forged today's solid links between our two nations and peoples, even though the roots of our relations go back to the very beginning of Korea's emergence as a modern state.

The United States led the United Nations resistance to aggression in 1950. We are still committed to the 1953 armistice agreement through the United Nations Command, which is a signatory to the armistice agreement and which an American officer commands. In 1954 our governments concluded a mutual defense treaty to assure the Republic of Korea of United States readiness to render assistance, in conformity with our constitutional process, in the event of armed attack. Pursuant to this treaty, the United States maintains ground and air forces in the Republic.

Dialogue Between North and South Korea

It is against this background of conflict, of collective response by the international community, and of U.S. assistance and support for the resolute Government and people of Korea, that the prospects have gradually emerged for a lessening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The Republic of Korea has taken momentous steps toward peace and stability, first, by initiating the Red Cross talks in mid-1971 to reunite families divided by the Korean conflict and, second, by opening the secret talks with the North in early 1972. These culminated in the joint announcement on July 4, 1972, by which both parties agreed to work for the ultimate reunification of the Korean Peninsula by peaceful means and to establish a joint coordinating committee.

The United States has welcomed these steps toward stability and peace and, indeed, in the Shanghai communique concluding President Nixon's historic visit to China in February 1972, affirmed that "the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension

and increased communication in the Korean peninsula."⁴ The dialogue between South and North has proceeded cautiously. At the moment it is in a state of abeyance. We think, however, that the patient step-by-step process of establishing contacts and building mutual confidence will continue.

Proposed U.N. General Assembly Resolution

In June of this year President Park took another major conciliatory step by presenting a seven-point proposal designed to enhance the prospects of peace in the peninsula and contribute to the achievement of eventual unification of the nation.

We support these Korean proposals. In order to help translate them into concrete action we and other friends of the Republic of Korea have joined in sponsoring a resolution at the U.N. General Assembly this fall which we believe will make a constructive contribution to the debate on the Korean question. Our aims are to avoid contentious discussion, to promote peace and stability, and to facilitate the talks going on between South and North Korea. Let me summarize this proposal:

—First, we recommend acceptance of the report by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which proposes its own termination. The Commission has performed valuable and honorable service in attempting to carry out its mandate and has concluded that its useful life has been completed.

—Second, we and our friends propose that the two parts of Korea consider membership in the United Nations as a means of furthering peace and eventual reunification. The resolution does not insist upon membership but, as Secretary Kissinger said in his address to the U.N. General Assembly:

Membership in this body should be a step toward reconciliation, not a source of conflict. The time has come for North and South Korea to be offered their rightful places here, without prejudice to a future evolution toward unification.

⁴For text of the communique, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435.

Unfortunately, it appears at this point that North Korea is not yet ready to participate in the debates and challenges that would result from full membership in the United Nations.

—Third, we believe that it is necessary to maintain the armistice agreement and its supporting arrangements for peace and security in the area, but we are willing that the parties concerned explore and agree upon satisfactory alternate arrangements.

We shall work closely with the Republic of Korea and its other friends and allies for the adoption of this resolution.

Given the close ties between them, it is only natural that the United States have a keen interest in the Republic of Korea. It would do a disservice to both our countries and to the solid relationship between us to ignore or gloss over differences when they occur. We recognize that the Korean Government and people must make their choices and that the political processes of a nation are essentially an internal matter. As with any close ally, we do consider it appropriate to make known our views on such subjects when it seems warranted. And we do so, quietly but frankly.

We have had occasion to do this recently in the case of an event that threatened the good relations between Japan and Korea. We hope such incidents can be speedily resolved and that individual rights will be respected.

Korea in the World Economy

Let me turn to the economy of Korea. This, too, is a subject of great interest to the United States, as it is to all of us here tonight.

For the past decade the economy of the Republic of Korea has made a remarkable upsurge. There has been talk of an "economic miracle" in several countries since World War II. Korea merits that description as justly as any. Real growth in gross national product since 1962 has been at the remarkable annual rate of 9.5 percent. Growth in earnings from commodity exports

in that decade has been even more impressive, reflecting annual increases at the rate of 40.3 percent.

More particularly, Korea's commodity exports to the United States in the past decade have increased by over 5 percent annually. And in recent years, one-half of all Korea's exports have gone to the U.S. market. This was possible because of the relatively free market and low-tariff philosophy of the United States. Unfortunately, certain imports from Korea, as well as from some other countries, have competed with our domestic production to such an extent as to cause injury to our domestic producers and manufacturers. Textiles are an outstanding illustration of this problem. Because of high tariff and nontariff barriers, this situation could not happen to a country such as Korea. For example, U.S. exporters cannot even sell a man's shirt to Korea, though textile sales are the principal export earner and the greatest single income generator in Korean exports to the United States. We look for improvement in this area.

In fairness, I must add a word of appreciation for the understanding and consideration of our situation which led Korea voluntarily to restrain the growth of its textile exports to the United States.

Korea has reached the stage of economic development where it no longer has to rely on a few favored exports that compete with local production in the importing country. Instead, it successfully competes with other exporting countries in foreign markets. This means that Korea is becoming a major element in world trade. It has set an export target of \$4.4 billion for 1976 and \$11 billion for 1981. Trade at this level is dependent on an increased volume of world trade and a more competitive position for Korean products.

But if Korea is to achieve the supply position targeted for the next eight years, it must comply with the recommendations of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] for liberalization of its import restrictions.

It must permit greater foreign access to its own domestic market if it wants foreign markets for Korean products.

For these reasons, we are especially pleased that the Republic of Korea has sent a "Sell to Korea" mission to the United States. I am sure that the mission members will find—if they have not already—that products of U.S. firms are competitive with, and in most cases superior to, the products of other suppliers, in price as well as in quality. Only by obtaining the best equipment can Korea hope to maintain its quality of product; only by purchasing the longest lasting and most productive equipment can Korea maintain the competitive price of its manufactured products. I know that Korea has these considerations in mind, and I am gratified that the Korean Government has taken the initiative in having its industrialists investigate the U.S. market as a source for the equipment needed to achieve Korea's ambitious development program.

There is a small number of observers who feel that Korea's ambitious export targets are overly optimistic. We have seen Korea launch ambitious targets in two previous five-year plans, however, and exceed them in spite of disbelievers and doubters. We firmly believe that the ambitious targets of the third five-year plan are attainable; we want Korea to achieve and surpass them again.

Korea is making such remarkable progress that it will not be able to qualify much longer for economic assistance. Korea is already a donor, extending some assistance to other less developed countries and has thus begun to play an even more important role in the world economy. It is, of course, also contributing to international lending and developmental institutions.

This is an appropriate occasion for me to express our nation's gratification that Korea has made such commendable progress in development. We like to think that this is in part due to the almost \$6 billion in economic assistance which we have extended to Korea over the 27 years of our close co-

operation. Korea's performance is all the more remarkable in view of a lack of natural resources. Thanks to the hard-working Korean people and the skill of her businessmen, Korea has become an important producing and trading nation.

I am proud that I was privileged to represent my country in Korea during a large part of the eminently successful second five-year plan. I know from personal experience the high caliber of Korea's business, industry, and government leaders. I can foresee the time when Korea will become one of the outstanding trading nations in the world. When this occurs it will be due in no small part to the farsighted initiatives of those who are represented here tonight on this Council.

The United States and Korea together have lived through many crises and faced many dangers. Now perhaps we can hope for a less turbulent world.

We can hope that confrontation will be replaced by cooperation; combativeness by competition. We can hope that trade, investment, and peaceful progress will ease old hostilities and open new doors.

The U.S.-Korea Economic Council is a sign of our many shared experiences. In promoting trade and commerce it will be contributing to the new era we are all trying very hard to build. I am therefore pleased to salute you this evening and, in the presence of these our distinguished visitors, to wish you every success.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

- Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973. Conference report to accompany H.R. 7645. H. Rept. 93-367. July 10, 1973. 16 pp.
- Suspension of Duty on Manganese Ore. Report to accompany H.R. 6676. S. Rept. 93-316. July 13, 1973. 3 pp.
- Amendment to Section 5 of the EURATOM Cooperation Act of 1958, as Amended. Report to accompany H.R. 8867. H. Rept. 93-385. July 19, 1973. 10 pp.

Annual Meeting of SEATO Council Held at New York

Deputy Secretary Rush was the chief U.S. delegate at the annual meeting of the SEATO Council held at New York September 28. Following is a press statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting.

Council members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States held their 18th annual meeting in New York today.

At the conclusion of the meeting, SEATO Secretary General H. E. Sunthorn Hongladarom announced that the Council upheld the objectives of the Manila Pact and its basic purpose of peace in Southeast Asia. They discussed and agreed on measures to ensure that SEATO's future activities are relevant to the situation in the treaty area brought about by recent international development, notably the movement towards a peaceful and viable settlement of the Indochina conflict.

In the light of major changes which have occurred in Southeast Asia since the last Council meeting, the Council agreed to a reduction of SEATO's traditional military activities, with increased emphasis on supporting the national programs of the two regional members, the Philippines and Thailand, in promoting stability and development.

The Council also agreed with the Secretary General's proposal calling for a complete integration of the military into the civilian staff at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok which would facilitate the organization's increased focus on cooperating in the support of the internal stability and development measures of the regional members.

Council members believed that these changes would result in SEATO's activities being more relevant to the situation in the

treaty area today, noting that the Manila Pact calls for cooperation among member nations to promote peace, economic progress and social well-being.

World Tourism Organization Statutes Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Nixon*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Statutes of the World Tourism Organization done at Mexico City on September 27, 1970. The report of the Department of State is enclosed for the information of the Senate.

The Statutes establish the World Tourism Organization as an international organization of intergovernmental character replacing the International Union of Official Travel Organizations, a non-governmental organization.

The World Tourism Organization will continue the activities of the International Union of Official Travel Organizations in promoting and facilitating international tourism. Additionally, because of the World Tourism Organization's intergovernmental character and close association with the United Nations system, it is anticipated that it will become an even more effective organization. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Statutes and give its advice and consent to ratification.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 12, 1973.

¹Transmitted on Sept. 12 (White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. R, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the statutes and the report of the Department of State.

General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency Holds 17th Session at Vienna

The 17th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held at Vienna September 18-24. Following is a statement made before the conference on September 18 by Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, who was chairman of the U.S. delegation.

It is an honor for me to represent the United States at this important meeting. This is my first IAEA General Conference, and I'm happy to have this opportunity to meet our many colleagues who have come to Vienna this week from all parts of the world.

I would like to commend Director General [A. Sigvard] Eklund for the outstanding leadership he has provided to the International Agency over the past 12 years. His is a truly remarkable record of devotion to the Agency's programs. We were delighted to join with the other delegates today in the unanimous reappointment of Dr. Eklund to a fourth term in office. We wish also to pay tribute to members of the Agency staff, who have served with such diligence and distinction.

Next month the United Nations Association of the United States plans to salute the IAEA as part of its annual celebration of the U.N.'s anniversary. As a contribution to these festivities the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission will open an exhibit in Washington. We are honored that Dr. Eklund is planning to participate in both of these events and to visit a number of our nuclear installations. The Agency has significant programs in the environmental, waste management, and nuclear safety fields, among others,

and we look forward to this opportunity to exchange ideas in these important areas.

The President of the United States has asked me to extend to you his best wishes for a most productive and rewarding meeting. I need not remind this conference that the activities of the IAEA relate directly and importantly to President Nixon's concerns for world peace and his determination to meet urgent energy needs without endangering our environment.

In the United States, President Nixon has taken decisive action to meet the energy challenge. He recently requested an extensive reorganization of the government agencies dealing with energy policy, natural resources, and research and development. The President has established an Energy Policy Office in the White House and has proposed to the Congress the creation of three Federal agencies: a Department of Energy and Natural Resources, which would be responsible for the balanced utilization and conservation of our resources; an Energy Research and Development Administration, which would use the present research and development structure of the Atomic Energy Commission; and a Nuclear Energy Commission, which would have the regulatory responsibilities for nuclear health and safety.

In his message to Congress in June setting forth these proposals, the President also announced that he was initiating a Federal energy research and development effort of \$10 billion over a five-year period beginning next year. To give impetus to this drive, he has directed that an additional \$100 million be authorized in the current year to accelerate existing projects and undertake new ini-

tatives in a number of research and development areas.

While the energy problems facing the United States have variously been described as a crisis or a dilemma, we prefer to view them as a challenge. We welcome this opportunity to apply to the whole field of energy the research and development techniques which have been successful in our atomic energy programs and in other large, complicated technological projects.

In the United States we are just beginning to achieve the promise of nuclear energy as a civilian power resource. The commercial operation of nuclear power plants reflects almost 30 years of discussion and development, during which the light water reactor has established itself as a major new source of electrical energy that is both economical and safe. The development of a liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor is now our highest national priority for nuclear power production, and we expect this reactor to become available in the mid-1980's. The development of fusion power should present a new option, perhaps by the year 2000. By that time nuclear power may account for about half of the world's electric generating capacity.

Vital as these efforts in nuclear technology are, we in the United States recognize that we must meet the energy challenge on a broad front that goes far beyond the nuclear sciences. In America, the scarcity of oil and gas supplies has forced us to give increasing attention to other sources of energy which we had not fully developed in the era of relatively cheap domestic petroleum products. Both the Federal Government and American industry are now studying ways of better utilizing our substantial coal reserves. There is also renewed interest in developing geothermal energy, and some advanced research has already started on harnessing solar energy and other natural sources of power.

One of the key features of the proposed Energy Research and Development Administration is that the new agency would have authority to conduct research and development on all these potential energy sources

as well as atomic energy. We hope that these efforts, together with vigorous programs to conserve energy, will provide the fuels needed for our growing economy.

We in the United States look forward with confidence to rapid growth in the use of nuclear power, but we are determined that this development shall not result in greater risks to man and his environment. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission is now devoting a substantial portion of its research and development resources to evaluating and reducing potential hazards of nuclear power plants. We are further reducing the already minuscule impact of radioactivity emanating from nuclear power plant operation, and we are giving greater attention to the thermal effects of cooling water used in these plants.

The proliferation of nuclear power plants also places in a new perspective the transportation, management, and ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes. We have imposed stricter regulations on the shipment of these materials, and we are accelerating the introduction of new methods of solidifying and storing radioactive waste materials. I am pleased to note that the Thursday afternoon science section will be devoted to the important subject of radioactive waste management.

Assistance to Developing Countries

Many of the concerns I have mentioned involving nuclear energy represent issues which are dominant in the IAEA as well as in my own country. These are in fact worldwide problems which we must face in developing new energy sources. They offer a unique opportunity for research by member states.

The Agency has already taken a significant step with its recently completed in-depth market survey of the power requirements of 14 developing countries in Asia, Southeast Europe, and Latin America. The report of this market survey is, in our view, an outstanding piece of work and an excellent example of the contribution the Agency can make to world energy efforts. We are pleased that the conference will consider this report.

We commend not only the Agency but those many people in the governments and utility companies of the developing countries who furnished this information. We also appreciate the work of the experts from a number of industrialized countries who developed and adapted the methodology required to produce this study.

We are convinced that this study will be useful both to the developing countries in assessing their power needs and to the nuclear industry. We believe that open competition in the market will determine which types of power reactors can help developing countries meet their growing power needs in the most economical way.

In conducting this survey, the Agency has acquired both the manpower and the supporting elements, such as specialized computer programs, which will enable it to evaluate the possible role of nuclear power in the developing countries. It would be a waste of valuable resources if these resources should now be dissipated. Moreover, the study makes it clear that in the years ahead nuclear power will become a very real option for a number of developing countries.

As they weigh the possibilities and problems of nuclear power, those countries will need assistance in a variety of ways—in the training of personnel, detailed planning of network expansion, drafting of legislation and regulations, and evaluation of environmental impact, for example. Surely the Agency could play a major role in helping to supply or secure such assistance.

In short, the completed survey should not be regarded as the end of the Agency's involvement with the potential for nuclear power in developing countries. The report will be considered in detail in committee later during this session.

Nuclear Safety and Environmental Integrity

In the years ahead, as nuclear power plants become a familiar part of the life and landscape of developing and industrial nations alike, the Agency will have increasingly important contributions to make in helping to

insure both human health and safety and environmental integrity.

Since its very inception, the Agency has regarded nuclear safety as among the most urgent and important items on its agenda. The United States has supported and encouraged every improvement in IAEA programs in nuclear safety for member nations. Recently we proposed a modest augmentation of the Agency staff and some revisions in procedures which would strengthen the Agency's ability to conduct safety reviews requested by member nations on projects proposed or being built in their countries. This kind of advice is essential for countries just getting started in the nuclear energy business. Since the IAEA is the only international agency that can give this advice, I am happy to note that the Director General has appointed an internal task force to develop recommendations as to how the Agency's program can be modified to provide such assistance.

The United States has devoted major efforts to the development of standards, reactor designs, construction practices, and operational techniques to assure that safety is maintained at a high level. Later this month we will be host to a workshop on regulatory principles and perspectives for representatives of a number of countries who are interested in learning about some of these techniques. We are glad to share this information, because we believe that any increment of safety achieved anywhere is of benefit everywhere. I understand that representatives of the IAEA will attend this workshop.

Members of our regulatory staff are also working in other ways to help improve Agency programs so that they can better meet the needs of the member countries now entering the nuclear power field. Our staff will continue to assist the Agency as much as possible in this effort.

The United States recognizes that the Agency has a highly significant role to play in taking actions designed to protect the environment. Those of us who work in the nuclear field are fully aware of inescapable en-

vironmental problems associated with the development of new energy resources in any form, be it nuclear fission or fusion, geothermal, solar, or whatever. We are convinced, however, that nuclear energy is the only presently available alternative to fossil fuel as a source of significant increments of power during coming decades and that its environmental effects can be properly controlled. We are equally convinced that any successful effort to attack the environmental problems associated with nuclear power will require not only energetic and imaginative work but also close international cooperation. By their nature, these problems are international in scope, and many of the Agency's services in this field are of direct value to all the member states.

We recognize with gratification that the Agency already has a strong program in the area of nuclear environmental protection. This program began almost as soon as the Agency came into existence and has steadily expanded. My government has supported all aspects of this program, and during recent years we have taken part in other efforts by the Agency to help deal with concerns about the environmental impact of nuclear energy.

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in June 1972 and the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution last December gave further impetus to the Agency's environmental programs. We support the environmental program recommended by the Board of Governors in the budget for 1974, which we anticipate will be supplemented in future years by financial support from the U.N. Environment Fund. We strongly urge all member states to support adequate budgetary provision for this program when we consider the 1974 budget later in this conference.

Let me note at this point our view of the Agency as offering a unique multinational focus for research in problem areas which may ultimately be capable only of international solution. Consequently, we support the emphasis being placed by the Agency on sup-

porting and coordinating research in radiological safety and waste management, especially in view of the need for continuous attention to changing national and international requirements. We support the program of the Monaco Laboratory, to which we have made special contributions of equipment worth about \$100,000 during the last four years. We are very pleased that the Board of Governors has endorsed the Director General's proposal, developed by the IAEA and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], that the Monaco Laboratory's program be expanded to include the use of nuclear and other techniques to monitor specified nonradioactive marine pollutants. We will encourage financing of this program by the U.N. Environment Fund.

Safeguards Under Nonproliferation Treaty

The objectives of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including the Agency's responsibility for administering the treaty's safeguards provisions, continue to have our strongest support. I understand that of the 78 non-nuclear-weapons states that are parties to the NPT, 26 now have NPT safeguards agreements in force and 17 have agreements signed or approved. We are happy that the European Community and its members have signed a safeguards agreement with the Agency, and we hope that all of the countries involved will promptly ratify the agreement and the NPT.

Although the United States is not required by the treaty to accept international safeguards in the United States, negotiations are now actively in progress on our offer to permit the Agency to apply its safeguards to U.S. nuclear activities, excluding those with direct national security significance. The United States offered to permit safeguards to be applied in the United States, when they are being applied broadly in highly industrialized non-nuclear-weapons countries, in order to demonstrate our belief that there is no risk to proprietary information by the application of IAEA safeguards and to meet the

concern by some that they might suffer commercial disadvantage from the Nonproliferation Treaty.

We will continue to support the Agency's efforts to develop technically meaningful and widely acceptable procedures to meet its safeguards responsibilities. We urge other member states to do the same. As the use of nuclear power becomes more widespread the Agency's safeguards responsibilities will increase and the safeguards program will need our continued support, both through insuring an adequate budget and in making available our best people and most advanced safeguards research results.

I am aware that there are a great many extremely worthwhile activities in the Agency's program that I have not touched on today. The U.S. delegation will support the 1974 budget as recommended by the Board of Governors, believing it to represent a well-balanced use of the resources that are expected to be available.

We fully support the Agency's technical assistance program. The Director General has called our attention to the rising costs involved in the provision of technical assistance. We hope that the \$3 million target for voluntary contributions toward the operational budget for 1974 will be fully met by our respective governments, at least at the level recommended by the General Conference and if possible above that. For our part, subject to congressional appropriations, we plan to continue to contribute generously to the target and to make additional in-kind grants for study in the United States, for the services of our experts, and for equipment to approved technical assistance projects. We also look forward to discussion next year of an increase in the target for 1975. In addition, my government is pleased to renew its pledge, for the 15th consecutive year, to donate up to 50,000 dollars' worth of special nuclear materials for use in Agency projects in research and for medical therapy.

With regard to our materials supply policy, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's uranium enrichment facilities, which currently

supply a large share of the world's needs, will be able to meet anticipated requirements for enrichment services only through the early 1980's, despite a current improvement program representing an investment of almost \$1 billion. We, as well as other nations which will increasingly rely on nuclear power, want to make certain that there will be no need to curtail these nuclear power programs because enrichment services are not fully available. The United States, through one or more of several alternatives available to us, will move in ample time to assure that such services will be available to meet both our own needs and the rapidly expanding requirements of the international market.

The safeguard of nuclear materials, the formulation and application of environmental and health and safety measures, the exchange of scientific information, and the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—these are four broad areas of nuclear activity in which the Agency performs services which are always useful and at times vital to every one of its member states. In most instances these are services which the Agency can undertake more effectively and more economically than could any nation operating unilaterally.

Thus let me close my remarks as I began, by underscoring the high esteem in which my government holds the Agency and all who contribute to its activities.

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference Confirmed

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the nomination of Dixy Lee Ray to be the Representative of the United States to the 17th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The nominations of William A. Anders, Clarence E. Larson, Dwight J. Porter, and Gerald F. Tape to be Alternate Representatives were also confirmed that day.

United States Welcomes Admission of Three New Members to the U.N.

*Statement by John Scali
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

Mr. President [Leopoldo Benites, of Ecuador]: May I offer my warm congratulations and those of the United States as you, the distinguished representative of a respected neighbor, assume the Presidency of this 28th General Assembly.

It is a special honor for me to speak as the representative of the host country at this moment in history. Three new members have taken their places today in the supreme parliament of mankind. One of them is a small country, particularly meaningful to us because it is a neighbor and a good neighbor. The entry of the two German states is the culmination of a generation of diplomacy, both inside and outside the United Nations, a process in which all parties have come to recognize the realities of today's world. It has been a process in which step by step the world has recognized that neither ideological conflicts, bitter memories, nor war-bred jealousies can be allowed to obstruct the building of a better future.

By welcoming new members, we have moved only part way on the road to enduring peace, but accompanied as it is by other moves toward international harmony, it is a move that should cause mankind to take heart and satisfaction.

We welcome the independent Bahamas to the United Nations with particular affection. This newest American republic is a close neighbor with whom we have much history in common. Like us, the Bahamas have a freely elected and representative government, the head of which, in the person of Prime Minister Pindling, is here among us today. We have been friends many years. The Amer-

ican Government has been represented in Nassau since 1821. We look forward to continuing these close ties with the Bahamas bilaterally and within this organization.

The entry of the two German states into the United Nations is a great symbolic act. The United Nations has grown over the years from its original 51 members to 135. But it was not until today that it could be said to even approach its goal of universality.

The entry of the two German states moves the United Nations much nearer to this goal, enhancing its ability to function in the real world where real decisions are made and executed.

The United States is proud of the role which it has played in making this event a reality. Beginning in 1969, President Nixon laid out a new blueprint for peace designed to replace conflict and confrontation with negotiation. His program was far more than atmospherics. He has since 1969 amply demonstrated his resolution to deal vigorously and forthrightly with the most difficult issues of our time and to lessen the threat of nuclear arms in a historic agreement with the Soviet Union. In Europe, the search for peace has meant seeking improvements in the Berlin situation, altering the nature of relations between East and West, reducing the military confrontation of opposing coalitions, and lowering the barriers to travel, cultural, and intellectual intercourse. It has also meant moving with careful steps toward normalizing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and other nations.

But progress through careful negotiation is not and cannot be the work of one country or even a small group of countries. We are working with the Soviet Union in full concert with our allies to settle the differences of decades and reduce tensions in central Europe.

A cornerstone of these efforts has been the Quadripartite Berlin Agreement, a document which shows what can be accomplished when there is readiness to reject the outworn ideo-

¹ Made in the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 18 (USUN press release 83).

logical positions and search for ways to solve the stubborn problems. The Berlin agreement demonstrates anew that even the most rigid deadlock can be resolved through patient negotiations and mutual accommodation.

This agreement in turn was followed by the quadripartite declaration of November 1972 in which all four powers agreed to support U.N. membership for the two German states. Today, we have witnessed one of the fruits of those agreements.

Throughout this process, the Federal Republic of Germany has played a major and constructive role. Its policies have helped lay the groundwork for today's events. It has taken and is continuing to take imaginative and forward-looking steps to place this relationship with the Soviet Union, other Eastern European countries, and the German Democratic Republic on a sound and stable basis. The Federal Republic is, moreover, taking these steps in full consonance with its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, stability, and security in the European Continent.

The Federal Republic of Germany is no stranger to the United Nations. It has played a substantial, indeed, often leading, role in the specialized agencies of this body. Its contributions have already brought great benefit to mankind. Now with its full participation, the entire world community stands to benefit.

We have also noted with appreciation the declaration of the German Democratic Republic of its intention to abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter and to make its full contribution toward alleviating the world's economic, social, and humanitarian ills.

In this connection, it is the particular hope of the United States that the German Democratic Republic, which occupies part of the territory of the former German Reich, will also recognize the just claims of those who suffered as a result of the actions of the Nazi government. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, took exemplary and com-

mendable measures in this regard many years ago.

The economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and spiritual contributions of the German people have justly attracted wide admiration and greatly enriched the world. Today we look forward to their full and effective participation in the immense international economic and social tasks facing the United Nations. The effort to improve the condition of man is not a task for only a few. It is a burden all nations must bear. Disease, hunger, human misery, pollution, and natural catastrophe oppress us all. The earth, air, and sea are a common heritage and a common concern. The tools of science, technology, and education, which the German people are so eminently qualified to provide, will be used to benefit every nation. With the help of the two German states, this world body will be better able to meet mankind's pressing problems. This is a day of great pride for the peoples of the world.

The generation which fought World War II is reassured by the entry of the two German states into the United Nations. Those who have lived through the strife of the post-war years can take heart. We learn from the past. For only with such a perspective can we grasp the full meaning of this solemn moment. But I would suggest that the larger meaning is found not by looking behind, but by looking ahead. The most serious differences among nations can and must be resolved diplomatically. There is no other way short of catastrophe. Ideological differences remain and are immense. But here in the United Nations the principles of universality and cooperation are, and must be, demonstrated once more for all to see. Is it too much to hope that today will also mark the beginning of a new realism for this body as it goes about its noble task on behalf of the peoples of all the world? As I welcome the two German states on behalf of the United States, I express this fervent hope: May peace, may justice, be with us all.

Agenda of the 28th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly¹

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Poland.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
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¹ Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 21 (U.N. doc. A/9201).

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MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6584). Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973.

Notification of acceptance deposited subject to completion of appropriate constitutional procedures: United States, September 28, 1973.
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 1, 1973.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Iraq (with a declaration), August 28, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.¹

Accession deposited: Ecuador, September 7, 1973.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.¹

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, September 11, 1973.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Acceptances deposited: Philippines, May 16, 1973 (with a declaration); Tunisia, September 11, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, September 11, 1973.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 1, 1963.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Gabon, September 3, 1973.

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Accepted by the President: September 26, 1973.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 6, 1973 (TIAS 7711). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca August 28 and September 19, 1973. Entered into force September 19, 1973.

Canada

Agreement for promotion of safety on the Great Lakes by means of radio, 1973, with technical regulations. Signed at Ottawa February 26, 1973.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 1, 1973.

Italy

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 18, 1973.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 1, 1973.

Paraguay

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Asunción May 24, 1973.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 1, 1973.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of September 21, 1967, as amended and extended, concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 27 and October 3, 1973. Entered into force October 3, 1973.

Uruguay

Treaty on extradition and cooperation in penal matters. Signed at Washington April 6, 1973.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 1, 1973.

Yugoslavia

Nonscheduled air service agreement, with annexes, protocol, and memorandum of implementation. Signed at Belgrade September 27, 1973. Entered into force provisionally September 27, 1973; definitively, on date of exchange of notes indicating agreement has been approved by the respective parties in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States 1973. This publication contains a complete and official listing of the foreign consular offices in the United States together with their jurisdiction and recognized personnel. Pub. 7846. Department and Foreign Service Series 128. 100 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S1.69:128)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan amending the agreement of September 21, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7595. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7595)

Military Mission. Agreement with Iran extending the agreement of November 27, 1943, as amended and extended. TIAS 7596. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7596)

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products. Agreement with Malaysia amending the agreement of September 8, 1970. TIAS 7597. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7597)

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan relating to the agreement of May 6, 1970, as amended and extended. TIAS 7598. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7598).

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to October 1 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 354 of September 28.

No.	Date	Subject
*358	10/1	Akins sworn in as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (biographic data).
*359	10/5	Program for state visit of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Republic of Ivory Coast.
*360	10/5	Neumann sworn in as Ambassador to Morocco (biographic data).
†361	10/5	U.S. and Philippines sign cotton textile agreement (rewrite).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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October 29, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

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Moral Purposes and Policy Choices

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*¹

This is an important anniversary. A year ago today, on October 8, came the breakthrough in the Paris negotiations which led soon afterward to the end of American military involvement in Viet-Nam. It is strangely difficult now to recapture the emotion of that moment of hope and uncertainty when suddenly years of suffering and division were giving way to new possibilities for reconciliation.

We meet, too, at a time when renewed conflict in the Middle East reminds us that international stability is always precarious and never to be taken for granted. *Pacem in Terris* remains regrettably elusive. However well we contain this crisis, as we have contained others, we must still ask ourselves what we seek beyond the management of conflict.

The need for a dialogue about national purposes has never been more urgent, and no assembly is better suited for such a discussion than those gathered here tonight.

Dramatic changes in recent years have transformed America's position and role in the world:

—For most of the postwar period America enjoyed predominance in physical resources and political power. Now, like most other nations in history, we find that our most difficult task is how to apply limited means to the accomplishment of carefully defined ends. We can no longer overwhelm our prob-

lems; we must master them with imagination, understanding, and patience.

—For a generation our preoccupation was to prevent the cold war from degenerating into a hot war. Today, when the danger of global conflict has diminished, we face the more profound problem of defining what we mean by peace and determining the ultimate purpose of improved international relations.

—For two decades the solidarity of our alliances seemed as constant as the threats to our security. Now our allies have regained strength and self-confidence, and relations with adversaries have improved. All this has given rise to uncertainties over the sharing of burdens with friends and the impact of reduced tensions on the cohesion of alliances.

—Thus, even as we have mastered the art of containing crises, our concern with the nature of a more permanent international order has grown. Questions once obscured by more insistent needs now demand our attention: What is true national interest? To what end stability? What is the relationship of peace to justice?

It is characteristic of periods of upheaval that to those who live through them they appear as a series of haphazard events. Symptoms obscure basic issues and historical trends. The urgent tends to dominate the important. Too often goals are presented as abstract utopias, safe havens from pressing events.

But a debate, to be fruitful, must define what can reasonably be asked of foreign policy and at what pace progress can be achieved. Otherwise it turns into competing

¹ Made at Washington on Oct. 8 before the Third *Pacem in Terris* Conference sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (press release 362).

catalogues of the desirable rather than informed comparisons of the possible. Dialogue degenerates into tactical skirmishing.

The current public discussion reflects some interesting and significant shifts in perspective:

—A foreign policy once considered excessively moralistic is now looked upon by some as excessively pragmatic.

—The government was criticized in 1969 for holding back East-West trade with certain countries until there was progress in their foreign policies. Now we are criticized for not holding back East-West trade until there are changes in those same countries' domestic policies.

—The administration's foreign policy, once decried as too cold war oriented, is now attacked as too insensitive to the profound moral antagonism between communism and freedom.

One consequence of this intellectual shift is a gap between conception and performance on some major issues of policy:

—The desirability of peace and détente is affirmed, but both the inducements to progress and the penalties to confrontation are restricted by legislation.

—Expressions of concern for human values in other countries are coupled with failure to support the very programs designed to help developing areas improve their economic and social conditions.

—The declared objective of maintaining a responsible American international role clashes with nationalistic pressures in trade and monetary negotiations and with calls for unilateral withdrawal from alliance obligations.

It is clear that we face genuine moral dilemmas and important policy choices. But it is also clear that we need to define the framework of our dialogue more perceptively and understandingly.

The Competing Elements of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy must begin with the understanding that it involves relationships between sovereign countries. Sovereignty has

been defined as a will uncontrolled by others; that is what gives foreign policy its contingent and ever-incomplete character.

For disagreements among sovereign states can be settled only by negotiation or by power, by compromise or by imposition. Which of these methods prevails depends on the values, the strengths, and the domestic systems of the countries involved. A nation's values define what is just; its strength determines what is possible; its domestic structure decides what policies can in fact be implemented and sustained.

Thus foreign policy involves two partially conflicting endeavors: defining the interests, purposes, and values of a society and relating them to the interests, purposes, and values of others.

The policymaker therefore must strike a balance between what is desirable and what is possible. Progress will always be measured in partial steps and in the relative satisfaction of alternative goals. Tension is unavoidable between values, which are invariably cast in maximum terms, and efforts to promote them, which of necessity involve compromise. Foreign policy is explained domestically in terms of justice. But what is defined as justice at home becomes the subject of negotiation abroad. It is thus no accident that many nations, including our own, view the international arena as a forum in which virtue is thwarted by the clever practice of foreigners.

In a community of sovereign states, the quest for peace involves a paradox: The attempt to impose absolute justice by one side will be seen as absolute injustice by all others; the quest for total security for some turns into total insecurity for the remainder. Stability depends on the relative satisfaction and therefore also the relative dissatisfaction of the various states. The pursuit of peace must therefore begin with the pragmatic concept of coexistence—especially in a period of ideological conflict.

We must, of course, avoid becoming obsessed with stability. An excessively pragmatic policy will be empty of vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction but

also roots and heart. General de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs that "France cannot be France without greatness." By the same token, America cannot be true to itself without moral purpose. This country has always had a sense of mission. Americans have always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements. A purely pragmatic policy provides no criteria for other nations to assess our performance and no standards to which the American people can rally.

But when policy becomes excessively moralistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on truth obstructs negotiation and accommodation. Good results may be given up in the quest for ever-elusive ideal solutions. Policy may fall prey to ineffectual posturing or adventuristic crusades.

The prerequisite for a fruitful national debate is that the policymakers and critics appreciate each other's perspectives and respect each other's purposes. The policymaker must understand that the critic is obliged to stress imperfections in order to challenge assumptions and to goad actions. But equally the critic should acknowledge the complexity and inherent ambiguity of the policymaker's choices. The policymaker must be concerned with the best that can be achieved, not just the best that can be imagined. He has to act in a fog of incomplete knowledge without the information that will be available later to the analyst. He knows—or should know—that he is responsible for the consequences of disaster as well as for the benefits of success. He may have to qualify some goals, not because they would be undesirable if reached but because the risks of failure outweigh potential gains. He must often settle for the gradual, much as he might prefer the immediate. He must compromise with others, and this means to some extent compromising with himself.

The outsider demonstrates his morality by the precision of his perceptions and the loftiness of his ideals. The policymaker expresses his morality by implementing a sequence of imperfections and partial solutions in pursuit of *his* ideals.

There must be understanding, as well, of the crucial importance of timing. Opportunities cannot be hoarded; once past, they are usually irretrievable. New relationships in a fluid transitional period—such as today—are delicate and vulnerable; they must be nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot pull up young shoots periodically to see whether the roots are still there or whether there is some marginally better location for them.

We are now at such a time of tenuous beginnings. Western Europe and Japan have joined us in an effort to reinvigorate our relationships. The Soviet Union has begun to practice foreign policy, at least partially, as a relationship between states rather than as international civil war. The People's Republic of China has emerged from two decades of isolation. The developing countries are impatient for economic and social change. A new dimension of unprecedented challenges—in food, oceans, energy, environment—demands global cooperation.

We are at one of those rare moments where through a combination of fortuitous circumstances and design man seems in a position to shape his future. What we need is the confidence to discuss issues without bitter strife, the wisdom to define together the nature of our world, as well as the vision to chart together a more just future.

Détente With the Soviet Union

Nothing demonstrates this need more urgently than our relationship with the Soviet Union.

This administration has never had any illusions about the Soviet system. We have always insisted that progress in technical fields, such as trade, had to follow—and reflect—progress toward more stable international relations. We have maintained a strong military balance and a flexible defense posture as a buttress to stability. We have insisted that disarmament had to be mutual. We have judged movement in our relations with the Soviet Union not by atmospherics but by how well concrete prob-

lems are resolved and by whether there is responsible international conduct.

Coexistence, to us, continues to have a very precise meaning:

—We will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance either globally or regionally.

—We will resist any attempt to exploit a policy of *détente* to weaken our alliances.

—We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.

The Soviet Union cannot disregard these principles in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the United States.

On this basis we have succeeded in transforming U.S.-Soviet relations in many important ways. Our two countries have concluded a historic accord to limit strategic arms. We have substantially reduced the risk of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation in crisis areas. The problem of Berlin has been resolved by negotiation. We and our allies have engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on major issues of European security, including a reduction of military forces in central Europe. We have reached a series of bilateral agreements on cooperation—health, environment, space, science and technology, as well as trade. These accords are designed to create a vested interest in cooperation and restraint.

Until recently the goals of *détente* were not an issue. The necessity of shifting from confrontation toward negotiation seemed so overwhelming that goals beyond the settlement of international disputes were never raised. But now progress has been made—and already taken for granted. We are engaged in an intense debate on whether we should make changes in Soviet society a precondition for further progress or indeed for following through on commitments already made. The cutting edge of this problem is the congressional effort to condition most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status for other countries on changes in their domestic systems.

This is a genuine moral dilemma. There are genuine moral concerns on both sides of the argument. So let us not address this as a debate between those who are morally sensitive and those who are not, between those who care for justice and those who are oblivious to humane values. The attitude of the American people and government has been made emphatically clear on countless occasions in ways that have produced effective results. The exit tax on emigration is not being collected, and we have received assurances that it will not be reapplied; hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government are being given specific attention; the rate of Jewish emigration has been in the tens of thousands, where it was once a trickle. We will continue our vigorous efforts on these matters.

But the real debate goes far beyond this: Should we now tie demands which were never raised during negotiations to agreements that have already been concluded? Should we require as a formal condition internal changes that we heretofore sought to foster in an evolutionary manner?

Let us remember what the MFN question specifically involves. The very term “most favored nation” is misleading in its implication of preferential treatment. What we are talking about is whether to allow *normal* economic relations to develop—of the kind we now have with over 100 other countries and which the Soviet Union enjoyed until 1951. The issue is whether to abolish discriminatory trade restrictions that were imposed at the height of the cold war. Indeed, at that time the Soviet Government discouraged commerce because it feared the domestic impact of normal trading relations with the West on its society.

The demand that Moscow modify its domestic policy as a precondition for MFN or *détente* was never made while we were negotiating; now it is inserted after both sides have carefully shaped an overall mosaic. Thus it raises questions about our entire bilateral relationship.

Finally, the issue affects not only our rela-

tionship with the Soviet Union but also with many other countries whose internal structures we find incompatible with our own. Conditions imposed on one country could inhibit expanding relations with others, such as the People's Republic of China.

We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions? Are we ready to face the crises and increased defense budgets that a return to cold war conditions would spawn? And will this encourage full emigration or enhance the well-being or nourish the hope for liberty of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Is it détente that has prompted repression—or is it détente that has generated the ferment and the demand for openness which we are now witnessing?

For half a century we have objected to Communist efforts to alter the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of cold war we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are we now to come full circle and insist on domestic compatibility as a condition of progress?

These questions have no easy answers. The government may underestimate the margin of concessions available to us. But a fair debate must admit that they are genuine questions, the answers to which could affect the fate of all of us.

Our policy with respect to détente is clear: We shall resist aggressive foreign policies. Détente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East. As for the internal policies of closed systems, the United States will never forget that the antagonism between freedom and its enemies is part of the reality of the modern age. We are not neutral in that struggle. As long as we remain powerful, we will use our influence to promote freedom, as we always have. But in the nuclear age we are obliged

to recognize that the issue of war and peace also involves human lives and that the attainment of peace is a profound moral concern.

The World as It Is and the World We Seek

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly two weeks ago, I described our goal as a world where power blocs and balances are no longer relevant; where justice, not stability, can be our overriding preoccupation; where countries consider cooperation in the world interest to be in their national interest.

But we cannot move toward the world of the future without first maintaining peace in the world as it is. These very days we are vividly reminded that this requires vigilance and a continuing commitment.

So our journey must start from where we are now. This is a time of lessened tension, of greater equilibrium, of diffused power. But if the world is better than our earlier fears, it still falls far short of our hopes. To deal with the present does not mean that we are content with it.

The most striking feature of the contemporary period, the feature that gives complexity as well as hope, is the radical transformation in the nature of power. Throughout history power has generally been homogeneous. Military, economic, and political potential were closely related. To be powerful, a nation had to be strong in all categories. Today the vocabulary of strength is more complex. Military muscle does not guarantee political influence. Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military strength may not be able to obscure economic weakness. Countries can exert political influence even when they have neither military nor economic strength.

It is wrong to speak of only one balance of power, for there are several, which have to be related to each other. In the military sphere, there are two superpowers. In economic terms, there are at least five major groupings. Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged; some 80 new na-

tions have come into being since the end of World War II, and regional groups are assuming ever-increasing importance.

Above all, whatever the measure of power, its political utility has changed. Throughout history increases in military power, however slight, could be turned into specific political advantage. With the overwhelming arsenals of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage is both pointless and potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is reached, additional increments of power do not translate into usable political strength, and attempts to achieve tactical gains can lead to cataclysm.

This environment both puts a premium on stability and makes it difficult to maintain. Today's striving for equilibrium should not be compared to the balance of power of previous periods. The very notion of "operating" a classical balance of power disintegrates when the change required to upset the balance is so large that it cannot be achieved by limited means.

More specifically, there is no parallel with the 19th century. Then the principal countries shared essentially similar concepts of legitimacy and accepted the basic structure of the existing international order. Small adjustments in strength were significant. The "balance" operated in a relatively confined geographic area. None of these factors obtain today.

Nor when we talk of equilibrium do we mean a simplistic mechanical model devoid of purpose. The constantly shifting alliances that maintained equilibrium in previous centuries are neither appropriate nor possible in our time. In an age of ideological schism the distinction between friends and adversaries is an objective reality. We share ideals as well as interests with our friends, and we know that the strength of our friendships is crucial to the lowering of tensions with our opponents.

When we refer to five or six or seven major centers of power, the point being made is not that others are excluded but that a few short years ago everyone agreed

that there were only two. The diminishing tensions and the emergence of new centers of power have meant greater freedom of action and greater importance for all other nations.

In this setting, our immediate aim has been to build a stable network of relationships that offers hope of sparing mankind the scourges of war. An interdependent world community cannot tolerate either big-power confrontations or recurrent regional crises.

But peace must be more than the absence of conflict. We perceive stability as the bridge to the realization of human aspirations, not an end in itself. We have learned much about containing crises, but we have not removed their roots. We have begun to accommodate our differences, but we have not affirmed our commonality. We may have improved the mastery of equilibrium, but we have not yet attained justice.

In the encyclical for which this conference is named, Pope John sketched a greater vision. He foresaw "that no political community is able to pursue its own interests and develop itself in isolation" for "there is a growing awareness of all human beings that they are members of a world community."

The opportunities of mankind now transcend nationalism and can only be dealt with by nations acting in concert:

—For the first time in generations mankind is in a position to shape a new and peaceful international order. But do we have the imagination and determination to carry forward this still-fragile task of creation?

—For the first time in history we may have the technical knowledge to satisfy man's basic needs. The imperatives of the modern world respect no national borders and must inevitably open all societies to the world around them. But do we have the political will to join together to accomplish this great end?

If this vision is to be realized, America's active involvement is inescapable. History

will judge us by our deeds, not by our good intentions.

But it cannot be the work of any one country. And it cannot be the undertaking of any one administration or one branch of government or one party. To build truly is to chart a course that will be carried on by future leaders because it has the enduring support of the American people.

So let us search for a fresh consensus. Let us restore a spirit of understanding between the legislative and the executive, between the government and the press, between the people and their public servants. Let us learn once again to debate our methods and not our motives, to focus on our destiny and not on our divisions. Let us all contribute our different views and perspectives, but let us once again see ourselves as engaged in a common enterprise. If we are to shape a world community we must first restore community at home.

With Americans working together, America can work with others toward man's eternal goal of a *Pacem in Terris*—peace abroad, peace at home, and peace within ourselves.

President Comments on Trade Bill as Reported by House Committee

Statement by President Nixon¹

Over the past several months, the House Ways and Means Committee has held exhaustive hearings and made a number of changes in the Trade Reform Act which I proposed last April. Its work was completed yesterday, and the trade bill will soon be considered by the House of Representatives.

Many of the committee's changes were made over the strong objections of the administration. Many others were accepted as significant improvements. In assessing the impact of the committee's changes, I have tried to determine how they would affect the purposes for which this legislation was originally designed.

In most respects the bill submitted to the House by the Ways and Means Committee is a highly responsible piece of legislation.

—It would permit the United States to enter major trade negotiations with the authorities needed to achieve broad gains in trade liberalization with a strong and proper emphasis both on equity and reciprocity.

—It would significantly ease access to escape clause relief and adjustment assistance for American workers and firms suffering injury or threat of injury from growing import competition.

—It would broaden the range of actions the United States can take in responding to unfair international trade practices.

—It would introduce several new authorities which can be used to manage domestic and international economic policies more effectively.

—It would allow the United States to fulfill its international pledge to establish a plan of generalized tariff preferences for the less developed countries of the world.

In short, the Trade Reform Act as reported to the House holds out the promise of more and better jobs for American workers, of more products at lower prices for the American consumer, of expanding exports for the United States and other nations, and most importantly, of reduced international tensions and a strengthened structure of peace.

In one important area, however, the committee bill is clearly inadequate. I am deeply concerned about the bill's failure to provide the tools we need to expand healthy commercial relationships with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. This administration is committed to seeking most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union. Indeed, the United States has made a formal commitment to the Soviet Union to seek the necessary legislative approval for such treatment in the firm belief that this is in the best interests of both our countries. Therefore, once again I strongly urge the Congress to restore the authority to grant nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to all countries.

¹ Issued on Oct. 4 (White House press release).

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of October 12

Press release 380 dated October 12

Secretary Kissinger: I suggest that we do this press conference in two parts. I will begin with a few personnel announcements, and I'll take some questions on those. And then I'll make a few comments to introduce the substantive part, and we'll have a question-and-answer period on that.

Now, with respect to personnel appointments, I would like to mention a number of Presidential appointments, all of which are subject to confirmation by the Senate. I have recommended to the President, and he intends to nominate, the following individuals for the positions stated:

As Under Secretary for Security Assistance, William Donaldson. Mr. Donaldson is currently chairman and chief executive officer of the investment banking firm of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette. He was named businessman of the year by the Associated Press for 1969 and 1970. He's a member of the board of trustees for the Ford Foundation and member of the Yale Corporation and to show the ecumenical spirit in which we proceed. In addition to his duties as Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Mr. Donaldson will be responsible for the energy aspects of foreign policy, and he will also have general supervision over those Bureaus in the Department that have not had a normal home on the seventh floor—Cultural Affairs, and Science and Technology—and he will also do other special assignments.

As Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Ambassador Dean Brown, who is now in Jordan. He is one of the most energetic younger Foreign Service officers. It will be his job, together with the new Director General of the Foreign Service, whom I will men-

tion later, to look at the whole personnel structure of the Foreign Service, to make sure that the ablest, most energetic people get into the key positions as rapidly as possible.

As Legal Adviser of the Department, the President has nominated Mr. Carlyle Maw. Mr. Maw is a senior partner in the law firm of Cravath, Swaine and Moore. He has been chairman of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; the International Law Association, the American Society for International Law. One of his primary tasks will be to work on the creative relationships of international law and the conduct of our foreign policy.

The Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, currently our Ambassador in Japan. Ambassador Ingersoll has performed with great distinction as our Ambassador to Japan since 1972, following a long and distinguished career in business. He emphasizes the importance we attach, in our Asian policy, to the special role of Japan. Also, by picking a man of his distinction, the intention is to emphasize that the Assistant Secretaries will henceforth play a very crucial role in the formulation and conduct of our foreign policy and will have greater discretion and greater responsibility.

As Assistant Secretary for Administration, John Thomas. Mr. Thomas is a career Foreign Service officer with extensive experience in the Department of State in the administrative field.

With respect to Ambassador Brown, I would like to emphasize that he will stay in his present post for the duration of the current crisis in the Middle East.

In addition, I wish to announce that I intend to appoint the following, who do not require senatorial confirmation:

As Director General of the Foreign Service, Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, our current Ambassador in Chile. As you know, Ambassador Davis has held three ambassadorships: to Bulgaria, to Guatemala, and to Chile, where he is presently serving. He is a career Foreign Service officer. I believe he's the youngest Career Minister in the Service, and he and Ambassador Brown will have the primary responsibility for vitalizing the Foreign Service and for making certain, as I pointed out previously, that the able and energetic individuals get promoted rapidly to key positions.

As Director of the Planning and Coordinating Staff, Mr. Winston Lord. Mr. Lord has been my Special Assistant at the National Security Council staff for three years. He was closely associated with the overtures toward the People's Republic of China. He has been one of my closest associates in the White House. He served before that in the Department of State and the Department of Defense. He has been told that the policy planning staff has top priority on the ablest young people in the Foreign Service, and the policy planning staff is going to be given a major role, I would say almost a principal role, in developing the choices for the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Under Secretaries—to make certain that we do not spend all our time on dealing with current crises but that we have a sense of direction.

As Inspector General of the Foreign Service, James Sutterlin. Mr. Sutterlin will be moving to the Inspector General post from his current assignment as Director of the Planning and Coordinating Staff. He is, as you know, a career officer with a distinguished record.

As a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, Mr. George Vest. Mr. Vest is presently in charge of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He is returning and will be available in the Department on Monday to begin his duties un-

der the stern supervision of the incumbent, Ambassador [Robert J.] McCloskey.

The officers who have held the positions for which new personnel have been announced today have given this government long and faithful service. They have my gratitude as well as that of the President for a job well done. I want to express my regret that Under Secretary Curtis Tarr has decided to return to private life, and he has all our good wishes.

Now I'll be glad to answer some questions on this, and then I'll get to others.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will George Vest have the title of Deputy Assistant Secretary also?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet decided what title he should have at present. It will be Special Assistant until we have considered it further.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the successor to Ambassador Ingersoll in Japan—what is the status of that?

Secretary Kissinger: It will be announced within three weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we assume that the other Assistant Secretaries will now stay in place for the near future, or will there be other changes?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I would not assume that these are the last changes that will be made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the appointment of an Ambassador to the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: I have told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that all vacant ambassadorships will be filled within two months of my swearing-in. I expect to hold to this schedule, and we expect to announce an Ambassador to the Soviet Union by the middle of November, after my return from China.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that you have discussed your employment questions, can we go to more substantive things?

Secretary Kissinger: If there are no more questions on personnel, yes. Maybe it would help if I made a few observations first on the Middle East, and then I'll take your questions.

Q. Right.

Summary of Situation in the Middle East

Secretary Kissinger: I thought it might focus our discussion if I began by giving you a brief summary of the situation in the Middle East as we see it.

You ladies and gentlemen will understand that we are, at this moment, in a delicate phase in which our principal objective has to be to bring about a cessation of hostilities and to lay the basis for a more permanent peace in the Middle East and that therefore I will have to be somewhat guarded in some of the observations I make and in some of the answers I give to your questions. But I expect that after the conclusion of this phase to have another press conference in which I will give a fuller account than may be possible today.

Now let me talk about the situation in the Middle East in the following parts: First, the situation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Secondly, the American efforts after hostilities started to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Third, a very brief observation on the military situation as we see it today. And, finally, where we hope to go from here.

First, with respect to what we knew prior to the outbreak of hostilities: In the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the United States was aware that there were additional concentrations of Syrian forces and also that the Egyptian forces were engaged on what was interpreted both by our intelligence as well as by Israeli intelligence as their regular fall maneuvers.

We asked our own intelligence, as well as Israeli intelligence, on three separate occasions during the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities to give us their assessment of what might happen. There was the unani-

mous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it happening. Nor was the possibility of hostilities raised in any of the discussions with either of the parties that took place at the United Nations during the last week.

In these circumstances, the United States had no occasion to warn any country against engaging in preemptive action. The United States, therefore, in the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, gave no advice with respect to a contingency that we had been unanimously assured was not likely to happen—in fact was certain not to happen.

The first time the U.S. Government was informed that hostilities might be imminent was at 6 o'clock Saturday morning, when I was awakened and immediately contacted the President. From then until the time that we were informed that hostilities had in fact begun—which was around 9 o'clock on Saturday morning—we did make intensive efforts with the parties, as well as with the Soviet Union and the Secretary General of the United Nations, to attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.

Obviously, given the scale of preparation that must have been made prior to the outbreak of hostilities, these efforts were unavailing.

After hostilities broke out, the United States set itself two principal objectives. One, to end the hostilities as quickly as possible. Secondly, to end the hostilities in such a manner that they would contribute to the maximum extent possible to the promotion of a more permanent, more lasting solution in the Middle East.

Therefore, the United States has sought during this period—first in the United Nations and, secondly, through a series of bilateral contacts—to create a framework in which both of these objectives could be realized. We have explored the possibilities of crystallizing a consensus within the United Nations. We have also been in touch with the parties, as well as with the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to see what bilateral efforts might bring.

We have not gratuitously sought opportunities for confrontations in public forums which might harden dividing lines and which might make it more difficult to move toward a settlement.

When this phase is over, we will give an accounting of the efforts we have undertaken, and then a judgment can be made with respect to them. For now, our objective is to bring about an end of hostilities in such a manner that we will be in contact with all of the parties, as well as with the permanent members of the Security Council, after hostilities are ended, because we believe that in this manner we can make a maximum contribution to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Our assessment of the military situation as we see it this morning is that Israeli forces seem to have advanced some distance into Syria. Egyptian forces are holding the east side of the Suez Canal to a distance of about 6 to 10 miles. The Egyptian front—the Suez front—is reasonably stable, and the Syrian front is somewhat fluid.

As for the future, the United States will continue to make, and is now engaged in making, efforts to bring about an end to hostilities in a manner that contributes to long-term peace in the area—and I may say to long-term peace in the entire world. This is the framework of our discussions.

And now, Stewart [Stewart Hensley, United Press International], if you would like to ask the first question.

Middle East Crisis and U.S.-Soviet Relations

Q. What I would like to ask is in connection with bringing about a framework of stability and so forth. You said Monday that the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States could not withstand, or could not survive, irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East.¹ And I am wondering whether in that connection you feel that the Russian statement urging other Arab

states to join Egypt and Syria in the fight against Israel constitutes the sort of irresponsibility which jeopardizes the détente and, if it does so, whether you intend to match from the American side the war supplies which are said to be coming in to the others from the Soviet side.

Secretary Kissinger: That's at least two questions.

With respect to the first question: the behavior of the Soviet Union in the Middle East crisis and the effect of the Middle East crisis on U.S.-Soviet relations. Any assessment has to recognize that both the United States and the Soviet Union confront, each from their own perspective, a very complex situation in the current crisis.

Indeed, the reason why we believe that a long-term settlement in the Middle East is so important is the danger that the Middle East may become in time what the Balkans were in Europe before 1914, that is to say, an area where local rivalries that have their own momentum that will draw in the great nuclear powers into a confrontation that they did not necessarily seek or even necessarily start.

It is obvious that the United States has a traditional friendship with Israel, which it will maintain in this crisis. It is also clear that the Soviet Union has a relationship going back some years with some of the Arab states, which it also will not rupture during this crisis. The difficulty both of us face is whether, while remaining true to our principles, we can nevertheless conduct the relationships in such a manner that the larger interests of peace are served.

We did not consider the Soviet statement to the President of Algeria helpful. We did not consider the airlift of military equipment helpful. We also do not consider that Soviet actions as of now constitute the irresponsibility that on Monday evening I pointed out would threaten détente. When that point is reached, we will in this crisis, as we have in other crises, not hesitate to take a firm stand. But at this moment we are still attempting

¹ See p. 525.

to moderate the conflict. As of this moment we have to weigh against the actions of which we disapprove—and quite strongly—the relative restraint that has been shown in public media in the Soviet Union and in the conduct of their representatives at the Security Council.

And as of this moment, our objective is, as I stated, to end hostilities on terms that are just to all without exacerbating relations to an unbearable point.

I want to repeat: When we make the judgment that actions have reached the point of irresponsibility, we will be very firm in making this clear.

Ongoing Discussions With Europe

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may change the subject for a minute, was the dialogue with Europe slowed down by the cancellation of your trip? And could you help us to guess when the Declarations of Principles will be ready for signature?

Secretary Kissinger: The dialogue with Europe was not significantly slowed down, although my vanity will not permit me to admit that my inability to conduct conversations will have no effect on ongoing diplomacy. [Laughter.]

Basically, the discussions that are now going on between us and the Europeans concern two declarations and the general structure of our relationship. The two declarations are between the United States and the Common Market about economic relationships and those political relationships impinging on economic relationships, and between the United States and all its other 14 partners in NATO in a multilateral forum about the future direction of NATO policy. And the third effort is to go beyond these declarations, to use them as a starting point to take a look at the future and to consider how the Western nations envisage the world in which they may want to live, or may have to live, over the next 25 years.

Now, with respect to the dialogue with the Common Market, that, too, has two aspects:

first, the internal cohesion of Europe, which has been, I believe, fostered, and strongly fostered, by our initiative; and secondly, the relationship of this united Europe with the United States.

On October 18, the Political Directors of the Nine European nations and Assistant Secretary of State [for European Affairs Walter J.] Stoessel will meet in Copenhagen to continue the discussions conducted by me with the Foreign Ministers and conducted subsequently by them in New York. Therefore that process will continue.

As you all know, I met with French Foreign Minister Jobert yesterday, and we had an opportunity to discuss both of these efforts.

Last week France submitted a proposal for a NATO declaration. I want to take this opportunity to emphasize that the declaration submitted by the French representative in the NATO Council is considered extremely constructive by the United States. And even though we have some additions that we may wish to discuss, we believe it represents a very major advance in the NATO discussions.

I think it is important to point out that it is not without significance that it is France which would have made this major contribution to the NATO dialogue.

So we believe that our discussions with Europe are now on course and that they will lead to a successful conclusion within a reasonable time span. And I want to emphasize again: We are not interested in time but in substance. And we're not concerned with just a headline, but we're concerned with getting our relationships defined in a manner that can stand the test of time.

Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News].

Situation Prior to Middle East Hostilities

Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the Middle East, do you believe, in light of the Soviet evacuation of dependents from Syria and Egypt last Thursday and Friday, that (1) they knew in advance of the plans for the attack? Do you feel that they should have informed the

United States of those plans? And (2) do you feel that the Soviet Union, to any degree, encouraged the attacks?

Secretary Kissinger: It is too early to make a final judgment on all of these matters.

If the Soviet Union encouraged these attacks—which we have, as of now, have no evidence of—that would have to be treated by us as a very serious matter.

Now, if the Soviet Union learned of these attacks through its own intelligence or in some other manner and did not inform us, then this is a different problem.

In an ideal world, one would expect closer consultation, but given the particular volatility of the Middle East, it would have been a heavy responsibility to make known certain advance information. Nevertheless, we would like to stress that if either side in this relationship has certain knowledge of imminent military operations in any explosive part of the world, we would consider it consistent and indeed required—by the principles that have been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union—that an opportunity be given to both sides to calm the situation.

Q. In view of the reputation of Israeli intelligence, to what do you attribute the failure of both their and our intelligence to spot what was about to take place?

Secretary Kissinger: Nobody made any mistakes about the facts. There are always two aspects to intelligence. One is a determination of the facts; the other is the interpretation of these facts. And there is the tendency of most intelligence services—and indeed of most senior officials and indeed of some newspapermen—to fit the facts into existing preconceptions and to make them consistent with what is anticipated. And if you start from the assumption that a war is probably unlikely—if you know that there have been Egyptian maneuvers every September over the last 10 years—then there is probably a tendency to make observed facts fit your preconceived theories. This is one of the gravest dangers of all intelligence assess-

ments. And facts are much easier to come by than intentions.

Over the years that I have been in this position, the possibility of a massive Arab attack was not considered among the most likely by any of the evaluators that I've talked to.

Q. May I follow that? Mrs. Meir said that she had advised other governments—I think she used the expression “a reasonable time in advance”—so that they could attempt to prevent it.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends on your definition of a reasonable time. We were informed at 6 o'clock on Saturday morning that a war might be imminent. We were informed somewhat earlier that Israel did not intend to attack herself, but that did not indicate to us necessarily that an Arab attack was imminent.

Soviet Airlift

Q. Mr. Secretary, what kind of help are the Soviets giving Egypt and Syria? What kind of help are we now, or will we later, give to Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: Herb [Herbert Kaplow, ABC News], at this time I would like to stress again that our principal problem in responding to questions like this is to keep in mind that we are in a very delicate situation which can be easily inflamed by rash statements or by responding to very immediate pressures.

The Soviet airlift, at this moment, is moderate. It's more than light. It's a fairly substantial airlift. And it has to be addressed in relation to the possibility of influencing immediate military operations.

As far as we are concerned, you all know that we do have an ongoing military relationship with Israel, which we are continuing. And we are having discussions with Israel about the special situation created by recent events, but I don't think any useful purpose would be served by going into detail.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, some

Arab countries are threatening to cut off Western oil supplies if the United States continues this ongoing relationship and re-supplies Israel. How heavily do those threats weigh in the determination of the policy?

Secretary Kissinger: We have made a very serious effort, in this crisis, to take seriously into account Arab concerns and Arab views. On the other hand, we have to pursue what we consider to be the right course; we will take the consequences in pursuing what we consider to be the right course.

Attempts To Crystalize a Consensus in the U.N.

Q. Can you give us any idea, Dr. Kissinger, of the kinds of obstacles that you're running into now in this quest for ending hostilities?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have seen a fair amount of discussion about the desirability of some United Nations action. Now, the difficulty has been that our almost daily canvass of the consensus in New York is that the opinions are so divided and the willingness to take a position on the part of the major—or on the part of all—the members of the Security Council is so low that our judgment that to force a formal vote on any proposition that we might put forward would only harden the dividing lines and would only serve to underline the inability to achieve a consensus.

We have therefore placed more stress on attempting to crystallize a consensus than we have in going through a battle of resolutions and counterresolutions.

Beyond this I cannot go, except to make clear that we are in touch with the parties and with the major—with the permanent members of the Security Council—as well as, on a daily basis, with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Murrey [Murrey Marder, Washington Post]. Let Murrey; Murrey has been over-ridden twice!

Q. Two questions, if I may.

Secretary Kissinger: I probably will regret recognizing him in a minute. [Laughter.]

Importance of Restraint by Great Powers

Q. Would you give us, sir, your overall assessment of the state of attitude by the superpowers—by the three major powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China—in respect to the danger of any spread of these hostilities? Secondly, if I may, as Presidential National Security Adviser how do you evaluate the handling of this crisis by the State Department? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first with respect to the second question, we are very impressed, in the White House, by the leadership that the State Department has received. [Laughter.] But, on a serious level, I think that—for crisis situations, certainly—the combination of these two positions enables a more coherent policy. And with the operation of my associates in the State Department, the conduct has been outstanding and has contributed to keeping the crisis, so far, contained within its present framework.

Now, with respect to the first question, the danger of escalation as it is evaluated by, may I say, the permanent members of the Security Council, so that I am not making distinctions here:

I think everybody is aware that a war of this nature has a possibility of escalating. I think that up to now both sides, the two countries that are most capable of producing a confrontation, that is, the United States and the Soviet Union, have attempted to behave within limits that would prevent an escalation into such a war. If you compare their conduct in this crisis to their conduct in 1967, one has to say that Soviet behavior has been less provocative, less incendiary, and less geared to military threats than in the previous crisis.

It is of course an extremely volatile situation which has potentialities for getting out of hand. And I can only emphasize once again the great importance of restraint by all of those countries who have it in their capacity to bring about an escalation and an expansion of hostilities and the expectation of the

United States that all countries that have a capacity to influence events influence them on the side of restraint and moderation, as we are attempting to do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this connection, have you tried to reach an agreement with the Soviets on suspending the deliveries of arms to the parties?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think I should go into any of—into the details of any exchanges with the Soviet Union at this time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk about firmness if the thing should get that far, are you thinking of the kind of firmness that the United States demonstrated in 1970 at the time of the Syrian crisis?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is whether, if the situation reached the point, the United States would act with the same firmness as in 1970. Situations are never comparable, but the basic principles that governed our policies throughout this administration remain constant, and I don't think I should speculate on the particular methods we would use. But we would be guided by the same principles.

But let me repeat: We do not want this to happen, we don't expect it to happen, and we think that with restraint by all sides there is no need whatever for it to happen.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you assess the superpower or the large powers—could you assess what you consider the Arab strategy in launching these attacks? I mean, you have talks with the Arab Foreign Ministers at the United Nations. There has been some talk that they had a limited psychological-political objective—in view of the talk about the so-called peace initiative that you were about to launch.

Secretary Kissinger: The Arab objective, of course, has not been fully shared with us. And so we are here in the realm of speculation. And the Arab objective will also become clearer as the days go on.

If the Arab objective was, as is sometimes stated, to emphasize the fact that the Middle East is—that permanent stability cannot be

assumed in the Middle East and that there is an urgency in achieving a negotiated settlement or that it is important to achieve a negotiated settlement, then it would be our judgment that that point has been made. The United States stands ready now, as it stood ready before the beginning of hostilities, to help the parties if they want to pursue a negotiated solution. We believe that it would be useful, and we would be prepared, as I pointed out to both sides in New York, to be helpful in that.

If that is the Arab strategy, then we are at a point where perhaps we can turn, after the end of hostilities, to that search for peace, which the United States would support.

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, obviously you can't ask the Russians to not send any more arms to these people if you are sending arms to Israel. Why don't you tell the Soviets that we will stop sending arms to Israel if they will stop sending them to the Arabs?

Secretary Kissinger: As I said, this is not the time to discuss what exchanges are going on between the Soviet Union and the United States, except to emphasize again that our primary objective is to bring about restraint and to bring about as rapid a solution as is possible.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you stressed in your speech on Monday night at the Pacem in Terris Conference the need to move from preventive diplomacy to more creative diplomacy. Does this crisis present an opportunity, do you believe, for the United States, particularly in cooperation with the Soviet Union, to stress a new urgency to move to direct or indirect Arab-Israeli negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: We would hope that after the completion—after the conclusion of hostilities that all—that, first, the parties directly involved and, secondly, the countries indirectly involved would recognize the fragility of the situation that erupts so periodically into conflict. And if that conclusion should be reached, as we believe it should be reached, the United States stands ready to help the parties in reaching a just settlement.

And we have also urged, and I want to use

this occasion to urge, all the parties in the conduct of their diplomacy now to keep in mind that whatever momentary advantages might be achieved in this or that forum, our principal objective should be to maintain relationships that can move both the area and the world toward a more lasting peace. We will conduct our foreign policy and our diplomacy in that manner, and we hope all other countries will also conduct themselves in that manner.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is an Arab view that it would be easier to reach a permanent settlement if the Egyptians maintain a certain foothold on the Sinai Peninsula. What kind of map at the end of hostilities do you think would contribute most to a settlement—a permanent settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: This is not an American determination to make. We stated some general propositions at the Security Council on Monday, and we will be prepared to participate in any other exchange and discussion. But I don't think any useful purpose would be served now—

Q. Mr. Secretary, you are planning a trip to China at the end of this month. Has that trip been jeopardized in any way by these developments? And would you expect Chinese cooperation in the restraints that you are advocating?

Secretary Kissinger: Our call for restraint is addressed to all nations with a capacity to influence events. Of course the Chinese capacity to influence events, given the geographic distance, is not as great as that of other countries, and that must be weighed. But our appeal for restraint is addressed to all countries.

I do not foresee that my trip to China will be jeopardized by the situation as it now exists. But of course this depends on how long it will go on.

Q. In pursuit of an end to hostilities, would we be willing to support a cease-fire-in-place now in the Mideast, or do we want withdrawal to the '67 line?

Secretary Kissinger: At this moment, this

is not the occasion to discuss any specific formula that may be advanced, because the attitude to a specific formula will depend on conditions which exist when it is advanced. And there are so many approaches that have been canvassed that it would serve no purpose to review now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of what was apparently a failure to gauge intentions on the facts prior to the outbreak of hostilities, what steps do you think this country can take to improve its capability to gauge intentions in a situation like this?

Secretary Kissinger: The judgment of the intentions of other countries is always an extremely difficult matter. And it isn't something that can be solved by improving any particular capabilities.

Surprise would never be possible if there were not misjudgments of intentions. And obviously the people most concerned, with the reputation of the best intelligence service in that area, were also surprised, and they have the principal problem of answering the question which you put to me.

To the degree that one can improve one's understanding of the mentality of other countries, to the degree that one understands their decisionmaking process, to that degree one can reduce the dangers of being taken by surprise. But the element of surprise can never be totally eliminated.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, before in assessing possible Arab objectives, you gave us one possibility, which broadly translated means making a political point. What other possible Arab objectives are there beyond that, and if there are, what could be the expected U.S. response?

Secretary Kissinger: I can't speculate on what conceivable objectives there might be—which could range from the one I gave to a total military victory, which could be from a short campaign to a war of attrition. The United States would believe that a prolonged war of attrition in the Middle East would have such a high possibility of great-power involvement—at least great-power involvement in the sense of increasing the

tensions to a point which would affect the entire international atmosphere and raise issues of supplies to both sides in such a manner—that we believe it is in the interest of all countries, including also, and above all, the participants, to bring the war to a reasonable and honorable conclusion as soon as that can be accomplished.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for spending this hour with us. We hope to see you again soon.

The Journey Toward a World Community

Toast by Secretary Kissinger¹

Mr. President [Leopoldo Benites, President of the 28th U.N. General Assembly], Mr. Secretary General [Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations], distinguished representatives of the world's nations, ladies and gentlemen: As I welcome you to this hall, let me also issue a word of warning. To those of you who are diplomats, be mindful of what you say, for you are surrounded by members of the press. And to those of you who are members of the press, be careful not to take too seriously everything you hear, for you are surrounded by diplomats.

But let me hasten to add that I mean no offense to the honored profession of diplomacy. I am now, by nomination of the President and confirmation of the Senate, a diplomat myself.

And as a former historian I know that 16th-century scholars believed that the world's first ambassadors were angels—messengers from heaven to earth.

There may have been one or two foreign ministers who have spoken before this Assembly during its 28-year history who appeared to claim a special relationship with

the Almighty. But that is a view not many of us here tonight would fully support—given the humility so characteristic of our profession.

The ancient Greeks—men with a perhaps less poetic eye than their medieval successors—also linked deity and diplomacy by naming Hermes the god of diplomats. Hermes, as you may recall, was the symbol of charm, but also of cunning. It is said that on the day of his birth he robbed a neighbor of 50 cows and then sneaked back to his cradle. Having managed to get through a whole week without a major diplomatic incident, I will draw no morals from this story.

Mr. President, before I run the risk of dealing U.S. foreign policy a fatal blow, let me turn to more serious thoughts.

Present on this occasion is a glorious mix of tongues, creeds, and races.

Here also are the leaders of an institution designed to serve all peoples of the world, not a particular people or culture or national policy.

And here are leaders of the U.S. Congress, men who remind us that, from the days of Warren Austin and Arthur Vandenberg, Americans—no matter what their party—have always supported the United Nations.

Finally, we are honored by the artists, academics, and journalists who are with us tonight, for they are all guarantors of our diversity and trustees of our common humanity.

Thus, this assemblage symbolizes the world as it is. But more, it symbolizes the world as it can be. For here in the United Nations, and at these tables tonight, we have come together across the boundaries of our differences, because of our common goal: our hope for peace and a better world for all mankind.

Ralph Waldo Emerson once cited a fable from an unknown antiquity:

The Gods, in the beginning, divided Man into men, that he might be more helpful to himself; just as the hand was divided into fingers, the better to answer its end.

This is a wisdom that neither men nor nations have yet understood or practiced. Over

¹ Given at a dinner hosted by Secretary Kissinger at the Metropolitan Museum of Art at New York on Oct. 4 honoring delegations to the U.N. General Assembly.

the centuries we have emphasized our philosophic and political varieties rather than our common destiny; we have been more given to conflict than cooperation. Of the species on this planet, man alone has inflicted upon himself most of his own suffering.

In an age of potential nuclear cataclysm, in an age of instant communication amidst ideological conflict, our most urgent task is to overcome these apparently iron laws of history. The vision of a world community based on justice, not power, is the necessity of our age.

So let us hold to values worthy of our goals, remembering that great works are not possible without deep commitment.

Where there is oppression, let us seek justice.

Where there is hunger, let us seek abundance.

Where there is inhumanity, let us have compassion.

Where there is distrust, let us strive for good faith.

Let us learn, as well, the difference between truth and self-righteousness. Let us recognize that no nation or group of nations can demand understanding for its own problems alone. Let us make sure that the best does not become the enemy of the good. Let us recall that the ideal can be reached only by stages that define the attainable. We will be judged finally by our deeds, not our proclamations.

I pledge you that the United States is ready to begin the journey toward a world community. Our sights will be raised even when our tread must be measured. We will make no excessive promises, but we will keep every promise we shall make. We look upon stability as a bridge to the realization of human dreams, not as an end in itself. We know that peace will come when all—the small as well as the large—have a share in its shaping and that it will endure when all—the weak as well as the strong—have a stake in its lasting.

Hope has been likened to a road in the

country: It is not there to begin with; but as it is traveled more and more, it comes into existence.

So let us work together to change our practices, not our ideals. In our daily labors let us travel the road of our hopes until what is now unfamiliar becomes natural and what is now our vision becomes our reality.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to join me in a toast to the United Nations—the treasury of man's noblest aspirations.

A Western Hemisphere Relationship of Cooperation

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger*¹

President Benites [Leopoldo Benites, of Ecuador, President of the 28th U.N. General Assembly], Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: There is a story of an Englishman who visited Sweden, and when he was going through passport control, he was confronted with two lines. One was marked for Swedes; the other one was marked for foreigners. After a while an official came by and found him sitting between these two lines. And the official said, "Sir, will you please go into one line or the other?" And he said, "That's just my problem. I am not a Swede, and I am obviously not a foreigner." [Laughter.]

I think that story is symbolic of our meeting today. We obviously do not belong all to one country, but we obviously are also not foreigners in this room.

I am grateful that you came and for this opportunity to tell you that we are serious about starting a new dialogue with our friends in the Americas.

As we look back at the history of the relationships of the United States to its neighbors to the south, it has been characterized

¹ Given at a luncheon hosted by Secretary Kissinger at the Center for Inter-American Relations at New York on Oct. 5 honoring Latin American delegations to the U.N. General Assembly.

by alternating periods of what some of you have considered intervention with periods of neglect.

We are proposing to you a friendship based on equality and on respect for mutual dignity.

And such a relationship is needed for all of us, and I believe it is needed also for the rest of the world.

In the United States in the last decade, we have experienced many dramatic changes. Throughout most of our history we could overpower most of our foreign policy problems, and we could also substitute resources for thought. Today, without understanding, we can do very little.

Throughout much of our history, indeed throughout much of this administration, we used to believe with respect to agriculture, for example, that our primary problem was how to get rid of seemingly inexhaustible surpluses. We have now learned that we share the world's problem: how to allocate scarce food resources in relation to world needs.

When I came to Washington, the discussions with respect to energy concerned means of restricting production and allocating it among various allies. Today the problem is to find energy sources around the world that can meet world needs.

So we in this country are going through a revolution of sorts, and the whole world is undergoing a revolution in its patterns. And the basic problem we face is whether we will choose the road of nationalism or the road of cooperation, whether we will approach it from the perspective of each party trying to get the maximum benefit for itself, or whether we can take a common view based on our common needs. And this is why our relations in this hemisphere are so crucial for all of us in this room and for all the rest of the world as well. We in this room, with all the ups and downs in our relationships, share a common history and similar values and many similar experiences. The value of human dignity is nowhere better understood

than in the countries of our friends to the south of us.

So if the technically advanced nations can ever cooperate with the developing nations, if people with similar aspirations can ever achieve common goals, then it must start here in the Western Hemisphere.

We in the United States will approach this dialogue with an open mind. We do not believe that any institution or any treaty arrangement is beyond examination. We want to see whether free peoples, emphasizing and respecting their diversity but united by similar aspirations and values, can achieve great goals on the basis of equality.

So we are starting an urgent examination of our Western Hemisphere policy within our government. But such a policy makes no sense if it is a U.S. prescription handed over to Latin Americans for your acceptance or rejection. It shouldn't be a policy designed in Washington for Latin America. It should be a policy designed by all of Latin America for the Americas.

And so as we examine our own policy, we must also ask for your help. We know that there isn't one Latin America, but many different countries. We know also that there are certain subregional groupings. But it isn't for us to say with whom to conduct the dialogue. That has to come from our guests here in this room.

And so as we form our policy, I would like to invite your suggestions, whatever form you think appropriate, as groups or subgroups or individual nations.

And when our final policy emerges, we will all have a sense that we all had a share in its making, and we will all have a stake in maintaining it.

So, President Benites and Excellencies, I would like to propose a toast to what can be an adventure of free peoples working together to establish a new relationship that can be an example to many other nations. I would like to propose a toast to Western Hemisphere relationships, to our distinguished guest of honor, President Benites.

Annual Meeting of IMF and IBRD Boards of Governors Held at Nairobi

The Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its affiliates held their regular annual meetings at Nairobi September 24-28. Following is a statement made before the Boards of Governors on September 25 by Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz, U.S. Governor of the Fund and Bank.

Department of the Treasury press release dated September 25

Nairobi has been a happy choice for this annual meeting. For many of us, the prospect of visiting Kenya and seeing some of its natural splendor provided a special sense of anticipation. Upon arrival, we found these striking and efficient facilities in the setting of a city that epitomizes the rapid progress that independent, self-reliant, and energetic people can make when they have the tools with which to work. I particularly appreciate President Kenyatta's warm words of welcome and his challenge to us all.

Less than two weeks ago in Tokyo, most of the nations here represented pledged themselves to a thorough review of our trading practices and rules. This week we can provide the necessary impetus to complete our work in reshaping our international monetary arrangements. Here in Nairobi—on a continent where vast potential often contrasts starkly with human poverty—we also come face to face with the challenge of economic development.

Trade, money, development—each of these is a large task. Any one of them, it might be said, would be enough for us to deal with alone. Yet, in a larger sense, we are fortunate that the pressure of events forces

us to deal with them together. They are related, not by any artificial or self-imposed negotiating calendar, but by reality. It is right to keep in mind that delay in one area could undermine progress in another. It is equally right—and a better omen—that success in one area will support and encourage good results in the others.

These fundamental interrelationships were plainly recognized in the mandate given the Committee of Twenty on monetary reform a year ago. They were recognized in the Tokyo Declaration on trade adopted by GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] earlier this month. Let us keep them in mind in all our work in Nairobi and beyond and emphasize the mutually reinforcing benefits of success in each field.

Monetary Reform

Our monetary discussions are now well advanced, owing in no small part to the patient and effective efforts of Mr. Wardhana and Mr. Morse [Ali Wardhana, Chairman of the Committee of Twenty; Jeremy Morse, Chairman of the Deputies of the Committee of Twenty]. We take satisfaction in the extent to which a basic convergence of views on the broad framework of a new system has emerged.

—We all seek a substantial strengthening of the processes of international adjustment through a blending of objective criteria and international judgment, with the recognition of the need for symmetrical and even-handed pressures on both surplus and deficit countries.

—There is full acceptance of the idea that

the center of gravity of the exchange rate system will be a regime of "stable but adjustable par values," with adequately wide margins and with floating "in particular situations."¹

—We anticipate a general system of convertibility to support the regime of par values, with a modified SDR [special drawing rights] as the central reserve asset and deemphasis of the roles of gold and reserve currencies.

—There is a common will to explore the complex technical requirements for multi-currency intervention and to find mutually satisfactory terms for consolidating or funding outstanding balances of reserve currencies.

At the same time, my sense of satisfaction is tempered. Issues of critical importance—carefully outlined in the report submitted to us by Mr. Wardhana—remain unresolved. No doubt we could each expound at length views on particular aspects of these issues. However, I believe those issues will be resolved as national governments are able to appraise more thoroughly the operational aspects of different approaches toward adjustment pressures, toward convertibility, and toward the definition and valuation of reserve assets. Moreover, we need to consider answers to each of those questions in the full context of answers to the others.

In constructing a world monetary system we cannot act, as I see it, like merchants in a bazaar bargaining for selfish advantage. Nor should we be concerned out of pride or politics with patching together and compromising components from every national position. All our success depends upon achieving a coherent, workable whole that fairly serves the common interests.

With good will and intensive technical work, the ground can be fully prepared for a comprehensive agreement as soon as next spring. That agreement will then need to be translated into an extensive and detailed

¹ For the text of a communique issued on Mar. 27 at the conclusion of a meeting of the Committee of Twenty at Washington, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1973, p. 587.

rewriting of the IMF Articles of Agreement. Is it wrong to aim to approve those new articles, for submissions to our legislatures, at our next annual meeting?

The Transitional Period

We are all conscious of the stresses in exchange markets arising from time to time during this transitional period. Yet, in broad terms, the substantial exchange rate changes of the past two years—although in some instances clearly exaggerated by speculation and uncertainty—have provided powerful and needed impetus toward correcting persistent structural imbalances.

In the case of the United States, the alarming erosion in our trade position has by now been decisively reversed. In contrast to a deficit of more than \$6½ billion in 1972, we should be close to balance in 1973. While an extraordinary surge in agricultural exports has greatly speeded the turnaround, our trade position in manufactured goods has also been improving, even in the face of high domestic demand.

We are also beginning to see welcome evidence that both American and foreign firms are reappraising their investment programs, with more emphasis on U.S. production. Thus, shifts in capital flows should reinforce the favorable effects on our payments of the swing in our trade position. In these circumstances, surpluses in both our trade and basic payments position now appear in sight for next year. Such surpluses for a period seem to me indispensable for full restoration of confidence, for encouraging a reflow of dollars to the United States, and for implementing any lasting monetary reform.

Our contacts with traders, investors, and businessmen suggest they have acclimated themselves reasonably well to the present monetary environment, despite more instability in exchange markets from day to day than they or we like to see. Propelled by boom conditions, world trade is, if anything, expanding even faster than in most earlier years.

It would be a fundamental error, however, to mistake present arrangements for monetary reform. Habits of cooperation and the exercise of good sense have carried us over the rough spots. But what is lacking—and what I believe to be the essence of any lasting monetary system—is a deep sense of commitment to an agreed code of international conduct to help guide us when the actions of one nation impinge on those of another.

Issues Left Open

In one way or another, most of the issues left open in Chairman Wardhana's report deal with delicate and sensitive questions arising out of the inherent tensions between the responsibilities of national governments to meet their domestic priorities and our common commitment to a mutually beneficial international order. We firmly believe these tensions can be constructively resolved, for in the end a well-functioning international system should contribute to the growth and stability of the individual countries operating within that system.

The challenge is to translate that concept into operating reality. To do so will require a commitment to some basic rules established in advance and seen as equitable to all. We must provide for necessary international review and surveillance. Not least, we must permit necessary scope for national decision-making.

In seeking an appropriate balance among these components of a new system, we have emphasized the role that quantitative indicators—and in particular reserve indicators—could play in helping discipline the adjustment process in an evenhanded, effective, and politically acceptable manner. I therefore welcome the prospect that in the months immediately ahead a common effort will be made to appraise and test the operational feasibility of that approach, alongside related questions of the operation of the convertibility provisions in the new system.

At the same time, I believe it is common

ground among us that effective processes of international consultation and decisionmaking are critical to the operation of the new system. I have been encouraged by the widespread recognition of the need to equip the IMF to play its full role at the center of the system. The logic is strong that, for the Fund to act effectively, member governments should have available a forum of workable size within the organization at which responsible national officials can speak and negotiate with both flexibility and authority. Conversely, we should be sure that the deliberations and concerns of the international community are fully and directly reflected in the internal councils of member governments.

These objectives could be fostered by keeping in being a streamlined Committee of Twenty able to review periodically or in emergencies larger issues with a significant impact on the monetary situation as a whole. Plainly, there will also be a need to retain a body along the lines of the present and highly competent Executive Board, with resident members and the knowledge and insight that come only with intimate day-to-day contact with operations and emerging problems.

In the effort to resolve finally these difficult substantive and organizational questions, I particularly look forward to the participation and fresh insights of our new Managing Director, Mr. [H. Johannes] Witteveen. He brings to us rich and varied experience as a professional economist and a practicing politician—precisely the disciplines that must be blended in all our work.

Interests of Developing Countries

The day has long passed—and rightly so—when discussions of trade and monetary issues could take place primarily in a relatively closed circle of industrialized countries. We must consider with great care what special arrangements within the trading and monetary systems may be appropriate to help meet development needs more effectively.

In presenting broad trade legislation to our Congress, we incorporated the concept of assisting development by means of generalized preferences, to be granted on a non-reciprocal basis. This approach, undertaken in concert with comparable efforts by other industrialized countries, is consistent with the broad thrust of our mutual effort to reduce barriers to trade and to encourage economic development. We look forward to early passage of this legislation.

We support the idea of freeing flows of capital to developing countries and exempting where possible those countries from controls imposed for balance of payments purposes.

Closer examination should be given to methods of providing credit through our international institutions better tailored to the needs of developing countries experiencing extended periods of difficulty.

Our judgment concerning the value of another proposal has, as is well known, been different. We feel the so-called SDR-aid link would in practice serve well neither monetary stability nor economic development. Experience strongly demonstrates the wisdom of keeping separate the function of money creation—which is what the SDR is all about—and the essentially political decision of resource transfer and redistribution.

As we deal with these specific issues, let us never lose sight of the much larger stake that developing countries—as all of us—have in a well-functioning, stable monetary system and an open trading order. Mr. McNamara [Robert S. McNamara, President, IBRD] has already pointed to the cost to poorer countries of burdens on their exports in the markets of industrialized nations. Long delays and sharp exchange rate adjustments among their more affluent trading partners, responding to imbalances that were permitted to build up over a period of years, have complicated the financial management of developing countries.

At the same time, a number of countries still classified as developing are reaching a stage of industrialization where they can,

in the mutual interest, accept their fair share of the responsibilities for a world order. Controls, subsidies, and other impediments to open trade that might have been justified in an earlier stage of development need to be reviewed and eliminated. The disciplines of balance of payments adjustment—whether to correct deficits or surpluses—need to be observed, and this can be done without sacrificing developmental objectives. Indeed, I believe there are longer term dangers to the kind of open, one-world economy we would like to see in casually proliferating arrangements that would divide the world sharply into distinct groupings of “have” and “have-not” nations.

In the short run, the prosperity of developing countries is tied to the prosperity of the industrialized world. In the past two years, relatively high prices for agricultural products and raw materials have directly benefited many. When the labor forces of industrialized economies are fully employed, resistance to imports of labor-intensive products declines, to the benefit of producer and consumer alike.

While uneven country by country, the overall results are apparent in the recent growth of production and monetary reserves of the developing world. Excluding the main oil producers, developing countries had a surplus of over \$4½ billion in 1972, and their surpluses appear to have been well maintained this year.

Long-Term Development and Official Assistance

A cyclical surge is of course no substitute for sustained development over a long period of years. In the end, development will succeed or fail as the result of the efforts of the millions of people in the developing countries themselves, working under the direction and leadership of their own governments. Compared to the human and material resources of even the poorest country, the effects of external assistance are bound to be modest. Indeed, all the official assistance of all the donor countries of the Western World amounts to less than

2 percent of the GNP of developing countries.

Effectively used, however, the margin of resources from abroad can be a catalyst—in some instances an essential catalyst—to the development process. I speak of this potential as seen from the particular vantage point of a country whose people and government have had experience in the provision of assistance in amounts, and over a period of time, without parallel in history. Even today, when others have moved to help pick up the burden, the United States provides almost 40 percent of official development assistance from the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, and it is by far the largest source of private capital as well.

This commitment has been a natural one, for we are a large and relatively rich country, unusually blessed with resources, political stability, and a productive population. We accept today, as we have in the past, the simple premise that no nation—whether the motives are properly considered those of common humanity or enlightened self-interest—can be oblivious to the conditions in which other men and women are living.

Out of this long experience, we have reached certain conclusions and raised certain questions that I want to convey to you today. The questions are no doubt sharpened by the searching look at priorities evoked by long years of an agonizing war and by the evident strains on our external position. Like every other country represented in this room, we face hard decisions about economic and social priorities in many areas.

The strongest of our convictions is that aid stimulates development only where there exists the will and competence to utilize it effectively. This implies a responsibility upon the donor as well as the recipient to identify, develop, and carry through projects of strategic developmental importance. The World Bank Group and its regional financing institutions rightly pride themselves as

leaders in efficient project planning and execution and in assessment of those projects as part of a larger development effort. This is not a matter of dramatic new initiatives, but hard persistent effort. We are particularly gratified that the World Bank Group is moving to reinforce its effectiveness by further strengthening postaudit performance evaluation independent of those responsible for project execution.

Second, there is a growing need to place more emphasis on what might be called “people-oriented” projects rather than large-scale civil engineering. We have redirected the emphasis in our own bilateral assistance in support of imaginative new programs in education, agriculture, and population planning. We warmly support the initiatives the World Bank has taken in these same areas. The fresh emphasis that Mr. McNamara placed on rural development in his remarks to us yesterday seems to us entirely appropriate.

Third, and most broadly, a genuine commitment on the part of recipient countries to the idea of development in their own policies is a key ingredient. Experience shows time and again that “growth-oriented” countries rapidly become less dependent on official assistance once internal conditions are right.

There is one aspect of “growth orientation”—the part played by private investment—that I wish to emphasize, sensitive though it may be. In sheer quantitative terms, the potential is clear enough: Net flows of medium- and long-term private capital to developing countries are now as large as official assistance. Moreover, the private investor can bring benefits in skills and experience that simply have no counterpart in governmental aid.

Every sovereign nation has, of course, the right to regulate terms and conditions under which private investment is admitted or to reject it entirely. However, when such capital is rejected, we find it difficult to understand that official donors should be asked to fill the gap. Moreover, we do not

find it reasonable that a nation taking confiscatory steps toward investment that it has already accepted from abroad should anticipate official assistance, bilateral or multilateral.

Mr. McNamara has outlined an ambitious program for the next five years. We are in a large measure of agreement with the objectives of that program, and we give them our support. We also appreciate that a consensus has been reached that the traditional share of the United States in IDA [International Development Association] financing should be dropped from 40 percent to one-third, and the shares of Japan, Germany, and others increased, to more accurately reflect the present distribution of economic strength.

On this basis, the U.S. administration will consult with, and strongly recommend to, the Congress our participation in a total fourth replenishment for IDA of \$4½ billion. In doing so, I must emphasize that many questions about this program, including those I have discussed with you, are on the minds of the Members of Congress. The large and distinguished delegation from the Congress that has accompanied me to Nairobi and visited a variety of World Bank projects in Africa is evidence that they are interested in finding constructive answers to these questions.

I cannot say with any certainty how long our consultative and legislative process will take or certify its outcome. We do fully recognize that necessary legislative procedures differ among countries and that time-tables are pressing. We will therefore remain in close touch with the management and the Executive Board of the Bank during this process.

Worldwide Surge of Inflation

Before concluding, I must underscore the threat to all our constructive labor from the storm of worldwide inflation.

Unfortunately, inflation is no new phenomenon. What is new is that it is now infecting more countries, in a greater degree,

than at any time in memory. Speculation in commodities is fed by fear about currencies. Inflation is becoming imbedded in the expectations of too many people. Long maintained, this will break down the processes of orderly development. It is simply incompatible with the stability of any international monetary and trading system.

I am familiar with analyses that trace world inflation to defects in the international monetary system. The Bretton Woods system has itself been criticized as an engine of inflation, and floating rates praised as permitting the restoration of internal monetary discipline. Equally forcibly, we are urged—especially by those who have seen their own exchange rates depreciate and their import bill rise—that floating rates are themselves an inflationary force.

Whatever the technical merits of these analyses in particular circumstances, I submit they place the responsibility for inflation and its correction in the wrong place. Let us not neglect the causes and cures that lie closer to our national actions and powers.

Two factors, mainly unforeseen a year ago, have been at work in the recent surge of inflation. The first is that strong expansionary forces have coincided among virtually all industrialized and developing countries. As a result, increases in cyclical demand have put pressures on supply, exposed unforeseen shortages of capacity, and driven up prices of raw materials. Second, the pressures on prices in two key areas—agriculture and energy—have been greatly aggravated by crop failures and weather and by shifts in production patterns and marketing policies.

In the United States, we have long been accustomed to relatively low prices of basic agricultural commodities. For many years, without adequate markets abroad, we kept a sizable margin of farm resources idle. But in the past crop year, the volume of our wheat exports nearly doubled, feed grain exports rose by two-thirds, and soybeans by one-sixth. And now, with our markets fully

open to the surge in world demand, looked to as a residual supplier when other countries are short, and without the price protection afforded those whose exchange rates have appreciated, we have felt the full brunt of the rise in world agricultural prices.

At the same time, our needs for energy imports are rising rapidly. Obviously these commodity flows in both directions have responded to pressing needs. But the price impact is measured by the fact that, taken together, prices of food and energy account for 82 percent of the rise in our wholesale price index and 66 percent of the rise in our consumer price index in the past year.

We believe a market-oriented system will respond flexibly and effectively to changing needs. We are making great efforts to deal with the high price of food by bringing idle acreage back into production. Normal market processes are at work. The prices of soybeans are 50 percent below their speculative peak, feed grains have fallen back by a quarter, and wheat prices—where the worldwide supply situation is most tenuous—have at least stopped rising.

We cannot speed the natural cycle of planting and harvesting and of animal growth. We face for a considerable period ahead a tight situation in agricultural markets. But we have every intention of keeping our markets open, for we are and intend to be a dependable supplier.

Meanwhile, this experience will ultimately redound to our common advantage if we attack with fresh urgency the problem of finding more effective patterns of production and trade to serve our mutual interests in more food at cheaper prices.

Let us work in similar spirit to deal with the problem of developing and distributing energy resources.

We, for our side, have now embarked upon a massive effort to develop the bountiful energy sources within our own country now made economic by higher prices. We look to others to help maintain the flow of energy so long as their own legitimate needs and aspirations are fairly recognized.

A vigorous attack on the special problems of food and energy is not a cure-all for inflation. A number of countries, as ourselves, have resorted to, and even intensified, direct price and wage controls. But we remain convinced that our success will hinge mainly on the firm and persistent application of the traditional tools of fiscal and monetary restraint. I need not belabor, to an audience of Finance Ministers and central bankers, that expenditure and monetary restraints are never popular. Nevertheless, I believe, in the face of the evident need, these policies are broadly accepted by the American people. We mean to see it through. We hope and expect our efforts will be mutually reinforcing with those of others.

U.S. Pledges Continued Efforts for Aviation Security

An International Conference on Air Law and an Extraordinary Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) met at Rome August 28–September 21. Following is a statement by Ambassador William M. Rountree, head of the U.S. delegation, as issued to the press at Rome on September 21.

The Diplomatic Conference and Extraordinary Assembly are rapidly drawing to a close.

In my opening statement I noted that we here were faced with a task of monumental complexity but equally of monumental importance. In retrospect one must conclude that the complexity has overshadowed the importance. We have been unable to agree upon any of the proposals which have been put before us designed to enhance the security of civil aviation. The great efforts which have gone into these proposals, particularly the efforts of their respective authors and sponsors, are deeply appreciated; and it is sad indeed that we have

been unable to find a sufficient area of agreement to adopt any of them.

In particular, my delegation strongly supported an independent convention which would have enabled international scrutiny and moral pressure to be brought to bear upon states acting contrary to the principles of the Hague and Montreal Conventions. This proposal never reached the stage of consideration in plenary session.

The independent convention concept and the other concepts for improved international measures were born during a time of great violence in international civil aviation. Unhappily, this violence has not noticeably diminished, and thus the largely negative results of our meetings here are even more regrettable.

Even, and more ironically, as our meetings here have taken place, dramatic new incidents have occurred to demonstrate again the need for heightened vigilance on the part of the international community.

Although my delegation's general assessment of our work here is not encouraging, I wish to observe that the international concern which brought about these meetings may ultimately have secondary consequences which are beneficial. For example, we have heard numerous distinguished delegates affirm that their governments have ratified or are in the process of ratifying the Hague and Montreal Conventions. If this in fact occurs rapidly and on a broad scale, then we might one day be able to conclude that the secondary consequences of this conference and Assembly were greatly beneficial.

However, I fear that despite the hopeful aspects which I have mentioned, we have done too little here to relieve this pressure on civil aviation.

When we return from Rome one message is clear, in the view of my delegation: States must expend even greater efforts to insure the safety of civil aviation against threats and dangers from any quarter.

Equally importantly, the existing ICAO machinery must play a vigorous and assertive role in assisting in this battle to elimi-

nate threats to civil aviation. We are confident that the Secretary General of ICAO, his staff, the Council of ICAO, and the representatives of states working in Montreal recognize that their role is now even more important. However, they cannot succeed alone. States, working individually and collectively, must also take up the task. Although we could not agree here upon a new treaty to establish machinery to do the job, no delegation can deny the gravity of the continuing threat to international civil aviation.

My delegation renews its pledge to try to respond adequately to this threat, and we are confident that others here sharing our grave concern will do likewise.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Yugoslavia Sign Agreement on Nonscheduled Air Services

The Department of State announced on September 27 (press release 352) that the United States and Yugoslavia had that day signed at Belgrade a Nonscheduled Air Service Agreement between the two governments. Ambassador Malcolm Toon signed for the United States and Milovan Djokanovic, Director General, Directorate General for Civil Aeronautics, signed for the Government of Yugoslavia. Simultaneously with the signature of the agreement, the two governments signed a protocol on commercial activities by carriers and two technical documents relating to the implementation of two aspects of the agreement. (For texts of the agreement and protocol, see press release 352.)

This agreement on nonscheduled (i.e., charter) air services includes many elements not contained in other charter arrangements and marks a significant step in the develop-

ment of the United States international civil aviation relations. It is anticipated that other agreements of this type will be negotiated in the future as we are able to work out with other countries the framework and detailed exchange of rights necessary to help regularize and promote the operation of this important aspect of international air travel.

The agreement with Yugoslavia sets forth in considerable detail the rights the two countries have exchanged in the field of non-scheduled air services. U.S. airlines will have the right to conduct a broad range of charter operations to and from Yugoslavia, including the relatively new type of charter called the Travel Group Charter. Yugoslav airlines will have equally comprehensive rights to conduct charters to the United States. Rights to conduct charters originating in the United States are considerably broader than those at present available to the Yugoslav airline and reflect the fact that residents of the United States constitute the large bulk of the air travelers between the two countries.

United States and Japan Sign Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on September 26 (press release 348) that the arrangement between the United States and Japan concerning exports of Japanese cotton textiles to the United States had been extended that day for one year from October 1, 1973, by exchange of notes at Washington. The level specified in the exchange of notes to which Japan will restrain its cotton textile exports to the United States during this period is 510,935,550 square yards equivalent. Proportionately, this is a 5 percent increase over the level specified for the previous arrangement period. (For texts of the U.S. and Japanese notes, see press release 348.)

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952; for the United States August 18, 1972. TIAS 7465.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, July 23, 1973.

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668.

Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, October 5, 1973; Costa Rica, October 11, 1973.

Protocol suspending the application of safeguards under the agreement of May 4, 1967, as amended (TIAS 6260, 6849), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy and providing for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839). Done at Vienna September 25, 1973. Entered into force September 25, 1973.

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, Norway, and the United States.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.¹

Signature: Australia (with a statement), October 10, 1973.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972.

Ratifications deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, October 9, 1973.

Entered into force for the United States: October 9, 1973.

BILATERAL

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol relating to a Trade Representation of the U.S.S.R. in Washington and a Commercial Office of the U.S.A. in Moscow. Signed at Moscow October 3, 1973. Entered into force October 3, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

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No.	Date	Subject
362	10/8	Kissinger: Pacem in Terris Conference.
*363	10/9	Gould sworn in as Ambassador to the Netherlands (biographic data).
*364	10/10	Shipping Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, Oct. 23.
*365	10/10	Laise sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic data).
*366	10/10	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Nov. 6.
*367	10/10	Study group 5 of U.S. National Committee for CCITT, Dec. 4.
*368	10/10	Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property, Oct. 30.
*369	10/10	Advisory Committee on "Foreign Relations of the United States," Nov. 9.
*370	10/11	Rush: President's Conference on Export Expansion.
*371	10/12	Maw to be nominated to be Legal Adviser (biographic data).
*372	10/12	Brown to be nominated to be Deputy Under Secretary for Management (biographic data).
*373	10/12	Sutterlin appointed Inspector General of the Foreign Service (biographic data).
*374	10/12	Davis appointed Director General of the Foreign Service (biographic data).
*375	10/12	Lord appointed Director of Planning and Coordination (biographic data).
*376	10/12	Vest appointed Special Assistant for Press Relations (biographic data).
*377	10/12	Thomas to be nominated to be Assistant Secretary for Administration (biographic data).
*378	10/12	Ingersoll to be nominated to be Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (biographic data).
*379	10/12	Donaldson to be nominated to be Under Secretary for Security Assistance (biographic data).
380	10/12	Kissinger: news conference.
*381	10/12	U.S.-Yugoslav cultural talks.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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President Nixon Addresses Conference on Export Expansion

Following are remarks made by President Nixon in the East Room at the White House on October 11 before the President's Conference on Export Expansion.

White House press release dated October 11

Members of the Cabinet and ladies and gentlemen: When I saw the guest list for this conference, I realized that probably never before have so many presidents been gathered in the East Room of the White House. [Laughter.] And we welcome you all, whatever your position in business or in government, to this Conference on Export Expansion.

I realize that you have been exposed for the past two or three hours to all the experts, and I will not take more of your time to go into some of the decisions on technical matters that we have made to work with you toward expanding exports.

On the other hand, I thought it might be useful at the conclusion of the conference, and before I have the chance to meet each of you personally at its end, for me to put the whole problem of trade, export expansion, in the larger context of foreign policy of the United States and the desire that all of us share as Americans to build a more peaceful world.

Now, first, I think it is well for us to understand what the limitations of trade are in building of our peaceful world. I noticed in my talking points it was indicated that if we have trade that automatically will lead to peace. Of course that isn't true at all. As a matter of fact, if we look at World War I and World War II, we will find that nations

that traded with each other fought each other. Japan and the United States in World War II are good examples, and of course Britain and France and Germany in World War I and World War II are examples of that. So trade between nations, no matter how great it is, does not necessarily lead to peace.

But having stated the negative proposition, let's also understand some of the positive points that can be made about trade and how it can help in building a structure of peace.

The first is that trade leads to communication between peoples, not just governments but peoples. And communication between peoples I very sincerely believe—having taken some role in opening communications with other nations in the world over the past 4½ years, opening communications with nations with which we had not had communications before—I believe that as we increase communication between peoples at all levels, the opportunity of discussing differences rather than fighting about differences is greatly increased.

And so as American businessmen and businesswomen travel throughout the world, as you meet your counterparts in business and, in the totalitarian countries, in government, you will help to create those channels of communication which are so essential if in times of crisis we are to avoid those explosions that could lead to war.

And then, of course, there is another broader point that should be made. As the nations of the world have a greater stake in peace, they have a less incentive to wage

war. And as we have more expanded world trade, trade with all nations, it means that nations which otherwise might be tempted to wage war because of their concerns about inability to move up their standard of living at home could develop a stake in peace. I firmly believe that.

I know that that is not easy to accomplish, and you know it as well. But I am sure that as we look toward the years ahead, that as the United States, along with other nations, whether they be in the more advanced industrial nations in Europe or in Asia or in the less developed countries, as the United States increases its trade with those nations, it inevitably will mean that their standard of living will rise as will ours, and as theirs rises their people and their governments will have a stake in peace. They will have a stake also in good relations with the United States.

So I have stated both ends of the proposition. On the one hand, that trade by itself does not lead to peace—it does not, and that is a grave illusion ever to think that it would. But the fact that if we have trade combined with an intelligent and pragmatic foreign policy, we can build a structure of peace which it would be much more difficult to build if we did not have the communications which trade brings and also the raising of the standard of living which inevitably will come as we trade with other nations.

So what I am saying to all of you here today is that this trip to Washington, I hope, will be useful to you in the years ahead in terms of bringing more business to the concerns that you represent. That is good for your various corporations or companies as the case may be; it is good for the United States, for labor, for business; and it is good for the nations abroad. But also it serves a much larger purpose.

You are part of, you are playing a very important role in, what I consider to be the great adventure of the last third of this century; and that is the adventure of building for the first time in this century a structure of peace for the whole world that will last.

I suppose it is rather ironic for me to speak of a structure of peace at a time when we have a very difficult war going on in the Mideast. I say “we,” even though the United States is not involved, because when war hits that part of the world, it inevitably leads to repercussions throughout Europe and Asia and of course the Americas as well.

And so we are concerned about that war. We are trying to play a responsible role in helping to bring the fighting to an end and then beyond that to build a structure of peace that will be permanent and not temporary.

That is all that I can say on that subject at this time, but let me first say, in addition to that, that while we have the truce in the Mideast broken at this time, we find that the United States is at peace with every nation in the world, and this is the first time that a President of the United States could say that for 12 years. And that of course is a hopeful development, but that also is not something that we can stand by and simply rest on our laurels, because we have ended wars before and yet in every generation we follow with another war.

World War I was ended, and then came World War II, and after it was ended came Korea, and after it was ended came Vietnam. That is why I have always spoken of the need not just to end the war which we were in, the longest in America’s history, but to look far beyond and to build a structure of peace in the world that would last.

That is what the initiatives toward the People’s Republic of China and the initiatives toward the Soviet Union and the initiatives toward the other Communist countries in Europe were all about. They had nothing to do with our deciding that our system of government now was closer in philosophy to theirs. We are still as far apart as we ever were.

But what it has to do with is that unless we do develop communications with, including trade, with those people who live in approximately one-half the world—or half the people of the world live in the nations that

I have referred to—unless we have those channels of communications open, the inevitability of a confrontation somewhere down the line is almost inescapable.

It is our chance, our opportunity, to help avoid that inevitable conflict. And you, each in your way, wherever you move in the world, I think, are contributing to the possibility of building that structure of peace that will last not just for a generation but beyond.

I should also add that I don't need to tell a group of American businessmen that the competitive situation in the world is a lot different from what it was immediately after World War II. It is hard to realize that there are times we talked about the dollar gap. It is hard to realize that there were times when we could talk about reciprocal trade when it was all, "What is the United States going to do in terms of opening its markets?" It is hard to realize that there was a time—as a matter of fact, not too long ago when I was Vice President of the United States, in 1958, talking to the President of Colombia in South America, when he told me, he said, "The trouble in the world today is that what we have in terms of world trade can be compared with a great poker game. The United States has all the chips and consequently nobody else can play. And so what you must do is to pass out some of the chips so the rest of us can play."

Of course, he was speaking of foreign aid, and he was also speaking of trade; but now we realize that not only must the United States play a responsible role in seeing that trade barriers against goods from abroad which are unfair are reduced but we must also play, as a government, a very strong role in seeing that American goods get a fair competitive position all over the world.

We can't have the one-way-street situation which presently exists in our relations with some countries. They know that, and we in our government understand it very thoroughly.

You know, you sometimes wonder about these government people, people like Mr. Eberle [William D. Eberle, President Nixon's

Special Representative for Trade Negotiations] and the Secretary of the Treasury and the people in the State Department, and I have often heard businessmen say, "Who do they represent? Do they represent us, or do they represent the foreign countries?"

Let me tell you this: These men in this government represent the United States of America. They are going to speak up for American businessmen. They are going to represent our interests and represent them aggressively, but in representing them aggressively, they also are going to recognize that it can't be a one-way street either way. We can't sell without buying.

And that is why we see some of the short-sighted talk to the effect that we should have legislation which will close American markets or raise barriers to goods abroad in order to save jobs here, that that is terribly shortsighted, because when we see it, we find that if we close our markets in order to save jobs here, we are going to lose jobs for those products that otherwise would be sold abroad.

And so the question is: How can we have a policy in which we buy and sell and have the right kind of a position in which we have more jobs at home, a better standard of living at home, and also a better opportunity for others abroad to participate in that development of prosperity?

So I would conclude my remarks, ladies and gentlemen, simply with this general proposition. We live in a far more competitive world. We find that the new Europe is going to give us very tough competition. Japan already is giving us very hard competition. Further down the road, even the totalitarian powers, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China—not because they are Communist, but because they are Chinese and because they are Russians and have drive—they are going to give us some competition in the world.

So when we finally come down to the bottom line, it is this: Government has got to see to it that American goods get a fair shake all over the world, and we will meet that responsibility. And we have to do everything

we can to expand our exports, and that is something that you can do, because we are a free enterprise country. Government cannot do it, and you have to do it.

But we also must recognize that if American goods are to be sold abroad, American business and American labor must be competitive, and the name of that game, as everybody in this room knows, is productivity.

That is why, in this period of time, to think in terms simply of building a great wall around this Nation so that noncompetitive industries can survive, that is good short-term politics—it is disastrous long-term statesmanship in terms of business, in terms of jobs, and in terms of the peace of America in the world.

And so, to all of you I say, thank you for coming to this conference. I know that many of you come to Washington many times for conferences and wonder if that trip was worthwhile. I can only say I believe yours is, because as we enter this new era of peace for America with all nations in the world, we must build on it, we must build a new structure. There must be new diplomacy, there must be the necessary military strength so that we can be the peacemakers in the world.

But we also need those communications, channels of communications which the businessmen, the businesswomen, of America open through the areas of trade, and we also need that kind of communication between nations in the trading area which will raise the standard of living throughout the world so that all peoples and all nations will have a stake in the peace of the world.

That is a great goal. You are all working for it, and speaking for all of the American people, we thank American business and American labor for the role you have played and for the greater role I am sure you will play after this conference is concluded.

President Establishes Committees on Export Expansion

President Nixon announced on October 11 (White House press release) that he would create the President's Export Council, an organization of leading American businessmen to advise him on ways to increase U.S. overseas sales. The President announced that he would appoint Fletcher L. Byrom, chairman of the board and chief executive officer of the Koppers Co., Pittsburgh, Pa., to be Chairman of the new Council, and F. Perry Wilson, chairman of the board and chief executive officer of the Union Carbide Corp., New York, N.Y., to be Vice Chairman. (For biographic data, see White House press release dated October 11.)

The President also announced that he would establish a new President's Interagency Committee on Export Expansion, representing 13 government departments and agencies, to initiate and coordinate government programs and policies affecting the U.S. export performance. The President announced that he would designate Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent to be Chairman of the Committee.

The President's Export Council and the President's Interagency Committee on Export Expansion, working through the Council on International Economic Policy as established by the International Economic Policy Act of 1972, will recommend short-term action to achieve material improvement in the U.S. trade account, long-term programs to achieve equilibrium in the U.S. balance of payments, and action to remove domestic impediments to U.S. exports and improve or supplement existing export incentives.

The President's Export Council will succeed the National Export Expansion Council, which was created in 1960 to advise the Secretary of Commerce on matters of U.S. world trade.

The Department's Strengthened Export Expansion Services

Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush¹

It is a particular pleasure to discuss with you this afternoon the role of the State Department and the Foreign Service in export expansion. As a fellow businessman for more than 30 years and with the past four years with the government in international affairs, I've developed some appreciation of what governmental support you want in your international dealings. I would therefore like to discuss with you how the Department of State and other agencies can be responsive to your needs and those of smaller, new-to-export firms.

We in the State Department share with our business colleagues the basic assumption that economic strength is one of the primary foundations of national power. A sound dollar, a vigorous export trade, and a healthy climate for international investment are prerequisites for the fullest realization of all our foreign policy goals. Without our solid industrial base, our stability, and our competitiveness in world markets, we would never have been able to shoulder the tasks we have undertaken since World War II. Without our great economic strength, the United States simply could not have provided aid to war-ravaged nations, developed collective security arrangements, extended a helping hand to the developing world, and waged two major conflicts.

In recognition of the close relationship between our economic strength, our export performance, and our ability to sustain basic political and strategic policies, State and Commerce introduced an export promotion

program almost 15 years ago. We were convinced that such an effort could serve as a powerful adjunct to a sound monetary and trade policy. That conviction is even stronger today.

Our export expansion program has come a long way since its inception. Over the years we have developed and introduced a number of major improvements. Moreover, in recent months we have thoroughly reviewed every aspect of our commercial program, including our Embassies' execution of these programs and the Washington backup provided by the Departments of State and Commerce.

We approach the basic task of export expansion programs on two mutually reinforcing fronts. Not only do we address the question of program content and methodology, but we also face the equally important issues of personnel resources and priorities. We fully appreciate that these two approaches must be coordinated.

Let me review with you some of the changes that State and Commerce have instituted in recent months.

On the program side we have concentrated our efforts in sharpening the focus of our promotional activities, in expanding our in-depth knowledge of foreign market potential, and in speeding the flow of information from our Foreign Service posts to American business.

Our most important accomplishment has been to develop a clearer set of program priorities. Frankly, we have been inclined in the past to commit our limited export promotion resources in a random, shotgun approach and to be reactive rather than innovative. Now, however, we target our

¹Made before the President's Conference on Export Expansion at the White House on Oct. 11 (press release 370).

export drive in support of those industries which a special Commerce Department study has determined to be the most competitive and to offer the best prospects for future growth.

We have also tailored this global targeting concept to our programs in major overseas markets. This fiscal year our 35 most commercially significant missions have for the first time explicitly defined a set of annual objectives and the means they propose to fulfill them. These are specific goals to improve our export performance in the target industries, goals which the Embassy believes attainable within the 12-month period. Our Embassy in Brasilia, for example, established seven goals to increase U.S. exports to Brazil. One of these was to increase our share of the Brazilian market for aircraft, aircraft parts, and airport equipment. In pursuit of that objective the mission undertook to support a U.S. exhibition at the São Paulo Aerospace Show—a very successful venture which was just concluded. The Embassy also intends to push the sale of large commercial aircraft to the Brazilian national airline, assist our small-plane manufacturers to arrange joint ventures, and promote U.S. equipment and services for the new São Paulo International Airport.

For fiscal year 1975 we are already hard at work with our colleagues in Commerce on comprehensive country programs in these same markets. These programs will again focus on precise, attainable goals and will integrate State and Commerce resources in Washington and at the post to implement them. Five pilot programs, one in each of our geographic regions, are being implemented.

To maximize the effectiveness of this target-industry approach, we are substantially increasing our market research capabilities. Contracted market research, conducted by qualified foreign firms under the careful supervision of our missions, has been significantly expanded. And as resources are freed from lower priority activities, our Embassies and consulates are

devoting more of their own efforts to analysis of the markets for U.S. products.

The third major area of improvement has been in communications—the increased transmission speed and the enhanced utility of the information we are providing you. Our vital commercial reporting on firms and on trade opportunities is now done exclusively by cable. Trade leads which formerly took an average of 26 days between transmission from our posts abroad and publication can now, with the aid of our computerized subscription mailing, be on a supplier's desk in less than a week. Reporting on major projects often requires even less time, since Commerce telephones the data transmitted by the Foreign Service to potentially interested firms. Our commercial officers have also been able to identify more exploitable leads. In the first six months of this year, the posts overseas submitted 5,987 specific trade leads, 80 percent higher than in the same period of 1972. Almost 400 of these entailed potential exports of at least \$5 million each. Moreover, the quality of these leads has been improved by more precise identification of product categories, thereby increasing the probability of locating an American supplier.

As I mentioned, we are stressing both program content and the quality of our performance in the commercial field. Foremost among our performance goals has been to involve the entire overseas mission in the task of export promotion. We have instructed our Ambassadors to insure that they have an integrated team effort. I have personally conveyed this message to all Assistant Secretaries, to all Country Directors, and to every Embassy I have visited, and I have been gratified with the response.

In our Embassies around the world, we are bringing to bear a team spirit on our export expansion drive. All of the elements of the mission are being harnessed in this effort:

—We are sensitizing our political and economic reporting officers to be alert to major projects which have export potential.

—We are obtaining through our AID mis-

sions more information about internationally financed projects and technical services which offer opportunities for U.S. business.

—We are seeking, with the full cooperation of our military attachés, to identify commercial trade leads flowing from military sales.

—We are publicizing through the United States Information Service our superior technology and the ability of American exporters to satisfy many local development needs.

The important thing is that today our Ambassadors can integrate overseas activity so that political as well as economic-commercial officers are involved. Recent comments we have received from a number of you also suggest that the deepened commitment of our Ambassadors and their staffs is having a favorable impact. As the president of a large western corporation wrote:

On behalf of all our officers, I want to express our appreciation for the efforts you expended in helping us secure the transmission line contract. Without your aggressive support, I seriously doubt that we could have been successful.

We are not only working harder, but we are putting more of our personnel and funds into the effort. At a time when our existing statutory activities and new programs are imposing substantial strains on our resources, we have actually reprogramed personnel from other functions into economic and commercial work. It may surprise you to know that we now have more economic and commercial officer positions overseas than we have political officer positions. And if the budgetary situation permits, we plan to increase further the amount of staff engaged in export promotion.

One of our central objectives is to enhance the skills of our economic and commercial officers. We have augmented our training programs to provide special emphasis on international business practices. In addition, we have achieved major strides in fulfilling our future needs for qualified economic and commercial officers through a vigorous recruitment drive.

Finally, we are trying to insure that the

staffing of our management positions properly reflects the priority we are according to our economic and commercial interests. We have designated 28 of our consulates in important commercial centers—14 of them in Europe—as “commercial interest posts” to be headed by officers with significant commercial experience. Relatedly we are filling roughly one-fourth of our positions of Deputy Chief of Mission, the Ambassador’s second-in-command, with officers who likewise have significant commercial experience.

What kind of support can you expect from your government representatives abroad? Most of you direct extensive international operations and are well established in all your major markets. The most important service we can perform for you is effective participation in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations over the coming months and years. I want to assure you that in our reporting and government-to-government contacts we will do our utmost to insure the success of these negotiations.

We will also assist you in your day-to-day competition with foreign firms. We will be ready to lend that needed additional boost in your bidding on major contracts and in your investment applications. You can count on us as well to work assiduously for the removal of any discriminatory obstacles that you may face. Also, when you encounter arbitrary and unreasonable actions by foreign governments, we will help you seek an amicable resolution of the problem.

Apart from our representational activities, we invite you to avail yourselves of the whole range of export promotion services we perform:

—We will give you timely notice of export opportunities.

—We will, with adequate advance warning, provide your representatives with briefings on political and economic trends in the countries they visit and arrange for them to meet foreign buyers.

—We will provide you with background information on foreign firms.

—We will provide government-supported exposure of your products in 14 trade center facilities and in U.S. exhibitions.

—We will identify potential agents, distributors, and licensees for your products.

I hope that every company throughout the country—large or small—will make use of our strengthened export promotion machinery. All of us in this government are striving to promote the closest possible government-business cooperation in support of U.S. exports. In today's international environment I am confident that partnership will improve our export performance.

Secretary Kissinger To Receive 1973 Nobel Peace Prize

On October 16 the Norwegian Parliament's five-member Nobel Committee announced the joint selection of Secretary Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, member of the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, as recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1973. Following are a statement issued by President Nixon and remarks made to the press by Secretary Kissinger that day.

PRESIDENT NIXON

White House press release dated October 16

I am sure that all Americans will join me in extending congratulations to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger upon his richly deserved selection as co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1973.

By jointly citing Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the Nobel Committee has also given deserved recognition to the art of negotiation itself in the process of ending a war and laying the groundwork for peace—an art that will be more essential than ever as we seek to build and maintain a structure of peace in the world.

It is my most fervent hope that the era of negotiation of the 1970's and the negotiation

this award recognizes will be capped by a just and lasting peace in Southeast Asia, in the Mideast, and throughout the world.

SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 384 dated October 16

Ladies and gentlemen: I don't have a formal statement. I thought I would make a few informal observations.

Nothing that has happened to me in public life has moved me more than this award, which represents a recognition of the central purpose of the President's foreign policy, which is the achievement of a lasting peace.

I am grateful to the President for having given me this opportunity and also for creating the conditions which made it possible to bring the negotiations on Viet-Nam to a successful conclusion.

When I shall receive the award, together with my old colleague in the search for peace in Viet-Nam, Le Duc Tho, I hope that that occasion will at last mark the end, or symbolize the end, of the anguish and the suffering that Viet-Nam has meant for so many millions of people around the world and that both at home and abroad it will mark the beginning of a period of reconciliation.

The news of this award reached me while I was chairing a meeting at the White House in which we were discussing means to speed peace in the Middle East. Nothing could underline so much that the search for peace is never ended. And nothing could have given us a greater impetus to work with even more energy and more dedication to end the hostilities that are now going on in the Middle East and to move from there rapidly to bringing about a just and decent and lasting peace in the Middle East.

But beyond all these immediate crises, perhaps the most important goal any administration can set itself is to work for a world in which the award will become irrelevant because peace will have become so normal and so much taken for granted that no awards for it will have to be given.

Thank you very much.

President Houphouet-Boigny of the Republic of Ivory Coast Visits the United States

President Félix Houphouet-Boigny of the Republic of Ivory Coast made a state visit to the United States October 8–15. He visited Washington October 9–11, where he met with President Nixon and other government officials. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Nixon and President Houphouet-Boigny at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on October 9 and their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 15

President Nixon

Mr. President, and all of our friends from the Ivory Coast, and all of our friends here in Washington, D.C., from the United States: Mr. President, I am honored to be the fourth American President to welcome you to Washington, D.C., and as you come on this occasion, I am also proud of the fact that both Mrs. Nixon and I have had the opportunity to visit and to know your country and to know what an exciting country it is from the standpoint of its prospects for the future.

For those in America who do not know Ivory Coast, we can report that you have the highest per capita income in black Africa, you have the highest rate of sustainable growth in that part of the world, and you have established a record for leadership that is known throughout the world. We know that this could not have happened without that leadership. Because as we look to the secret of progress for Ivory Coast, we find it first in its wealth, the wealth in its resources. We find it second in its wealth in its people, a hard-working devoted people who are determined to move forward in the areas

of progress. And we find it third in leadership, leadership which you have provided since Ivory Coast became a nation and leadership which has meant stability, which has meant private and free enterprise coming into your country, not to exploit but to develop for the good of all of the people, and leadership which, above all, has meant peace.

And Mr. President, on this occasion when we meet, the last point is most important. We realize that fighting has again broken out in the northern part of your continent and in the Mideast, and I think all of our fellow Americans will be interested to note that our distinguished and honored guest today, just this year, received the Peace Award, the first Peace Award ever given by the organization which was set up for world peace through law. And that is why, Mr. President, in addition to talking to our bilateral problems—which, incidentally, are not very controversial, because our relations are excellent and have been for many years—we will today be talking about the problems of how we can create that same period of peace and stability for all of Africa that you have in your country and how, also, working together with other nations who want peace for the whole world, we can contribute to an end to the fighting which is now going on at such terrible cost to both sides in the Mideast.

We look forward to our talks, to get your judgment as to how all nations can contribute to the goal of not simply an end to the fighting which is going on now but to building a new structure of peace in the Mideast which will give a better hope for avoiding war breaking out as it has over and over again for the past 25 years.

I do not mean that today we will find the answer to that problem that has plagued many administrations here and abroad for a

quarter of a century, but I do know that uppermost in our agenda today will be a discussion of those problems with the hope that we can find those common principles which will move toward not only an end to the fighting but building a permanent structure of peace in the Mideast and eventually, of course, throughout the world.

So, Mr. President, I say that we give you a very special welcome today to our country because of your official position and also because both Mrs. Nixon and I have had the privilege of being welcomed so warmly in your country. And we hope that you will enjoy your stay here, your visit to the West Coast, and will go back with as pleasant memories of the United States as Mrs. Nixon and I have very pleasant and warm memories of Ivory Coast.

President Houphouet-Boigny¹

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Allow me first of all to express to you in my own name, in the name of my wife, and of my delegation, my deep appreciation for your kind invitation and for the words full of praise you have just had for myself and my delegation. At this privileged moment I feel deep pride and joy, first of all, because my new visit in your great and beautiful country will permit me to acquaint myself more deeply with one of the more astonishing adventures of modern times, an adventure without which our world of today would be deeply different from what it is with its fascinating diverseness and its bounties.

In the second place it is because I am about to meet with you for the very first time about problems which matter to both of us, and such exchanges with the prestigious President of the most powerful of all nations cannot fail to show and illustrate our common will, as you have yourself just stressed a moment ago, to foster dialogue in peace. And finally, I am deeply convinced that my visit

will very happily contribute to a cause dear to us, that of cooperation and friendship between the United States and the Ivory Coast. This cooperation and friendship, which in their traditional cordiality and very large permanence are to us essential features in our foreign relations, can only benefit from the conversations and the meetings—loyal, candid, and frank—that we shall have with you and with the figures that we shall meet here.

I come to you, Mr. President, simply and as a friend, to thank you with all my heart in my own name and in that of my wife and express to you the feelings of admiration and confidence placed in you by the people of the Ivory Coast and which, through you, are addressed to the entire American Nation. Long live the United States of America, long live the friendship between our two peoples.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 15

President Nixon

Mr. President: It is a very great pleasure to welcome you and your very lovely First Lady at the White House on this occasion. And because I know that this company and all of those who will be listening in the press room below are more interested in what you will be saying than what I will be saying, my remarks will be brief.

But first let me say that perhaps my greatest expert on foreign affairs is not really Dr. Kissinger, but my wife. [Laughter.] And after she was able to take a trip to Africa, which I have been wanting to take—and I, incidentally, Dr. Kissinger, intend to take before my term of office is finished, the first American President ever to visit Africa—Mrs. Nixon came back with very warm feelings for all the countries she had visited, but she had a very special feeling about Ivory Coast and its President and its First Lady.

She said that the President was a man

¹ President Houphouet-Boigny spoke in French on both occasions.

who not only was handling the affairs of his country well but who had a great grasp of the problems of the world. And she said that his First Lady was, among all the first ladies she had met in the world, one of the most gracious, the most beautiful, and—to a woman this is important and to a man also—the best dressed.

Now, to be very serious for a moment before introducing the President to this assemblage, people wonder what happens when the President of Ivory Coast and the President of the United States sit down for an hour and a half and talk. Now, we both agree that we talked about cocoa and coffee and reverse preferences, and international trade problems, and other bilateral matters—like whether Kaiser should or should not invest in Ivory Coast, and they should—but what, it seems to me, is particularly important about this visit is that while we covered all the bilateral problems very thoroughly and found that we had very little to disagree about, that the President was able to convey to me an understanding of not only the problems of his own country and the problems of the new African states but an understanding of his view of the world.

In other words, we have in our company tonight—and I wish all of you could know him as I have known him, as my wife has known him—a world statesman of the first rank, a man who has demonstrated by his leadership capabilities that he knows what it takes to take a new country and to give it the stability, the drive, and the spirit that will make it a major force in that area of the world, but also a man who does not think of his own country as just an island, who is not parochial, as are too many of the leaders in the world today, but one who sees the whole world, as one who realizes that what happens 5,000 miles away in India and Pakistan affects him, as one who sees that what happens in the Mideast affects him and his people, as one who sees that what happens in any part of the world affects his country—although it is very easy to become obsessed with your own problems.

And for that reason tonight I know that all of you, not only because we admire our distinguished guest for his leadership of his own country, with the best record of national growth and per capita income of any of the nations of black Africa, but also because he has demonstrated that he has that rare ability to see beyond the problems of the moment and look to the problems of the future, to see beyond the geographical problems that involve only his own island as it exists in the West Coast of Africa and see beyond and see the whole world, because he is truly one whose views on the world scene can affect the world—it is for this reason that this house is honored for the third time to have him as our guest.

And so in presenting him to you, I present a man who represents his own country with great distinction, a man who is also one who understands and is a great advocate of the problems of the new Africa and where it must go but also one who when he comes to America is able to speak with great understanding and great wisdom about those problems that, wherever they exist in this world, will affect the future of his country and the future of ours.

To a world statesman of the first rank, the President of the Ivory Coast, President Houphouet-Boigny.

President Houphouet-Boigny

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: In few words, Mr. President, but in particularly sensitive and well-chosen words, you have said much about my country and my people, about our achievements and our expectations, which is both friendly and profound. I am deeply touched, and I do thank you in my own name, on behalf of my wife, and on behalf of the delegation with me here today. We all share in my very sincere joy and feelings.

It will soon be two years that we had the honor and the great pride to welcome Mrs. Richard Nixon to our capital city. This dazzling visit, which we shall always remember,

attested, if need be, of the quality of the relations between our two countries and of the concern which you feel, Mr. President, to show your interest and your friendship to us.

Today, in spite of your heavy responsibilities, you have received us here, and you are sharing with your representatives of the Government and the people of the Ivory Coast some of your very valuable time, and this indeed is again a very rare treat for all of us.

I shall deliberately not mention here the international problems and the African problems which with you we have surveyed in such a rewarding manner earlier today. I should like to dwell specifically upon the relations between the United States and the Ivory Coast because I am indeed convinced that my third visit in the United States will, as much as my preceding and memorable visits, be a milestone along the comforting path of the relations between our two countries.

These relations to which the establishment of diplomatic links came very early and very spontaneously to give formal official nature are, I am happy to stress, without any clouds. The cordiality, the diverseness, and the frankness of our relations are the dominant themes. And the reasons that we have to eternalize the excellence of these relations and enhance their effects are tied directly to the convergence of our interests as well as to the commonality of our feelings.

It is, Mr. President, in the first place in the area of business that we see the thrust of this convergence. Recipient of 14 percent of our exports, mainly coffee and cocoa, the United States has become the second customer of the Ivory Coast. It is also one of our privileged suppliers. This is all the more significant that the natural and traditional framework of our trade relations with Europe was not a natural incentive to a development of your exports toward our part of the world.

As to industrial investments, which now remain very scant in our country, they should become in the very near future, with a textile plant near Abidjan, and as the more remote

future, for the two projects of rubber tires and the operation of iron ore, they should really take off in a much more significant manner.

In very general terms we note with deep satisfaction the new interest that your businessmen are taking in our country. At the same time, we appreciate the action and the diverse forms of the technological and financial aid of the United States in the Ivory Coast over the last several years. The Eximbank has particularly been active to support two of our regional development programs: two of the most essential ones, one in the central with the Kossou Dam and the other in the north for a huge sugar industry complex.

As to the valuable assistance of your Peace Corps volunteers, it is the extension of the AID program, and it illustrates our common preoccupation to give our cooperation the irreplaceable human dimension, its need to bring people together and to bring for better understanding nations and races; and this is a very happy plea and testimonial for this community of feelings between us that I referred to a minute ago.

To come to meet you, Mr. President, is not simply for the people of the Ivory Coast the opportunity to dwell upon the favorable course of our relations, to set forth its spirit and stress its thrust, it is also a way for us to satisfy a portion of the curiosity and admiration which has always led us to take an interest in your amazing nation.

I do not know which of your history—the virtue of your people or your phenomenal development in the scientific and economic area—is the most noteworthy. I am convinced that the lessons and the examples upon which we can ponder here are particularly rewarding and numerous.

What is first of all remarkable, I believe, is the aptitude of American society to merge into a single unit the most diverse contributions come from afar and particularly from the banks of the old Europe. Your history is like no other in that respect, to have transplanted so many human contributions, lin-

guistic and religious contributions—so dissimilar—into a community which is so extraordinarily original, without precedent, without equivalent in any other part of the world.

The American adventure is also a way to define new relationships between man and nature. From the scouts and the pioneers who went West, to the conquerors of the moon, it is always the same challenge cast by every succeeding generation. It is also the birth of a new system of relationships between man and the coming into being of a genuine democracy which regardless of the scope of its contradictions and its problems have always preserved its main balance and has always offered to the world as a mirror, sometimes casting a deformed picture, but always an enlightening one, of trans-intentions which come to be such a course of upheaval as we near the end of the century throughout all our societies.

The history of the United States is universal scope, Mr. President, and it has been very aptly said that it is the common property of any man who wishes to be contemporaneous with his own time and who questions himself about the future of mankind. The United States has also shown man in a most fruitful way—the entire scope of his creative genius and his faculty to transform and enrich the natural bounties of the soil and the subsoil. Few countries, without any doubt, have as much and as many different resources as your country, Mr. President, but it still needs to develop these phenomenal resources in the most rational way possible, to put them at the service of the community. The fact that today the United States is the first industrial power in the world—at the same time from the standard of value and quantity as technological perfection, individual productivity, and invested capital—this fact is not due to chance.

Nowhere has the faculty to develop, produce, invent, and multiply been so effective, so rapid; and this variety is present nowhere else in the world. No other country has produced more business leaders; no country has

obtained such a standard of living.

To have been the first to conquer the atom and then space shows very eloquently the high degree and the capacity for renewal of American science, technology, and economy. This phenomenal progression does not go without its equilibriums and constraints. And this is not specifically part of your history alone; you are not the only ones today to attempt to resolve the delicate problem of equilibrium within growth, but perhaps—and this is also one of your main strengths—you are the first to have confronted with so much rigor and lucidity problems as essential and timely as those of pollution, the quality of life, urbanization, and the preparation of your own future.

It would be a simplistic and an unfair view to limit your innovative capability—your capacity to go beyond your own efforts and to stimulate creative competitiveness—to reduce it only to material dimensions. One tends to forget too often that your thinkers, your writers, your filmmakers, your architects, have brought much to the world. New forms of expression in thought and sensitivity, a nation which gave to our movements of contemporaneous expression such key and diverse men as Mark Twain, Ernest Hemingway, John Ford, and Frank Lloyd Wright. That displays an intellectual vitality and a creative maturity which stand as an example.

As an example indeed is your entire history, which has also avoided the traps of solitude to seek an opening toward the world. Its main thrust is generous passions and deep love of freedom.

Your country, Mr. President, remains in this connection, for all men who love justice, the country which during a darker period of mankind's history did not hesitate to throw its phenomenal resources into a battle which on other continents sought to reestablish a more effective order of dignity for man's earth and to establish civilization, relationships no longer seeking as a justification racism and brute force.

And so you will understand why we feel so proud, Mr. President, to be again in your

country today and to pursue our quest, our fascinating quest, after your realities and your people.

There is a last reason which alone would be sufficient to give our meeting a great deal of significance and I will say this very simply: It is the assurance that I feel as I come to meet you that I discover one of the most significant figures of our time. Few statesmen have exerted such a deep and remarkable influence as you have, Mr. President, at this latter part of our century, on the disconcerting and tumultuous course of our history.

Having inherited a situation which the aftermath of the last war or ideological opposition had frozen in a balance of terror or an implacable conflict, you have in a few short years contributed in a decisive manner to rearrange the framework of international relations which have become accustomed to following exclusively a relationship based upon force and intolerances. Through specific measures, consistent and concrete, which display your courage, your realism, and your clear vision, you have enabled our world to regain part of the serenity it had lost, and you have enhanced the policy of comprehension, dialogue, and peace to which, as you know, we are so passionately attached.

Even more than the respected President of the most powerful nation, you are in the eyes of the people of the Ivory Coast, the shaper of a more harmonious world, the indefatigable apostle of the genuine consultations, and the generous initiator of peaceful confrontation.

To know this and to be aware of it matters to us, but to be able to say so in your own

Capital is a great and new comfort to us, Mr. President. If the Ivory Coast rejoices today so sincerely over our meeting, it is because it is aware that as a response to your friendly invitation it gives a very privileged character to moments that we should like to stretch in time the already beautiful and long history of our very cordial relations, receives a contribution, and also we bring a modest contribution to strengthening a climate of international concord, without which no undertaking of progress and justice appears possible.

As we begin a visit which will be important and fruitful for our common future, I should like to re-create our fruitful friendship and our very deep esteem. But it would be a betrayal of this friendship, esteem, and confidence, Mr. President, if before I conclude I did not share with you the very deep preoccupation I feel as a man, as a leader, as an African, in one word about the very serious problem in the Mideast.

Your action on behalf of peace, which is already so remarkable—and history will note your capital role—would remain incomplete if you did not succeed, acting with the leaders of the Soviet Union, not to impose, but to create and foster conditions for a just and durable peace in that part of the world where one should speak only of peace, love, and brotherhood.

I raise my glass to you, Mr. President, to you, Mrs. Nixon, and to the greatness and the prosperity of the American Nation, strengthening of the friendship between the United States and the Ivory Coast, international cooperation and brotherhood among man.

Commercial Relations With State-Controlled Economies

*Address by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

I was very pleased to accept David Packard's invitation to talk to you this morning about our commercial relations with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the other state-controlled economies.

The most striking thing about our trade with Communist countries is the sizable trade surplus we are running and can expect to maintain. By the end of 1973, U.S. trade with these countries will approach \$3.5 billion, compared with last year's \$1.2 billion. The trade balance will be about 4 to 1 in our favor, giving us a surplus of \$2 billion. This has made a major contribution to working our way out of the enormous trade and payments deficit we sustained last year.

I hope that what I have to say will help all of us meet the challenge of keeping this trade expanding. It may be of even greater fundamental importance to think hard about how we should adapt our economic policies and your business planning to the fact that these two huge markets, with their cheap energy, rich resources, and intelligent work forces, may be ready to take full participating membership in the world economic community.

Trade with the People's Republic of China is moving very much more rapidly than any of us expected. At the beginning of the year we were predicting that we would export between \$250 million and \$300 million this year. It is more likely to turn out to be \$800 million.

The previous attitudes of the People's Republic had led us to believe that they would try to keep their imports reasonably in line with their exports on a bilateral basis. It now looks as though our favorable trade balance with the P.R.C. will be somewhere in the area of 14 to 1.

When you analyze our exports, you find that \$650 million is in grain, cotton, and soybeans. The large grain figure arises from a poor harvest, and it is not likely to hold. China had previously been an exporter of soybeans and with good weather is likely to restore itself to that position. Their interest in cotton, on the other hand, is likely to grow, and some analysts see them absorbing as much as a quarter of the U.S. cotton crop.

Apart from agricultural products, half of the balance will be in large passenger aircraft and parts. Other significant items will be in artificial fibers, communications equipment, scientific testing equipment, and chemical fertilizer purchases.

Looking at the next two years, it seems likely that their reduced grain purchases will be more than offset by a series of whole-plant turnkey contracts. They just signed the first of these with an American company for three ammonia plants, running to \$70 million. They are big importers of fertilizer and have apparently made a decision to meet their own requirements as far as possible and in general to expand their chemical and petrochemical capacity. Turnkey plant contracts made with offshore subsidiaries of U.S. companies and foreign companies, buying much

¹ Made before the Business Council at Hot Springs, Va., on Oct. 13.

of the plant equipment and other components in the United States, now approach \$1 billion.

As we appraise their economic development plans, there will be major opportunities to sell roadbuilding, construction, and mining equipment and some petroleum equipment. They are engaged in an active geological program, but they do not yet appear to be willing to buy exploration services or to go into joint ventures with foreign companies.

Further Expansion of Trade With China

It is important to understand the great differences between the People's Republic and the Soviet Union in the structure of their economies and in their trade practices. Buying in the Soviet Union is highly centralized. The People's Republic is highly decentralized. There are really three economies in mainland China. There is a heavy industrial segment, primarily defense, which is centrally managed. There is a larger segment made up of other sectors of the economy which is planned and managed by the Provincial governments. Then there is the agricultural sector where decisions are made by 74,000 communes. The state trading corporations which do all the buying are themselves decentralized in their operation, and they bring in local communes or cooperatives and Provincial governments on buying decisions relevant to them.

For our trade with the People's Republic to expand further, it will in the long run be necessary for us to buy more from them. Tariff discrimination against exports from the People's Republic is more severe than in the case of the Soviet Union because of the way the character of their export potential meshes with our tariff structure. On top of this they are handicapped by lack of familiarity with our market. For example, they do not want to give wholesale discounts, and we have to educate them about labeling, FDA [Food and Drug Administration], and inspection requirements as well as the structure of our distribution apparatus. This is the task to which the U.S.-China Business

Council, which Don Burnham chairs, can contribute substantially.

Opportunities in Eastern Europe

Secretary [of Commerce Frederick B.] Dent has just returned from an official visit to Poland, Hungary, and, together with Secretary [of the Treasury George P.] Shultz and myself, to Yugoslavia. These countries have an avid desire for American machinery and technology. They have ambitious development programs and are counting heavily on American equipment.

I was particularly impressed with the opportunities offered by the "creeping capitalism" which characterizes the Yugoslav economy. Their state and cooperative entities now have some 80 joint ventures with Western firms. Of these, seven are American firms, the latest one involving a \$17 million investment. In our discussions there we were told that restrictions on the repatriation of earnings, which have made joint ventures there of limited attraction to American firms, are about to be liberalized. We were also told that they would hope to eliminate 60 percent of their import controls before the end of 1974.

Yugoslav exports to the United States have been growing much more rapidly than their purchases from the United States. We are hoping that one contract involving over \$100 million is about to break our way. They are aware of this and seem ready to encourage expansion of their imports from the United States.

We have made a lot of progress in improving our share of the Soviet market. Prior to 1972 the U.S. share of Soviet contracts for Western plant and equipment was 5 percent or less. U.S. firms are now getting 20 percent of Soviet contracts for plant and equipment. Of total foreign purchases of about \$3 billion the Soviet Union has placed \$600 million in contracts with the United States since the beginning of 1972. This makes the United States second only to Germany among the major Western sources of technology and equipment.

I think this is a remarkable achievement

when we stop to think that Germany, France, Britain, and Japan have been working intensively on the Soviet market for almost 10 years and have the advantages of geographic proximity, a longer record of previous dealings, frequently a greater flexibility in being able to accept barter deals, and so on. We are now on reasonably even terms in credit and have the advantage of Soviet respect for U.S. technology and know-how. Competition in prices of course is important, but United States firms have won Soviet contracts at higher prices on the basis of their willingness to compete on a turnkey basis including performance guarantees, which seem to be particularly important to Soviet bureaucracy.

Cooperative Ventures in the U.S.S.R.

When General Secretary [Leonid I.] Brezhnev was in Washington a few months ago and when he talked to our U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission in Moscow last week, he stated there were virtually unlimited possibilities for economic cooperation but emphasized that the major possibilities will be outside the traditional patterns of trade. The Soviets take the view that buying and selling, the traditional forms of trade, are becoming increasingly less important. They point out that textiles, clothing, and other consumer goods make up a smaller percentage of trade and that price and other advantages which one country or another may have in these consumer goods is fleeting in character. All developed countries have some access to new techniques. Different countries have different needs and different types of natural resources to develop. This presents the opportunity for development projects along cooperative lines.

It is clear that the Soviets have decided that the way to accelerate their economic development is to acquire technology, capital, and management skills from American, European, and Japanese corporations by giving them the opportunity to work on the large ore and gas deposits and great forest resources which exist within the Soviet Union.

Beyond that, they seem prepared to offer

opportunities to build production facilities which have high energy needs near their hydroelectric plants, which can provide cheap energy and to which accessible and cheap raw material can be easily brought. Our companies are there and, with the Japanese, are looking into huge oil and gas pipeline projects. The Japanese are there looking at large timber, coal, and ore prospects.

Soviet economic planning, their internal needs, and their export aspirations seem likely to provide opportunities to participate in new aluminum, ferroalloy, and petrochemical facilities in Siberia. In these operations electric power can run from 10 percent to as high as 20 percent, in the case of aluminum, of total production costs. As energy costs elsewhere in the world rise, the huge hydroelectric plants in east Siberia with large amounts of unused capacity for producing low-cost power can provide a critical competitive edge in manufacturing operations which are energy intensive. This advantage can be compounded where manufacturing facilities in other countries have to rely on imports of raw materials which are readily available in the Soviet Union.

Obviously, there are competitive considerations here which need very careful study and thought. Particularly in the energy field, the price, supply, and other advantages to our economy should be such that the capital could not be more advantageously used in developing our own energy sources. The Soviets seem likely to be influenced to provide attractive economic terms by their desire to acquire technology and to develop a foreign exchange earning capacity to permit continued purchases from the West.

These projects can have several advantages from our viewpoint. They could provide us with long-term supplies of energy and raw materials to replace depleted domestic sources. They would require massive exports of American capital equipment. The product which would constitute repayment for that equipment would on the whole compete with imports from other sources more than with domestic production. And the close involve-

ment of American industry would provide some assurance of compatibility with domestic economic interests.

It is entirely reasonable to contemplate the possibility of an important commercial and economic relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. These are, after all, the world's two principal national economic entities. While there are differences in our economic systems, the direction of our mutual efforts for the last year and a half has been to develop a substantial economic relationship.

It is particularly important, however, that we, both government and business, understand the essential role of credit in our developing economic relations with the U.S.S.R. Sales of capital equipment to any country, East, West, or South, are conducted on the basis of medium- and long-term credits.

The President's decision last year to make normal export financing facilities of the Eximbank available in our trade with the U.S.S.R. has made our exports in this sector reasonably competitive with those of other Western suppliers.

These emerging economic relationships are inextricably intertwined with satisfactory political relationships. Recognizing this basic fact early in his administration, President Nixon set out first to assure a substantial degree of stability in political affairs. The guiding principle behind the normalization of economic relations with Communist countries has been that economic normalization is linked with progress toward the improvement of political relations. The pace of advancement in the economic sphere thus has been regulated by the pace of advancement in the political sphere.

Transnational Investment

We must recognize that to the extent these development opportunities in Siberia are economically sound, Japanese and European companies will be ready to take them on if we do not.

Indeed, to fully grasp the implications of the Soviet determination to seek partnership

with the West in developing its resources and exploiting its cheap energy and other economic advantages we must examine it in a broader context. Japan, in its five-year plan, has made a decision to encourage energy-intensive industries, polluting industries, and labor-intensive industries to move down south to other offshore islands and the Southeast Asian Peninsula. Germany recognizes that it has been able to increase its production sufficiently to pass the United States as the world's largest exporter of manufactured goods only by bringing in very large numbers of foreign workers from Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and other countries in southern Europe. They now recognize that they have gone about as far as they can in that direction and are beginning to seek further economic expansion by bringing plants to the workers rather than workers to their plants. As part of this, there is an intensified interest in direct investment in the United States.

The speed with which assembly lines and other manufacturing facilities can be picked up and moved today and the recognition by less developed countries that they can solve their job problems by attracting factories make the bringing of plants to workers an increasingly significant worldwide phenomenon. Over 50 electronic companies have been set up in less than two years in Malaysia, with employment going from zero to 8,000.

All this makes the role of the multinational corporations increasingly important to our economic balance and our political purposes in expanding channels of communications between nations and promoting the economic development of the poorer parts of the world. It makes more urgent our common task of expanding public understanding that blocking companies from operating offshore when and where they have to in order to compete will lose jobs and increase the cost of living. It also places an obligation on the leaders of those corporations to see that their commitment of capital, technology, and skills abroad does not shortchange the economic interests of the United States. It is, I believe, true that for the most part the economic interests of

companies and their stockholders in getting the maximum return for these assets parallel the Nation's interests and that proposals here and abroad to establish machinery to regulate multinational corporations, other than, of course, to require them to adhere to the laws of their domicile and of host countries, would be counterproductive. The United Nations, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], the European Community, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are all studying the need to establish greater controls over the multinational corporations, and there is a continuing need to correctly analyze and explain how these transnational carriers of training and education, of capital and technology, of experience and skill, contribute to peace and prosperity on a worldwide basis.

Department Establishes Office for Law of the Sea Negotiations

The Department of State announced on September 18 (press release 334) that under the direction of the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, an office (D/LOS) has been established to supervise and coordinate matters relating to the law of the sea negotiations. D/LOS has action responsibility within the Department for matters relating to the law of the sea negotiations. It will also coordinate these matters within the executive branch and will have interagency participation. In conjunction with the Bureaus of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs, D/LOS will be responsible for liaison with the Congress and interested public. D/LOS will act as the interagency backstopping mechanism for the law of the sea negotiations.

D/LOS accommodates the Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference, John R. Stevenson, and the Chairman of the NSC Interagency Task Force on Law of the Sea and its Executive

Group, John Norton Moore. Both Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. Moore report directly to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee.

U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for Travel to Certain Areas

Following are the texts of three public notices which were published in the Federal Register on September 14.

Public Notice 398¹

TRAVEL INTO OR THROUGH CUBA

Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), use of U.S. passports for travel into or through Cuba remains restricted. To permit unrestricted travel would be incompatible with the resolutions adopted at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member. At this meeting, held in Washington from July 21 to 26, 1964, it was resolved that the governments of the American States not maintain diplomatic, consular, trade or shipping relations with Cuba under its present government. This resolution was reaffirmed in the Twelfth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS held in September 1967, which adopted resolutions calling upon Member States to apply strictly the recommendations pertaining to the movement of funds and arms from Cuba to other American nations. Among other things, this policy of isolating Cuba was intended to minimize the capability of the Castro government to carry out its openly proclaimed programs of subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into or through Cuba unless specifically validated for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.

This public notice shall expire on September 14, 1974 unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Effective date.—This notice becomes effective on September 14, 1973.

Dated August 31, 1973.

[SEAL]

KENNETH RUSH,
Acting Secretary of State.

¹ 38 Fed. Reg. 25705.

Public Notice 399¹

TRAVEL INTO OR THROUGH NORTH KOREA

Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), use of U.S. passports for travel into or through North Korea remains restricted. In view of the continued hostility of the North Korean regime toward the United States, the unsettled situation along the Military Demarcation Line, and the special position of the Government of the Republic of Korea which is recognized by the U.S. as well as by U.N. resolution as the only lawful government in Korea, the Department of State believes that wholly unrestricted travel by American citizens to North Korea would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into or through North Korea unless specifically validated for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.

This public notice shall expire on September 13, 1974, unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Effective date.—This notice becomes effective on September 14, 1973.

Dated August 31, 1973.

[SEAL]

KENNETH RUSH,
Acting Secretary of State.

Public Notice 400¹

TRAVEL INTO OR THROUGH NORTH VIETNAM

Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), the use of U.S. passports for travel into or through North Vietnam remains restricted. In the aftermath of the signing on January 27, 1973, of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, tensions continue to be high and conditions unsettled in the Indo-China area. The Peace Agreement envisages that the implementation of the Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and North Vietnam. However, the development of such a new relationship

is still in its earliest stages. In these circumstances the Department of State believes that unrestricted travel by American citizens to North Vietnam would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into or through North Vietnam unless specifically validated for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.

This public notice shall expire on September 14, 1974, unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Effective date.—This notice becomes effective on September 13, 1973.

Dated August 31, 1973.

[SEAL]

KENNETH RUSH,
Acting Secretary of State.

Military Sales Credit Authorized for Peru

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION NO. 74-4¹

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION—PERU

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 20, 1973.

In accordance with the recommendation in the Acting Secretary's memorandum of July 20, 1973, I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, that the extension of credit to the Government of Peru, in connection with the sale of F-5 military aircraft, is important to the national security of the United States.

You are hereby requested on my behalf to report this determination to the Congress as required by law.

This determination shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.



¹ 38 Fed Reg. 25705.

¹ 38 Fed. Reg. 27811.

A Comprehensive Approach to Worldwide Problems of Food Shortages and Malnutrition

Following is a statement submitted to the Subcommittees on African Affairs and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 5 by Maurice J. Williams, Acting Administrator of the Agency for International Development and the President's Special Relief Coordinator for Major Disasters Abroad.¹

AID press release 73-73 dated October 5

Events of the last several months have brought home more sharply than ever before one simple central fact. All of us in the world live out of the same food basket. A major drought in Asia affects supplies throughout the world. Rising prices make it difficult for poor countries to import essential food. All countries must work to meet the hunger and malnutrition resulting from natural disasters. A bad harvest of Peruvian anchovies can tip the balance between a healthy export market for U.S. soybeans and a necessity to disappoint our best overseas customers for our farm products. We all have good reason to be concerned about the future of this world food basket.

World cereal and protein consumption has been running slightly ahead of food production in recent years. Our food reserve margins now are close—too close for comfort or complacency.

In this period of reduced food supply and rapidly rising demand, the United States has held open the door of its granary. Commer-

cial exports of grains are at record level, and Public Law 480 programs are continuing, although on a drastically reduced scale.

In a situation of short supply and high prices, the less developed countries (LDC's) who must import grain for essential needs are at a particular disadvantage. In some cases, because of natural disaster or economic difficulties of long standing, they are dependent on donations or concessional sales from the United States and other food-exporting nations. For others, even though able to purchase grains commercially, the present high prices constitute a significant drain on foreign exchange and budget resources. For them grain supplies for their people at basic sustenance levels are a political and economic necessity.

U.S. Food Assistance

The current Food for Peace legislation requires that commodities shipped under the concessional sales and donation programs be in excess of the amounts required for domestic consumption, adequate carryover of stocks, and anticipated sales for dollars, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. For these reasons, the amount of commodities made available for Food for Peace in fiscal year 1974 is likely to be only half of the amount shipped in FY 1973. We have had to drastically curtail P.L. 480 programs in many other developing countries.

Even with a cut of this magnitude, the importance of continuing humanitarian food programs is fully recognized. The United States continues to be the principal contribu-

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

tor to the World Food Program, sponsored jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations. The U.S. pledge for the 1973-74 biennium is \$136 million—in commodities and freight, cash contribution, and shipping costs. The commodity portion is charged to title II of P.L. 480. We expect to fulfill the present pledge.

The United States is also signatory to the Food Aid Convention of 1971. By that convention it is committed to donate or sell concessionally a minimum of 1,890,000 metric tons of wheat and coarse grains in fiscal years 1972, 1973, and 1974. We have met and will continue meeting that commitment.

Donations of food to U.S. voluntary agencies for their overseas distribution programs to the needy are also continuing. While some reductions in the volume of food donations must be made, the voluntary agencies are cooperating in focusing the use of available supplies to help the most nutritionally vulnerable groups—in maternal/child health programs, preschool and primary school feeding. And to upgrade the nutritional quality of the food, we are continuing to put strong emphasis on the use of high-protein blended and fortified foods, such as corn-soya blend, wheat-soya blend, and soy-fortified flour and bulgur.

Food for Peace commodities will continue to be made available for drought relief in the Sahelian zone of Africa. The United States has been by far the largest single donor of food to the Sahel—about 40 percent of the amount pledged so far. Under the leadership of the FAO, a survey of food needs for the months ahead is nearing completion. The United States will continue to participate in the international effort to help the drought victims.

In the case of Pakistan, the President recently announced that 100,000 tons of wheat would be made available as part of our assistance following the disastrous floods. We cannot, however, meet all of Pakistan's needs for grain on concessional terms. In response to U.N. requests, the United States has contributed about half of

all the grain which will be supplied to Bangladesh during this calendar year. We are also meeting the minimum essential food requirements of south Indochina.

The situation we face this year points up the great importance of the Food for Peace program in our relations with developing countries. Food for Peace enables the United States to carry out its longstanding tradition of humanitarian assistance to the needy, to provide help in time of disaster, and to boost the efforts of less developed countries to help themselves. I fervently hope that Secretary [of Agriculture Earl L.] Butz' drive to maximize U.S. farm production next year is so successful that Food for Peace can be fully restored. It is of utmost importance that the continuing need for food aid be fully a part of our agricultural policy.

Joint International Action Required

The current situation also points up the need for a coordinated approach with other donors and major food producers. In 1972 the United States provided 75 percent of all bilateral and multilateral food aid. The world food problem requires a joint review with other donors, both major cereal and non-cereal producers, to analyze (a) world food demands, (b) the overall supply situation, and (c) the need and provision of concessional food aid and other means to address the food problem, including more assistance to agricultural production.

As a first step in achieving joint action, the Secretary of State has proposed that the United Nations call a World Food Conference in 1974 to consider ways to maintain adequate food supplies and harness the efforts of all nations to meet hunger.

The less developed nations have made rapid progress in agricultural production, but more needs to be done in relation to their needs. Since 1955 agricultural production in the LDC's has increased some 62 percent. This is in fact a more rapid rate of growth than the developed countries, which increased production 51 percent,

achieved during the same period. However, per capita agricultural output in the LDC's only increased 3 percent during the same period. Hence, food production in these countries is just holding its own against population growth. These countries remain, therefore, close to the edge of malnutrition and hunger—dependent increasingly on imports and on the world's stocks when an emergency arises.

In the years ahead appropriately directed economic and technical assistance for agriculture in the developing countries will be the difference between adequate food and nutrition or mass starvation in many areas. U.S. economic assistance is primarily directed to agricultural and family planning problems.

Research To Increase Crop Yields

With very little new land to develop, food production increases must come from higher yields of land already in farming. This requires new farming technologies, new farming methods, new institutional capabilities, and usually new governmental policy approaches.

We all know of the new wheat, rice, and corn varieties that scientists have developed in the last several years. Led largely by American scientists and supported by work in our universities and Department of Agriculture, an International Research Center in Mexico has made basic genetic improvements in the spring wheats of the type grown widely in the tropics. These varieties have been adapted to local conditions by additional work done locally in several Asian countries, often with American scientific help and in research institutions we helped to build. The same thing has been done with rice through an International Research Center located in the Philippines. Other international centers are working on other crops and livestock. American universities are collaborating with these centers and are themselves taking the lead on similar efforts with sorghum, winter wheat, soybeans, and

livestock, as well as basic research on soil and water management. The United States contributes to all phases of these research efforts through the foreign aid program.

Of the 12 less developed Asian countries for which comparable data are available, the six which led the way in the shift to new varieties increased total rice production almost 40 percent in the last six years. The six which made the least such changes increased total rice production only about 11 percent—nearly a 4 to 1 difference.

For wheat the difference was even more dramatic. The top four countries in the rate of adoption of new wheat varieties more than doubled total wheat production in six years. This is an astounding accomplishment. The remaining 10 countries, which made only minor shifts toward the new technologies, increased their total production only some 12 percent. In other words, countries which shifted heavily to new varieties and the necessary related technological improvements increased their total wheat production some nine times as much as did those which did not make these changes.

Benefits of Collaborative Research

Important total production increases have been limited essentially to those crops on which substantial scientific research and development have taken place on an organized worldwide basis and to those countries where the results of this research have been vigorously incorporated into public and private action.

This progress is due in large part to the fact that we, other donor countries, and the developing countries have really begun to learn how to work together under close collaborative research and development arrangements to tackle the central problems of food production, nutrition, and human reproduction. We have learned that unorganized bits and pieces of effort carried out in many places seldom carry us far. But the same effort, when put to work in a systematic mutually supporting way, gets results. The

arrangements are supported by the self-interest of the participating countries, who are learning that this is the only way to solve their own problems. The United States finances only a small fraction of the cost, but it provides the impetus and often the central scientific skill essential to the success of the entire enterprise.

As with the other participants, we are direct beneficiaries of these organized research and development efforts. Often the feedback of this research to American agriculture far exceeds its cost. Plant and animal disease resistance factors discovered overseas are priceless to us when the disease breaks out here. High-protein cereals developed through these efforts can contribute importantly to the diets of our poorest people and should bring down the cost of animal feed rations—a great need at the present time, as we all know.

Immediately before us is the task of broadening the base of agricultural production increases, both in the number of crops and of countries making rapid production increases. Fortunately, the background work for much of this is well underway. You may have read in last weekend's press of a plant-breeding "breakthrough" by Purdue University in radically increasing, by at least 300 percent, the human nutritional value of sorghum. We are at almost this same point of accomplishment in improving nutritional values of wheat, through a research project led by the University of Nebraska, collaborating with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the International Research Center in Mexico, and some 35 or more LDC's.

The Canadians are taking the lead, under similar collaborative arrangements, in work on the root crop "manioc"—often called cassava or a half-dozen other names—a crop grown largely, also, by very poor people on over-poor lands.

All this means, to me, that we are on the right track and that there is much reason for optimism regarding the medium and long term, if we persevere in our economic assistance efforts.

The availability of a scientific and techno-

logical base for rapid agricultural production increases by no means assures that individual farmers, or countries, will have the institutions and resources to translate these technical possibilities into production performance.

New technological potentialities do not take root unless certain requisite institutional capabilities exist in the country, unless adequate numbers of skilled personnel are available to guide the process and a competent citizenry exists to put it to work on the farms and throughout the distributional system, and unless the capital is available so the farmer can buy fertilizer and other essential production inputs.

The congressional initiatives to focus the bilateral economic aid program more directly on the problems of food production, rural development, and population are an important step in the right direction, but the resources must be adequate to the task before us. We need the economic assistance tools if research is to continue and the needed production increases in the poor countries are to be realized.

Additionally, the extraordinary disasters of the Sahel and Pakistan have put large demands on economic assistance resources which had not been foreseen.

In closing I want to emphasize the importance of moving on all these fronts:

—We need adequate concessional food supplies to meet the immediate needs of the developing world which press against basic subsistence levels;

—We need better mechanisms for international cooperation to assure adequate world stocks and to harness the efforts of all nations to meet the problems of hunger and malnutrition; and

—We need to expand our research and development efforts in agriculture and related areas to accelerate production increases in the less developed countries.

Only with a comprehensive approach to these problems can we stave off continuing hunger and malnutrition and recurring food crises in the world.

U.S.-Paraguay Extradition Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Nixon¹

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the Republic of Paraguay, signed at Asuncion on May 24, 1973. I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

The Treaty significantly updates the extradition relations between the United States and Paraguay and adds to the list of extraditable offenses narcotics offenses, including those involving psychotropic drugs, and aircraft hijacking.

This Treaty will make a significant contribution to the international effort to control narcotics traffic. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 12, 1973.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Authorizing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1974, for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Active-Duty and Reserve Strength, Military Training Student Loads, and for Other Purposes. Report, together with additional views, to accompany H.R. 9286. H. Rept. 93-383. July 18, 1973. 150 pp.

Mutual Development and Cooperation Act of 1973. Report, together with minority and additional views, to accompany H.R. 9360. H. Rept. 93-388. July 20, 1973. 106 pp.

¹ Transmitted on Sept. 12; for texts of the treaty and the report of the Department of State, see S. Ex. S, 93d Cong., 1st sess.

Amending the International Economic Policy Act of 1972. Conference report to accompany S. 1636. H. Rept. 93-389. July 23, 1973. 4 pp.

Prohibition of Intervention in Foreign Political Affairs. Report to accompany S. 2239. S. Rept. 93-343. July 24, 1973. 3 pp.

Amendment to Article 61 of the Charter of the United Nations. Report to accompany Ex. L, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-9. July 26, 1973. 4 pp.

Providing for the Appointment of Alternates for the Governors of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Report to accompany S. 1887. S. Rept. 93-350. July 26, 1973. 3 pp.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES

1972 Report of Advisory Committee on the "Foreign Relations" Series

The Advisory Committee on "Foreign Relations of the United States" is to meet November 9. Following is the text of the report of the Advisory Committee on its meeting held at the Department on November 3, 1972.

I

In 1972, publication of volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* reached an all-time high since founding of the series in 1861. A total of eleven volumes appeared, virtually completing the series through the year 1947. Moreover, plans for 1973 call for continuance of this phenomenal rate. The scheduled publication of eleven more volumes in 1973 would bring the series through 1948 and into 1949. The Advisory Committee is most gratified at this development, for in its last several reports the Committee had called attention to the increasing slippage, the widening time gap, between the occurrence of diplomatic events and the appearance of the corresponding volume of *Foreign Relations*. Indeed, the gap had cracked the 25-year mark. The Committee realizes that the reversal of this trend required broad concurrence in assigning a higher priority and increased funds to the *Foreign Relations* series. *The Committee wishes therefore to express commendation to all concerned, officials within the Department of State, the President's Office, and the Congress, for their recognition of the need for greater support of "Foreign Relations"*

and to the Historical Office of the Department of State for demonstrating in convincing manner that increased support was amply justified.

II

On March 8, 1972, the President in a memorandum to the Secretary of State called for acceleration of publication of *Foreign Relations* so as to reduce the time-span lag to 20 years within a 3-year period.¹ Or, phrased somewhat differently, to publish '56 in '76. From the materials presented by the Historical Office to the Committee it emerged that the Historical Office might be able to complete the compilation of '56 by '76 but that the present schedule does not provide for the publication of the volumes for 1956 by 1976. The Committee would be less than candid if it suppressed its feeling of dismay at this development. To play catch-up in anything is difficult, so the Committee understands. But once momentum in that direction is gained, it would be most unwise, the Committee believes, to allow it to dissipate. *The Committee therefore urges that the publication schedule for "Foreign Relations" be reviewed so as to achieve the goal of '56 in '76, and that every effort within the Historical Office and full assistance from without be dedicated to this end.* Return to the 20-year rule for *Foreign Relations* would be a fitting accomplishment to record in the Bicentennial Year of this Nation.

III

Essential to timely publication of *Foreign Relations* is a speedy and effective documentary declassification process. Declassification has always presented many problems, but these have become vastly complicated since World War II. The process has taken on multilateral dimensions, involving not only the Department of State, but also the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council among others. The President in his memorandum of March 8, 1972 recognized the complex and multilateral nature of declassification when he instructed the above-mentioned agencies to cooperate fully with the Secretary of State in collecting and declassifying materials. As *Foreign Relations* moves into the 1950s, it is unlikely that the cooperative process will resolve all problems of declassification. It is also imperative that acceleration of the publication of *Foreign Relations* continue, "without impairing," as the President has stated, "the quality and comprehensive nature of the series." *The Committee therefore suggests that on occasions when cooperation fails to resolve matters of declassification, the Secretary of State be empowered to frame specific recommendations and that his recommendations be given substantial weight in the resolution of the*

matter. Many signs point to significant changes of direction in the course of this Nation's foreign affairs from that set by events of the late 1940s and early 1950s. A new generation of Americans will be called upon to live with these new directions, to understand and to guide them. For these tasks, the record of the immediate post-World War II decade is essential.

IV

In its past several reports, the Committee has voiced concern over discontinuance of the series *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*. And in its report for 1971, the Committee endorsed a suggestion emanating from the President's Office that "crisis volumes" might be prepared and issued well before those "crisis" events would be covered in *Foreign Relations* in the normal course. The Committee expresses its disappointment that little progress along either line is evident. Obstacles appear to be of different orders, however. In the case of *Current Documents*, lack of funding seems the main problem. In this respect, the Committee observes that the additional funding required is most modest indeed, given the current scale of public spending generally. In the case of "crisis volumes," it appears that compilation within the Historical Office of a pilot volume proved possible, but clearance did not. Obviously, declassification (a matter spoken to in Section III of this report) was involved, as was also general governmental documentary and informational policy (matters to be spoken to in Sections V and VI below). *The Committee repeats its recommendation that the program to publish "crisis volumes" be effectively carried out.*

V

On March 8, 1972, the President signed an Executive Order relating to declassification of and access to government documents. The Committee took note of the possibility that the limitations of this Executive Order might not be widely understood, and expectations might be raised, especially within the scholarly community, that could not be fulfilled. *The Committee therefore suggests that wide publicity be given to the limitations and other features (such as the 30-year rule) of the Executive Order.*

VI

During and since World War II, the amount of documentation produced in the course of conduct of this Nation's foreign relations has increased by astronomical leaps. This vast body of recent diplomatic documents together with archives from the Nation's beginnings constitutes a true national heritage. It behooves all concerned to treat this archival resource as a national trust, insuring to the citizenry for their enlightenment adequate preservation of and ready access to this national treasure. As to ready access, we are past the threshold of electronic developments whereby a document prop-

¹ For text of the memorandum, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1972, p. 519.

erly housed in Washington could be made instantly available to the researcher or concerned citizen in virtually any part of these United States. *The Committee therefore recommends that immediate consideration be focused on the development of plans and systems whereby diplomatic documents may become available through electronic means in all regions of the country.* The costs of a national electronic retrieval system would undoubtedly be high. But the Committee is convinced that they would pale in the light of the benefits to be obtained. Perhaps the greatest catastrophe of our civilization, so it is sometimes said, was the burning of the library at Alexandria. The burial of this Nation's documentary archives could produce a creeping catastrophe of much the same scale. Let us not repeat the intellectual vandalism of an earlier millennium by substituting the tomb for the torch.

DAVID R. DEENER,	<i>American Society of</i>
Chairman	<i>International Law</i>
ALWYN V. FREEMAN	
WALTER LAFEBER	<i>American Historical</i>
ARMIN H. RAPPAPORT	<i>Association</i>
PAUL A. VARG	
RICHARD C. SNYDER	<i>American Political</i>
H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD	<i>Science Association</i>

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Jamaica Sign Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on September 27 (press release 350) that the arrangement between the United States and Jamaica concerning exports of Jamaican cotton textiles to the United States had been extended September 26 for one year from October 1, 1973, by exchange of notes at Washington. The level specified in the exchange of notes to which Jamaica will restrain its cotton textile exports to the United States during this period is 30,134,550 square yards equivalent. This represents a 5 percent increase over the level specified for the previous arrangement year. (For texts of the U.S. and Jamaican notes, see press release 350.)

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668.

Acceptance deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, October 18, 1973.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

Accession deposited: Lebanon, August 10, 1973.

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6584). Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973.

Acceptances deposited: Ecuador, Uganda, September 13, 1973; Sweden, September 17, 1973; Guatemala, September 20, 1973; Brazil, September 21, 1973; Rwanda, September 22, 1973; Indonesia, Nicaragua, September 25, 1973; Czechoslovakia, Ivory Coast, September 26, 1973; Bolivia, El Salvador, Madagascar, Peru, Portugal, September 27, 1973; Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, United Kingdom, Venezuela, September 28, 1973; Zaïre, September 29, 1973; Burundi, Congo, Dahomey, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Liberia, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, September 30, 1973.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Accession deposited: Guyana, September 13, 1973.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Thailand, September 20, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543),

as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1, 1949; for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Tonga, September 5, 1973.

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Tonga, September 5, 1973.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.¹

Accession deposited: Tonga, September 5, 1973.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973.²

Ratification deposited: Mexico, September 11, 1973.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Gabon, August 28, 1973.

BILATERAL

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of June 29, 1971, concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

25 and 26, 1973. Entered into force September 26, 1973.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement of May 6, 1970, as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 12, 1973. Entered into force October 12, 1973.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 6, 1970, as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles to exempt hand-loom products of the cottage industry. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 12, 1973. Entered into force October 12, 1973.

Poland

Agreement relating to port access procedures. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw September 27, 1973. Entered into force September 27, 1973.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on October 12 confirmed the following nominations:

Henry A. Byroade to be Ambassador to Pakistan.

Daniel Parker to be Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

Stanley R. Resor, U.S. Representative for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations, for the rank of Ambassador.

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*383	10/16	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, Oct. 24.
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* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

President Nixon's News Conference of October 26

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon in the East Room at the White House on October 26.¹

Ladies and gentlemen: Before going to your questions, I have a statement with regard to the Mideast which I think will anticipate some of the questions because this will update the information which is breaking rather fast in that area, as you know, for the past two days.

The cease-fire is holding. There have been some violations, but generally speaking, it can be said that it is holding at this time. As you know, as a result of the U.N. resolution which was agreed to yesterday by a vote of 14 to 0, a peacekeeping force will go to the Mideast; and this force, however, will not include any forces from the major powers, including, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The question, however, has arisen as to whether observers from major powers could go to the Mideast. My up-to-the-minute report on that—and I just talked to Dr. Kissinger five minutes before coming down—is this: We will send observers to the Mideast if requested by the Secretary General of the United Nations, and we have reason to expect that we will receive such a request.

With regard to the peacekeeping force, I think it is important for all of you ladies and gentlemen, and particularly for those listening on radio and television, to know why the United States has insisted that major powers not be part of the peacekeeping force and that major powers not intro-

duce military forces into the Mideast. A very significant and potentially explosive crisis developed on Wednesday of this week. We obtained information which led us to believe that the Soviet Union was planning to send a very substantial force into the Mideast, a military force.

When I received that information, I ordered, shortly after midnight on Thursday morning, an alert for all American forces around the world. This was a precautionary alert. The purpose of that was to indicate to the Soviet Union that we could not accept any unilateral move on their part to move military forces into the Mideast.

At the same time, in the early morning hours, I also proceeded on the diplomatic front. In a message to Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party], an urgent message, I indicated to him our reasoning and I urged that we not proceed along that course and that, instead, that we join in the United Nations in supporting a resolution which would exclude any major powers from participating in a peacekeeping force.

As a result of that communication and the return that I received from Mr. Brezhnev—we had several exchanges, I should say—we reached the conclusion that we would jointly support the resolution which was adopted in the United Nations.

We now come, of course, to the critical time in terms of the future of the Mideast. And here the outlook is far more hopeful than what we have been through this past week. I think I could safely say that the chances for not just a cease-fire, which we presently have and which, of course, we have had in the Mideast for some time, but

¹ For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 29.

the outlook for a permanent peace is the best that it has been in 20 years.

The reason for this is that the two major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have agreed—this was one of the results of Dr. Kissinger's trip to Moscow—have agreed that we would participate in trying to expedite the talks between the parties involved. That does not mean that the two major powers will impose a settlement. It does mean, however, that we will use our influence with the nations in the area to expedite a settlement.

The reason we feel this is important is that first, from the standpoint of the nations in the Mideast, none of them—Israel, Egypt, Syria—none of them can or should go through the agony of another war.

The losses in this war on both sides have been very, very high. And the tragedy must not occur again. There have been four of these wars, as you ladies and gentlemen know, over the past 20 years. But beyond that, it is vitally important to the peace of the world that this potential trouble spot, which is really one of the most potentially explosive areas in the world, that it not become an area in which the major powers come together in confrontation.

What the developments of this week should indicate to all of us is that the United States and the Soviet Union, who admittedly have very different objectives in the Mideast, have now agreed that it is not in their interest to have a confrontation there, a confrontation which might lead to a nuclear confrontation—and neither of the two major powers wants that.

We have agreed also that if we are to avoid that, it is necessary for us to use our influence more than we have in the past to get the negotiating track moving again, but this time moving to a conclusion, not simply a temporary truce but a permanent peace.

I do not mean to suggest that it is going to come quickly, because the parties involved are still rather far apart. But I do say that now there are greater incentives within the area to find a peaceful solution and there are

enormous incentives as far as the United States is concerned, and the Soviet Union and other major powers, to find such a solution.

Q. Mr. President, I wonder if you could share with us your thoughts, tell us what goes through your mind when you hear people, people who love this country, and people who believe in you, say reluctantly that perhaps you should resign or be impeached.

The President: Well, I am glad we don't take the vote of this room, let me say. And I understand the feelings of people with regard to impeachment and resignation. As a matter of fact, Mr. Rather [Dan Rather, CBS News], you may remember that when I made the rather difficult decision—I thought the most difficult decision of my first term—on December 18, [1972], the bombing by B-52's of North Viet-Nam, that exactly the same words were used on the networks—I don't mean by you, but they were quoted on the networks—that were used now: tyrant, dictator, he has lost his senses, he should resign, he should be impeached.

But I stuck it out, and as a result of that we not only got our prisoners of war home, as I have often said, on their feet rather than on their knees, but we brought peace to Viet-Nam, something we haven't had and didn't for over 12 years.

It was a hard decision, and it was one that many of my friends in the press who had consistently supported me on the war up to that time disagreed with.

Now, in this instance I realize there are people who feel that the actions that I have taken with regard to the dismissal of Mr. [Archibald] Cox are grounds for impeachment. I would respectfully suggest that even Mr. Cox and Mr. [Elliot L.] Richardson have agreed that the President had the right, constitutional right, to dismiss anybody in the Federal Government; and second, I should also point out that as far as the tapes are concerned, rather than being in defiance of

the law I am in compliance with the law.

As far as what goes through my mind, I would simply say that I intend to continue to carry out to the best of my ability the responsibilities I was elected to carry out last November.

The events of this past week—I know, for example, in your head office in New York, some thought that it was simply a blown-up exercise, there wasn't a real crisis. I wish it had been that. It was a real crisis. It was the most difficult crisis we have had since the Cuban confrontation of 1962.

But because we had had our initiative with the Soviet Union, because I had a basis of communication with Mr. Brezhnev, we not only avoided a confrontation, but we moved a great step forward toward real peace in the Mideast.

Now, as long as I can carry out that kind of responsibility, I am going to continue to do this job.

Q. Mr. President, getting back to the Middle East crisis for a moment, do you consider that the crisis is over now, and how much longer will the American forces be kept on alert around the world?

The President: With regard to the alert, the alert has already been discontinued with regard to NORAD, that is, the North American Command, and with regard to SAC. As far as other forces are concerned, they are being maintained in a state of readiness, and obviously, Soviet Union forces are being maintained in a state of readiness.

Now, as far as the crisis in the Mideast is concerned, I don't want to leave any impression that we aren't going to continue to have problems with regard to the cease-fire. There will be outbreaks because of the proximity of the antagonistic forces, and there will be some very, very tough negotiating in attempting to reach a diplomatic settlement. But I think now that all parties are going to approach this problem of trying to reach a settlement with a more sober and a more determined attitude than ever before, be-

cause the Mideast can't afford—Israel can't afford, Egypt can't afford, Syria can't afford—another war. The world cannot afford a war in that part of the world. And because the Soviet Union and the United States have potentially conflicting interests there, we both now realize that we cannot allow our differences in the Mideast to jeopardize even greater interests that we have, for example, in continuing a détente in Europe, in continuing the negotiations which can lead to a limitation of nuclear arms and eventually reducing the burden of nuclear arms, and in continuing in other ways that can contribute to the peace of the world.

As a matter of fact, I would suggest that with all of the criticism of détente, that without détente, we might have had a major conflict in the Middle East. With détente, we avoided it.

Q. Mr. President, a question from the electronic media related to the Middle East—

The President: Radio.

Q. Radio. I have heard that there was a meeting at the State Department this afternoon of major oil company executives on the fuel shortage. Whether or not you confirm that, has this confrontation in the Middle East caused a still more severe oil problem, and is there any thinking now of gasoline rationing?

The President: Well, we have contingency plans for gasoline rationing and so forth, which I hope never have to be put into place.

But with regard to the oil shortage, which you referred to, one of the major factors which gave enormous urgency to our efforts to settle this particular crisis was the potential of an oil cutoff.

Let me say that I have also noted that in the State Department or from the State Department today a statement raised a little difficulty in Europe, to the effect that our European friends hadn't been as cooperative as they might have been in attempting to help us work out the Middle East settlement

or at least the settlement to the extent that we have worked it out as of the resolution of yesterday.

I can only say on that score that Europe, which gets 80 percent of its oil from the Mideast, would have frozen to death this winter unless there had been a settlement and Japan, of course, is in that same position. The United States, of course, gets only approximately 10 percent of its oil from the Mideast.

What I am simply suggesting is this: that with regard to the fuel shortage potentially in the United States and in the world, it is indispensable at this time that we avoid any further Mideast crisis so that the flow of oil to Europe, to Japan, and to the United States can continue.

Q. Mr. President, against this background of détente, Mr. Brezhnev's note to you has been described as rough or perhaps brutal by one Senator. Can you characterize it for us and for history in any way?

The President: Yes, I could characterize it, but, Mr. Theis [J. William Theis, Hearst Newspapers], it wouldn't be in the national interest to do so. My notes to him he might characterize as being rather rough. However, I would rather—perhaps it would be best to characterize it. Rather than saying, Mr. Theis, that his note to me was rough and brutal, I would say that it was very firm and it left very little to the imagination as to what he intended.

And my response was also very firm and left little to the imagination of how we would react. And it is because he and I know each other and it is because we have had this personal contact that notes exchanged in that

way result in a settlement rather than a confrontation.

Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you a question about the Mideast. To what extent do you think your Watergate troubles influenced Soviet thinking about your ability to respond in the Mideast, and did your Watergate problems convince you that the United States needed a strong response in the Mideast to convince other nations that you have not been weakened?

The President: Well, I have noted speculation to the effect that the Watergate problems may have led the Soviet Union to miscalculate. I tend to disagree with that, however. I think Mr. Brezhnev probably can't quite understand how the President of the United States wouldn't be able to handle the Watergate problems. He would be able to handle it all right, if he had them. [Laughter.]

But I think what happens is that what Mr. Brezhnev does understand is the power of the United States. What he does know is the President of the United States. What he also knows is that the President of the United States, when he was under unmerciful assault at the time of Cambodia, at the time of May 8, [1972], when I ordered the bombing and the mining of North Viet-Nam, at the time of December 18, still went ahead and did what he thought was right; the fact that Mr. Brezhnev knew that regardless of the pressures at home, regardless of what people see and hear on television night after night, he would do what was right. That is what made Mr. Brezhnev act as he did.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of October 25

Press release 390 dated October 25

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I thought the most useful introduction to your questions would be a summary of events between October 6 and today so that you can evaluate our actions, the situation in which we find ourselves, and our future course.

The crisis for us started at 6 a.m. on October 6, when I was awakened with the information that another Arab-Israeli war was in progress. I mention this personal detail because it answers the question that the United States intervention prevented Israel from taking preemptive action. The United States made no demarche to either side before October 6, because all the intelligence at our disposal and all the intelligence given to us by foreign countries suggested that there was no possibility of the outbreak of a war. We had no reason to give any advice to any of the participants, because we did not believe—nor, may I say, did the Israeli Government—that an attack was imminent.

In the three hours between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m., we made major efforts to prevent the outbreak of the war by acting as an intermediary between the parties, of assuring each of them that the other one was—attempting to obtain the assurance of each side that the other one had no aggressive intention.

Before this process could be completed, however, war had broken out. And it started the process in which we are still engaged.

I do not think any useful purpose is served in reviewing every individual diplomatic move, but I thought it would be useful to indicate some of the basic principles we attempted to follow.

Throughout the crisis the President was convinced that we had two major problems:

first, to end hostilities as quickly as possible—but, secondly, to end hostilities in a manner that would enable us to make a major contribution to removing the conditions that have produced four wars between Arabs and Israelis in the last 25 years.

We were aware that there were many interested parties. There were, of course, the participants in the conflict—Egypt and Syria on the Arab side, aided by many other Arab countries; Israel on the other. There was the Soviet Union. There were the other permanent members of the Security Council. And, of course, there was the United States.

It was our view that the United States could be most effective in both the tasks outlined by the President—that is, of ending hostilities, as well as of making a contribution to a permanent peace in the Middle East—if we conducted ourselves so that we could remain in permanent contact with all of these elements in the equation.

Throughout the first week, we attempted to crystallize a consensus in the Security Council which would bring about a cease-fire on terms that the world community could support. We stated our basic principles on October 8. We did not submit them to a formal vote, because we realized that no majority was available and we did not want sides to be chosen prematurely. On October 10 the Soviet Union began an airlift, which began fairly moderately but which by October 12 had achieved fairly substantial levels.

Let me say a word here about our relationship with the Soviet Union throughout this crisis and what we have attempted to achieve. The United States and the Soviet Union are, of course, ideological and, to some extent, political adversaries. But the United States and the Soviet Union also have a very special

responsibility. We possess—each of us—nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity. We—both of us—have a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life. Both of us, sooner or later, will have to come to realize that the issues that divide the world today, and foreseeable issues, do not justify the unparalleled catastrophe that a nuclear war would represent. And therefore, in all our dealings with the Soviet Union, we have attempted to keep in mind and we have attempted to move them to a position in which this overriding interest that humanity shares with us is never lost sight of.

In a speech—*Pacem in Terris*—I pointed out that there are limits beyond which we cannot go. I stated that we will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance, either globally or regionally; that we would resist any attempt to exploit a policy of *détente* to weaken our alliances; and that we would react if the relaxations of tensions were used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots. We have followed these principles in the current situation.

It is easy to start confrontations, but in this age we have to know where we will be at the end and not only what pose to strike at the beginning.

Throughout the first week we attempted to bring about a moderation in the level of outside supplies that were introduced into the area and we attempted to work with the Soviet Union on a cease-fire resolution which would bring an end to the conflict.

This first attempt failed, on Saturday, October 13, for a variety of reasons—including, perhaps, a misassessment of the military situation by some of the participants. We were then faced with the inability to produce a Security Council resolution that would command a consensus, and the substantial introduction of arms by an outside power into the area. At this point, on Saturday, October 13, the President decided that the United States would have to start a resupply effort of its own. And the United States, from that time on, has engaged in maintaining the military

balance in the Middle East in order to bring about a negotiated settlement that we had sought.

Concurrently with this, we informed the Soviet Union that our interest in working out an acceptable solution still remained very strong and that as part of this solution we were prepared to discuss a mutual limitation of arms supply into the area.

In the days that followed, the Soviet Union and we discussed various approaches to this question, the basic difficulty being how to reconcile the Arab insistence on an immediate commitment to a return to the 1967 borders with Israeli insistence on secure boundaries and a negotiated outcome.

As you all know, on October 16, Prime Minister Kosygin went to Cairo to work on this problem with the leaders of Egypt. He returned to the Soviet Union on October 19.

We began exploring a new formula for ending the war that evening, though it was still unacceptable to us. And while we were still considering that formula, General Secretary Brezhnev sent an urgent request to President Nixon that I be sent to Moscow to conduct the negotiations in order to speed an end to hostilities that might be difficult to contain were they to continue.

The President agreed to Mr. Brezhnev's request, and as all of you know, I left for Moscow in the early morning of October 20.

We spent two days of very intense negotiations, and we developed a formula which we believe was acceptable to all of the parties and which we continue to believe represented a just solution to this tragic conflict.

The Security Council resolution had, as you all know, three parts. It called for an immediate cease-fire-in-place. It called for the immediate implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted in November 1967 and which states certain general principles on the basis of which peace should be achieved in the Middle East. And, thirdly, it called for negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices to bring about a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

This third point was the first international

commitment to negotiations between the parties in the Middle East conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union were prepared to offer their auspices, if this proved to be acceptable to the parties, to bring about and then to speed the process of negotiations. The United States continues to be ready to carry out this understanding. This, then, was the situation when I returned from Moscow and Tel Aviv on Monday evening.

Since then, events have taken the following turn. On the first day—that is, Tuesday—of the implementation of the cease-fire, there was a breakdown of the cease-fire which led to certain Israeli territorial gains. The United States supported a resolution which called on the participants to observe the cease-fire, to return to the places from which the fighting started, and to invite United Nations observers to observe the implementation of the cease-fire. This seemed to us a fair resolution.

In the last two days, the discussion in the Security Council and the communications that have been associated with it have taken a turn that seemed to us worrisome. We were increasingly confronted with a cascade of charges which were difficult to verify in the absence of United Nations observers and a demand for action that it was not within our power to take. There was a proposal, for example, that joint U.S. and Soviet military forces be introduced into the Middle East to bring about an observance of the cease-fire.

I would like to state on behalf of the President the United States position on this matter very clearly. The United States does not favor and will not approve the sending of a joint Soviet-United States force into the Middle East. The United States believes that what is needed in the Middle East above all is a determination of the facts, a determination where the lines are, and a determination of who is doing the shooting, so that the Security Council can take appropriate action. It is inconceivable that the forces of the great powers should be introduced in the numbers that would be necessary to overpower both of the participants. It is in-

conceivable that we should transplant the great-power rivalry into the Middle East or, alternatively, that we should impose a military condominium by the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States is even more opposed to the unilateral introduction by any great power, especially by any nuclear power, of military forces into the Middle East in whatever guise those forces should be introduced. And it is the ambiguity of some of the actions and communications and certain readiness measures that were observed that caused the President at a special meeting of the National Security Council last night, at 3 a.m., to order certain precautionary measures to be taken by the United States.

The United States position with respect to peace in the Middle East is as follows: The United States stands for a strict observance of the cease-fire as defined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on October 22. The United States will support and give all assistance and is willing to supply some personnel to a United Nations observer force whose responsibility it is to report to the Security Council about the violations of the cease-fire and which would have the responsibility, in addition, of aiding the parties in taking care of humanitarian and other concerns that are produced by the fact that on the Egyptian-Israeli front a series of enclaves exist in which demarcation is extremely difficult.

If the Security Council wishes, the United States is prepared to agree to an international force, provided it does not include any participants from the permanent members of the Security Council, to be introduced into the area as an additional guarantee of the cease-fire.

The United States is prepared to make a major effort to help speed a political solution which is just to all sides.

The United States recognizes that the conditions that produced the war on October 6 cannot be permitted to continue, and the United States, both bilaterally and unilaterally, is prepared to lend its diplomatic weight to a serious effort in the negotiating process

foreseen by paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 338.

We are therefore at a rather crucial point.

From many points of view, the chances for peace in the Middle East are quite promising.

Israel has experienced once more the trauma of war and has been given an opportunity for the negotiations it has sought for all of its existence, and it must be ready for the just and durable peace that the Security Council asks for.

The Arab nations have demonstrated their concern and have received international assurances that other countries will take an interest in these negotiations.

The Soviet Union is not threatened in any of its legitimate positions in the Middle East. The principles I mentioned earlier of the special responsibility of the great nuclear powers to strike a balance between their local interests and their global interest and their humane obligations remain.

And, seen in this perspective, none of the issues that are involved in the observance of the cease-fire would warrant unilateral action.

As for the United States, the President has stated repeatedly that this administration has no higher goal than to leave to its successors a world that is safer and more secure than the one we found. It is an obligation that any President, of whatever party, will have to discharge, and it is a responsibility which must be solved—if mankind is to survive—by the great nuclear countries at some point, before it is too late.

But we have always stated that it must be a peace with justice. The terms that have been agreed to in the United Nations provide an opportunity for the peoples of the Middle East to determine their own fate in consultation and negotiation—for the first time in 25 years.

This is an opportunity we are prepared to foster. It is an opportunity which is essential for this ravaged area and which is equally essential for the peace of the world. And it is an opportunity that the great

powers have no right to be permitted to miss.

Now I'll be glad to answer questions.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you go into a little more detail on the Soviet threat that caused the alerting of U.S. military elements last night? And also, if you could tell us if Ambassador Dobrynin [Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States] delivered you a brutal note, as described by Senator Jackson, on the Middle East situation?

Secretary Kissinger: Senator Jackson is a good friend of mine, but he does not participate in our deliberations.

I will not discuss the details of individual communications.

We became aware of the alerting of certain Soviet units, and we were puzzled by the behavior of some Soviet representatives in the discussions that took place.

We do not consider ourselves in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We do not believe it is necessary, at this moment, to have a confrontation. In fact, we are prepared to work cooperatively toward the realization of the objectives which we have set ourselves.

But cooperative action precludes unilateral action, and the President decided that it was essential that we make clear our attitude toward unilateral steps.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you were, early on, talking about the special responsibility of the two nuclear superpowers to avoid anything which would eliminate or incinerate humanity, you went on to say that there are limits beyond which we can't go. And among those, you said we would resist any attempt to exploit the détente in a manner to weaken others or weaken our allies—I didn't get that exactly, but you will recall what you said.

And what I want to know—what I wanted to ask you is whether you believe that the action of the Russians so far, particularly in departing from what you thought was an agreement, has gone to the point where it threatens exploitation of the détente to an adverse extent.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not yet prepared to make this judgment. We have to realize, of course, as I pointed out in my remarks, that the Soviet Union and we are in a very unique relationship. We are at one and the same time adversaries and partners in the preservation of peace.

As adversaries, we often find ourselves drawn into potential confrontations and each of us has friends that let themselves pursue objectives that may not be sought fully by either of us.

When we took the precautionary steps of which you are all aware, we did so because we thought there might be a possibility that matters might go beyond the limits which I have described. But we are not yet prepared to say that they have gone beyond these limits, and we believe that the possibility of moving in the direction that the Security Council had established earlier this week is still very real. And if the Security Council today were to pass a resolution that permitted the introduction of United Nations forces except those of the permanent members, the United States would feel that we are back on the road that had been charted earlier this week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the United States received a specific warning from the Soviet Union that it would send its forces unilaterally into the Middle East? Do you have intelligence that the Russians are preparing for such an action? The reason I raise these questions—as you know, there has been some line of speculation this morning that the American alert might have been prompted as much perhaps by American domestic requirements as by the real requirements of diplomacy in the Middle East. And I wonder if you could provide some additional information on that.

Secretary Kissinger: Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News], we are attempting to conduct the foreign policy of the United States with regard for what we owe not just to the electorate but to future generations. And it is a symptom of what is happening to our country that it could even be suggested that

the United States would alert its forces for domestic reasons.

We do not think it is wise at this moment to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges that prompted this decision. Upon the conclusion of the present diplomatic efforts, one way or the other, we will make the record available, and we will be able to go into greater detail. And I am absolutely confident that it will be seen that the President had no other choice as a responsible national leader.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you say, sir, why the United States feels that the permanent members of the Security Council should not send forces, although there is a chapter in the U.N. Charter, I believe, that calls upon all members of the U.N. to provide forces if called upon to do so.

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that the particular provision of the charter which you mentioned should be seen in the light of the particular circumstances. When you have a situation in which several of the permanent members may have conflicting interests, and when the presence of the forces of the permanent members may themselves contribute to the tension in the area, it seems to us the only possible course is to exclude the members—the forces of all permanent members.

It would be a disaster if the Middle East, already so torn by local rivalries, would now become, as a result of a U.N. decision, a legitimized theater for the competition of the military forces of the great nuclear powers.

And therefore it seemed to us that the political purposes would be best served if any international force that were introduced were composed of countries that have no possibility of themselves being drawn into rivalry as a result of being—

Q. Dr. Kissinger, it may seem obvious, but I would just like to ask you—is the purpose of the alert which is now going on to tell the Soviet Union that if they send forces into the Middle East we will do the same?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to specu-

late about what the President may decide to do in circumstances which we fervently hope will not arise. It would seem to us that to threaten all that has been achieved in the search for peace by unilateral action would be a step of irresponsibility that we do not believe is likely. And therefore I do not want to speculate what the United States would do if it should appear that instead of beginning an era of cooperation we were thrown back to the confrontations which sooner or later will have to be surmounted—because humanity cannot stand the eternal conflict of those who have the capacity to destroy it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Cairo Radio said that such an offer of Soviet troops for enforcing the cease-fire has been received from Moscow. Has such an offer been made, and if so, have the Soviet troops indeed been alerted and are they on the move?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not, of course, aware of the diplomatic exchanges that may go on between the Government of Egypt and the Government of the Soviet Union. We are also not aware of any Soviet forces that may have been introduced into Egypt. And we believe, and we will bend every effort in that direction, that any actions that are taken by any country in the Middle East will be within the framework of the Security Council and of United Nations decisions.

I want to repeat again: We do not now consider ourselves in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We continue to be prepared, and we believe it is entirely possible to maintain the direction that has brought us to this point and on which the peace of the world depends.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Soviet Union has threatened unilateral action and pushed this circumstance to the brink of confrontation? Do you see it possible that they saw the events of last weekend as having so weakened the President—he was threatened with impeachment—that they saw a target of opportunity and decided to move?

Secretary Kissinger: Speculation about motives is always dangerous. But one cannot

have crisis of authority in a society for a period of months without paying a price somewhere along the line.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, from a public standpoint, until this morning the public would have had the belief and the view that this crisis was in hand, that the cease-fire was taking hold. You have declined to discuss the diplomatic context of the specific communications. But was there prior to this latest sudden development any indication that this situation might go into such a direction?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there was not. Until yesterday afternoon we had every reason to believe that the basic direction that had been established, and to which all parties had agreed, would in fact be implemented. And I repeat: We still believe that it is possible to continue in this direction. Nobody can gain from introducing great-power rivalry or from compounding—by compounding great-power rivalry. The overriding goal in the Middle East must be a just and durable peace between the Arab nations and Israel. That, the United States is prepared and, indeed, determined to promote. And that is the issue to which we should address ourselves.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, to follow that up, please, Senator Jackson, among others, has said that this government has been operating under what he called an illusion of détente from the very beginning. Can you be a little more precise now under these circumstances about the status of the détente with the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], we have, from the beginning of this administration, recognized that there is a—that we are dealing with an ideological and political adversary. We have also believed that we had a historic obligation, precisely in these conditions of being in opposition, to attempt to remove the dangers of war. We have always made clear, and we have always practiced, that we would resist any foreign policy adventures through the many crises in the early parts of this administration.

Where we have differed with some of our critics, it was in our conviction that it was dangerous to attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of a country with such a different domestic structure and such a different ideological orientation.

We have maintained the integrity of our allies and the security of the United States while reducing the danger of war.

As I said in my remarks, this is a historic task that somebody will have to solve and that it is in the interests of all Americans and all of mankind that it be solved as quickly as possible.

As for the status of the détente, I think we can make a better judgment when we know whether peace has taken hold. If the Soviet Union and we can work cooperatively, first toward establishing the cease-fire, and then toward promoting a durable settlement in the Middle East, then the détente will have proved itself. If this does not happen, then we have made an effort—for which we have paid no price—that had to be made. And then one has to wait for another moment when the task of insuring or of bringing peace to mankind can be attempted.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the reports of this joint—the Soviet plan for a joint Soviet-U.S. force were rather widespread before you went to Moscow, especially in Eastern Europe. Did Mr. Brezhnev discuss this idea with you in any way? And if not, why do you think he kept quiet about it then only to appear to activate it a few days later?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what plans were widespread in Eastern Europe. I can only deal with plans which reach us in some official manner. The plan for a joint U.S.-Soviet military force in the Middle East was never broached to us, either publicly or privately, until yesterday. And we immediately made clear that we would not participate in such a force and also that we would oppose any unilateral moves.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have said that U.S.-Soviet auspices might be useful in moving this along diplomatically. Are you prepared personally to play a role in getting these

talks started? And secondly, have all the parties accepted the necessity for direct Arab-Israeli talks?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not been in equally close contact with all of the parties. And we have reason to believe that a sufficient number of the parties have accepted these talks for them to start. And indeed, as late as yesterday afternoon, preliminary conversations took place between Ambassador Dobrynin and me about the site, the participation, and the procedures for these talks.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, earlier you referred to legitimate Soviet interests in the Middle East and indicated that we felt they were not threatened there. Have the Soviets indicated they agree with your assessment?

Secretary Kissinger: On the basis of the conversations that I had with General Secretary Brezhnev as late as last Sunday and the communications that were exchanged afterward between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev, there was every reason to expect that while of course our interests were not congruent, and while of course there were differences in approach, that a certain parallelism could develop in the direction of producing a permanent peace. And therefore I would have to say that we had reason to believe, and we have no reason yet to alter our estimate, that the joint auspices of which the Security Council resolution speaks can yet be implemented.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, between the two cease-fire resolutions in the United Nations, in that period the Israeli forces have made substantial military gains on the ground. Is the United States prepared to urge Israel to comply with the resolution which calls for all parties to withdraw to the lines at the time of the first cease-fire?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States supported both resolutions and is today supporting another resolution containing similar provisions as well as a provision for an international force drawn from all member states of the United Nations—for which all mem-

ber states of the United Nations would be eligible except the permanent members of the Security Council.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I notice that you said the President decided on the military alert and that you said the President had no other choice. Did you recommend this, or did the President initiate the military alert matter, and do you feel that it is a totally rational decision?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Mollenhoff [Clark R. Mollenhoff, Des Moines Register and Tribune], I have a general rule not to provide a checklist of what advice I give to the President. But due to the particular implications of your remark, I may say that all of the President's senior advisers—all the members of the National Security Council—were unanimous in their recommendation, as a result of a deliberation in which the President did not himself participate, and which he joined only after they had formed their judgment, that the measures taken—that he in fact ordered—were in the essential national interest.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you say what, in your judgment, changed from the period yesterday when you and Ambassador Dobrynin were talking about participation and site and so on for talks and the period last night which led the Soviets to take the action that they took? What, in your estimation, changed?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to make clear that as of now the Soviet Union has not yet taken any irrevocable action. It is our hope that such an action will not be taken.

I repeat again what I have said on many occasions in this press conference. We are not seeking an opportunity to confront the Soviet Union. We are not asking the Soviet Union to pull back from anything that it has done.

The opportunity for pursuing the joint course in the Security Council and in the diplomacy afterward is open. The measures we took and which the President ordered

were precautionary in nature. They were not directed at any actions that had already been taken. And therefore there is no reason for any country to back off anything that it has not yet done.

As to the motives, I think we should assess that after the current situation is over.

Q. Dr. Kissinger—

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me get this question, and then you.

Q. Sir, in the reasons that prompted the President to make his decision, did any of those reasons include a threat aimed against this country as opposed to a threat in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I really do not think it is appropriate for me to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges. We are not talking of threats that have been made against one another. We are not talking of a missile-crisis-type situation. We are talking of a situation where 72 hours ago we still introduced joint resolutions, where the necessity for a joint movement toward peace is as real now as it was then, where the participants in the Middle East have everything to gain from a period of quiet and from at least watching or attempting to see what an American diplomatic effort can produce. And therefore we are talking about a precautionary situation and not an actual one.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that you are asking the American people—you and the President—who are already badly shaken by the events of the last week, to accept a very dramatic military alert involving nuclear forces, on the basis of a kind of handful of smoke without telling them or us exactly why. If I understood you earlier, you said that we had discovered the alert of some Soviet forces, and we were disturbed by the behavior apparently of some people that American officials were dealing with. And that is all we really have to justify this alert.

Now, this country is pretty badly shaken right now. And I wonder if you can give us

any more information that will help convince people that there is some solid basis for the actions that have been taken.

Secretary Kissinger: We are attempting to preserve the peace in very difficult circumstances. It is up to you ladies and gentlemen to determine whether this is the moment to try to create a crisis of confidence in the field of foreign policy as well. We have tried to give you as much information as we decently and safely and properly can under these conditions. As soon as there is a clear outcome we will give you the full information. And after that you will be able to judge whether the decisions were taken hastily or improperly.

The alert that has been ordered is of a precautionary nature and is not of any major and irrevocable—it is not in any sense irrevocable. It is what seemed to be indicated by the situation.

We will be prepared, however, and I am certain within a week, to put the facts before you.

But there has to be a minimum of confidence that the senior officials of the American government are not playing with the lives of the American people.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the chief problem in the Middle East at the moment seems to be the concern by the Egyptians for the safety of its 3d Army on the east bank of the canal. Are there any steps being taken to possibly ameliorate their situation? And secondly, could you give us some more details about the results of your conversation as to forthcoming talks? About 12 hours ago everybody was waiting for talks to begin. Can you tell us in which direction we can anticipate that will go?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that the particular problems that are raised by a cease-fire in which the forces are deployed in such a curious fashion—each army having units behind the lines of the other—that these conditions first of all produce, especially in the initial phases, many difficulties. We also are absolutely convinced that with the presence of observers, with good will on all sides, and with the active participation of

the United States and the Soviet Union, that the difficulties can be substantially eased and eventually removed.

It is my understanding, for example, that some humanitarian supplies reached the 3d Army today.

And we would certainly be prepared to lend our good offices to an effort in which neither side gained a decisive advantage as a result of the deployment of their forces.

I therefore am convinced that the particular conditions of the cease-fire, difficult as they are, can be dealt with and can be ameliorated with statesmanship on all sides.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have surely told Dobrynin and others what you have told us and perhaps even more. Can you give us any indication of what effect this had on these people?

Secretary Kissinger: We are at this moment in the Security Council debating the resolution that we are supporting. If that resolution is accepted and carried out, we believe that it will lead to an immediate easing of the situation and to a restoration of the conditions as we observed them at noon yesterday.

May I say also that this press conference was scheduled at a time before this latest event was known or suspected. And I went through with it in order to be able to put into perspective the evolution that brought us here and as much of the reasoning as I could, given the delicacy of the situation.

Q. You didn't answer the second half of my question, Dr. Kissinger—

Secretary Kissinger: What was the second half?

Q. About negotiations, where they were going to go.

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that negotiations can and should begin in a matter of a very few weeks.

Q. How?

Secretary Kissinger: How?

Q. Yes. You said we were discussing participation and forum. I wondered if you could give us more details.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should wait until the parties are prepared to announce this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you any indication of how the Soviet Union will vote on the resolution today?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the debate is still in process. And once we know the result of that vote—

Q. Is there any indication of how they might vote?

Secretary Kissinger: We are hopeful that the Soviet Union will vote for the resolution.

Q. If the resolution is passed, Dr. Kissinger, do you expect the alert would be taken off?

Secretary Kissinger: The alert will not last one minute longer than we believe is necessary.

Q. Dr. Kissinger—

Secretary Kissinger: And it would be taken off as soon as any danger of unilateral action is removed.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, concerning the role that the United States may play in obtaining conditions for an enduring peace, several months ago you were reported as saying that you were supportive of an American policy that supports Israel but not Israeli conquests. What is your view on that now?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I was quoted to that effect four and a half years ago before I understood the special nomenclature that is attached to the various ground rules.

Our position is, as I have stated publicly, that the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations and that in a process of negotiations it will be necessary to make substantial concessions.

The problem will be to relate the Arab concern for the sovereignty over territories to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries.

We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this. And as the President has stated to the four Arab Foreign Ministers, and as we have stated repeatedly, we will make a major

effort to bring about a solution that is considered just by all parties. But I think no purpose would be served by my trying to delimit the exact nature of all of these provisions.

The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

President Nixon Presents Nine Medals of Honor

*Remarks by President Nixon*¹

Ladies and gentlemen: As all of you know, this is a Medal of Honor presentation. As I was looking over the record of the last four years, I found that 143 Medals of Honor have been presented during those four years. There will be nine presented today, and the difference is that this is the first time that a Medal of Honor presentation will be made in peacetime, when the United States is at peace not only in Viet-Nam but is at peace with every nation throughout the world.

Now, when we speak of the Medal of Honor, I would say first that those who receive that medal in this room honor this great house and this historic room. When we speak of the Medal of Honor in relationship to the war, the long and difficult war in which so many Americans participated, we realize how these men who receive this medal today and their colleagues—how what they did has made it possible for the United States to end this war and finally to have peace with honor.

As one of our prisoners of war said when he returned from Viet-Nam, you, you and your colleagues in the Armed Forces of the United States, made it possible for our prisoners of war to return to the United States on their feet rather than on their knees. And so you receive a Medal of Honor today be-

¹ Made in the East Room at the White House on Oct. 15 (White House press release).

cause what you have done is to help the United States maintain its honor.

Now, I suppose that talking about honor, as far as a great nation is concerned, would sound somewhat jingoistic, but I would remind everybody in this audience, particularly at a time when there is another war in the Mideast, that a strong United States, a United States that is respected, is essential if we are to have a chance to have a lasting peace in the world. Because with all of our strength and with all of the sacrifices that Americans have made in four wars in this century, the United States policy is not one of aggression, it is not one to dominate any other country, it is one that seeks peace for ourselves and for other nations, and of course seeks, in addition to that, a world in which all nations have the right to be independent of foreign domination.

One word, finally, with regard to the current war which is going on in the Mideast. If I were to describe our policy, I would say that it is like the policy that we followed in 1958 when Lebanon was involved, it is like the policy we followed in 1970 when Jordan was involved. The policy of the United States in the Mideast, very simply stated, is this: We stand for the right of every nation in the Mideast to maintain its independence and security. We want this fighting to end. We want the fighting to end on a basis where we can build a lasting peace.

But the policy of the United States is that of peacemaker in the area, and I would conclude by saying that the men honored today and the thousands of other Americans who also should be honored, who served their country in Viet-Nam, make it possible for the United States to play the honored role of peacemaker in the world. And now we will go forward with the citations.

[The presentations were made.]

Ladies and gentlemen, that completes the ceremony, and we want all of you to enjoy this White House. It belongs to you, and today it is your home. You can spend your time on this first floor in the historic Red Room and the Green Room and the Blue

Room. In the dining room there are refreshments which will be there for you and your friends to enjoy.

We congratulate you all again, and we thank you from our hearts for your service to the Nation.

President Nixon Holds Meeting With Arab Foreign Ministers

President Nixon met on October 17 with Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah of Kuwait, Foreign Minister Ahmed Taibi Benhima of Morocco, and Foreign Minister Sayyid Umar al-Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia. Following are remarks made to the press by President Nixon and Foreign Minister al-Saqqaf after the meeting.

White House press release dated October 17

President Nixon: Ladies and gentlemen, the Foreign Ministers and I have had a very good talk discussing all of the aspects of the current situation in the Mideast. I will not go further than that except to say the conversations will continue over at the State Department with Dr. Kissinger, and any statement with regard to the nature of the conversation will be made from Dr. Kissinger.

Question: Will he tell us what was discussed?

President Nixon: I doubt if there will be a statement, but what I mean is if you have any further questions, you should address them to him.

Question: Will you tell us what general areas were covered?

Foreign Minister al-Saqqaf: If I have to say something, we four Foreign Ministers from the Arab world, representing 18 Arab countries, have been received well, and we had a very good exchange of views and discussions with His Excellency Mr. President Nixon. The meeting and discussions were fruitful, and we think the man who could solve the Viet-Nam war, the man who could

have settled the peace all over the world, can easily play a good role in settling and having peace in our area of the Middle East.

Question: Did you discuss oil, Mr. Minister?

President Nixon: It wouldn't be fair to ask him questions, because he speaks for 18; and I will simply say this in conclusion—that His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia has been very generous in his comments with regard to our peace mission. I explained to the Foreign Ministers in our first four years we had the opening to China, we had a new relationship with the Soviet Union, and of course, we brought an end to the war in Viet-Nam.

I told them that a major goal and an urgent goal at this time which we believe can, will, and must be achieved is a fair and just and peaceful settlement in the Mideast and we are all dedicated to that goal. Whatever differences we have are with regard to the means, with regard to, of course, certain ends as well, but the goal of a fair and just and equitable peace we all are dedicated to.

Thank you.

Emergency Security Assistance Requested for Israel and Cambodia

*Message From President Nixon*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am today requesting that the Congress authorize emergency security assistance of \$2.2 billion for Israel and \$200 million for Cambodia. This request is necessary to permit the United States to follow a responsible course of action in two areas where stability is vital if we are to build a global structure of peace.

For more than a quarter of a century, as strategic interests of the major powers have converged there, the Middle East has been

a flashpoint for potential world conflict. Since war broke out again on October 6, bringing tragedy to the people of Israel and the Arab nations alike, the United States has been actively engaged in efforts to contribute to a settlement. Our actions there have reflected my belief that we must take those steps which are necessary for maintaining a balance of military capabilities and achieving stability in the area. The request I am submitting today would give us the essential flexibility to continue meeting those responsibilities.

To maintain a balance of forces and thus achieve stability, the United States Government is currently providing military material to Israel to replace combat losses. This is necessary to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance resulting from a large-scale resupply of Syria and Egypt by the Soviet Union.

The costs of replacing consumables and lost equipment for the Israeli Armed Forces have been extremely high. Combat activity has been intense, and losses on both sides have been large. During the first 12 days of the conflict, the United States has authorized shipments to Israel of material costing \$825 million, including transportation.

Major items now being furnished by the United States to the Israeli forces include conventional munitions of many types, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, crew-served and individual weapons, and a standard range of fighter aircraft ordnance. Additionally, the United States is providing replacements for tanks, aircraft, radios, and other military equipment which have been lost in action.

Thus far, Israel has attempted to obtain the necessary equipment through the use of cash and credit purchases. However, the magnitude of the current conflict coupled with the scale of Soviet supply activities has created needs which exceed Israel's capacity to continue with cash and credit purchases. The alternative to cash and credit sales of United States military materials is for us

¹ Transmitted to the Congress on Oct. 19 (White House press release).

to provide Israel with grant military assistance as well.

The United States is making every effort to bring this conflict to a very swift and honorable conclusion, measured in days not weeks. But prudent planning also requires us to prepare for a longer struggle. I am therefore requesting that the Congress approve emergency assistance to Israel in the amount of \$2.2 billion. If the conflict moderates, or as we fervently hope, is brought to an end very quickly, funds not absolutely required would of course not be expended.

I am also requesting \$200 million emergency assistance for Cambodia. As in the case of Israel, additional funds are urgently needed for ammunition and consumable military supplies. The increased requirement results from the larger scale of hostilities and the higher levels of ordnance required by the Cambodian Army and Air Force to defend themselves without American air support.

The end of United States bombing on August 15 was followed by increased communist activity in Cambodia. In the ensuing fight, the Cambodian forces acquitted themselves well. They successfully defended the capital of Phnom Penh and the provincial center of Kampong Cham, as well as the principal supply routes. Although this more intense level of fighting has tapered off somewhat during the current rainy season, it is

virtually certain to resume when the dry season begins about the end of the year.

During the period of heaviest fighting in August and September, ammunition costs for the Cambodian forces were running almost \$1 million per day. We anticipate similar average costs for the remainder of this fiscal year. These ammunition requirements, plus minimum equipment replacement, will result in a total funding requirement of \$380 million for the current fiscal year, rather than the \$180 million previously requested. To fail to provide the \$200 million for additional ammunition would deny the Cambodian Armed Forces the ability to defend themselves and their country.

We remain hopeful that the conflict in Cambodia be resolved by a negotiated settlement. A communist military victory and the installation of a government in Phnom Penh which is controlled by Hanoi would gravely threaten the fragile structure of peace established in the Paris agreements.

I am confident that the Congress and the American people will support this request for emergency assistance for these two beleaguered friends. To do less would not only create a dangerous imbalance in these particular arenas but would also endanger the entire structure of peace in the world.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 19, 1973.*

U.N. Calls for Middle East Cease-Fire and Negotiations and Establishes Emergency Force

Following are statements made in the United Nations Security Council October 8-27 by U.S. Representative John Scali during the debate on the situation in the Middle East, together with the texts of resolutions adopted by the Council on October 21, 23, 25 and 27 and a report of the U.N. Secretary General.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

Statement of October 8

USUN press release 91 dated October 8

The United States has requested that the Security Council be convened today in order that it might deal urgently with the current situation in the Middle East.

For the first time in more than three years, armed hostilities have broken out on a massive scale in the Middle East. The cease-fire we have sought to maintain has been broken. The recourse to tragic violence we have sought to avoid is upon us.

Reports based on U.N. sources appear to indicate that the air attacks in the Golan Heights were initiated by Syrian MIG aircraft and that the first firing on the Suez front, which took place at the same time as the Syrian attack, was from west to east. The subsequent development of the fighting has been fully covered in the press.

In the days before fighting broke out, we received reports of intensified military activities in the Middle Eastern area. We watched these developments closely, but until a few hours before military operations started we were unable to conclude that these activities were a prelude to actual fighting. This is a region in which alarms and alerts are fairly frequent. In themselves, military movements

would not necessarily indicate that combat was about to begin. When, very shortly before the initial attacks took place, we received indications that this was the fact, we immediately undertook intensive diplomatic efforts in hopes that the outbreak of hostilities might be prevented. We discussed the situation directly with Israel and Egypt. We consulted other permanent members and exchanged views with many governments represented on this Council. Others in and outside of the area pursued parallel efforts. We kept in close touch with Secretary General Waldheim, who also lent his great weight and prestige to the efforts. Unfortunately these efforts did not prevent the outbreak, and intense fighting continues.

In so serious a situation we felt that we could not fail to exercise our responsibility, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to request a meeting of the Council in order that it might be seized of the grave situation which had arisen. Not to have done this would have been to fail in our obligations under the charter. We hope that in the days ahead the Council by its deliberations can restore in some measure its historic role of constructive ameliorator in the most critical and explosive area in the world.

Definitive judgments as to constructive action are difficult in view of the fluidity of the situation. My government has itself made no such judgments. Nor have we felt it would be constructive to divert the Council's energies and attention to the question of assessing blame.

Our purpose today is not to sift conflicting reports or to assess responsibility for what has occurred. Our purpose is to help promote a solution for the tense and dangerous situation confronting us.

We recognize that it is difficult to separate proximate from underlying causes. The former may be clear-cut, but the latter are complex, and perceptions of right and wrong inevitably vary. It has been over six years since the present abnormal situation was created in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. That war in turn followed 18 years of abnormal armistice. For the failure to move from abnormal armistice and cease-fire to political accommodation and peace, there is more than enough blame to go around. All concerned have missed opportunities to make the transition over the past 25 years.

We have given preliminary thought to the direction in which this Council might move in dealing with this problem so that new opportunities to make practical progress toward peace can be created and the present tragedy can be made a new beginning rather than simply another lost opportunity. As we see it, there are a number of principles which the Council must seek to apply:

—First, in a situation where fighting is raging unchecked, the most appropriate means must be found for bringing the hostilities to an end. Military operations must be halted. The guns must fall silent so that additional human suffering may be avoided and the search for peace may proceed.

—Second, conditions must be restored in the area that would be conducive to a settlement of the longstanding differences in the Middle East. There must be respect for the rights and positions of all the states in the region. A beginning must be made toward converting the sharp confrontation of violently opposing claims and counterclaims, which for over a quarter of a century has made true stability impossible, to a more reasoned discourse aimed at genuine reconciliation. The least damaging way to bring this about is to have the parties concerned return to the positions before hostilities broke out.

—Third, in all its efforts the Council must be mindful of the need for universal respect for the integrity of those instruments and principles of settlement for the Middle Eastern dispute which have received the adherence of the interested parties and the support

of the Council's authority. The foundations so laboriously achieved in the past for negotiations looking toward a Middle Eastern peace must not be destroyed under the stress of a military emergency.

These principles, in the opinion of my government, constitute the framework within which we can act in this Council to reduce the prevailing tension in the Middle East and to prepare for a reinvigoration of the process of peacemaking. We are prepared to discuss these principles, and any others which other members may put forward, as a basis for our further action.

What we seek in this Council is not a war of words, but a broad consensus which will enable the Council to put the full weight of its influence behind the task of restoring peace so that the Middle East can be set on a new course pointing toward a better era in the region.

Let us then renounce the sterile gains of propaganda and turn to serious discussion. The situation is urgent; the need is great; and time presses.

Statement of October 21

USUN press release 96 dated October 21

The United States, together with the U.S.S.R., has called for this meeting of the Security Council with one purpose in mind: to take joint action and to present a joint proposition to the Council whose aim is to bring an immediate cease-fire-in-place and to begin promptly negotiations between the parties under appropriate auspices looking toward a just and durable peace based on the November 1967 Security Council resolution.¹

As the members of this Council know, the tragic fighting over the past 17 days has been both furious and costly. We believe that the prolongation of the war is not in the interests of the parties or the peoples in the area and that its continuance carries grave risks for the peace of the world. Because of this, President Nixon agreed that Secretary

¹For text of Security Council Resolution 242 adopted on Nov. 22, 1967, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

of State Kissinger should fly to Moscow in response to an invitation of General Secretary Brezhnev. As a result of these discussions the Council has before it the resolution agreed jointly by the United States and the Soviet Governments on which both our governments request immediate action on the part of the Security Council. The resolution has already been circulated to the members of the Council.

Let me make a few brief remarks regarding the three short paragraphs of the resolution, for they all stand clearly on their own words and speak for themselves.

The first paragraph calls for an immediate cease-fire. In our view as well as that of the Soviet Union, this applies not only to the parties directly concerned but also to those who have joined in the fighting by sending units. This paragraph calls for the stopping of fighting in the positions presently occupied by the two sides. We believe that 12 hours should allow ample time to achieve the practical implementation of this paragraph.

The second paragraph calls for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all of its parts after the cease-fire. The members of this Council, as well as the parties concerned, are fully familiar with Security Council Resolution 242, and it needs no elaboration here. The paragraph is linked to paragraph 3, which calls for the immediate beginning of negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. We believe that from the tragic events of the past 17 days there must be a new resolve, a new attempt to remove the fundamental causes that have brought war to the Middle East so frequently and so tragically. Another respite between two wars is just not good enough. And for our part, both the United States and the Soviet Union are ready to make our joint good offices available to the parties as a means to facilitate the negotiating process.

Finally, I want to report to the Council that both the Soviet Union and the United States believe that there should be an immediate exchange of prisoners of war.

Mr. President, we believe this is a historic moment for the Council. We believe that this Council, in exercising its primary responsibility in the field of peace and security, can make a major contribution to this end by adopting this resolution promptly.

Statement of October 23

USUN press release 98 dated October 23

I should like to put on record my delegation's deep regret that our proceedings had been interrupted by unfortunate disorder. I wish also to compliment our distinguished President, Ambassador McIntyre [Sir Laurence McIntyre, of Australia], for his patient efforts to maintain and restore order in the chamber. This wrangle was particularly regrettable because of the urgency of the issue before us. The issue is peace, and while we speak men are dying.

My delegation, for its part, was prepared to allow the distinguished Representative of China to speak. We did not believe he would speak an unreasonable period of time. The issue has been resolved, and we fervently hope that we may be spared further interruptions in the future.

Mr. President, the United States has joined with the Soviet Union in introducing this draft resolution before the Council because of its concern that the cease-fire ordered by the Council on October 22 be made fully effective at the earliest possible moment.

There have been charges from each side of violations allegedly committed by the other. It is obviously impossible at this moment to determine the accuracy of these charges. No third-party evidence from an objective source is available to us.

The resolution before us confirms the Council's decision of October 22 on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective. The resolution also suggests that the Secretary General take measures to dispatch United Nations

observers immediately to supervise the observance of the cease-fire, including personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all those in Cairo.

We consider the central features of the resolution to be those in which the Council confirms its position for a cease-fire and in which it provides for the stationing of observers between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt. The former provision will put an end to bloodshed; the latter will result in the creation of a clear line of demarcation separating the forces of the two sides.

We have agreed, for reasons of principle, with the provision of the resolution urging the forces to return to the positions they occupied when the cease-fire became effective. We put forward that principle of return to positions occupied before hostilities broke out in a statement I made in this chamber on October 8. At that time the principles did not receive the support from the Council. Consistent with our argument at that time, we agree today that forces should return to the positions occupied at the time the cease-fire became effective. But we must point out that there will be great difficulty in establishing actual cease-fire lines and in fixing the positions of forces which have been maneuvering in the desert. I hope that this will not become our central preoccupation as we search for a just and durable peace.

It is important that the United Nations resume at once the function of observation of the forces of the parties. Fortunately the United Nations has in the area officers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, who can proceed quickly to the cease-fire area. On the passage of this resolution, we would expect the Secretary General, through the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, to put observers in place at once and to receive immediately reports from them on events in the areas of contact between the two sides. These reports would of course be transmitted to the Security Council forthwith.

Finally, Mr. President, we must look to the future. Our paramount task is to bring about

a cease-fire and to halt the bloodshed. We hope, therefore, that the Security Council can give prompt consideration to the U.S.-Soviet resolution, as it has, so that the fighting may be stopped and negotiations begin, looking toward a just and lasting peace.

Statement of October 24

USUN press release 99 dated October 24

The Security Council meets tonight, for the third time in four days, on a note of increasing urgency. In spite of two Security Council resolutions adopted without a dissenting vote, calling upon the parties in the strongest terms to cease all fighting and to terminate all military activity, military operations have recurred in the zones of combat. As long as the fighting goes on, even intermittently, the parties incur increasing losses; the forces of hate and fear are strengthened; the difficulty of attaining a lasting peace deepens; and the task of reconciliation becomes more difficult.

Tonight this Council is convened at the request of the delegation of Egypt. The distinguished Foreign Minister of Egypt has suggested the Security Council invite the Soviet Union and the United States to send forces to the area to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire on the part of Israel and to insure its effectiveness.

At the same time the Council is confronted by claims from the Israeli side that Egyptian forces failed to abide by the cease-fire and are accordingly responsible for the fact that hostilities have recurred.

Let me say again, as I said yesterday, that it remains impossible to determine the accuracy of these contradictory charges. Until the impartial observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization can reach their posts in the areas of contact and can report to the Chief of Staff of the Organization, we will be unable to assess with certainty these conflicting claims.

Accordingly, the United States believes that the Council has before it two urgent tasks. First, it must impress upon the par-

ties with renewed vigor that each of them must comply immediately and fully with the cease-fire resolutions we have adopted. Second, it should urge and encourage the Secretary General and the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization to move as promptly as possible to place additional observers on the spot.

Mr. President, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Egypt has suggested that the United States send armed forces to the area of fighting in order to supervise implementation of the cease-fire. In the view of the United States, this is not a time in which involvement by the great powers through the dispatch of their armed forces could be helpful in creating conditions of peace. Our objective in the Middle East has not been to produce a military confrontation but rather to encourage restraint and caution on both sides.

The United States remains committed to Resolution 338 and Resolution 339 of this Council, in all their parts. We believe that the parties, with the assistance of the United Nations observers, can and will bring the fighting to an end. For our part, I can state that we have been in active and serious consultation with the Government of Israel to impress upon it the urgency of absolute adherence to the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions. We will continue to make these representations as required.

We also agree, as I said yesterday, that the forces of the parties should return to the positions they occupied when the cease-fire became effective. Mr. Malik [Yakov Malik, Soviet Representative to the U.N.], I believe, knows that we have exerted all of our efforts to put the cease-fire into effect, to translate it from a careful, balanced appeal to a reality which will end the killing. In keeping with the understanding that Secretary Kissinger negotiated with the Soviet leaders in Moscow, in a spirit of friendship, as part of our efforts to improve relations on a broad front with the Soviet Union, we have done our

part to carry out this agreement—calmly and without seeking to extract propaganda advantage. But this, Mr. President, cannot be done merely by snapping our fingers. In a highly emotional state of affairs, in time of war, it is not easy. As a matter of principle, the United States believes today, as it made clear in my statement of October 8, that return to positions held before hostilities broke out is the preferred means of opening the way to genuine reconciliation.

We will continue to support this principle. But it can only be applied in the context of agreement as to the geographical and physical facts. Until actual cease-fire lines are demarcated and it becomes clear where the opposing forces were stationed at a given moment in time, there can be no agreed basis for firm truce lines. This emphasizes still further the need for completing the organization and placement of the Truce Supervision force and for insuring that the Council and the parties are fully informed of developments and the military commanders of the two sides instructed in compelling terms to stop the fighting.

Statement of October 25

USUN press release 101 dated October 25

The United States supports the eight-power resolution presented to this Council last night as amended this morning.

We have from the first advocated an immediate cease-fire at the positions occupied when Security Council Resolution 338 came into effect at 1650 GMT on October 22.

We agree on the need to increase the number of observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization immediately.

We approve of the establishment of a new United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel from member states except those of the permanent members of the Security Council. We will seek to be helpful in facilitating the transportation of this Force to the area.

We trust that the Secretary General will

proceed with the utmost despatch to carry out the functions entrusted to him under the resolution.

Mr. President, we believe that the resolution now before us will, if faithfully implemented by all concerned, result in the prompt and effective establishment of a true cease-fire in the Middle East. Nothing could be more important as a step toward peace. We urge the Security Council to adopt this resolution as a matter of highest priority.

Statement of October 26

USUN press release 103 dated October 26

Let me reaffirm once again what I have said repeatedly here before. In word and deed the United States stands for strict observance of the cease-fire.

Mr. President, in the view of my delegation, the most constructive contribution we in this chamber could make at this stage is to proceed systematically as quickly as possible on our mission of ending the fighting and beginning peace negotiations. We cannot accomplish anything by repeatedly resorting in this chamber to exchanges of unverifiable charges and countercharges when objective, unchallengeable facts are needed. We do not need more reckless accusations. We need responsible action. We can proceed to implement Resolution 340, which was sponsored by eight nonaligned members of the Security Council and which, if carried out, can put us on the road to real peace.

I have heard Ambassador Malik's one-sided version of history before and I will not reply in kind, because our two governments have a special responsibility to lead the way to peace and the moment is too grave for that kind of talk.

I must take exception, however, to Ambassador Malik's resort to the habit of selecting a phrase from the Secretary of State's press conference and reading it out of context. I should perhaps express resentment over such a debater's trick, but instead I will thank

the Ambassador for advertising Dr. Kissinger's statements.

I have sent a complete text of Dr. Kissinger's news conference remarks to each of the United Nations Missions in New York because I thought objective readers would be more impressed with the Secretary's fair-minded description of events and American policy at this period of history. If you have found Ambassador Malik's sample titillating, dear colleagues, let me suggest that you will find Dr. Kissinger's statements taken in their entirety even more interesting and far more balanced than some of the remarks that you have heard this evening.

Statement of October 27

USUN press release 104 dated October 27

The United States welcomes with great satisfaction the action of the Council in approving the Secretary General's report. We have demonstrated that indeed this organ can act effectively to fulfill its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

But even as we rejoice in our agreement it is important to recognize the difficult task confronting the Emergency Force. Supervising cease-fire lines in an area in the wake of war will not be easy. The Force from its inception will require the full cooperation of the parties concerned—as the Secretary General's report states. In addition, it must operate as an integrated military unit with efficiency and with special privileges for none.

We consider the language of the report carefully drawn. For instance, the statement "All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the Council for its decision" assures an orderly, agreed withdrawal of the Force, but only when the Council so decides. We are also satisfied that the phrase "bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic distribution" is consistent with article 101 of the

charter and assures that all of the obvious and necessary criteria will be given appropriate consideration in the composition of the Force.

Looking to the future, we hope that the Secretary General can move as swiftly as possible to implement the resolution we have just approved. The United States, as I said in my statement of October 25, is prepared to consider requests for assistance to this end.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to express my personal satisfaction that my government has helped to arrange for a meeting on the ground of Egyptian and Israeli military representatives under U.N. auspices to discuss the practical application of the cease-fire. This is a significant practical result of the thorough deliberations in this chamber. I regard it as especially noteworthy that arrangements are now being made to provide nonmilitary supplies for the 3d Army area. For us the humanitarian aspect of the U.N. effort is a critically important element in this peacekeeping mission.

Mr. President, may I once again express my delegation's firm support for this constructive action of the Council. The future will record this as a historic moment in the annals of the United Nations if we can maintain the momentum generated here and move on to a peaceful, durable settlement.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Security Council Resolution 338²

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

² Adopted on Oct. 22 at 12:50 a.m. by a vote of 14 to 0 (China did not participate in the voting).

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Security Council Resolution 339³

The Security Council,

Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

1. *Confirms* its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.

Security Council Resolution 340⁴

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973,

Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line,

1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;

3. *Decides* to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the

³ Adopted on Oct. 23 by a vote of 14 to 0 (China did not participate in the voting).

⁴ Adopted on Oct. 25 by a vote of 14 to 0 (China did not participate in the voting).

state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973);

5. *Requests* all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

Security Council Resolution 341⁵

The Security Council,

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) contained in document S/11052/Rev. 1 dated 27 October 1973;

2. *Decides* that the Force shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides.

REPORT OF THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL IN PURSUANCE OF RESOLUTION 340⁶

Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973 in which the Council, among other things, decided to set up immediately a United Nations Emergency Force under its authority and requested the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect.

Terms of reference

2. (a) The Force will supervise the implementation of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973), which reads as follows:

"1. Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;"

(b) The Force will use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavours in the area.

(c) In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force will have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO.

General considerations

3. Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. Firstly, it must have at all

times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.

4. Having in mind past experience, I would suggest the following guidelines for the proposed Force:

(a) The Force will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field will be exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Commander will be responsible to the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General shall keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the Council for its decision.

(b) The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Force should operate at all times separately from the armed forces of the parties concerned. Consequently separate quarters and, wherever desirable and feasible, buffer zones will have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties. Appropriate agreements on the Status of the Force will have to be concluded with the parties to cover the above requirements.

(c) The Force will be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.

(d) The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The Force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council.

(e) In performing its functions, the Force will act with complete impartiality and will avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned which in no way affect the implementation of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973) and operative paragraph 1 of resolution 339 (1973).

⁵ Adopted on Oct. 27 by a vote of 14 to 0 (China did not participate in the voting).

⁶ U.N. doc. S/11052/Rev. 1.

(f) The supporting personnel of the Force will be provided as a rule by the Secretary-General from among existing United Nations staff. Those personnel will, of course, follow the rules and regulations of the United Nations Secretariat.

Proposed plan of action

5. If the Security Council is in agreement with the principles outlined above, I intend to take the following urgent steps:

(a) I propose, with the consent of the Security Council, to appoint the Commander of the Emergency Force as soon as possible. Pending the Commander's arrival in the mission area, with the consent of the Council given at its meeting of 25 October 1973, I have appointed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General E. Siilasvuo, as interim Commander of the Emergency Force, and have asked him to set up a provisional headquarters staff consisting of personnel from UNTSO.

(b) In order that the Force may fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to it, it is considered necessary that it have a total strength in the order of 7,000.

(c) The Force would initially be stationed in the area for a period of six months.

(d) In my letter of 25 October to the President of the Security Council, I proposed, as an urgent interim measure and in order that the Emergency Force may reach the area as soon as possible, to arrange for the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden now serving with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to proceed immediately to Egypt. I am at present actively engaged in the necessary consultations, bearing in mind the considerations in paragraph 4 (c) above, with a view to making requests to a number of other Governments to provide contingents of suitable size for the Force at the earliest possible time. As the Members of the Council are aware, this is a complex matter in which a number of factors have to be taken into account. I shall report further to the Council as soon as possible.

(e) In addition to the countries requested to provide contingents for the Force, I propose to request logistic support as necessary from a number of other countries, which may include the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

Estimated cost and method of financing

6. At the present time there are many unknown factors. The best possible preliminary estimate based upon past experience and practice is approximately \$30,000,000 for a Force of 7,000, all ranks, for a period of six months.

7. The costs of the Force shall be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

Annual Report on Trade Agreements Program Transmitted to the Congress

Message From President Nixon¹

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with section 402(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA), I transmit herewith the Seventeenth Annual Report of the President on the Trade Agreements Program. This report covers developments in the year ending December 31, 1972.

In the period since I last reported to the Congress on our trade agreements program, we have taken major new initiatives to give strong momentum to closer multilateral cooperation and to develop a fairer and more efficient framework for the conduct of international economic relations. As a result of intense preparatory work throughout 1972, nations accounting for the bulk of world trade, meeting in Tokyo last month, opened a major round of new negotiations to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and to reform the rules by which all can gain from expanded trade. In the related field of monetary affairs, encouraging progress has been achieved on reform of the international monetary system to provide sound underpinnings for a fairer, more open trading system.

Concurrently with work on these basic longer term objectives, U.S. negotiators also pressed actively in bilateral consultations for the early removal of foreign nontariff barriers which have distorted normal trade patterns and restricted U.S. exports. The success of these efforts has, in some cases, opened markets where U.S. exporters have competed at a disadvantage for over two decades. In other instances, prompt U.S. assertion of our rights under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has either deterred the institution of proposed restrictions or resulted in their early termination.

As a result of U.S. representations, our traders are already realizing tangible benefits from the major liberalization of quotas

¹ Transmitted on Oct. 17 (White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 93-166, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the report.

and licensing by Japan and the virtual elimination of Japanese export incentives. Compensatory taxes affecting some \$40 million of U.S. agricultural exports were terminated on 98 percent of the products involved. The reduction or removal of these and other trade distortions demonstrates that sound trade policy and vigorous negotiation can create new and better opportunities for American businesses, farms, and workers.

Consistent with our efforts to strengthen the fabric of common interests between this country and the Soviet Union, we concluded a major agreement last year which lays the basis for the normalization of relations in the trade field. Important initial steps also have been taken to reduce barriers to commercial relations with the People's Republic of China. These developments open vast opportunities for long-term mutual economic benefit and for the advancement of world peace through the reduction of political tensions. I again urge the Congress, in considering my request for authority to grant normal tariff treatment to these countries, to work with me in framing an authority which preserves these gains.

While we may justifiably be encouraged by our achievements in trade and monetary negotiations since 1971 and by the reversal of the downward trend in our merchandise trade balance, we must not underestimate the magnitude and complexity of the tasks ahead. The multilateral trade negotiations which have just been opened are a fundamental building block in the foundation of a

new world politico-economic structure. The stakes are thus high and the bargaining will be intense.

To realize our objectives in the trade field, I sent to the Congress last April proposals for new legislation entitled the Trade Reform Act of 1973. In my statement of October 4, I expressed my views on the bill which was approved by the House Ways and Means Committee.² As legislative deliberation continues, I look forward to working with the Congress on this bill in a spirit of constructive partnership.

The profound changes which have taken place in the world economy and the impact of growing economic interdependence on political relations among nations is now clearly recognized. While formidable problems exist in the trade area and while countries still differ widely on some of the important issues, the will now exists to negotiate the necessary far-reaching changes instead of resorting to confrontation or retaliatory measures which generate political frictions. We, like other nations, will be hard bargainers, but with a shared spirit of mutual commitment to a more open and equitable trading system, the entire world can progress toward a new era of economic well-being and peaceful international relations.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 17, 1973.*

² For text of the statement, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1973, p. 531.

The Conceptual Framework for the Inter-American System

Address by Jack B. Kubisch

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

As I stand here, I am very conscious of my predecessors at this podium. This distinguished association has been the forum in years past for important pronouncements or discussions by U.S. officials regarding our policy toward the countries of Latin America.

Indeed, four years ago the President of the United States appeared before you to propose new goals for the relations between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. Because I am aware of these precedents, I wish to make clear at the outset that I will not be making any new or dramatic declarations today regarding U.S. policies or programs.

Rather, I would like to share with you some thoughts and observations regarding the future course of relationships between this country and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Two weeks ago in New York our new Secretary of State, addressing Latin American Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, called for "a new dialogue with our friends in the Americas."² He said that if the technically advanced nations can ever cooperate effectively with the developing nations, and if people with similar aspirations can ever achieve common goals, then it must begin in the Western Hemisphere.

Secretary Kissinger said that the United States would approach such a dialogue with an open mind and that from our point of

view no institution or treaty arrangement would be beyond examination.

So my purpose here is in part to salute you and indicate the very deep respect with which I and the U.S. Government regard the Inter American Press Association, its purposes, and its distinguished membership, and in part to make some contribution to the new dialogue which Secretary Kissinger has proposed. I do this in the hope of stimulating constructive responses from others who, like the distinguished members of this audience, are interested in the future well-being of the peoples of this hemisphere.

The Search for a New Relationship

In his address to this organization four years ago, President Nixon proposed new goals for the Americas. He urged a reshaping and reinvigorating of our relationships. In effect, the President called for an end to the preponderant position of the United States within the inter-American system—an end to what some have called U.S. hegemony, along with its customary companion, paternalism.

With the President's words in mind, the past four years can be seen as a kind of search—a quest by the United States and the other countries of the hemisphere toward a substitute for the old and perhaps outworn pattern of inter-American relations.

It should not be surprising that the search has not yet finally ended nor that the effort to define a new set of relationships has been accompanied by strain. The old relationships were, after all, almost a century—and

¹ Made before the Inter American Press Association at Boston, Mass., on Oct. 19.

² For a toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon at New York on Oct. 5, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1973, p. 542.

in some respects even longer—in the making. Major changes in international relationships are in any case complex, hazardous, and uncertain undertakings.

There were no magic formulas four years ago, nor do any appear to be available today. What is quite apparent, however, is that for some time there has been widespread agreement among the members of the inter-American system—and by that I mean all the organizations, treaties, charters, and entities that comprise it—that the principles and modalities of cooperation and interaction among the countries of this hemisphere need to be rethought and reformulated. There is strong and generalized feeling that present modes of our relations do not reflect the realities of a rapidly changing world and the needs of the hemisphere today. There is a widely held belief that the inter-American system itself is not working well, that it contains anachronistic elements and vestiges of the past.

This general dissatisfaction with the status quo was at least partially expressed in the unanimous agreement at the OAS General Assembly last April to undertake a process of consultation among our governments to try to reach agreement on a restructured inter-American system. As a result of that decision, a Special Committee of the OAS has been meeting regularly since June in an effort to rethink and rework the fundamental relationships among countries of the hemisphere.

The U.S. participation in the Special Committee has been attentive and deliberately restrained. We have wished to hear the ideas of others. We have attempted to avoid even the appearance of trying to play too prominent a role in these proceedings. A number of delegations have put forth new, interesting, and imaginative ideas for change, and we are in agreement with many of them. It is still too early, however, for a broad and final consensus to have emerged from the deliberations of the Special Committee.

More recently another significant dimension has been added to these efforts at re-

forming and restructuring inter-American relations. I refer to the personal commitment of our new Secretary of State to bring to bear his extraordinary intellect, talents, and prestige to the process of finding new policies to govern inter-American relations.

I can tell you that the Secretary has initiated an urgent reexamination within the U.S. Government of our Western Hemisphere policies. I know he is also looking forward to learning the considered views of his Latin American colleagues on this subject. He is not seeking to develop a U.S. prescription to be handed over to Latin America for its acceptance or rejection. By the same token, he hopes that his colleagues to the south will also not think in terms of prescriptions for the United States. Rather, the objective should be full, frank, and informed dialogue from which would emerge a policy framework designed together by the United States and the countries of Latin America for the common good of all the Americas.

Obviously changes in the inter-American system and U.S. policy toward the hemisphere are not one and the same thing. Just as obviously, however, the two are closely related. We understand that a number of Latin American Foreign Ministers have responded to the Secretary's initiative and that there will be an exchange of views among Latin American officials as to how, when, and in what form to respond to this high-level dialogue proposed by Secretary Kissinger.

It should be obvious from what I have been saying that the U.S. Government has not reached any firm and irrevocable decisions as to the future of the inter-American system. We do believe, however, that the new set of inter-American relationships must take account of the profound changes in the world that have occurred in recent years. We also believe that a reformed inter-American system must reflect the needs and aspirations of all the peoples and nations that participate in it—and that includes the United States of America.

It seems to me that what may be required is a new conceptual framework for relations between the United States and the other countries of the hemisphere. I would therefore like to comment on some of the broad possibilities which suggest themselves as we search for such a new conceptual framework.

Perspectives of the Inter-American System

First, however, I would like to say a few words about how the inter-American system has evolved over the years and what it is today.

From one point of view the inter-American system is a set of rules, procedures, and practices that regulate the behavior of its 23 members—including the United States—among themselves.

From another perspective, however, the inter-American system is a body of rules, procedures, and practices that has as one of its principal purposes the shaping of the relationships between one member of the hemispheric community—the United States—and all of the other members of that community. For we must frankly recognize that the United States, perhaps by virtue of the accidents of history, has a special, almost unique, impact on all the other countries of the region. As one of my Latin American friends once remarked to me: "We nations of Latin America have many differences, but one of the things we have in common is the United States."

The inter-American system that has resulted, therefore, has been, at least in part, an attempt by the members of the Western Hemisphere community to cope with the fact that one member—the United States—has had economic, political, and military power to a much greater degree than that possessed by the other members.

The system, in my view, has been for most of its history rather successful in dealing with that fact of international life.

It has also provided an alliance in which the strength of the United States could to a

large extent be used to shield the countries of this hemisphere from external threat.

It has done more than that, however. The system, by consecrating in solemn international agreements the juridical equality of the United States with the other nations of the region, has also assisted the nations of Latin America in constraining and even regulating to some extent the international behavior of the United States.

At the same time, the system has also developed certain principles by which the United States has committed itself to use its greater resources to assist the other nations of the hemisphere in advancing their own economic and social development. The point 4 program, the International Cooperation Administration, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Alliance for Progress, and the Agency for International Development are but a few of the better known organizational examples of how U.S. economic resources have been marshaled for the benefit of Latin America.

Nor were the benefits of this arrangement one-sided, for the system has also afforded the United States an opportunity to further its own national interests by collective agreement and negotiation, rather than solely by unilateral action. The United States has long recognized that its own present and long-range interests are best served by the security and well-being of the other nations of the hemisphere.

Thus, the inter-American system that has evolved over the course of a century has been by and large—and with all its imperfections and shortcomings—a notably successful effort in adaptation by the nations of this hemisphere to the circumstances of international life. However, human life on this planet has always outdistanced the structures devised by men to regulate their relations with one another. And probably in no other era have changes in international relationships been as rapid and as far-reaching as in recent years.

What are these changed circumstances, and how have they affected the nations of this hemisphere?

Changes on the International Scene

One of the most profound changes that has occurred in the recent past is the end of the position of overwhelming economic superiority enjoyed by the United States for many decades.

We have seen the rise of Europe and Japan to the status of economic superpowers. We have seen the decline of the dollar as the basis for the international monetary and trading system developed after World War II. We have seen the U.S. economy moving from abundance—even overabundance—of energy resources, foodstuffs, and other commodities, to shortages and deficits.

These changes in the economic situation of the United States are bound to have profound consequences for Latin America. They mean that Latin America must look, not just to one developed country, but to all developed countries to share in the responsibility of providing that extra margin of resources from abroad that the region needs for its development. They mean that Latin America's relations with the European Economic Community and with Japan have taken on new importance—that Latin America is looking outward beyond the hemisphere for new opportunities in trade and investment. We regard this as healthy, as part of the broad movement toward a truly global system of trade and commerce.

This shift in the economic position of the United States also implies that this country must seek greater reciprocity in its economic relations with the rest of the world. By this I do not mean, of course, complete and full reciprocity in our economic intercourse with Latin America. It does seem to me, however, that we can no longer presume that, because of its greater relative wealth, the economic obligations between the United States and the other nations of the hemisphere all run one way.

Not only has there been a change in relative power relationships in recent years but there has been to some extent a redefinition of power itself. In large part, this redefinition has been brought about by the recognition of the unthinkability of nuclear war.

Whatever the reason, we now see the rise of states and of groups of states whose power is not measured by military capabilities alone but also by their economic dynamism and command of vital resources, not to mention their moral and intellectual force in the world.

This redefinition of power has opened up the prospects of a different kind of world from the one we have become accustomed to. It is, to use a familiar phrase, a multipolar world in which individual countries, sub-regional and regional blocs, can take their place alongside the military superpowers and play vigorous world roles.

The movement toward greater strength by regional cooperation is probably farthest advanced in Western Europe. Regional unity would seem to me, however, to offer highly important opportunities for other areas of the world as well, and especially Latin America.

There are already several efforts within Latin America toward subregional and regional cooperation which show great promise. In addition to the subregional efforts at economic integration, such as the Andean Pact, the Caribbean Free Trade Association, and the Central American Common Market, for example, we see an impressive capability among the Latin American and also the Caribbean states to formulate common positions on world and regional issues. It is quite easy to envisage a point between now and the end of this century when Latin America, or major parts of it, will have reached a degree of political cooperation and economic integration comparable to or surpassing that now enjoyed by the European Community.

In my opinion, greater cohesion and cooperation among Latin American states either

at the regional or subregional level should be regarded by the United States as a highly favorable development. If some of the problems in our relationships in the past have been due to a too dominant U.S. role in the hemisphere, then a stronger and more united Latin America will serve the best interests of all.

One of the most important and obvious changes on the international scene has been the replacement of the cold war by a movement toward détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. The accompanying relaxation of international tension—only temporarily threatened, I hope, by recent developments in the Middle East—has favorable implications for the entire world, Latin America not excepted.

Finally, there have been significant changes within the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean themselves. Nationalism, which has always been a dynamic force in Latin America, as elsewhere in the world, is in our day assuming new and potentially much more constructive and farther reaching dimensions. Many nations of Latin America have also broadened the concept of national security—quite rightly, in my view—to embrace overall economic development and social justice. They are also seeking better ways to express their national identities and personalities and to increase control of their own destinies.

The new openness and more forward-looking spirit in the world, the vastly increased opportunities for interaction between nations and groups of nations on a global scale through the movement of peoples, goods, and ideas, will certainly help the nations of Latin America in their quest for a fuller, richer, and more satisfying national life.

The changes in the international environment which I have attempted to describe mean that the inter-American community is at a truly historic crossroads.

Looking Ahead

In my opinion, the challenges which face the inter-American system require bold and imaginative solutions if our regional relationships are to reflect the new realities. It seems that we must devise new principles and procedures which reconcile the differing imperatives of our respective national circumstances with the growing interdependence among nations. Such an effort offers us both the possibility and the challenge of writing a major new chapter in the history of the Western Hemisphere.

Many of the ideas which have been put forward during the current deliberations of the OAS Special Committee, on which sit many distinguished and thoughtful members, have been inspired by just such a goal. Progress in the Special Committee has not been easy, but this should not surprise us. As the Secretary of State recently reminded us in his address to the *Pacem in Terris* Conference, international life consists of relations among sovereign countries, and to attempt to construct a body of principles that will regulate the behavior of such proud, independent, and quite different states—to attempt to legislate such behavior and to do so in a way that will stand the test of time—is an enormously difficult task, as history so amply demonstrates.

Let me assure you that the U.S. Government has reached no hard-and-fast conclusions regarding the future of its relationships in this hemisphere, except that they should evolve in a way that reflects the realities in the world and best serves the national interests of all our countries.

We look forward eagerly to the new, closer, high-level dialogue with our neighbors in this hemisphere. We shall listen to their views closely and carefully as we reformulate and develop our own policies. We do not wish to—nor could we—make any decisions unilaterally about the future course of this hemisphere to which we belong and which we cherish so deeply.

If we in the Western Hemisphere are to

break out into new ground in international relations, we must once again become pioneers.

We must embark on what Secretary Kissinger has characterized as a new adventure of free peoples, working together to establish a new set of relationships that will be an example to the other nations of the world—to find a new way of reconciling our differences and our inequalities so as to insure peace, progress, prosperity, and justice for all.

Secretary Kissinger Receives George Catlett Marshall Medal

Following are informal remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at Washington on October 17 upon receiving the George Catlett Marshall Medal of the Association of the United States Army.

Press release 356 dated October 18

We are now engaged in very serious, very openminded consultations with many countries, trying to bring about an end to the hostilities in the Middle East. So that this crisis through which we are now living is a test of the possibilities of diplomacy and of the real meaning of détente. Because it must be clear that while the United States is trying to make our nation safe from war, we will not do so at the price of making the rest of the world safe for war.

We believe that there exists an opportunity for a decent and just settlement, fair to all the parties, which must be reached first by bringing about an end to hostilities and then by a dedicated effort that will end the conditions that produced this current conflict.

This is our policy, which we will pursue with conviction and which we believe and hope will succeed.

No one would understand these purposes better than the man in whose honor this award was named. He was a master in the art of war, and he won equal acclaim for his

dedication in building peace. He demonstrated that one of the quotes of De Tocqueville, who was one of the keenest observers of the American scene, about the dilemmas of democracies in the conduct of foreign policy was wrong. De Tocqueville wrote that:

It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior There is (he said) a propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion.

This is indeed a great danger in democracies. But General Marshall, as Secretary of State, faced a nation tired of the sacrifices of war and reluctant to sacrifice for the maintenance of peace. With no clear vision of America's role in the world, partisan political considerations had begun to dominate postwar foreign as well as domestic affairs. But General Marshall's great contribution was to prove that democracies can conduct an effective foreign policy. He provided a new vision, making foreign policy an expression of national rather than partisan purpose. He induced Congress to share in its design, and he established the closest relations with Senator Vandenberg and other congressional leaders.

While every moment in history is unique, a few moments are similar in their openness to fundamental choice.

George Marshall faced the danger of a world descending into chaos, and he had the opportunity to build a new international order. The reconstruction of Europe, the creation of NATO, the rebuilding of Japan, the beginning of point 4, were major acts of statesmanship and substantially determined the course of the past quarter century.

Now we face another open moment in history, when once again we must clearly perceive the shape of the world and purposefully seek to shape it. And this moment indeed has come about because much of the vision that General Marshall represented has been fulfilled. It is due to the success of the policy he inspired.

In our relationship, particularly to Europe, which was shaped by a plan that bore his

name, we now must redesign that relationship in the face of new conditions.

Western Europe is no longer as weak as it was in the immediate postwar period and is able to assume a much greater political responsibility. The military vacuum that existed at the time has been filled to a considerable extent by the Atlantic coalition. The relationship with the Soviet Union, despite difficulties that exist at this moment, nevertheless gives hope that the danger of war has receded.

The unity of Europe, which they have forged and which we have supported, creates the need for a new set of economic relationships.

This is why we are now in the process of developing a new set of patterns and strategy in political relationship and economics in which we hope to be worthy of the vision that inspired General Marshall. Because if the nations of the Atlantic area, sharing similar traditions, having experienced many of the same agonies, and combining the same or very similar purposes, cannot work together, it is difficult to see how we can achieve cooperative relationships in a dynamic situation in other parts of the world.

And so it is around the globe.

Japan has recovered. In Southeast Asia, a new relationship has to be developed.

China, with which General Marshall's name was associated, has gone through a dramatic period and has reentered the international scene.

We have the opportunity to repeat his great tasks of construction. But we face it in a different environment.

At the time that General Marshall was Secretary of State, his wisdom was a bonus because the United States was physically so preponderant that we could overwhelm every problem with resources. We could always substitute our resources for thought. We were not in a position where we faced the danger of irretrievable error.

But today we face the problem of applying scarce resources to limited objectives. We require intelligence and vision and fore-

sight—not just as an accident of history but as a necessity for all times.

We also confront choices that are clouded by ambiguity.

A generation ago the challenges were clear, the alternatives were naked. Today the dangers appear less immediate, the choices less clear-cut.

We are therefore required to summon an unaccustomed ability to deal with nuance, to strive for what is good while never forgetting what is best. The America of De Tocqueville faced no such challenge. Even the America of General Marshall knew no such overwhelming need.

Now we have to decide: Were the achievements of General Marshall an interlude or an introduction, a passing moment of American maturity or the beginning of an era of great achievement?

Will we follow President Truman's wise advice, that peace is not a reward that comes automatically to those who cherish it; it must be pursued, increasingly and unswervingly, by every means at our command. This is the challenge that General Marshall summoned America to meet, and this is the summons we must once again answer.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Report, together with supplemental views, to accompany S. 1914. S. Rept. 93-356. July 27, 1973. 9 pp.

Endangered and Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1973. Report to accompany H.R. 37. H. Rept. 93-412. July 27, 1973. 40 pp.

Amending Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, and Authorizing a Trans-Alaska Oil and Gas Pipeline, and for Other Purposes. Report, together with dissenting, separate, and additional views, to accompany H.R. 9130. H. Rept. 93-414. July 28, 1973. 87 pp.

Six Amendments to the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960. Report to accompany Ex. I, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-12. August 1, 1973. 3 pp.

United States and Philippines Sign Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on October 5 (press release 361) that notes had been exchanged at Washington on September 27 and October 3 extending through December 31, 1976, the bilateral agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles between the United States and the Philippines. Willis C. Armstrong, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, and Mario C. Belisario, Philippine Embassy Chargé d'Affaires, signed the respective notes. (For texts of the notes, see press release 361.)

The aggregate level to which the Philippines will restrain exports of cotton textiles to the United States for the 12-month period beginning January 1, 1974, is 66,331,913 square yards equivalent. This level is 5 percent greater than the level for the preceding 12-month period.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.
Accession deposited: Pakistan, October 18, 1973.

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668.
Acceptance deposited: Poland, October 23, 1973.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-

treau September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, October 25, 1973.¹

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.²
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, October 25, 1973.

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6584). Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973.
Accepted by the President: October 9, 1973.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.²
Acceptance deposited: United States, October 17, 1973.

Postal Matters

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Ratification deposited: Burma, September 12, 1973.
Accession deposited: Mauritius, September 10, 1973.
Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agreement, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 1971. TIAS 7236.
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, July 6, 1973.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Proclaimed by the President: October 13, 1973, for articles 1 through 12.

¹ Applicable to the territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom, as well as the British Solomon Islands Protectorate.
² Not in force.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, October 25, 1973.

BILATERAL

Khmer Republic

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of July 25, 1973 (TIAS 7703). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh October 8, 1973. Entered into force October 8, 1973.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of July 25, 1973 (TIAS 7703). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh October 18, 1973. Entered into force October 18, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS

Department Issues Reference Volume on U.S. Diplomatic Representatives

The Department has issued a publication entitled "United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973," by Richardson Dougall and Mary Patricia Chapman, both officers of the Historical Office in the Bureau of Public Affairs. This 239-page paperbound book includes a tabular listing of American diplomatic representatives abroad from 1778 through March 31, 1973, arranged by country to which accredited. Representatives serving as chiefs of mission to international organizations, Ambassadors at Large, and Presidential appointees in the Department of State are also included. The publication includes an alphabetical listing of all persons included in the tables or in explanatory footnotes, giving for each officer full name, years of birth and death, and a chronological listing of posts mentioned in the volume.

Copies may be ordered from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520, at \$2.70 per copy (Department of State publication 8738; GPO cat. no. S1.69:147).

GPO Sales Publications

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Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$16.35; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$14.50; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 20¢ each.

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The Realities of the Western Hemisphere. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series is based on a statement made by Secretary of State William P. Rogers before the General Assembly of the Organization of American States at Washington, D.C., April 6, 1973. Pub. 8727. Inter-American Series 104. 5 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S1.26:104).

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Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Republic of China amending the agreement of December 30, 1971, as corrected. TIAS 7590. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7590).

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*391	10/26	Byroade sworn in as Ambassador to Pakistan (biographic data).
†392	10/26	Multilateral agreement reached on Atlantic fisheries.
*393	10/26	Duke Ellington and B.B. King to tour Africa.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's News Conference of October 26

Secretary Schlesinger: I thought that it was possible that you might have some questions that you would like to raise this morning, and I'm prepared to take them.

Q. Most of our NATO allies have apparently taken the position that they're not going to allow the United States to use their airspaces or their facilities for our effort to resupply Israel, and we can understand the individual reasons for doing that—it's not a NATO operation. Can you comment on reports that some of our NATO allies, particularly Turkey, have allowed overflights of Soviet aircraft to resupply the Arabs?

Secretary Schlesinger: I won't comment on the particular issue that you indicate.

Q. Can you repeat that. There is microphone trouble.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think we have had a demonstration in recent days of the importance of readiness. I wish that it were reflected better in this room.

The question referred to the suggestion that Turkey had permitted overflights by the Soviet Union. My response was that I would not comment on that particular allegation, but we will investigate all aspects of the responsiveness of various countries in this crisis and will take them into consideration in the future.

Q. Can you tell us what steps the Soviet Union was taking that led us to a military alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: I'll mention a number of them, but there were a plethora of indicators. We were aware that the Soviets had alerted comprehensively their airborne forces. In addition, the Soviet air was stood

down, I believe, starting on Monday, and diminished to zero flights on Tuesday. The standing down, along with the alerting of airborne units, plus certain ambiguous developments to which Dr. Kissinger referred yesterday, suggested the possibility of a movement that was unilateral on the part of the Soviet Union, and we took the normal precautions under those circumstances, adjusting our DEFCON [defense condition] status.

Q. You said that we took the normal circumstances—normal adjustments. It has been suggested, and I wonder if you'd comment, that in fact we took extra-firm, extra-quick reaction in order to leave no misunderstanding or no possibility of misunderstanding on the part of the Soviets that the President is still able to act despite his domestic difficulties. Would you comment on that?

Secretary Schlesinger: I would say that our reaction was timely; that it was not extra-quick. Given the indicators that existed, the reaction was taken at the appropriate time. On the question of comprehensiveness or firmness, opinions may differ with regard to that. I think that it's quibbling about details, however. I think that it was important in view of the circumstances that have raised a question or may have raised a question about the ability of the United States to react appropriately, firmly, and quickly, that this certainly scotched whatever myths may have developed with regard to that possibility.

Q. Can you tell us how long the alert is going to go on—U.S. alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: We have begun to phase down the alert. CINCSOUTH—the Southern Command—and the Alaskan Command went back to normal DEFCON status at 12 o'clock midnight last night. We will be making other adjustments as the circumstances warrant, as the President directs. I would expect that there may be some adjustments in the near term, but it will depend on the circumstances and the views of the President.

Q. Are there any other adjustments today, sir?

Secretary Schlesinger: It is certainly possible that there will be other adjustments made.

Q. Secretary General Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party] has said that Soviet representatives have already gone into the war zone. Do we have any indications of what they are—the numbers, types, et cetera?

Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviet representatives, I assume, would be associated with the observation teams to which Dr. Kissinger referred yesterday. They would not be Soviet combat forces. The need [is] for small numbers of people and any indications we have suggest that they would be in small numbers.

Q. Wasn't he talking about observers under the U.N. auspices, where the Russians evidently are talking about sending representatives to Egypt on request of [President Anwar] Sadat?

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure just what the Russian suggestion is. In the judgment of the U.S. Government, there should be no combat forces, major combat forces, introduced by any of the permanent members of the Security Council. Now, there may be small numbers of forces, of individuals rather than forces, who would be moving into the combat area—or recently the combat area, since at the present time all is quiet out there—and, hopefully, they would be associated with the U.N.-controlled observation teams.

Q. Has the airlift been resumed by the Soviet Union?

Secretary Schlesinger: The airlift of the Soviet Union is going on at the present time, much diminished from the prior level.

Q. Mr. Secretary, being an expert in the intelligence field, could you comment on the fact that we are spending \$3 billion a year on this and we come up with a big fat zero. Mr. Kissinger has to be waked out of a sound sleep to find out that this happened. He said that the other countries were caught flat-footed also. Could you comment on the efficacy of our intelligence effort in this area?

Secretary Schlesinger: As a general comment, intelligence with regard to the intentions as opposed to capabilities is a very difficult task, and one cannot expect to have to bat 1,000 in that area. The purpose of our intelligence expenditures is to improve, and substantially—and we believe it has substantially improved—the intelligence available to the United States. We had indications of the movements of forces. In the estimating process, of course, one must make that decision or come to a conclusion whether or not the forces will be utilized. I think that the technical performance—the technical performance of the intelligence agencies—cannot be criticized; in fact, it must be highly commended. There are always limitations in the performance, in the estimating process. I think that the technical performance of the intelligence community with regard to the indicators of the possibility of Soviet movement, rather than being a flat zero as your question implied, was extraordinarily good.

Q. Is it the administration view now that because the administration took a strong stand by declaring this alert it turned the Russians around?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that I would refrain from making so generalized a comment. I think that what we would say is that it was necessary to go on alert because of the possibility, the possibility of the

movement of forces in a certain region of the world, that the alert was necessitated by that movement of forces. The alert also had the function of demonstrating the strong belief of the U.S. Government that the movement that was being speculated on would be disadvantageous to the world's peace. Consequently, to the extent that that message was conveyed, I think that this has been a success. But I should stress that the selection of DEFCON III was a normal procedure under those circumstances.

Q. I would like to go into that a little bit. When you used the phrase earlier that the Soviet air was stood down—I don't understand what that means—I guess it's a technical military term. What does that mean, the Soviet air was stood down, and what are the implications of that?

Secretary Schlesinger: The implications of any standing down are that one must consider the possibility that those equipments are being mobilized for a new purpose.

Q. So the reading here was that the Soviets might be putting themselves in a position to move troops into the Middle East and you wanted to warn them not to do it. Is that correct?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think the first part of it is the correct reading. The second part is your inference, and you're welcome to it. I wouldn't confirm that.

Q. They wouldn't move a lot of airborne troops without some kind of air cover—fighter planes and things like that. Were there indications of that kind of alert as well? Did that tend to soften the concern any, or was it just felt that they didn't need that?

Secretary Schlesinger: As one will recognize, there has been major air transportation into the Middle East during the last three weeks. All of it has gone through unimpeded, so it was not judged that fighter cover would be a necessity.

Q. Once more, for the fourth time. Is there

anything that the Russians are now doing that prevents us from calling off the alert now? Why do we have to space out this call-up or alert or stage it out?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the answer to that is that we do not know at this stage whether the Soviets have reduced their alert status, we are carefully watching the circumstances, and that we are adjusting downward as the circumstances permit. Is that a complete answer to that question?

Q. You say we are carefully watching their alert status. Have they begun to adjust downward?

Secretary Schlesinger: As I indicated a moment ago, it is easier to determine when forces have been put on the alert than when that alert status has been terminated.

Q. What's the status of the American airlift to Israel right now?

Secretary Schlesinger: The American airlift is continuing.

Q. At what stage? Are we still at 20 flights a day?

Secretary Schlesinger: Approximately 20 flights a day. There has been no adjustment of the American airlift. It will continue until such time as sea transportation permits the discontinuation of the airlift. Because of the geographic proximity, Soviet sealift, which is now in high gear, has taken over in large measure from the airlift.

Q. Nothing that you have said, or Mr. Kissinger said yesterday, has indicated that Soviet nuclear or strategic forces were alerted. Why was it necessary to alert our SAC [Strategic Air Command] forces in connection with this Mideast crisis, given the nature of the fighting that has gone on in recent days and the type of troops—airborne troops—that were alerted by the Soviets? Why did we have to apparently, from what we can tell, escalate it into terms of nuclear forces?

Secretary Schlesinger: That is a precautionary measure, as I indicated. We chose

a DEFCON status that is an intermediate status. Under circumstances that existed at that time one wishes to have one's forces in enhanced readiness posture. This was, of course, not the highest readiness posture. We have had circumstances in the last 15 years in which we have gone into a higher readiness posture than was decided upon the other evening. The Soviet buildup of naval forces in the Mediterranean, associated with the possibility—the possibility of actions taking place that might have involved U.S. naval forces, leads one to take precautionary steps involved in putting all U.S. forces that could be involved in a higher state of readiness.

Q. Certain moves were taken during this alert which gave the implication that we were prepared to move paratroopers on our own side to the Middle East. This would indicate also a possible confrontation with paratroopers coming from Russia. Dr. Kissinger indicated that he was not ever thinking of such a confrontation. Why would you then alert the 82d Airborne for that purpose?

Secretary Schlesinger: A lot is tied up in your word "prepared." The increase in the readiness condition of U.S. forces may have been misunderstood by some in recent days. To increase the readiness condition does not mean that one is prepared to move those forces or, even more strongly, commit them to battle. We were, of course, in a position in which, if the circumstances required, we would have been prepared to move the 82d Airborne, but we were only putting ourselves in a readiness posture. And it is important to be in a readiness posture because frequently that removes the necessity of taking actions that might have to be considered if one were not in a readiness posture.

Q. [Inaudible] raise the possibility for the point, that you know of, that prior to their alert we had sent an additional helicopter carrier with marines into the Mediterranean and that you had attended a maneuver of

the 82d Airborne down in Fort Bragg. Did they say that those actions by the United States precipitated their alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: Not to my knowledge, but I would indicate that I would not care to comment upon the extent of diplomatic communications. That is a prerogative of Dr. Kissinger. The movement of the marines was a normal replacement of the marines in the Mediterranean. It was accelerated by a few days—I don't remember whether it was five days or so. There is a long voyage between here and the Mediterranean. One might regard that as a precautionary measure, but the basic answer to that, I think, is that this was part of a normal replacement. Similar activities have gone on with regard to the Soviet fleet. My visit to Brass Key II to which you referred had been laid on for some months.

Q. Can you give us to some degree the scenario leading up to this alert? The group here says that it was started at 12 o'clock (midnight); Dr. Kissinger said 3 o'clock (a.m.). I realize that there's a three-hour housekeeping maneuver, but did you make the decision by yourself or were you acting on the orders of the President or what?

Secretary Schlesinger: The meeting, and one is a little vague on times, started about 11 o'clock (p.m.). It may have been a little bit later than that.

Q. What meeting is this you are referring to?

Secretary Schlesinger: This was the meeting of the abbreviated National Security Council.

Q. Could you start by telling us who was there?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think most of the people who were there have been mentioned in their normal statutory capacities. Dr. Kissinger was there, Mr. Colby [William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence], Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff],

and myself. The meeting started at approximately 11 o'clock (p.m.) as I recall it. The decision to notify the commands of an enhanced readiness status was taken at approximately 11:30 (p.m.). There's a whole series of decisions that went on between approximately 11:30 (p.m.) and about 3:30 in the morning; somewhere around 2 o'clock (a.m.)—I don't remember the precise time—Admiral Moorer and I returned to the Pentagon in which further action was taken to complete the package of measures that were undertaken at that time. The initial decision was made by myself, however, at approximately 11:30 (p.m.), and I instructed Admiral Moorer to go ahead with the enhanced readiness condition.

Q. Had you talked with the President at this time?

Secretary Schlesinger: I had not talked with the President at that moment. Dr. Kissinger had, I believe, just spoken with the President. The President was in complete command at all times during the course of that evening.

Q. Was he aware that you had alerted the troops?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, sir.

Q. Did he approve that?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, indeed. As Dr. Kissinger indicated, he approved the entire package about 3 o'clock in the morning.

Q. Could you tell us what it was, according to our assessment, that led the Russians to make a move toward moving troops into the Middle East?

Secretary Schlesinger: I would be inclined not to speculate on motives regarding events that did not take place. The Soviets did not move any forces. There were, as I indicated, some actions that increased our wariness and some ambiguous diplomatic signals to which Dr. Kissinger referred, but those events did not take place. You can speculate for yourself with regard to the kinds of dis-

cussions that might have been ongoing in the Kremlin during that period of time.

Q. Would you tell us how many Soviet troops were alerted and characterize their state of alert? Also, outside of those troops and the potential for a Soviet airlift of troops, were there any other indicators that caused us to go on our own alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, sir, there were additional indicators—some of them, as I have indicated, in the diplomatic area, but there were also additional military indicators in this area.

Q. What were they?

Secretary Schlesinger: I believe I mentioned the enhancement of the Soviet naval forces. They are now up to about 85 ships in the Mediterranean, which is approximately double the normal level of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. In addition, there were a number of other indicators of military intelligence nature into which I shan't go.

Q. What about the number of men involved?

Q. And troops in state of readiness?

Secretary Schlesinger: It was a comprehensive alerting of the Soviet airborne.

Q. Where?

Secretary Schlesinger: I will refrain from answering that at the present time.

Q. How many divisions?

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not going to go into the Soviet force structure.

Q. It wasn't a comprehensive alert of all their forces—

Secretary Schlesinger: No, the airborne.

Q. There are some reports that roughly 50,000 airborne were alerted—the Soviets. Is that a rough approximation?

Secretary Schlesinger: As a matter of fact, I'm not sure of the precise number, but that number is in about the right ballpark.

Q. One other question: Their (Soviet) two

helicopter carriers—did they go into the Mediterranean?

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't believe so; I can check on that.

Q. Are they still moving around the Black Sea?

Secretary Schlesinger: I've indicated, I think, the full extent of the activities.

Q. Could you tell us why the U.S. Government viewed the apparent decision, or tentative decision, of the Soviets to send forces in as a peacekeeping measure when they combined that with an appeal to us to send troops in—I mean, why did we think this was such a dangerous thing? They've had 15,000 troops there before, and they said they were going just to secure peace.

Secretary Schlesinger: You are dealing with a hypothetical question, once again. I think that the movement of Soviet forces, the postulated movement of Soviet forces, which is designed, ostensibly designed, to restrain the behavior of one of the nations engaged in military hostilities, with the possible longrun implications of such stationing of forces, is not something that would be conducive to the development of what is the fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy—which is a stable and permanent settlement in the Middle East.

Q. If you could just clarify, earlier you said, I think, that the CINCSOUTH was making adjustment. Now, why would a NATO command be involved in this type of thing? Did you misspeak?

Secretary Schlesinger: SOUTHCOM.

Q. Both you and Secretary Kissinger have gone to great lengths to indicate that we were not at the brink of war at any time. There are many questions still left unanswered regarding your intelligence estimates as to Russian moves. Is there any way you could help us clear some of this up? It's still ambiguous. I myself am not clear how close we were to actually coming to a confrontation.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think we were very far away from a confrontation—

Q. I couldn't hear the question.

Secretary Schlesinger: The questioner wished to obtain some assurance with regard to the issue of how close we were to a confrontation, and I indicated that we were very far away from a confrontation. If the question refers to a military confrontation, under the circumstances I think that we were taking the actions that were necessary to preclude the development of a military confrontation. Now, there were, of course, some elements of confrontation in the sense of political adversaries. They were, I think, as Dr. Kissinger indicated the other day, a normal development that occurs between great powers which have considerations in which they are in conflict and also considerations which force them toward a common approach to problems.

I think that this whole episode indicates the limitations, in a sense, of détente, but it also indicates the strength of détente. The fact that Dr. Kissinger, with considerable skill, I must say, a great deal of energy, was able to work out in collaboration with the Soviets the arrangement for two cease-fires, is, I think, a tribute to the strength of détente—the communications that existed between the two so-called superpowers. However, of course, there were some elements of conflict but the overall episode did indicate some of the strengths of détente and some of the advantages to both sides—and to the world at large—in this relaxation of tension. I should underscore that détente refers to mutual relaxation of tension and that détente must be a two-way street, as in the close of this episode it turned out to be.

Q. Was part of the formula, as it existed around 11 to 11:30 (p.m.), that there were Soviet transports en route and we didn't know whether they had troops but given all the other circumstances we felt we couldn't take the chance that there were troops aboard those planes?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that there were mixed reactions and different assessments of the probability. I think that the probability of Soviet forces being en route was considered by some to be quite low but that the probability might rise was a matter of concern universally.

Q. [Inaudible] thought those planes were en route might have troops on them?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, indeed, as I indicated that there is a different assessment of probabilities by different individuals. So that when you say that they might have troops aboard, nobody under those circumstances could dismiss that as a possibility no matter how low he placed the probability.

Q. Could you tell us when exactly you first learned that the seven Soviet airborne divisions, or whatever the force may have been, had been placed in an alert status? Wasn't that some time back, about the time Kosygin [Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers] was in Cairo—quite a way back?

Secretary Schlesinger: It was in an earlier point; I don't remember the precise day. I think that one must recognize that in these assessments it's a pulling together of a number of strands. While the airlift is fully preoccupied, quite obviously that is of lesser importance than when there is a standdown. Simultaneously, if there are diplomatic signals that cause wariness, that adds to the total picture. But you are quite right.

Q. Is he right, was it several days before that when you first learned about it?

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't remember precisely the number of days or even whether it was days rather than a day. But it had occurred earlier.

Q. Let me jog your memory on that. Our colleague Joe Alsop reported that on either the 19th or 20th of this month that an airborne division was alerted.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would not raise any question about the authenticity of the comments of any of your colleagues. I don't

remember the precise day. I think that the statement is correct. We can probably check on that for you.

Q. We've had a situation over the past two weeks where our client state got into trouble. We sent in nearly a billion dollars' worth of military equipment to help it out. We then got a cease-fire; our client state took advantage of the cease-fire to strengthen its position on the west bank, to encircle the 3d Army. It plunged us into a one-day crisis with our major adversary. What does this all say about our future relations with Israel, and specifically, what are we telling Israel now as to what it should do on that 3d Army?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the answer to your final question will be eminently satisfactory, but I cannot give it to you now. With regard to our posture in general, I would not use the term "client state," particularly in an exclusive sense. Our purpose has been to restore peace to the area and to maintain a balance so that there can be some stabilization in an area which over the past 25 years has had a notably tragic history. I think that it is evident that in order to have a long-term settlement, the relationship between Israel and her neighbors must be based on something far broader than a military preponderance by the State of Israel. In the working out of that relationship, which we hope has been fostered by the total resolution of the United Nations, the agreement of the parties to negotiate one with another for the first time in many years—for the first time since 1948 in effect—will be instrumental in bringing about the kinds of stable relationships, or increased stability in those relationships. The United States desires stability in the area, equity for all parties in the area, protection of the security of all parties; and consequently, I would tend to adapt the assumptions that underlay your question. The United States has sought to achieve a degree of balance—sometimes the phrase "evenhandedness" is employed—with regard to the countries in the area.

Longrun stability, however, would not have been achieved if Israel had been inundated after the war started on October 6. The United States delayed, deliberately delayed, the start of its resupply operations hoping that a cease-fire could be implemented quickly. Soviet resupply operations started on the 10th of October, if I remember correctly. We hoped that we could discourage that activity on the part of the Soviets and that once again we could bring an immediate cease-fire. By the morning of the 13th, it was evident, I think, that without resupply there would be extreme difficulty in maintaining a balance. There were some who believed that the existence of the State of Israel was seriously compromised and therefore in order to achieve what is our objective—a longrun settlement with equity for all parties—that that action was necessitated on the part of the United States. But the United States, I think, seeks to have in the Middle East a condition of stability and a condition in which the rights of all parties are respected. I hope that many of the nations in the Middle East, without regarding themselves as our clients, regard themselves to a high degree friends and partners of the United States.

Q. How much equipment have we sent to Israel and how much will we send?

Secretary Schlesinger: At the present time, I think we have delivered approximately 10,000 tons directly.

Q. What is that in terms of dollars?

Secretary Schlesinger: About \$850 million at this stage.

Q. You mean we stopped since last Friday? The White House said it was \$825 million then.

Secretary Schlesinger: You can get the precise number; I think it's about \$850 million.

Q. How much will we deliver in terms of dollars before we stop the resupply?

Secretary Schlesinger: There is a tendency in these kinds of deliveries for high-

value items to be delivered at an earlier point in time so that the value per ton tends to decline with the passage of time. I'm sorry I did not answer your full question. What was the rest of the question?

Q. What will be the total value?

Secretary Schlesinger: The President has asked for a supplemental of \$2.2 billion. We do not know whether that is the precise requirement.

Q. Does your remark just now indicate that we have completed delivery of expensive items such as planes, tanks? There'll be no more?

Secretary Schlesinger: No, what my remark suggested was that in the immediate environment after the 13th of October, that certain high-value consumables and subsequently certain replacement items were delivered. For the time being there is a reduction in the flow of such items and there is more of a flow of consumables.

Q. Is there a tentative cutoff date for the American airlift? Do you have a date in mind by which you can complete it?

Secretary Schlesinger: For the airlift? I can't give you a precise date, but it could go on. I gave you an imprecise date—at the point that the sealift begins to take over which should be in about two to three weeks' time.

Q. How are we going to create this condition of stability that you talked about in that area if we pump in 2 billion dollars' worth of arms and rearm the Israelis and Russia pumps in numbers of rubles of arms and re-arms the Egyptians and Syrians and equips them to fight all over again? What kind of a fruitful policy is that?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that it's quite obvious from your question that if that were the sole basis of policy on our part or on the part of the recipient states or the supplier states, that it would be difficult to obtain the kind of longrun settlement to which we have both referred. The settlement must be based upon restraint and

balance on the part of the supplier nations, but most fundamentally on the development of a political relationship that can only come from direct negotiations and from the beginning of the appreciation of both parties in the conflict of the requirements that the other party sees which are fundamental and those that can be compromised.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one point about the timing, I hadn't known before our meeting here that you had known for some time about the Soviet alert of its airborne forces. In the light of that, what specific thing caused this 11 o'clock meeting of the National Security Council; what was the immediate precipitating factor; what had been learned that led to that late night meeting?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the direct precipitating cause falls in that area that we have not discussed and I do not wish to go into, which relates to ambiguous signals that caused increased wariness. These were not of a military nature.

Q. Are our deliveries by sea and air going to proceed more or less with those of the Russians?

Secretary Schlesinger: Our deliveries are based upon our assessment of what the requirements are to maintain a balance in the area. As you are aware, the American airlift was based upon that premise as was the provision of certain equipments. In tonnage, this is less than the tonnage that was carried initially by the Soviet airlift. In addition, the Soviets are moving about 60,000 tons at the present time by sea. We have moved little by sea ourselves at this stage. There have been a number of Israeli vessels that have begun to move certain equipments by sea, but I believe that the total movement is about 10,000 tons. So, once again it's much smaller.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to Southern and Alaskan Commands, can you say what portion of U.S. forces they represent; does that mean nuclear forces are still on alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: Nuclear forces; let me underscore once again that we have a

scaled set of postures ranging from DEFCON V to DEFCON I. We have chosen an intermediate readiness posture. As a matter of fact, for most of the forces concerned, we regard it as a minimum or the lowest degree of readiness that was required by those circumstances. So when you use the phrase "alert," all we are referring to is enhanced readiness of a moderate degree. That has not as yet been changed. As I indicated earlier, we will begin, I think, to make selective adjustments in the readiness posture of all of our forces, including the Strategic Air Command, as the circumstances warrant and in response to the directives of the President.

Q. You've gone through an elaborate discussion of all the military reasons for the alert and then you say, however, none of these reasons was the precipitating cause of the alert and you're not going to tell us what that reason was. I think you owe us an obligation to give us some idea about those ambiguous statements that the other—

Secretary Schlesinger: I do not think that that would be in the interest of the American public at that time or the question of world peace. As my response to an earlier question indicated, the episode has underscored the strengths of détente, it has also underscored its limitations, and consequently in a matter so delicate it would seem to me to be inappropriate at this time to go any further into the kinds of matters to which you refer. I indicated that it was of a non-military nature.

Q. I gather from what you said in answer to your first question that we are disappointed with the behavior or the actions of most of our NATO allies and that this may influence us in things like military aid, et cetera, in the future. Is that a correct interpretation? You said we would take this into account in planning our future actions.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that obviously that the circumstances force one—any new set of circumstances forces one—to consider established notions, estab-

lished doctrine. We maintain our forces in Germany, to cite one example, because it provides us with enhanced readiness. The reactions of the Foreign Ministry of Germany raised some questions about whether they view readiness in the same way that we view readiness, and consequently we will have to reflect on that matter.

U.S. Urges North Viet-Nam To End Violations of Paris Agreement

Following is a U.S. note delivered to the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on October 26. The note was also delivered to other participants in the International Conference on Viet-Nam.

Press release 394 dated October 30

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam of January 27, 1973.

The United States refers to recent statements by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam that the United States is illegally providing military assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam and states that these charges are without any foundation and intended to mask the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's own continuing violations of the Paris Agreement. The United States draws the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's attention to the fact that, as set forth in the United States note of April 20, 1973, to the signatories of the March 2, 1973, Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam and in the United States note to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam dated September 10, 1973, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam side has shipped vast quantities of war material into South Viet-Nam since January 28 in

violation of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement.¹

The United States notes that also in contravention of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam side has dispatched large numbers of North Vietnamese troops into South Viet-Nam since January 28, 1973. Some of these troops entered South Viet-Nam by crossing the Demilitarized Zone in violation of Article 15(b) of the Agreement, while others entered through Laos and Cambodia, violating Article 20(a).

The United States further notes that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has failed to honor its commitment in the Joint Communiqué of June 13 to designate three additional points of entry and to discuss in the Two-Party Joint Military Commission modalities for the supervision of the replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement.

In addition, because of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam side's failure to cooperate with the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and to provide it assistance and protection as required by Article 10 of the ICCS Protocol, the ICCS has been unable to station and maintain teams at certain locations where Article 4(d) of the ICCS Protocol requires that such teams be stationed: Gio Linh, Lao Bao, Duc Co and Xa Mat. In consequence of these failures by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to honor its commitments under the Paris Agreement and its Protocols, the machinery provided for in the Agreement to supervise replacement of war materials by the two South Vietnamese parties has never been established. Responsibility for the lack of supervision of, and control over, import of war materials into South Viet-Nam lies entirely with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

The United States urges the Democratic

¹ For texts of the notes, see BULLETIN of May 14, 1973, p. 599, and Oct. 1, 1973, p. 423.

Republic of Viet-Nam side to remedy this dangerous situation by ceasing all violations of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement; by at once formally designating three additional points of entry; by at once beginning discussions in the Two-Party Joint Military Commission regarding the modalities for the supervision of the replacement of war materials permitted under Article 7; and by immediately inviting the ICCS to send its teams to Gio Linh, Lao Bao, Duc Co, and Xa Mat, providing them with suitable quarters and other amenities. Only in this way can Article 7 of the Paris Agreement be implemented and violations by either side be prevented.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam will recognize that it has a grave responsibility in this matter and that on the course it elects to follow the prospects for lasting peace in Viet-Nam will depend.

Funds Requested for U.S. Contribution to Multilateral Lending Institutions

*Message From President Nixon*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

As their role in conveying financial assistance to developing countries has steadily enlarged in recent years, multilateral lending institutions have become vital to our hopes for constructing a new international economic order.

One of the most important of these institutions is the International Development Association, a subsidiary of the World Bank that provides long-term loans at low interest rates to the world's poorest nations. During the 13 years of its operation, IDA has provided over \$6.1 billion of development credits to nearly 70 of the least developed countries of the world. Two dozen countries have contributed funds for this effort.

By next June, however, the International

Development Association will be out of funds unless it is replenished. As a result of an understanding reached in recent international negotiations, I am today proposing to the Congress that the United States join with other major industrialized nations in pledging significant new funds to this organization. Specifically, I am requesting that the Congress authorize for future appropriation the sum of \$1.5 billion for the fourth replenishment of IDA. Initial payments would be made in fiscal year 1976 and the full amount would be paid out over a period of years.

I am also requesting that the Congress authorize an additional \$50 million for the Special Funds of the Asian Development Bank. The bank is one of the major regional banks in the world that complements the work of the International Development Association and the World Bank.

Legislation for both of these authorities is being submitted to the Congress today by the Secretary of the Treasury.

STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Just over a year ago, in September 1972 at the annual meeting in Washington of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, I stressed the urgent need to build a secure structure of peace, not only in the political realm but in the economic realm as well. I stated then that the time had come for action across the entire front of international economic problems, and I emphasized that recurring monetary crises, incorrect alignments, distorted trading arrangements, and great disparities in development not only injured our economies, but also created political tensions that subvert the cause of peace. I urged that all nations come together to deal promptly with these fundamental problems.

I am happy to be able to report that since that 1972 meeting, we have made encouraging progress toward updating and revising the basic rules for the conduct of international financial and trade affairs that have guided us since the end of World War II.

¹ Transmitted to the Congress on Oct. 31 (White House press release).

Monetary reform negotiations, begun last year, are now well advanced toward forging a new and stronger international monetary system. A date of July 31, 1974, has been set as a realistic deadline for completing a basic agreement among nations on the new system.

Concurrently, we are taking the fundamental steps at home and abroad that will lead to needed improvement in the international trading system. On September 14, while meeting in Tokyo, the world's major trading nations launched new multilateral trade negotiations which could lead to a significant reduction of world trade barriers and reform of our rules for trade. The Congress is now considering trade reform legislation that is essential to allow the United States to participate effectively in these negotiations.

ESSENTIAL ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

While there is great promise in both the trade and monetary negotiations, it is important that strong efforts also be made in the international effort to support economic development—particularly in providing reasonable amounts of new funds for international lending institutions.

A stable and flexible monetary system, a fairer and more efficient system of trade and investment, and a solid structure of cooperation in economic development are the essential components of international economic relations. We must act in each of these interdependent areas. If we fail or fall behind in one, we weaken the entire effort. We need an economic system that is balanced and responsive in all its parts, along with international institutions that reinforce the principles and rules we negotiate.

We cannot expect other nations—developed or developing—to respond fully to our call for stronger and more efficient trading and monetary systems, if at the same time we are not willing to assume our share of the effort to ensure that the interests of the poorer nations are taken into account. Our position as a leader in promoting a more

reasonable world order and our credibility as a negotiator would be seriously weakened if we do not take decisive and responsible action to assist those nations to achieve their aspirations toward economic development.

There are some two dozen non-communist countries which provide assistance to developing countries. About 20 percent of the total aid flow from these countries is now channeled through multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank group—which includes IDA—and the regional development banks.

These multilateral lending institutions play an important role in American foreign policy. By encouraging developing countries to participate in a joint effort to raise their living standards, they help to make those countries more self reliant. They provide a pool of unmatched technical expertise. And they provide a useful vehicle for encouraging other industrialized countries to take a larger responsibility for the future of the developing world, which in turn enables us to reduce our direct assistance.

The American economy also benefits from our support of international development. Developing countries today provide one-third of our raw material imports, and we will increasingly rely upon them in the future for essential materials. These developing countries are also good customers, buying more from us than we do from them.

NEW PROPOSALS FOR MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE

Because multilateral lending institutions make such a substantial contribution to world peace, it must be a matter of concern for the United States that the International Development Association will be out of funds by June 30, 1974, if its resources are not replenished.

The developing world now looks to the replenishment of IDA's resources as a key test of the willingness of industrialized, developed nations to cooperate in assuring the fuller participation of developing countries in the international economy. At the Nairobi meeting of the World Bank last month, it

was agreed by 25 donor countries to submit for approval of their legislatures a proposal to authorize \$4.5 billion of new resources to IDA. Under this proposal, the share of the United States in the replenishment would drop from 40 percent to 33 percent. This represents a significant accomplishment in distributing responsibility for development more equitably. Other countries would put up \$3 billion, twice the proposed United States contribution of \$1.5 billion. Furthermore, to reduce annual appropriations requirements, our payments can be made in installments at the rate of \$375 million a year for four years, beginning in fiscal year 1976.

We have also been negotiating with other participating nations to increase funds for the long-term, low-interest operation of the Asian Development Bank. As a result of these negotiations, I am requesting the Congress to authorize \$50 million of additional contributions to the ADB by the United States—beyond a \$100 million contribution already approved. These new funds would be associated with additional contributions of about \$350 million from other nations.

MEETING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES

In addition to these proposals for pledging future funds, I would point out that the Congress also has before it appropriations requests for fiscal year 1974—a year that is already one-third completed—for bilateral and multilateral assistance to support our role in international cooperation. It is my profound conviction that it is in our own best interest that the Congress move quickly to enact these pending appropriations requests. We are now behind schedule in providing our contributions to the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, so that we are not keeping our part of the bargain. We must show other nations that the United States will continue to meet its international responsibilities.

All nations which enjoy advanced stages

of industrial development have a grave responsibility to assist those countries whose major development lies ahead. By providing support for international economic assistance on an equitable basis, we are helping others to help themselves and at the same time building effective institutions for international cooperation in the critical years ahead. I urge the Congress to act promptly on these proposals.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 31, 1973.*

U.S.-Denmark Extradition Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Nixon*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Denmark, signed at Copenhagen on June 22, 1972. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

The Treaty is one of a new series of extradition treaties being negotiated by the United States and contains provisions for offenses of aircraft hijacking, narcotics, and conspiracy to commit listed offenses.

The Treaty will make a significant contribution to the international effort to control narcotics traffic. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 30, 1973.*

¹ Transmitted on Oct. 30 (White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. U, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which included the text of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

Science and Technology and World Economic Affairs

*Address by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

In my remarks today I would like to consider with you the national stake in technological innovation and in the strengthening of our country's scientific and technological position and their close connection with our international relations and our economic strength and posture in the world.

Until recently our research funding and the level of our scientific education were taken as insuring for the future the technological and industrial leadership we had enjoyed in the past. In the private sector, the remarkable American record of technological innovation in the past seemed to offer assurance of our future competitiveness.

Then, toward the end of the 1960's, the downward trend of our balance of trade called into question many assumptions we had been making—including our assumptions about technology. It became clear that we had relied too heavily on a long lead and heavy funding in a few conspicuous areas and forgotten that commercial competition is waged in terms of thousands of items in many markets.

Our balance of trade involves more, of course, than the state of our technology. Productivity, quality, and price were—and remain—important factors. Successive devaluations of the dollar are serving as an important corrective, and our efforts to reduce trade barriers can also play a significant role.

But today we consider none of these more important than supporting science to nourish

technology and enlisting our technology to pay our way in the world and to meet the world's development and environmental needs. No traces of overconfidence or complacency are to be found in government today. And I trust that none is to be found in the private sector; for although the government's view and efforts have broadened, it is to the private sector that we must look to reinvigorate our competitiveness in these "thousands of items in many markets" that have a marked effect on our balance of trade and to produce the energy, the environmental progress, and the development of poor nations which are fundamental to peace and prosperity in the world.

While our position has weakened on many fronts of the trade competition, we have remained strong in the export of "technology-intensive" products. Sophisticated products, including components and equipment, continue to contribute importantly to our balance of trade in manufactures: Some \$8 billion in 1972 came from nonelectric machinery, machine tools, farm machinery, printing and reproduction equipment, aircraft and aircraft parts, and computers and parts.

If we look beyond the balance of trade to receipts from royalties and fees, we find an additional benefit from technology. In 1972 our royalty and fee earnings from foreign subsidiaries and licensees were in net surplus by \$2.8 billion. Whether the technology involved should all be counted as "advanced" is perhaps open to question, given the inadequacy of data. Nonetheless, these earnings clearly accrued from technology that

¹ Made before the Industrial Research Institute at Chicago, Ill., on Oct. 17.

has not been made obsolete in the market in which it is employed.

Looking to the future, there is another way in which advanced technology will have an important bearing on our international economic situation: through assisting in meeting the mounting demand for energy and raw materials, and accomplishing this in ways which will not further despoil the environment.

The United States has an enormous economic stake in science and technology. As we look ahead, we can see that the outflow of dollars necessary to bring in from abroad the fuel and the raw materials needed to keep our plants and households going and to maintain our living standards will grow sharply.

Looking at our own economy and at the policies of other nations, we see forces and programs which will put still heavier responsibilities on our high-technology industries and our engineering and managerial skills. Our economy is increasingly a service economy. Two out of three of us work in service industries. Only one out of three of us work in producing the goods which are the main substance of world trade.

We find our chief competitors, Japan and the European Community, with more or less conscious plans to shift labor-intensive, energy-intensive, and fuel-intensive industries beyond their boundaries—to Taiwan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. At the same time we see them developing policies to subsidize and otherwise promote the development of high-technology industries at home—aircraft, computers, nuclear power, communications equipment, and so on.

Many of our own corporations find it necessary to shift labor-intensive industries to Latin America and Asia in order to meet world competition. At the same time, the Soviet Union and the oil-rich Persian Gulf states are seeking to attract industries which find a significant economic advantage in cheap power and proximity to raw materials which they have to import in order to manu-

facture in the United States. These are fundamental economic forces which are loose in the world. We will have to adjust to them, and we will have to look to science and technology to fill the gap in our employment and national earning power which seems likely to arise from these forces.

As this implies, our position in the world economy hinges on:

—The export of products incorporating advanced technology;

—The international diffusion of advanced technology; and

—The introduction within the United States of technological advances whose effects will reach beyond the domestic economy.

International Transfer of Technology

What is the government doing to promote continuing technological innovation? Dr. Stever [H. Guyford Stever, Science Adviser to President Nixon] has dealt with funding basic and applied science and programs to stimulate innovation. Let me discuss the State Department activities in developing a worldwide climate making for a satisfactory flow of technology and for international cooperation in science and its application.

Most of our specific concerns with technology arise from its proposed or ongoing transfer to foreign countries or foreign industry. In an open society and close-knit world, it's neither desirable nor possible to completely shut off the flow and diffusion of technology, nor can the flow always be completely turned on. Whether across divisional boundaries in your own company or across national boundaries, the management of technology transfer is an elusive, complex process. It challenges the best talent available in your organizations even under favorable circumstances.

Our mutual objectives are to assure the adequacy of controls and mechanisms for the protection of private and government technology, the appropriate payment for private and government technology, and the develop-

ment of guidelines that represent U.S. national interests, short-term and long-term. This requires attention to questions of national security, economics, domestic employment, and business interests. Doing this in a dynamic environment of international relations and commitments is an extremely difficult and complex task. There is now a broad effort in several government agencies to evolve such an understanding, with a vigorous level of discussion indicative of the importance of the problem.

To protect our technology and enhance its application and value, we work:

- To secure patent protection abroad;
- To secure fair treatment of foreign branches and affiliates of U.S. corporations;
- To preclude the emergence abroad of industrial standards which could serve as non-tariff barriers or lead to a mismatch of different segments of global systems (such as those in the telecommunications field); and
- To obtain fair value for our technology.

U.S. Private Industry and the U.S.S.R.

Now let me quickly, by way of an example or two, deal with both government and business cooperation and international cooperation. An exceptional recent instance of vital cooperation between government and your organization occurred in the evolving U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade relationships, stemming from the 1972 summit agreements on trade, science and technology, environment, and space. Since 1972 the U.S. Government and private industry have increasingly explored useful and profitable ways of doing business with the Soviet Union. There is no question but that the Soviets are intensely interested in American technology. In the agreements with the U.S.S.R., both governments pledged to find ways for establishing mutually beneficial relationships in science and technology. Such cooperation can be governmental or private and commercial.

The Soviet Union fully recognized the importance of American industry in this proc-

ess. The State Committee for Science and Technology (SCST) in recent months has signed agreements with 13 American companies, all of which make reference to the May 24, 1972, science and technology agreement.

While this is a matter primarily between U.S. private industry and the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, the U.S. Government also has a major interest in seeing that the relationships between the powerful and well-coordinated SCST and individual companies are carried out in conformance with U.S. national interests.

We discussed this matter with the officials of the Industrial Research Institute, and the suggestion was made that a letter be sent to some 220 member firms of IRI which represent 90 percent of the research conducted by medium- and high-technology companies in the United States. The letter was sent by the President's Science Adviser, Dr. Stever, and was accompanied by a letter from the president of IRI urging cooperation with the government in providing on a strictly voluntary basis information on their relationships with the SCST. The U.S. Government offered to make information obtained from these replies available to the companies and offered assistance to American companies dealing with the SCST. The responses to Dr. Stever's and Dr. [Herbert I.] Fusfeld's letters have been most gratifying, and we want to especially thank IRI for its fine part in this cooperative effort.

We have received about 125 replies, and we can expect that others will continue to come in. The Department of State, Dr. Stever's office, and the Bureau of East-West Trade of the Department of Commerce have carefully analyzed these replies and in addition have interviewed in depth senior executives of about 10 companies. From these analyses we have drawn some tentative conclusions:

1. Thirteen firms have signed agreements with the SCST. About 20 additional firms are engaged in exchanges of visiting groups

from which additional agreements may emerge.

2. Eighty percent of those responding have stated they have no present negotiations or discussions.

3. None of the responses showed any reluctance to respond to the government's request for information. Rather, there has been often expressed appreciation for information and a desire to continue to cooperate.

4. Further tentative conclusions might be cited:

a. Clearly, the Soviets have been active, but apparently the SCST is highly selective as to with whom they finally sign agreements. U.S. firms for the most part find that negotiations and arrangements for visits are lengthy and tedious.

b. The Soviets are not concentrating (with the possible exception of the computer industry) on any particular industrial sector. The Soviets seem to be interested in research-intensive industry and prefer large firms, especially multinationals and conglomerates.

c. The SCST, in the eyes of American companies, appears to become increasingly powerful and a principal means through which business with the Soviets must be carried out in high-technology areas.

d. With few exceptions, the Soviets have shown interest in buying American high technology but have been less than forthcoming in making reciprocal offers.

As you explore further business opportunities with the Soviet Union, we would appreciate your continuing to keep us informed so that we in turn may be of greater assistance to you in your dealings with the U.S.S.R.

Energy Research and Development

Another area I would like to touch on, in which international cooperation can be vital, is energy R. & D. Within the U.S. Government we have completed a first pass at evaluating the projects and the capabilities of the major industrial governments in work-

ing on new sources, reduced environmental impact, and more efficient use and transmission of energy. This is the basis for our bilaterally sitting down with these nations and determining if and where we can develop joint R. & D. projects which can contribute to the solution of our energy problems. At the same time we are working with the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to develop on an urgent basis an evaluation of the status and relative priorities of energy research in the OECD member countries. This report, which will identify gaps in research or areas of insufficient coverage, should provide a basis for and encourage increased cooperation between countries—at both governmental and industrial levels—on the research and development aspects of energy problems.

Two findings in this work will be of special significance to you:

1. The U.S. Government doesn't know all that it should about domestic energy R. & D. in the private sector and the extent of communication and cooperation in this field between U.S. industry and its counterparts abroad.

2. If an expanded program of international cooperation is to succeed, private industry—with its technological skills and great experience—must be brought in to play a major role.

The questions that need to be addressed are:

1. What, if anything, should the U.S. Government do to encourage and facilitate the U.S. industry efforts to support the government objective of increasing international cooperation in energy R. & D.?

2. What are the barriers, if any, to effective industrial international cooperation? Are there restrictions or impediments by legislation, taxation, or antitrust that affect the role of industry?

The Industrial Research Institute's Federal Science and Technology Committee has already had initial conversations with Mr. [Nelson F.] Sievering, Deputy Director

of the Department of State's Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, and his staff in an effort to assist us in assessing the role of private industry in international cooperation in energy R. & D.

One of the difficulties we face in the broad area of attitudes and policies regarding the international transfer of technology is specifying the national interests involved—which are frequently conflicting—and establishing their appropriate priorities. We must, of course, protect our national security. Where our proper course lies as regards our industrial competitiveness in the world market has been widely debated. We do not believe in protectionism as the basis for continued U.S. leadership in advanced technology. You know, better than most, that continued technological leadership in a dynamic economy rests on our own innovative capabilities and not on attempts to weaken or limit the technological enterprise of other nations. When the benefits of our own enterprise are made available to others, we do ask that the quid pro quo include an appropriate financial recompense for the R. & D. investments, public and private, which we have made. This is essential to our continued innovative efforts.

As we develop appropriate precepts for assessing the diffusion of our technology abroad, we should not forget that the national technological reservoir must be kept full by the energy, initiative, imagination, and risk-taking ability of our R. & D. community in industry and in government. I emphasize that the continued strength of industrial R. & D. is essential if we are to maintain an advantageous technological position in the international arena.

At the same time, neither the United States nor other industrialized countries can depend wholly on indigenous efforts. We can benefit from advances originating abroad

just as others will benefit from advances originating here. Advanced technology is thus a dynamic force in world economic affairs.

The United States enjoys a strong position. We intend to maintain a strong position, and we rely heavily on you.

United States Offers Increases of Cotton Textile Imports

Press release 396 dated October 30

The United States is offering all of its bilateral cotton textile agreement partners the opportunity to export to the United States additional amounts of cotton fabric and cotton yarn, the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements announced on October 30.

Twenty-eight countries have been told that the current market situation with respect to cotton fabric and cotton yarn will permit the United States to offer on a one-time basis additional imports of cotton fabric and yarn up to an amount equal to 5 percent of the aggregate ceiling of each bilateral agreement.

Each country with which the United States has a bilateral cotton textile agreement is being asked to inform the United States by November 15, 1973, as to the additional amounts and categories which it may wish to export to the United States under this arrangement. The added amounts will not become part of the base of each country's bilateral agreement.

The Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, chaired by the Department of Commerce, includes representatives of the Departments of State, the Treasury, and Labor.

Messages Exchanged by President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962

In response to requests from the public under Executive Order 11652, the Interagency Classification Review Committee has recently taken declassification action on a series of messages exchanged between President Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. During October 1962 President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev exchanged a total of 10 messages about Cuba, only the last four of which were made public at the time. All 10 messages, with annotations supplied by the Historical Office of the Department of State, are printed here as a matter of general public interest. For each of the five messages from Chairman Khrushchev there are included both the informal translation which was made immediately available to President Kennedy and the official translation prepared later. Related documentation was published in the Department of State Bulletin of November 12, 1962, and in "American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962."

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 22, 1962¹

[WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1962.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington.² In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one

thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that

¹Text communicated to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington at 6 p.m. on Oct. 22, 1962; text had previously been telegraphed to the American Embassy at Moscow for simultaneous delivery there.

²For President Kennedy's television and radio address on Oct. 22, 1962, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 23, 1962

Informal Translation ³

MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received your letter, and have also acquainted myself with text of your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba.

I should say frankly that measures outlined in

³ Informal translation by the American Embassy at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 3 p.m. Moscow time on Oct. 23, 1962, and transmitted to the Department of State by telegram at 5 p.m. Moscow time (received at 11:56 a.m., Oct. 23, Washington time).

your statement represent serious threat to peace and security of peoples. United States has openly taken path of gross violation of Charter of United Nations, path of violation of international norms of freedom of navigation on high seas, path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against Soviet Union.

Statement of Government of United States America cannot be evaluated in any other way than as naked interference in domestic affairs of Cuban Republic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charter of United Nations and international norms do not give right to any state whatsoever to establish in international waters control of vessels bound for shores of Cuban Republic.

It is self-understood that we also cannot recognize right of United States to establish control over armaments essential to Republic of Cuba for strengthening of its defensive capacity.

We confirm that armaments now on Cuba, regardless of classification to which they belong, are destined exclusively for defensive purposes, in order to secure Cuban Republic from attack of aggressor.

I hope that Government of United States will show prudence and renounce actions pursued by you, which could lead to catastrophic consequences for peace throughout world.

Viewpoint of Soviet Government with regard to your statement of October 22 is set forth in statement of Soviet Government,⁴ which is being conveyed to you through your ambassador in Moscow.

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

Official Translation ⁵

Moscow, October 23, 1962.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received your letter, and have also acquainted myself with the text of your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba.

I must say frankly that the measures indicated in your statement constitute a serious threat to peace and to the security of nations. The United States has openly taken the path of grossly violating the United Nations Charter, the path of violating international norms of freedom of navigation on the high seas, the path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against the Soviet Union.

The statement by the Government of the United States of America can only be regarded as undisguised interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Union and other states. The United Nations Charter and international norms give no right to any state to institute in interna-

⁴ For text, see *New York Times* of Oct. 24, 1962.

⁵ Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

tional waters the inspection of vessels bound for the shores of the Republic of Cuba.

And naturally, neither can we recognize the right of the United States to establish control over armaments which are necessary for the Republic of Cuba to strengthen its defense capability.

We reaffirm that the armaments which are in Cuba, regardless of the classification to which they may belong, are intended solely for defensive purposes in order to secure the Republic of Cuba against the attack of an aggressor.

I hope that the United States Government will display wisdom and renounce the actions pursued by you, which may lead to catastrophic consequences for world peace.

The viewpoint of the Soviet Government with regard to your statement of October 22 is set forth in a Statement of the Soviet Government, which is being transmitted to you through your Ambassador at Moscow.

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 23, 1962 ⁶

[WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1962*].

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of October twenty-third. I think you will recognize that the steps⁷ which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.

I hope that you will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the quarantine, the basis of which was established by the vote of the Organization of American States this afternoon, and which will go into effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-four.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

⁶ Text transmitted by the Department of State to the American Embassy at Moscow at 6:51 p.m. Washington time on Oct. 23, 1962, and delivered in Moscow at 7 a.m., Oct. 24, Moscow time.

⁷ So transmitted to the American Embassy at Moscow, but corrected there to read "step".

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 24, 1962

Informal Translation ⁸

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 23, familiarized myself with it and am answering you.

Imagine, Mr. President, that we had posed to you those ultimative conditions which you have posed to us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And that would have been comprehensible to us.

Having posed these conditions to us, you, Mr. President, have challenged us. Who asked you to do this? By what right have you done this? Our relations with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what sort of state it may be, concern only the two countries between which those relations exist. And if one is really going to talk about a quarantine, referred to in your letter, it can be established, according to accepted international practice, only by the agreement of states between themselves, and not by any sort of third party. There exist, for example, quarantines on agricultural goods and products. But in the case at hand, the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring quarantines, but advancing an ultimatum and threatening that unless we subordinate ourselves to your demands, you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you wish to convince me to agree to this! What does agreement with such demands mean? This would mean to guide oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason but to indulge arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

And, Mr. President, I cannot agree with this and think that in your heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This organization has absolutely no authority or basis to make decisions like that of which you speak in your letter.⁹

⁸ Informal translation by the American Embassy at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 11:30 p.m. Moscow time on Oct. 24, 1962, and transmitted to the Department of State by telegram at 2 a.m., Oct. 25, Moscow time (received at 9:24 p.m., Oct. 24, Washington time).

⁹ In the Russian original the four sentences which follow form part of this paragraph. See the official translation below.

Consequently, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists, generally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly support the principles of international law, strictly observe the norms regulating navigation on the high seas and in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are attempting to legislate in questions of international law, you are trampling upon the generally accepted norms of this law. And all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its Government, but also as a result of considerations of the election campaign in the USA. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? You cannot find such a morality and such a law, because the actions of the USA with regard to Cuba are outright banditry, or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, the peoples of all countries, and at least of all the American people,¹⁰ can suffer gravely from such folly, since the USA has fully lost its former inaccessibility with the advent of contemporary types of armament.

Consequently, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, then you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the USA. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our situation and think how the USA would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone had attempted to dictate conditions of this sort to you, the USA, you would have rejected such an attempt. And we also say—No.

The Soviet Government considers that violation of freedom of the use of international waters and international air space is an act of aggression, pushing mankind towards the abyss of a world missile-nuclear war. Consequently, the Soviet Government cannot give instructions to the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the instructions of the American naval forces blockading that island. Your instructions¹¹ to Soviet mariners are strictly to observe the generally recognized norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat from them by even one step. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what sort of responsibility will rest on it in that case. Of course, we shall not be simply observers of piratical actions of American ships on the high seas. We will then be

forced for our part to take the measures which we deem necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. For this we have all that is necessary.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

Official Translation ¹²

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 23, have studied it, and am answering you.

Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us.

In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established, according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and universally

¹² Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

¹⁰ As received by telegram in Washington. The passage should read "and not least of all the American people". Compare the official translation below.

¹¹ As received by telegram in Washington. The Russian text, however, read "Our instructions". See the official translation below.

recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.

Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you—the United States—you would reject such an attempt. And we also say—no.

The Soviet government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.

Respectfully,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

Moscow, *October 24, 1962.*

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 25, 1962 ¹³

[WASHINGTON,] *October 25, 1962.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurances from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by Tass in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied—namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

¹³ Text communicated to the Soviet Embassy at Washington at 1:45 a.m. Washington time on Oct. 25, 1962; transmitted to the American Embassy at Moscow at 1:59 a.m., Oct. 25, Washington time for delivery also in Moscow.

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 26, 1962

Informal Translation ¹⁴

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 25. From your letter, I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and (some) ¹⁵ sense of responsibility. I value this.

Now we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would judge that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means of the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with us, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace. I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of understanding, and of what war entails.¹⁶ What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would

experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your conclusions regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different estimates of these or those military means. Indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take for example a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number of troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for infantry to attack. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not quarrel now. It is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this. But I say to you: you, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand: can one attack, if one has on one's territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction. But one cannot attack with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can attack. Without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to the effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All the means located there, and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can attack you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that

¹⁴ Informal translation by the American Embassy at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 4:43 p.m. Moscow time on Oct. 26, 1962, and transmitted to the Department of State at 7 p.m. Moscow time (received in four sections between 6 and 9 p.m., Oct. 26, Washington time).

¹⁵ The parentheses are in the source text.

¹⁶ On Oct. 27, 1962, the Department of State sent to the White House the following corrected version of this sentence: "I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of understanding and a proper evaluation of the character of contemporary war and of what war entails."

one can think that it is possible to attack thus. I say precisely attack, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this. We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you, we have differences on ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful coexistence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these (cargoes)¹⁷ are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and

believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted—and we are ready to enter such negotiations—and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly.¹⁸ You have asked what happened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke about it in Vienna—that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, pointing out that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we too possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged, but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war

¹⁸ In the corrections to this message which the Department of State sent to the White House on Oct. 27, 1962, it was indicated that a new paragraph should start at this point.

¹⁷ The parentheses are in the source text.

not only between the reciprocal claims, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.¹⁹

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is: we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. We were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The USA participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants in the aggression against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General [William Sidney] Graves, who, at that time, commanded the US expeditionary corps. Graves called it "The American Adventure in Siberia".

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counterrevolutionary emigrants, that you support them and would help them to realize their plans against the present government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hang over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban government to furnish it aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and the government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the

armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, too, who manifests alarm and

¹⁹ On Oct. 27, 1962, the Department of State sent to the White House the following corrected version of this sentence: "Moreover the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the Soviet Union and the USA, between whom, strictly speaking, are no reciprocal claims, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war."

concern for the fate of the world, and I readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

Official Translation ²⁰

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 25. From your letter I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and a sense of responsibility. I appreciate this.

By now we have already publicly exchanged our assessments of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his interpretation of these events. Therefore, I would think that, evidently, continuing to exchange opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, would probably not add anything to what one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned for the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and all the more, communists—people who know how to value not only their own lives but, above all else, the life of nations. We communists are against any wars between states at all, and have been defending the cause of peace ever since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, not as a game or a means for achieving particular purposes, much less as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means of achieving them is work. War is our enemy and a calamity for all nations.

This is how we Soviet people, and together with us, other peoples as well, interpret questions of war and peace. I can say this with assurance at least for the peoples of the Socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among nations.

I can see, Mr. President, that you also are not without a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, not without an understanding and correct assessment of the nature of modern warfare and what war entails. What good would a war do you? You threaten us with war. But you well know that the very least you would get in response would be what you had given us; you would suffer the same consequences. And that must be clear to us—people invested with authority, trust and responsibility.

²⁰ Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

We must not succumb to light-headedness and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are forthcoming in one country or another. These are all transitory things, but should war indeed break out, it would not be in our power to contain or stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have taken part in two wars, and I know that war ends only when it has rolled through cities and villages, sowing death and destruction everywhere.

I assure you on behalf of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people that your arguments regarding offensive weapons in Cuba are utterly unfounded. From what you have written me it is obvious that our interpretations on this point are different, or rather that we have different definitions for one type of military means or another. And indeed, the same types of armaments may in actuality have different interpretations.

You are a military man, and I hope you will understand me. Let us take a simple cannon for instance. What kind of a weapon is it—offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive weapon if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But when artillery is concentrated and supplemented by an appropriate number of troops, then the same cannon will have become an offensive weapon, since they prepare and clear the way for infantry to advance. The same is true for nuclear missile weapons, for any type of these weapons.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our armaments in Cuba are offensive. However, let us not argue at this point. Evidently, I shall not be able to convince you. But I tell you: You, Mr. President, are a military man and you must understand: How can you possibly launch an offensive even if you have an enormous number of missiles of various ranges and power on your territory, using these weapons alone? These missiles are a means of annihilation and destruction. But it is impossible to launch an offensive by means of these missiles, even nuclear missiles of 100 megaton yield, because it is only people—troops—who can advance. Without people any weapons, whatever their power, cannot be offensive.

How can you, therefore, give this completely wrong interpretation, which you are now giving, that some weapons in Cuba are offensive, as you say? All weapons there—and I assure you of this—are of a defensive nature; they are in Cuba solely for purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. And you say that they are offensive weapons.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba could launch an offensive upon the United States and that even we, together with Cuba, could advance against you from Cuban territory? Do you really think so? How can that be? We do not understand. Surely, there has not been any such new development in military strategy that

would lead one to believe that it is possible to advance that way. And I mean advance, not destroy; for those who destroy are barbarians, people who have lost their sanity.

I hold that you have no grounds to think so. You may regard us with distrust, but you can at any rate rest assured that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we launch an offensive against you, you will respond in kind. But you too will get in response whatever you throw at us. And I think you understand that too. It is our discussion in Vienna that gives me the right to speak this way.

This indicates that we are sane people, that we understand and assess the situation correctly. How could we, then, allow [ourselves]²¹ the wrong actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and before they die destroy the world, could do this. But we want to live and by no means do we want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country in a peaceful endeavor. We argue with you; we have differences on ideological questions. But our concept of the world is that questions of ideology, as well as economic problems, should be settled by other than military means; they must be solved in peaceful contest, or as this is interpreted in capitalist society—by competition. Our premise has been and remains that peaceful coexistence of two different sociopolitical systems—a reality of our world—is essential, and that it is essential to ensure lasting peace. These are the principles to which we adhere.

You have now declared piratical measures, the kind that were practiced in the Middle Ages when ships passing through international waters were attacked, and you have called this a "quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels will probably soon enter the zone patrolled by your Navy. I assure you that the vessels which are now headed for Cuba are carrying the most innocuous peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that all we spend our time on is transporting so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Even though your military people may possibly imagine that these are some special kind of weapons, I assure you that they are the most ordinary kind of peaceful goods.

Therefore, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that the ships bound for Cuba are carrying no armaments at all. The armaments needed for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not mean to say that there have been no shipments of armaments at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already obtained the necessary weapons for defense.

I do not know whether you can understand me

²¹ The brackets are in the source text.

and believe me. But I wish you would believe yourself and agree that one should not give way to one's passions; that one should be master of them. And what direction are events taking now? If you begin stopping vessels it would be piracy, as you yourself know. If we should start doing this to your ships you would be just as indignant as we and the whole world are now indignant. Such actions cannot be interpreted otherwise, because lawlessness cannot be legalized. Were this allowed to happen then there would be no peace; nor would there be peaceful coexistence. Then we would be forced to take the necessary measures of a defensive nature which would protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why do this? What would it all lead to?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the U.N., containing his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals are to the effect that our side not ship any armaments to Cuba for a certain period of time while negotiations are being conducted—and we are prepared to enter into such negotiations—and the other side not undertake any piratical action against vessels navigating on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has evolved that would give nations a chance to breathe easily.

You asked what happened, what prompted weapons to be supplied to Cuba? You spoke of this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what prompted it.

We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke of this in Vienna—that a landing was effected and an attack made on Cuba, as a result of which many Cubans were killed. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I regarded that explanation with respect. You repeated it to me several times, hinting that not everyone occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you did. I appreciate such frankness. For my part I told you that we too possess no less courage; we have also acknowledged the mistakes which have been made in the history of our state, and have not only acknowledged them but have sharply condemned them.

While you really are concerned for peace and for the welfare of your people—and this is your duty as President—I, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Furthermore, the preservation of universal peace should be our joint concern, since if war broke out under modern conditions, it would not be just a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, which actually have no contentions between them, but a world-wide war, cruel and destructive.

Why have we undertaken to render such military and economic aid to Cuba? The answer is: we have done so only out of humanitarian considerations. At one time our people accomplished its own revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. Then we were attacked. We were the target of attack by many countries. The United States took part in that affair. This has been documented by the participants in aggression against our country. An entire book has been written on this by General Graves, who commanded the American Expeditionary Force at that time. Graves entitled it *American Adventure in Siberia*.

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to rebuild a country on new principles. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people. But we do not interfere in questions of internal organization; we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union wants to help the Cubans build their life, as they themselves desire, so that others would leave them alone.

You said once that the United States is not preparing an invasion. But you have also declared that you sympathize with the Cuban counterrevolutionary emigrants, support them, and will help them in carrying out their plans against the present government of Cuba. Nor is it any secret to anyone that the constant threat of armed attack and aggression has hung and continues to hang over Cuba. It is only this that has prompted us to respond to the request of the Cuban Government to extend it our aid in strengthening the defense capability of that country.

If the President and Government of the United States would give their assurances that the United States would itself not take part in an attack upon Cuba and would restrain others from such action: if you recall your Navy—this would immediately change everything. I do not speak for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba would, probably, announce a demobilization and would call upon the people to commence peaceful work. Then the question of armaments would also be obviated, because when there is no threat, armaments are only a burden for any people. This would also change the approach to the question of destroying not only the armaments which you call offensive, but of every other kind of armament.

I have spoken on behalf of the Soviet Government at the United Nations and introduced a proposal to disband all armies and to destroy all weapons. How then can I stake my claims on these weapons now?

Armaments bring only disasters. Accumulating them damages the economy, and putting them to use would destroy people on both sides. Therefore, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No. they

are a forced waste of human energy, spent, moreover, on the destruction of man himself. If people do not display wisdom, they will eventually reach the point where they will clash, like blind moles, and then mutual annihilation will commence.

Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh carefully what the aggressive, piratical actions which you have announced the United States intends to carry out in international waters would lead to. You yourself know that a sensible person simply cannot agree to this, cannot recognize your right to such action.

If you have done this as the first step towards unleashing war—well then—evidently nothing remains for us to do but to accept this challenge of yours. If you have not lost command of yourself and realize clearly what this could lead to, then, Mr. President, you and I should not now pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied a knot of war, because the harder you and I pull, the tighter this knot will become. And a time may come when this knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capable of untying it, and then the knot will have to be cut. What that would mean I need not explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.

Therefore, if there is no intention of tightening this knot, thereby dooming the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, let us not only relax the forces straining on the ends of the rope, let us take measures for untying this knot. We are agreeable to this.

We welcome all forces which take the position of peace. Therefore, I both expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, who shows alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant.

These, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you should agree with them, could put an end to the tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are governed by a sincere desire to alleviate the situation and remove the threat of war.

Respectfully,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] October 26, 1962.

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE
OF OCTOBER 27, 1962 ²²

Informal Translation ²³

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is with great satisfaction that I studied your reply to Mr. U Thant on the adoption of measures in order to avoid contact by our ships and thus avoid irreparable fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part persuades me that you are showing solicitude for the preservation of peace, and I note this with satisfaction.

I have already said that the only concern of our people and government and myself personally as chairman of the Council of Ministers is to develop our country and have it hold a worthy place among all people of the world in economic competition, advance of culture and arts, and the rise in people's living standards. This is the loftiest and most necessary field for competition which will only benefit both the winner and loser, because this benefit is peace and an increase in the facilities by means of which man lives and obtains pleasure.

In your statement, you said that the main aim lies not only in reaching agreement and adopting measures to avert contact of our ships, and, consequently, a deepening of the crisis, which because of this contact can spark off the fire of military conflict after which any talks would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would begin to operate—the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only a first step. The main thing is to normalize and stabilize the situation in the world between states and between people.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the first duty of the president. However, these questions are also uppermost in our minds. The same duties rest with me as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. You have been worried over our assisting Cuba with arms designed to strengthen its defensive potential—precisely defensive potential—because Cuba, no matter what weapons it had, could not compare with you since these are different dimensions, the more so given up-to-date means of extermination. Our purpose has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can challenge the humanity of our motives aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire.

You want to relieve your country from danger and this is understandable. However, Cuba also wants this. All countries want to relieve themselves

from danger. But how can we, the Soviet Union and our government, assess your actions which, in effect, mean that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases, surrounded our allies with military bases, set up military bases literally around our country, and stationed your rocket weapons at them? This is no secret. High-placed American officials demonstratively declare this. Your rockets are stationed in Britain and in Italy and point at us. Your rockets are stationed in Turkey.

You are worried over Cuba. You say that it worries you because it lies at a distance of 90 miles across the sea from the shores of the United States. However, Turkey lies next to us. Our sentinels are pacing up and down and watching each other. Do you believe that you have the right to demand security for your country and the removal of such weapons that you qualify as offensive, while not recognizing this right for us? You have stationed devastating rocket weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey literally right next to us. How then does recognition of our equal military possibilities tally with such unequal relations between our great states? This does not tally at all.

It is good, Mr. President, that you agreed for our representatives to meet and begin talks, apparently with the participation of U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant. Consequently, to some extent, he assumes the role of intermediary, and we believe that he can cope with the responsible mission if, of course, every side that is drawn into this conflict shows good will.

I think that one could rapidly eliminate the conflict and normalize the situation. Then people would heave a sigh of relief, considering that the statesmen who bear the responsibility have sober minds, an awareness of their responsibility, and an ability to solve complicated problems and not allow matters to slide to the disaster of war.

This is why I make this proposal: We agree to remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a statement to the effect that the United States, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey. Let us reach an understanding on what time you and we need to put this into effect. After this, representatives of the U.N. Security Council could control on-the-spot the fulfillment of these commitments. Of course, it is necessary that the Governments of Cuba and Turkey would allow these representatives to come to their countries and check fulfillment of this commitment, which each side undertakes. Apparently, it would be better if these representatives enjoyed the trust of the Security Council and ours—the United States and the Soviet Union—as well as of Turkey and Cuba. I think that it will not

²² Broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. Moscow time, Oct. 27, 1962; Russian text delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow at the same hour.

²³ Reprinted with corrected paragraphing from BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 741-743.

be difficult to find such people who enjoy the trust and respect of all interested sides.

We, having assumed this commitment in order to give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to increase their confidence in their security, will make a statement in the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available its territory as a place d'armes for such invasion, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Turkey either from Soviet territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Turkey.

The U.S. Government will make the same statement in the Security Council with regard to Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the integrity of the frontiers of Cuba, its sovereignty, undertakes not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade and not to make its territory available as place d'armes for the invasion of Cuba, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Cuba either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Cuba.

Of course, for this we would have to reach agreement with you and to arrange for some deadline. Let us agree to give some time, but not to delay, two or three weeks, not more than a month.

The weapons on Cuba, that you have mentioned and which, as you say, alarm you, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore any accidental use of them whatsoever to the detriment of the United States of America is excluded. These means are stationed in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and only in defensive aims. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or an attack on the Soviet Union, or other of our allies then, of course, these means do not threaten anyone and will not threaten. For they do not pursue offensive aims.

If you accept my proposal, Mr. President, we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them exhaustive instructions to order to come to terms sooner. If you would also appoint your men and give them appropriate instructions, this problem could be solved soon.

Why would I like to achieve this? Because the entire world is now agitated and expects reasonable actions from us. The greatest pleasure for all the peoples would be an announcement on our agreement, on nipping in the bud the conflict that has arisen. I attach a great importance to such understanding because it might be a good beginning and, specifically, facilitate a nuclear test ban agreement. The problem of tests could be solved simultaneously, not linking one with the other, because they are

different problems. However, it is important to reach an understanding to both these problems in order to make a good gift to the people, to let them rejoice in the news that a nuclear test ban agreement has also been reached and thus there will be no further contamination of the atmosphere. Your and our positions on this issue are very close.

All this, possibly, would serve as a good impetus to searching for mutually acceptable agreements on other disputed issues, too, on which there is an exchange of opinion between us. These problems have not yet been solved but they wait for an urgent solution which would clear the international atmosphere. We are ready for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] October 27, 1962.

Official Translation ²⁴

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.

I have already said that our people, our Government, and I personally, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.

In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would then come into play—the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state of peace among states and among peoples.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the

²⁴ Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to strengthen its defense capability—precisely defense capability—because whatever weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable.

It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our representatives meet and begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.

I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation, and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and

to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and mine—both the United States and the Soviet Union—and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of [to] the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.

Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay—say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet

Union or any of our other allies, then of course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack.

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved.

Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are very close together.

All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been exchanging views. These issues have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] *October 27, 1962.*

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27, 1962²⁵

[WASHINGTON,] *October 27, 1962.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek

²⁵ Reprinted from BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 743. This message was transmitted by the Department of State to the American Embassy at Moscow at 8:05 p.m. Washington time, Oct. 27, 1962; delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 10:30 a.m. Moscow time, Oct. 28. Text also delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington during the evening of Oct. 27 and released to the press.

a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend²⁶—in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative—an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows:

1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.²⁷ I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms

²⁶ As transmitted to Moscow, this passage read "week and".

²⁷ As transmitted to Moscow, this sentence was joined with the following sentence with the word "and."

race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26th.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 28, 1962²⁸

Informal Translation²⁹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27. I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed.

Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons constructions sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

²⁸ Broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. Moscow time, Oct. 28, 1962; Russian text delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow at 5:10 p.m. on the same date.

²⁹ Text of a Moscow broadcast in English; reprinted with corrections from BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 743-745.

Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages—that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so; however, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.

This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed. In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship.

In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory.

The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor. The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life.

Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the means of defense against aggression—only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba—to prevent rash acts.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear. It is for this reason that we instructed our officers—these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers—to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Rep-

representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.

Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assistance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a reasonable solution. We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension.

Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.

We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge. Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor.

I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane,

whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time, you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S. Administration.

But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurance, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.

But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states.

A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your reconnaissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this. What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol. Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when we are living through such anxious times.³⁰

I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba.

We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zootechnicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.

I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.

We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of

³⁰ See the official translation below for a paragraph omitted here.

the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps.

We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.

In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] *October 28, 1962.*

Official Translation ³¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27, 1962. I express my satisfaction and appreciation for the sense of proportion you have displayed, and for your understanding of the responsibility you now bear for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

I regard with great understanding your apprehension and the apprehension of the people of the United States of America over the fact that the weapons which you describe as offensive are indeed terrible weapons.

Both you and we understand what kind of weapons they are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible a conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give confidence to all peoples longing for peace, and to reassure the people of America, who, I am sure, want peace as much as the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to previously issued instructions for the cessation of further work at the weapons construction sites, has issued a new order to dismantle the weapons, which you describe as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I would like to repeat, as I have already stated in my previous letters, that the

Soviet Government has extended economic aid as well as arms to the Government of Cuba, since Cuba and the Cuban people have constantly been under the continual threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratical vessel has shelled Havana. It is said that irresponsible Cuban émigrés did the shooting. This is possibly the case. But the question arises: from where did they shoot? After all, these Cubans have no territory; they are fugitives from their homeland; they have no funds for conducting military actions.

This means that someone put into their hands the weapons for shelling Havana and for piratical acts in the Caribbean, in Cuban territorial waters. It is unthinkable in our time that a pirate ship could pass unnoticed, particularly considering the saturation of the Caribbean with American ships from which literally all of this is seen and observed. And in such circumstances pirate ships freely roam about Cuba, shell Cuba, and carry out piratical attacks upon peaceful cargo ships. It is, after all, known that they even shelled a British freighter.

In short, Cuba has been under a continual threat from aggressive forces that have not concealed their intention to invade Cuba's territory.

The Cuban people wish to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and to enjoy the fruits of their labor. The threat of a Cuban invasion and all the other designs aimed at surrounding Cuba with tension are designed to engender uncertainty in the Cuban people, to intimidate them, and to hinder them in freely building their new life.

Mr. President, I want to say clearly once again that we could not be indifferent to this, and so the Soviet Government decided to help Cuba with means of defense against aggression—means only for purposes of defense. We placed means of defense there, means which you call offensive. We placed them there in order that no attack might be made against Cuba and that no rash acts might be permitted.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that no attack would be made on Cuba and that no invasion would take place—not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other countries of the Western Hemisphere, as your same message pointed out. In view of this, the motives which prompted us to give aid of this nature to Cuba no longer prevail. Hence, we have instructed our officers (these means, as I have already reported to you, are in the hands of Soviet officers) to take the necessary measures to stop the construction of the facilities indicated, and to dismantle and return them to the Soviet Union. As I have already informed you in my letter of October 27, we are prepared to come to an agreement with you to

³¹ Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

enable representatives of the U.N. to verify the dismantling of these means.

In this way, on the basis of the assurances you have made and of our orders to dismantle, there appear to exist all the necessary conditions for the elimination of the conflict which has arisen.

I note with satisfaction that you have echoed my desire that this dangerous situation be eliminated and also that conditions be created for a more thorough appraisal of the international situation, which is fraught with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocket technology, space ships, global rockets, and other lethal weapons. All mankind is interested in ensuring peace.

Therefore, we who bear great trust and responsibility must not permit the situation to become aggravated but must eliminate breeding grounds where dangerous situations are created, fraught with serious consequences for the cause of peace. And if we, together with you and other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense situation, we must also concern ourselves with seeing that other dangerous conflicts do not arise which might lead to a world thermonuclear catastrophe.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about the improvement of relations between NATO and the states of the Warsaw Pact, which you mention. We spoke of this a long time ago, and are ready to continue exchanging opinions with you on this question and to find a reasonable solution. We also wish to continue to exchange opinions on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, on general disarmament, and on other questions relating to relaxation of international tensions.

Mr. President, I place belief in your statement. On the other hand there are irresponsible people who would like to carry out an invasion of Cuba at this time and thereby unleash a war. If we take practical steps and announce the dismantling and evacuation of the above-mentioned means from Cuba, in doing so we at the same time want the Cuban people to be sure that we are with them and are not relieving ourselves of the responsibility of granting aid to the Cuban people.

We are convinced that the peoples of all countries will, like yourself, Mr. President, understand me correctly. We do not threaten. We desire only peace. Our country is now on the upswing. Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and have created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are making use of these values and want to develop their achievements further and by their steadfast labor to ensure even greater growth along the path of peace and social progress.

I should like, Mr. President, to remind you that military aircraft of a reconnaissance nature have violated the frontiers of the Soviet Union—over which matter we had a controversy with you, and

an exchange of notes took place. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 aircraft, whose reconnaissance flight over the U.S.S.R. led to the disruption of the summit meeting in Paris. You took a correct position at the time in condemning that criminal action on the part of the previous Administration of the United States.

But during your term of office as President, a second case of violation of our frontier by an American U-2 aircraft has taken place in the Sakhalin area. We informed you of this violation on August 30. You then replied that this violation had occurred as a result of bad weather and gave assurances that it would not be repeated. We accepted your assurances because there was, indeed, bad weather in that area at the time.

However, if your aircraft had not been given a mission to fly near our territory, then even bad weather could not have led an American aircraft into our air space. The conclusion follows that this is done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the frontiers of other states.

An even more dangerous case occurred on October 28, when your reconnaissance aircraft invaded the northern area of the Soviet Union, in the area of the Chukotski Peninsula, and flew over our territory. One asks, Mr. President, how we should regard this. What is this—a provocation? Your aircraft violates our frontier, and this happens at a time as troubled as the one through which we are now passing, when everything has been put in battle readiness. For an intruding U.S. aircraft can easily be taken for a bomber with nuclear weapons, and that can push us toward a fatal step. All the more so, because the U.S. Government and the Pentagon have long been saying that you continually maintain bombers with atomic bombs in the air. Therefore, you can imagine what kind of responsibility you assume, especially during such an anxious time as the present.

I should like to ask you to assess this correctly and to take steps accordingly, to prevent it from serving as a provocation to touch off a war.

I should also like to express to you the following wish. Of course, this is the Cuban people's affair—you do not at present maintain diplomatic relations, but through my officers in Cuba I have reports that American planes are conducting flights over Cuba.

We are interested in not having any war at all in the world and in the Cuban people's being able to live in peace. But, in addition to this, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. By agreement with the Cuban Government, we have there officers and instructors who are training the Cubans; they are mainly ordinary people, including specialists, agronomists, animal husbandry technicians, irrigation and reclamation experts, common laborers, tractor drivers, and others. We have concern for them.

I should like to ask you, Mr. President, to bear in mind that a violation of Cuban air space by American aircraft may also have dangerous consequences. And if you do not want that, no cause should be given for the creation of a dangerous situation.

We must now be very cautious and refrain from any acts that would not help in the defense of the states involved in the controversy, but which could arouse only irritation, and even prove to be a provocation for a fatal step. We must therefore display sense and wisdom, and refrain from acts of that kind.

We value peace, perhaps even more than other peoples, because we experienced a terrible war against Hitler. But our people will not flinch in the face of any ordeal; our people trust their own government, and we assure our own people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not escape the responsibility and the grave consequences that war will bring to them. We are confident, however, that reason will prevail, that war will not be unleashed, and that the peace and security of peoples will be ensured.

In regard to the current negotiations of Acting Secretary General U Thant, with representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent to New York V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., with a view to assisting Mr. Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] *October 28, 1962.*

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 28, 1962 ³²

[WASHINGTON,] *October 28, 1962.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight, even though the official text has not yet reached me, because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations, as your message says, so that the United States in turn will be able to remove ³³ the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

³² Reprinted from BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 745-746. This message was transmitted by the Department of State to the American Embassy at Moscow at 5:03 p.m. Washington time, Oct. 28, 1962; delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 6:08 a.m. Moscow time, Oct. 29. Text also delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on Oct. 28 and released to the press at 4:35 p.m. on that date.

³³ As transmitted to Moscow, the text read "in turn can remove".

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

TREATY INFORMATION

Convention and Uniform Law on Wills Adopted by Diplomatic Conference

*Department Announcement*¹

Representatives of 48 countries meeting at the State Department in Washington from October 16 to October 26 have produced a convention and uniform law providing for an "international will."

The number of countries participating at the conference was greater than that at any previous diplomatic conference held to adopt a uniform law in the field of private law. The conference was also the first private law conference for which the United States has served as host.

The treaty and annexed uniform law produced by the conference have great practical importance. At present, for example, a will made in the United States according to the formalities prescribed by our law could fail to meet the formal requirements for disposi-

tion of property located in another country. Consequently the will might not be enforced in that country. Under the convention, however, if the maker of the will has complied with the simple provisions regarding signing and witnesses, and if the necessary certificate has been made out, the will must be accepted as to form by the courts of all other countries that are parties to the convention. This should result in substantial saving of time and money in probating wills disposing of property in two or more countries.

The new international will is an addition to and not a replacement for existing forms of will. International acceptability will undoubtedly be a strong inducement to make a will according to the simple requirements of the uniform law. Thus in an increasingly mobile world this new convention marks another advance toward the elimination of legal disputes, delays, and uncertainties.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Lesotho, September 27, 1973.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic (with a statement), July 5, 1973.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.¹

Acceptance deposited: Panama, August 13, 1973.

Exhibitions

Convention relating to international exhibitions, as amended. Done at Paris November 22, 1928. Entered into force January 17, 1931; for the United States June 24, 1968. TIAS 6548, 6549.

Accession deposited: Australia, September 27, 1973.

¹ Issued on Oct. 30 (press release 397).

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.²

Accession deposited: Australia, September 27, 1973.

Judicial Procedure

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington October 26, 1973.²

Signatures: Republic of China, Iran, Sierra Leone, United States, October 27, 1973; Laos, October 30, 1973; Holy See, November 2, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.²

Ratification deposited: Japan, September 27, 1973.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Ratification deposited: Sudan, October 31, 1973.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 30, 1973 (with declarations).

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 30, 1973.

Property—Industrial

Locarno agreement establishing an international classification for industrial designs, with annex. Done at Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into force April 27, 1971; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7420.

Ratification deposited: Hungary (with a declaration), September 28, 1973.

Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Done at Washington February 2, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, October 16, 1973.

Entered into force: October 16, 1973.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization. Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 30, 1973.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 23, 1972.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 30, 1973 (with a declaration).

BILATERAL

Switzerland

Amendment to the agreement of December 30, 1965 (TIAS 6059), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington November 2, 1973. Enters into force on the date on which each government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

World Wildlife Conference—Efforts To Save Endangered Species. Contains remarks by Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton, a message from President Nixon read by Secretary Morton, and statements made by Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, at the World Wildlife Conference held at Washington February 12–March 2. Also contains the text of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and a list of animals threatened with extinction. Pub. 8729. General Foreign Policy Series 279. 30 pp. 50¢. (Cat. No. S1.71:279).

Remote Sensing for Earth Resources. Agreement with Brazil. TIAS 7600. 9 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7600).

Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground—Expanded Use of Ascension Island. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 7602. 5 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7602).

Fisheries—Shrimp. Agreement, with agreed minute and exchanges of notes, with Brazil. TIAS 7603. 19 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7603).

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

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* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXIX, No. 1796

November 26, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces in Central Europe Open at Vienna

*Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe opened at Vienna on October 30. Countries represented are Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. Following is a statement made on October 31 by Ambassador Stanley R. Resor, chairman of the U.S. delegation.*¹

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 73-9 dated October 31

My government warmly welcomes the beginning of these negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe.

A great challenge lies before us. Central Europe is the focus of one of the greatest concentrations of military power in peacetime history. For more than two decades, the armed forces of East and West have confronted each other there. This confrontation has given rise to abiding apprehension and concern. And it represents a formidable burden on us all.

The time has come to change this situation. Successive changes in East-West relations have made it possible to seek to reduce the scale and intensity of the confrontation.

This is surely one of the central tasks of our time. It is also a delicate one. The pres-

ent security situation in Europe is unsatisfactory in many ways, but we would not wish it to worsen through unwise measures. Therefore we must carry out our task in such a way as to strengthen peace and stability in Europe, not weaken them. The structure of security in Europe is a delicate one; and in the interests of all we will have to proceed cautiously and step by step, realizing that all parties will wish to be assured of their security at each stage.

We do not expect this task to be easy. These negotiations represent a radical new departure in international diplomacy. There has been nothing quite like them before. Both in the subject matter they will address and in their pattern of participation, they break new ground. But their importance justifies an extraordinary effort on the part of us all.

My government's approach to these negotiations is a practical one. We are interested in concrete results. At the same time, we are not setting any artificial deadlines for ourselves. We consider that the negotiations should move ahead at a steady, even tempo, keeping pace with the development of the subject matter, without an artificial pre-ordained pattern of breaks.

Further, we will strive for a businesslike atmosphere. We are here to perform a specific task. We are interested in seeking mutually acceptable solutions to the problems we will have to address together. We are not interested in polemical debates. Many aspects of the subject matter are controversial, and viewpoints will diverge. We believe that it would be helpful in this context if all participants made it a conscious rule to dis-

¹ Other senior members of the U.S. delegation are Jonathan Dean, Department of State, deputy chairman; Bruce C. Clarke, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Maj. Gen. Willis D. Crittenger, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Timothy Stanley, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

cuss the subject matter and present their points of view in terms of concrete, objective facts, and not in terms of the presumed intentions of other participants.

The enterprise on which we are now embarking provides us with an opportunity of historic importance to move from confrontation to negotiation on a problem area of key importance for all of us. The military confrontation in Central Europe is the product of history. It is a result of past tensions, and at the same time a cause of tension.

In keeping with the businesslike and objective spirit which I have suggested should govern the tone of our discussions, we do not wish to engage in debates over how or why the present situation arose. We should move directly to the task of seeking to change that situation in ways that will benefit all of us. Thus we hope to reduce the risks for all arising from miscalculation, misunderstanding, or misinterpretation of actions of either side.

Our main task will be to achieve a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces with undiminished security—undiminished security for all participants in these talks. If we can achieve this goal—and my government believes we can—then an MBFR agreement or agreements will be a highly important contribution to strengthening peace, security, and mutual confidence in Europe and to improved, more fruitful relations among us all. Such a result would be welcomed by all our peoples. With this prospect before us, my government considers that these negotiations will test the willingness of all participants to address and to resolve the hard, concrete military security issues in Central Europe.

Our negotiations were preceded earlier this year in Vienna by preparatory talks. In those talks, the following principles were agreed as guidance for the negotiations:

—Mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe would be considered.

—The general objective of the negotiations will be to contribute to a more stable

relationship in Europe and to the strengthening of peace and security.

—In the negotiations, an understanding should be reached to conduct them in such a way as to insure the most effective and thorough approach to the consideration of the subject matter, with due regard to its complexity.

—Specific arrangements will have to be carefully worked out in scope and timing in such a way that they will in all respects and at every point conform to the principle of undiminished security for each party.

—Any topic relevant to the subject matter may be introduced for negotiation.

We believe these agreed guidelines form a sound basis for our work. The proposals we will make during the course of these negotiations, and our approach to the negotiations themselves, will be consistent with these guidelines.

In the preparatory talks, we also agreed on procedures for these negotiations. We feel that no further general discussion of procedural matters is needed at this time. Our task is now to address questions of substance relating to the subject matter. We believe that day-to-day procedural business, such as the scheduling of meetings, can be handled in appropriate ways.

The preparatory talks recorded agreement on a further point; namely, the region on which the negotiations will focus. That region was defined in the June 28 communique as Central Europe.

General U.S. Approach in Negotiations

Based on the points of agreement between us which I have just enumerated, I should like now to outline for you the general approach of my government to the substance of these negotiations.

In our view, the subject matter of these negotiations is the size, character, and activities of armed forces in Central Europe.

We aim to reduce the size of those forces in such a way as to lead to a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces

Final Communiqué Issued at Conclusion of MBFR Preparatory Talks

Preparatory consultations for the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations were held at Vienna January 31–June 28 by representatives of the 19 countries participating in the current substantive negotiations. Following is the text of a final communiqué issued on June 28.

1. Preparatory consultations relating to Central Europe took place in Vienna from January 31, 1973 to June 28, 1973. Participation in and procedures for these consultations were as set forth in the Record of the plenary meeting of May 14, 1973.

2. In the course of these consultations, it was decided to hold negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. The negotiations will take place in Vienna, and will begin on October 30, 1973. It was also agreed that participation in and procedures for the negotiations will be as set forth in the Record of the plenary meeting of May 14, 1973.

3. The participants in the consultations had a useful and constructive exchange of views on an agenda for the forthcoming negotiations. They agreed that during the negotiations, mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe would be considered. It was agreed that the general objective of the

negotiations will be to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. They agreed that, in the negotiations, an understanding should be reached to conduct them in such a way as to ensure the most effective and thorough approach to the consideration of the subject matter, with due regard to its complexity. They also agreed that specific arrangements will have to be carefully worked out in scope and timing in such a way that they will in all respects and at every point conform to the principle of undiminished security for each party. It was decided that in the course of the negotiations, any topic relevant to the subject matter may be introduced for negotiation by any of those states which will take the necessary decisions, without prejudice to the right of all participants to speak and to circulate papers on the subject matter. This exchange of views on an agenda will greatly facilitate the work of the forthcoming negotiations. During the negotiations, the question of establishing working bodies or working groups will be considered.

4. The participants expressed their gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Austria for the considerate assistance and facilities it provided during the consultations and for its agreement that the forthcoming negotiations can take place in Vienna.

while maintaining undiminished security for each party.

We aim at affecting the character of these military forces by reducing those aspects or characteristics of the forces which are of particular concern to us because of their intrinsic capabilities. Agreements on topics of this kind would contribute to the creation of a more stable military balance.

Finally, we aim at dealing in these negotiations with the activities of these military forces in a manner which will minimize the risk of miscalculation, surprise, or their use in a destabilizing manner. Agreements on measures to accomplish this would also enhance stability and mutual confidence.

We have agreed that the outcome of these negotiations must be one which preserves undiminished security for each party. No participant or group of participants should

gain unilateral advantage from an agreement. It is the considered view of my government that the aims I have outlined above with respect to the size, character, and activities of military forces in Central Europe can and should be realized in a manner that preserves undiminished security for my country and all its allies when appropriate account is taken of significant objective disparities affecting the current situation in Central Europe. The disparities which we view as operating to our disadvantage in Central Europe are: disparities in manpower, in the character of forces, and in geography.

Let me elaborate on these. In manpower, the countries of the Warsaw Pact have more ground personnel on active duty in Central Europe than does NATO. We consider that to narrow and finally eliminate this disparity

in manpower through mutual reductions would improve stability in Central Europe.

With respect to character of forces, the Warsaw Pact forces maintain a concentration of heavy armor in Central Europe. I have said that we shall seek to avoid debates over each other's intentions or motives. Therefore I am not remarking on the possible intentions of anyone when I say that it is an objective fact that a marked imbalance in tanks exists in Central Europe.

We consider that stability is enhanced when all participants in these talks are able to see each other's purpose as a defensive one and when they perceive each other's forces to be configured in a way consistent with defensive purposes. A substantial reduction in the armored capability of the U.S.S.R. in Central Europe would, in our view, be consistent with defensive purposes and would constitute a major contribution to enhanced stability in Europe.

The third major disparity to which I have referred—geography—is also basic to the situation in Central Europe. The United States and the U.S.S.R., which station significant forces in Central Europe, are located at vastly unequal distances from the area. The territory of the Soviet Union directly and immediately adjoins Central Europe. Soviet forces, located in Soviet territory, have ready access over the Polish plain to the very heart of the area. The United States, on the other hand, is located at a great distance from Central Europe and is separated from the area by the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, access to Central Europe is far more difficult for U.S. forces.

The geographic disparity has this consequence for mutual reductions: Any Soviet forces withdrawn from Central Europe into the territory of the Soviet Union could return quickly and easily; U.S. forces withdrawn to the United States would be an ocean away. This point applies equally to reinforcement capability. A reduction agreement would have to deal with this inherent inequity in a manner that did not result in any diminution of our security. There are

also other geographic disparities of considerable importance.

Size and Activities of Forces

Implicit in all that I have said on the need to deal with these major disparities is the concept that these negotiations must achieve equitable results, arrived at in an equitable manner. In keeping with this concept and with the actual nature of the problem at hand, we consider that an ultimate goal of these negotiations should be approximate parity in the form of a common ceiling for the ground forces of each side in Central Europe. Our approach to these negotiations, as I have already said, is a realistic one. In view of the complexities of the subject matter, we believe that our initial goal would have to be a more modest one than the achievement, in one step, of a common ceiling for ground forces in Central Europe.

Thus we consider that our negotiations should proceed in more than one phase. The first phase should focus on U.S. and Soviet ground forces. Their reduction in a manner consistent with the principle of undiminished security would be a particularly valuable contribution to stability in Europe. Moreover, it would be logical if the two largest powers with forces in the area should take the first step.

It is our view that reduction of forces in Central Europe will not of itself be sufficient to result in greater stability. Other measures will also be needed. These should include stabilizing measures, verification measures, and noncircumvention provisions.

For example, not only the size and character, but also the activities of armed forces affect the stability of the military situation in Europe. Therefore we consider that measures affecting certain military activities are necessary. As participants will be aware, this is what we had in mind when we introduced the term "associated measures" into the communique of last June. Activities of the forces in the area, if their purpose is ambiguous or if they are carried out on such a scale or in such a manner as to be

perceived by other participants as a potential threat, could be destabilizing. Agreed measures relating to force activities and arrangements designed to reduce the possibility of miscalculation—that is, what may be termed stabilizing measures—would be a significant contribution to stability in the area and could enhance mutual confidence. We shall have a number of such measures to propose.

Verification and Noncircumvention Measures

It is also our view that appropriate provisions concerning verification of a reduction agreement will need to be agreed. Each participant or group of participants will wish to have adequate assurance that the terms of a reduction agreement are being faithfully carried out. That will clearly be in the interests of all. It will be necessary, therefore, to deal with this matter in the context of agreement on the substance of reductions.

We consider that each participant will also wish to have appropriate assurances that each party to possible agreements will refrain from any action which would circumvent or undermine an agreement. We will need to take this matter up in detail at a later stage in our negotiations, when the outlines of a possible reduction agreement may have begun to emerge.

We believe, in sum, that appropriate provisions and assurances regarding the activities of forces in Central Europe, regarding verification of the observance of a reduction agreement, and regarding measures to assure that a reduction agreement will not be circumvented will be necessary to preserve undiminished security for each party. In accordance with this same principle of undiminished security for each party, we will also wish to insure that agreed measures in Central Europe not result in reduced stability or security outside the area.

Finally, as a last major point, I wish to remind you of the statement made at the May 14 plenary of the preparatory talks by Ambassador Quarles Van Ufford [Bryan

Quarles Van Ufford, head of the Netherlands delegation] on behalf of my government and the other governments represented by my colleagues. That statement said that:

The representatives of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America wish to point out that the arrangements for the participation of Hungary in these consultations are without prejudice to the nature of Hungary's participation in future negotiations, decisions, or agreed measures or to the security of any party, and that, in particular, the question of how and to what extent Hungary will be included in future decisions, agreements, or measures must be examined and decided during the pending negotiations.

This represents our continued intention.

I have outlined for you the overall American approach to the subject matter of these negotiations. As will have been evident from statements made earlier, this approach is shared by our allies. Our general method of exposition over the next weeks and months will be to proceed from the general to the specific. This initial exposition of our approach to the subject matter has dealt with general concepts. We will return to these concepts in our ensuing discussions in the next days. We hope to elaborate on them and examine their practical implications with you in increasing detail.

I wish to stress in closing that my government attaches great weight to these negotiations. We believe that the goal we seek—a more stable military balance in Central Europe at lower levels of forces with undiminished security for each party—is of immense potential importance to us all. Success in achieving this goal would surely be regarded by all our peoples as a great and valuable contribution to a lasting peace in Europe and in the world. In view of the importance of this goal, it is up to all of us here to exert every effort to achieve it. We, for our part, are ready to move ahead.

On behalf of my government, I would like to thank the Austrian authorities for agreeing to host our conference in Vienna and for making available facilities to help us in our work. There could be no better site for this important conference.

President Nixon's Veto of War Powers Measure Overridden by the Congress

Following are texts of a message from President Nixon to the House of Representatives dated October 24 and a White House statement issued November 7, when the House and Senate voted to override the President's veto of House Joint Resolution 542.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON, OCTOBER 24

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 29

To the House of Representatives:

I hereby return without my approval House Joint Resolution 542—the War Powers Resolution. While I am in accord with the desire of the Congress to assert its proper role in the conduct of our foreign affairs, the restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the authority of the President are both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.

The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs have been debated since the founding of our country. Only recently, however, has there been a serious challenge to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in choosing not to draw a precise and detailed line of demarcation between the foreign policy powers of the two branches.

The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of foreseeing every contingency that might arise in this complex area. They acknowledged the need for flexibility in responding to changing circumstances. They recognized that foreign policy decisions must be made through close cooperation between the two branches and not through rigidly codified procedures.

These principles remain as valid today as they were when our Constitution was written. Yet House Joint Resolution 542 would violate those principles by defining the President's powers in ways which would strictly limit his constitutional authority.

CLEARLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years. One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution—an action which does not normally have the force of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving legislation.

I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional. The only way in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution—and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone is clearly without force.

UNDERMINING OUR FOREIGN POLICY

While I firmly believe that a veto of House Joint Resolution 542 is warranted solely on constitutional grounds, I am also deeply disturbed by the practical consequences of this resolution. For it would seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis. As a result, the confidence of our allies in our ability to assist them could be dimin-

ished and the respect of our adversaries for our deterrent posture could decline. A permanent and substantial element of unpredictability would be injected into the world's assessment of American behavior, further increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and war.

If this resolution had been in operation, America's effective response to a variety of challenges in recent years would have been vastly complicated or even made impossible. We may well have been unable to respond in the way we did during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Congo rescue operation in 1964, and the Jordanian crisis of 1970—to mention just a few examples. In addition, our recent actions to bring about a peaceful settlement of the hostilities in the Middle East would have been seriously impaired if this resolution had been in force.

While all the specific consequences of House Joint Resolution 542 cannot yet be predicted, it is clear that it would undercut the ability of the United States to act as an effective influence for peace. For example, the provision automatically cutting off certain authorities after 60 days unless they are extended by the Congress could work to prolong or intensify a crisis. Until the Congress suspended the deadline, there would be at least a chance of United States withdrawal and an adversary would be tempted therefore to postpone serious negotiations until the 60 days were up. Only after the Congress acted would there be a strong incentive for an adversary to negotiate. In addition, the very existence of a deadline could lead to an escalation of hostilities in order to achieve certain objectives before the 60 days expired.

The measure would jeopardize our role as a force for peace in other ways as well. It would, for example, strike from the President's hand a wide range of important peace-keeping tools by eliminating his ability to exercise quiet diplomacy backed by subtle shifts in our military deployments. It would also cast into doubt authorities which Pres-

idents have used to undertake certain humanitarian relief missions in conflict areas, to protect fishing boats from seizure, to deal with ship or aircraft hijackings, and to respond to threats of attack. Not the least of the adverse consequences of this resolution would be the prohibition contained in section 8 against fulfilling our obligations under the NATO treaty as ratified by the Senate. Finally, since the bill is somewhat vague as to when the 60 day rule would apply, it could lead to extreme confusion and dangerous disagreements concerning the prerogatives of the two branches, seriously damaging our ability to respond to international crises.

FAILURE TO REQUIRE POSITIVE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

I am particularly disturbed by the fact that certain of the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces would terminate automatically under this resolution 60 days after they were invoked. No overt Congressional action would be required to cut off these powers—they would disappear automatically unless the Congress extended them. In effect, the Congress is here attempting to increase its policy-making role through a provision which requires it to take absolutely no action at all.

In my view, the proper way for the Congress to make known its will on such foreign policy questions is through a positive action, with full debate on the merits of the issue and with each member taking the responsibility of casting a yes or no vote after considering those merits. The authorization and appropriations process represents one of the ways in which such influence can be exercised. I do not, however, believe that the Congress can responsibly contribute its considered, collective judgment on such grave questions without full debate and without a yes or no vote. Yet this is precisely what the joint resolution would allow. It would give every future Congress the ability to handcuff every future President merely by doing nothing and sitting still.

In my view, one cannot become a responsible partner unless one is prepared to take responsible action.

STRENGTHENING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCHES

The responsible and effective exercise of the war powers requires the fullest cooperation between the Congress and the Executive and the prudent fulfillment by each branch of its constitutional responsibilities. House Joint Resolution 542 includes certain constructive measures which would foster this process by enhancing the flow of information from the executive branch to the Congress. Section 3, for example, calls for consultations with the Congress before and during the involvement of United States forces in hostilities abroad. This provision is consistent with the desire of this Administration for regularized consultations with the Congress in an even wider range of circumstances.

I believe that full and cooperative participation in foreign policy matters by both the executive and the legislative branches could be enhanced by a careful and dispassionate study of their constitutional roles. Helpful proposals for such a study have already been made in the Congress. I would welcome the establishment of a non-partisan commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. This commission could make a thorough review of the principal constitutional issues in Executive-Congressional relations, including the war powers, the international agreement powers, and the question of Exec-

utive privilege, and then submit its recommendations to the President and the Congress. The members of such a commission could be drawn from both parties—and could represent many perspectives including those of the Congress, the executive branch, the legal profession, and the academic community.

This Administration is dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs and to preserving the constitutional prerogatives of both branches of our Government. I know that the Congress shares that goal. A commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President would provide a useful opportunity for both branches to work together toward that common objective.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 24, 1973.*

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 7

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated November 12

The President is extremely disappointed with the House vote to override his veto of House Joint Resolution 542.

He feels the action seriously undermines this Nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis.

The confidence of our allies in our ability to assist them will be diminished by the House's action. Our potential adversaries may be encouraged to engage in future acts of international mischief because of this blow to our deterrent posture.

Department Supports Request for Emergency Appropriations for Security Assistance for Israel and Cambodia

Statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush¹

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and to testify in support of the President's request for emergency appropriations to support our efforts to establish the foundations for peace in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The members of this committee have earned a well-deserved reputation for careful oversight of government programs. In this respect, we share with you a concern for prudence in government operations, as well as a common interest in the achievement of our national objectives abroad.

The last few months have witnessed developments unforeseen when executive branch witnesses last testified before you on the security assistance program for fiscal year 1974. Though their situations are different in many respects, two friendly countries have been forced into combat at a level which we did not expect when we submitted our budget to you. The request currently before you is for \$2.4 billion in additional security assistance to aid Israel and Cambodia.

The major portion of the President's request arises from the sudden outbreak of war in the Middle East and the heavy burden this has placed on Israel's resources. In contrast with previous rounds of hostilities,

the fighting this time was tougher and more prolonged. Israel suffered major losses in its inventory of equipment—particularly in aircraft and armor—that will have to be replaced.

To date, Israel has purchased upward of \$1 billion in military equipment from the United States. The items purchased include conventional munitions, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, crew-served and individual weapons, and a standard range of vital aircraft ordnance. In addition, Israel has bought replacements for tanks, aircraft, radios, and vehicles and will need additional equipment in the months ahead to make good military equipment lost during the recent conflict. This equipment is essential if the military balance in the area is to be maintained. It is designed to provide Israel with the essential security needed in the face of the new highly sophisticated armaments being made available by the Soviet Union to several Near Eastern countries.

When faced with this situation, the administration perceived two possible options. We could have sought an appropriation to supply military equipment under the open-ended terms of the recently passed Jackson amendment to the military procurement bill or we could come to Congress at an early stage, discuss the problem and the magnitude of it, and ask Congress to join us in this resupply effort by passing special emergency legislation. We chose the second option because we felt the Congress had in-

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on Nov. 5. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

dedicated its desire to be consulted as early as possible and to participate fully in the decisionmaking process. Moreover, this emergency legislation gives us the choice of supplying this equipment either through grant military assistance or by foreign military sales credits.

The deep concern of the Congress is evidenced by the fact that 70 percent of the Senate Members and 60 percent of the Representatives have joined in sponsoring resolutions which call upon our government to maintain Israel's deterrent strength by transferring, "by whatsoever means necessary, Phantom aircraft and other equipment, in the quantities needed by Israel."

Three-fourths of this committee, actually three-fourths of the members of this subcommittee, have sponsored such measures.

It is unclear at this time what the total Israeli requirement will be and what impact future purchases will have on Israel's economy. These matters are under active review. I can assure the committee, however, that the requested \$2.2 billion appropriation in the form of a mix of foreign military sales credits and grant military assistance represents our best estimate of the amount needed. If the total requirement is less than \$2.2 billion, we will report this fact to the Congress.

Thus far Israel has used cash and credit to make its purchases of military equipment. In view of the extraordinary demands on Israel's resources arising out of the hostilities, the President has asked for authority to make grant assistance as well as credit assistance available to Israel. We will need a clearer idea of the magnitude of Israeli requirements and the effect of the war on its financial situation before we can determine what the precise terms of our assistance should be. We will keep the Congress informed as the picture becomes clearer.

We are confronted now with the hard fact that since the outbreak of war on October 6, the Soviet Union has launched a massive resupply effort—by both air and sea—to refurbish the depleted inventories of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. We do not know what the

terms of these arrangements are, but it is worth noting that following the 1967 war the Soviets supplied some 1 billion dollars' worth of arms to their Arab friends gratis. Certainly we see no sign that the question of repayment terms is in any way holding up the present flow of Soviet weaponry to the area.

It is our conviction that negotiations leading to a peace settlement—which we are now hoping to arrange—will encounter serious difficulty should there develop a situation in which one side is apprehensive about its security. The requested emergency appropriations would enable the U.S. Government to assist Israel in meeting its security needs. It also provides tangible evidence of U.S. support. We believe it will contribute to the creation of an environment propitious for negotiations.

I want to stress that our request for these emergency appropriations for Israel falls within the broad framework of our policy objectives in the Middle East. The committee is of course aware of the seriousness that not only President Nixon but his predecessors have attached to the commitment of this country to insure the basic security of Israel. We believe that maintaining that commitment is essential, but we have never seen this in itself as the sum total of our objectives in the Middle East. We seek a fundamental peace settlement that will provide all states in the area—the Arab states as well as Israel—with security from the recurrent threat of war.

During the past week we have been engaged in delicate discussions with Egypt, Syria, and Israel in an effort to put the cease-fire on a more secure footing and get negotiations on a peace settlement underway. Secretary Kissinger is leaving today on a trip to Arab capitals to continue these talks.

In a way very similar to Israel, the people of Cambodia need assistance to permit them to defend themselves against aggression from the outside. As a result, we are also requesting an additional \$200 million in grant military assistance for Cambodia.

These funds are intended to meet the increased ammunition requirements of Cambodia's Armed Forces that have arisen as a result of the termination of U.S. air support on August 15, 1973.

The Khmer people have withstood enemy attacks with courage and fortitude. Indeed, they have more than held their own. The administration is convinced that failure to provide Cambodia the means to defend herself would dangerously weaken prospects for peace in Southeast Asia.

The increased enemy pressures against the Cambodian Government forces started even before the Paris agreements. At that time, of course, we were able to assist them with U.S. air support. Now, however, with the unexpected ending of this support and the reduction of fighting elsewhere, the Cambodians are facing a significantly different situation. This has resulted in considerable increases in ammunition expenditures, particularly for artillery which must be used as a partial compensation for the loss of U.S. air support. Equipment requirements for the resupply of combat losses and the upgrading of some Cambodian units have naturally also increased.

Some have charged that the ammunition requirements are excessive. In fact, they are comparable with those of U.S. units when fighting in similar circumstances. The Defense Department now estimates that ammunition requirements for fiscal year 1974 have increased by considerably more than \$100 million from the original estimates made in early 1973. In addition, operations and maintenance expenditures have increased by approximately \$8 million; equipment requirements have increased by over \$50 million; and supply operations to deliver this ammunition and equipment have increased by over \$30 million. The items of equipment we are proposing are unsophisticated and relatively inexpensive; for the army, machineguns, rifles, and artillery pieces; for the air force, light aircraft and helicopters; and for the navy, river patrol boats.

Our support for Cambodia has been limited to a relatively small MAP program

[military assistance program]. MAP, as opposed to MASF assistance, [military assistance service funded] is normally used for less developed countries not involved in a shooting war. The North Vietnamese and the insurgent forces are well supplied in Cambodia and are able to move supplies for a dry season offensive, possibly as early as December. Because of these changed circumstances in Cambodia and under our current funding constraints, we are now using virtually all available MAP funds under the reduced figures in the continuing-resolution authority to meet the Cambodian Government's minimal needs for survival. The supplemental requested is essential to continue to meet these unexpectedly high needs and still maintain a minimal level of military assistance to other friends and allies such as Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. Without it, we will be faced with making a choice between the two. A Communist military victory and the installation of a government in Phnom Penh which is controlled by Hanoi would gravely threaten the fragile structure of peace established in the Paris agreements. Decimating our other military assistance programs to meet Cambodian requirements could weaken the defensive posture of our allies and thereby endanger U.S. national security.

This assistance we are requesting is not regarded by the administration as a solution to the basic problem that confronts Cambodia today. However, an overall settlement in Southeast Asia can only be achieved when North Viet-Nam and its allies fully comply with the agreements reached earlier this year in Paris. The importance that world opinion attaches to ending the conflict in Southeast Asia was dramatically illustrated by the award of the Nobel Prize to Secretary Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. The administration continues to hope that all governments will work to insure that the Paris agreements are fully honored and implemented.

In the final analysis, gentlemen, I believe that the issues revolving around peace and war in the Middle East and Southeast Asia are the same. All nations must respect the

principles embodied in the United Nations Charter. These principles are the foundation upon which world peace must rest. They are not subject to unilateral interpretation. And until all nations are prepared to respect them, we must be sure that others who share our hopes for a more peaceful world have the resources to protect their independence and national sovereignty.

Report on Educational and Cultural Exchange Program Sent to Congress

*Message From President Nixon*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith the Annual Report on the International Educational and Cultural Exchange Program conducted during fiscal year 1972 by the Department of State under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-256).

During the past quarter century, the increase in economic and scientific interdependence among nations, the growth of new transnational communities based on common interests and concerns, the global reach of communications and the upsurge in travel have all radically altered the international environment. All these developments make it particularly important that the quality of the participants selected for exchange programs and the nature of their exchange experiences be truly outstanding. Added attention should also be given to relatively low-cost ways of enhancing the professional and cultural experiences of foreign students and others who come to live and to work in our country.

During this past year, a special effort has been made to foster group exchanges concerning problems we have in common with other countries. At the same time, we are striving to concentrate on the exceptional

individual, on the promising young leader or the influential communicator, for example, as well as to develop exchanges that introduce our visitors to America's exceptionally rich ethnic and cultural diversity.

Our exchange programs have proved especially valuable in recent months in our developing relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The American and Soviet peoples are now working more closely in a wide range of areas—exchanging reactor scientists, sharing research findings in heart disease, cancer, and environmental health, cooperating in nearly 30 environmental projects, collaborating in the use of computers in management and planning joint probes into space. Cultural groups and performing artists are moving between the two countries in increasing numbers. Similar exchanges are occurring with the People's Republic of China. In the past year, Chinese table tennis players, physicians, scientists and acrobats have visited the United States, and businessmen, doctors, journalists, educators, scientists and scholars from this country have gone to China.

Scientific, educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and scores of other countries are also steadily increasing, under both official and unofficial auspices. These exchanges have helped to open new levels of dialogue with present and prospective leaders in much of the world.

A unique feature of the exchange program and a major source of its vitality through the years has been the enthusiastic involvement of thousands of private individuals, associations and businesses in its activities. They have voluntarily given a great deal of their own resources and time and effort to these programs and have thus made the exchange program truly representative of the people of the United States. I gratefully salute those who have taken part in this highly effective form of people-to-people diplomacy.

All of these elements are discussed in greater detail in this Annual Report and I

¹ Transmitted on Oct. 16.

am pleased to commend this document to the thoughtful attention of the Congress.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE. October 16, 1973.

U.S. Contributes Funds for Airlift of Refugees in South Asia

Press release 400 dated November 6

The United States will contribute \$2 million toward support of a massive two-way airlift of refugees between Bangladesh and Pakistan, the Department of State announced on November 6.

The U.S. contribution, authorized by President Nixon, responds to appeals from United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and Sadruddin Aga Khan, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The airlift is a direct result of the Delhi Agreement of August 28, 1973, under which more than 200,000 persons are to be repatriated or resettled. About 50,000 persons have been moved to date, at the rate of approximately 800 a day.

The Department has been informed by the UNHCR that cash pledges, including the U.S. contribution, amount to \$5.7 million; other contributors thus far include Australia, Denmark, Japan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey. East Germany and the Soviet Union bilaterally, and the United Kingdom through the UNHCR, have contributed the use of aircraft.

The movement is under the direction of the UNHCR assisted by the International Committee of the Red Cross. President Nixon's determination order was made under provisions of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962. The United States will maintain a continuing interest in the successful conclusion of this important humanitarian undertaking and will consider additional support in relation to needs as they arise and to the contributions of other nations.

Sahel African Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance

Following is a report submitted to President Nixon on September 27 by Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development and the President's Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief to Sub-Sahara Africa.

AID press release 73-76 dated October 23

TEXT OF REPORT

SEPTEMBER 27, 1973.

REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance for Sahel Africa

My report to you of August 10 concluded: ¹

—that donations of food from the U.S. and other donors were adequate to meet overall immediate needs for survival in the drought and famine stricken areas of Africa.

—that there were critical problems in the transport and distribution of food to people in some remote areas during the sixty days until local harvests of food in October.

—that prompt planning for longer-term recovery was essential.

In response to your direction to assure the effectiveness of relief efforts, I visited the four countries of Upper Volta, Mali, Niger and Chad during the critical period September 8-21. I saw firsthand the drought devastation and human problems, and observed our relief efforts in action. I met with the Presidents and senior officials of these countries, as well as with the Presidents of Senegal and Mauritania. In discussions with the leaders of all six countries, I sought to assess future needs for emergency relief and for recovery.

My findings on relief operations follow:

1. The devastation and dislocations of the drought have been immense. These coun-

¹ For text of the report, see BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1973, p. 380.

tries—already among the poorest in the world—have experienced staggering losses in crops and livestock. Great numbers of people migrated long distances in their desperate search for livelihood and food. Families are separated. Many died along the way from hunger and sickness, particularly in remote nomadic communities where help did not reach them in time. Some two million people have been left completely destitute, without means of recovering their livelihood. Others can recover more quickly but will need help to do so.

2. Nevertheless, widespread starvation has been averted. Relief food and medical supplies from the U.S. and other countries are reaching those for whom they were destined in the cities, villages, and remote areas of Sahel Africa. Without our help, millions would have died of starvation. Emergency assistance from all sources has risen to about \$154 million, of which the United States alone contributed over \$47 million. (Annex A details the U.S. relief effort.)

3. As your representative, I received expressions of sincere gratitude for American help at every level, from Presidents to individual nomads. They knew, and made clear that they knew, that the United States was out in front in the timeliness and magnitude of its help, and in getting it to where it was needed. Major effective relief also was provided by the European Economic Community.

4. The Sahel countries will continue to need help on an urgent basis for at least the coming year. While the local harvests this October will relieve some of the pressures of immediate crisis, crops will be well below needs in most of the areas. Even where harvests are reasonably good, the availability of food for normal marketing will be a problem as farmers seek to rebuild reserves. Several million people are destitute and without means to purchase food.

Loss of income and extraordinary relief needs have exposed the budgets of these stricken countries to severe strain. The Sahel countries seek and need a continuation of food relief. We will know the precise scale of these needs for the coming year after com-

pletion of a field assessment now underway with the Food and Agriculture Organization.

5. As relief operations continue, it is important that the Sahel countries, and those who seek to help them, direct their efforts toward recovery measures which will reduce the need for future relief operations. The Presidents of the Sahel countries support this objective and welcomed our initiative. We have sent a special A.I.D. Task Force to the area to help design concrete programs of action to cope with drought-related problems and particularly to maximize production from the next crop, which will be planted in nine months.

6. Nutritional problems, particularly for women and children, are a growing concern. U.S. epidemiologists from the Center for Disease Control have helped identify pockets of distress. In response we are supplying medicines, vitamins, blankets, shelter and specially fortified foods for these camps. More needs to be done to meet the minimum nutritional needs of women and children, and we are bringing this need to the attention of U.S. private voluntary agencies.

Increasing public concern in the United States, especially from the Black community, has been aroused by the plight of these people and their struggle to survive.

PUSH (People United to Save Humanity) waged a nationwide campaign for food and medical donations, which with the help of A.I.D. are being transported to the Sahel. AFRICARE, a promising new organization, has undertaken a public fund-raising campaign. Other Black organizations helping include: the National Office of Black Catholics, Congress of African People, National Welfare Rights Organization and the African Heritage Studies Association.

A wide range of other voluntary agencies—including CARE, Church World Service, Catholic Relief Services and American Red Cross—also are actively engaged.

Recovery and Development Needs: Even without a drought, the development problems of the countries of the Sahel are formidable. There is a delicate balance between the

capacity of the land and the needs of farmers and herders. The drought has tilted this balance drastically—transforming a precarious situation into a calamity which has left deep scars.

Water resources have been depleted. Range lands have been severely overgrazed and may require years to recover. In a broad sense, the drought speeded up an already deteriorating ecological situation which must be reversed if the same kind of calamity is not to reoccur.

The Governments of the region have recognized the need to cooperate in recovery and development programs which seek to overcome the basic problems of the region. To meet this need, they established the Interstate Committee of the six governments which met in Upper Volta September 8-12. I attended this meeting as your special representative.

Major decisions taken by the six heads of state include:

- declaration that the Sahel was a continuing disaster situation which would require the continued help of the international donor community.

- designation of President Lamizana of Upper Volta to present the Sahel's drought problems to the United Nations General Assembly.

- adoption of recovery and development proposals, which placed emphasis first on efforts to ensure speedy recovery from the drought's effect by increasing next year's harvest; and, second, on seeking major financing of longer-term projects.

Donor representatives at the meeting considered the program proposals a positive statement of needs by the Sahel Governments for planning and possible action. Under Secretary Bradford Morse [United Nations Under Secretary General for Political and General Assembly Affairs] reaffirmed the desire of the United Nations to work in a coordinated way in meeting needs. The World Bank will make available special, flexible credits. Other major donors—including the French, Germans, Canadians, and

European Economic Community—also offered to help.

I indicated U.S. willingness to help with both technical and material resources in meeting the region's needs. In particular, I pledged that the United States would engage its best scientific capacities to work with the Sahel Governments on their water and arid land problems.

Role of Research and Science for Future Development: The African countries, and the international community, recognize that the problems of the Sahel require new approaches to development if the region is to become self-sustaining and avoid future disasters. In particular, it is necessary to approach the rehabilitation of the area with careful attention to protecting the natural resources of land and water which are crucial to development over the long term.

We have initiated special investigations of the development potentials of this region by engaging:

- NASA to explore the use of such advanced technology as the Earth Resources Technology Satellite and Sky Lab to analyze from photos the cropping and water resource potential;

- Massachusetts Institute of Technology to analyze major development options for this region;

- the National Academy of Sciences to provide scientific advisory services covering a spectrum of disciplines during the recovery period.

We can be proud of the role played by the United States, and the rest of the donor community, in helping the stricken states of the Sahel meet their most urgent needs. Recognizing that the disaster crisis will continue for at least another year, we, and other donors, are continuing to cooperate with the drought affected nations, in the longer-term rehabilitation and recovery effort. Much has been done to help, but much remains to be done.

MAURICE J. WILLIAMS

*President's Special Coordinator for
Emergency Relief to Sub-Sahara Africa*

TEXT OF ANNEX TO REPORT

SAHEL DROUGHT ASSISTANCE United States Government Assistance

I. Total Assistance

Food Assistance (256,000 tons of cereals)	\$ 40,818,000
Other Emergency Assistance	6,447,000
Total	47,265,000

II. Assistance by Receiving Country

A. CHAD

Food Assistance, 8,000 tons of cereals	1,416,000
One month C-130 airlift plus materials for food air drops	172,200
Seeds, livestock feeding and emergency agricultural materials	110,000
Total for Chad	1,698,200

B. MALI

Food Assistance, 55,000 tons of cereals	8,438,000
Airlift by three C-130s for six months	3,159,000
Medicines, blankets, tenting materials and related needs of nomad refugee camps	219,900
Other emergency needs	56,000
Total for Mali	11,872,900

C. MAURITANIA

Food Assistance, 33,000 tons of cereals	5,035,000
Airlift by one C-130 to start October 1	100,000
Other transport costs	300,000
Medicines and related material for nomad groups	77,225
Provision of materials for water development	125,000
Total for Mauritania	5,637,225

D. NIGER

Food Assistance, 61,000 tons of cereals	10,672,000
Livestock feed and vaccines	505,000
Medicines and special foods	28,000
Support to Belgian airdrop	15,000
Agricultural improvements	131,000
Total for Niger	11,351,000

E. SENEGAL

Food Assistance, 45,000 tons of cereals	5,328,000
Livestock feed and vaccines	244,491
Other emergency programs	75,000
Total for Senegal	5,647,491

F. UPPER VOLTA

Food Assistance, 35,000 tons of cereals	6,094,000
Livestock feed and vaccines	281,000
Field hospital (complete) and medicines	16,650
Special transport of grains	40,000
Well deepening program	60,000
Total for Upper Volta	6,491,650

G. REGIONAL AND OTHER

Other and Unallocated food assistance, 19,000 tons	3,835,000
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Regional programs, support to U.S. voluntary agency programs, special survey teams, support of international agencies and other regional emergency programs

731,534

Total Regional and Other

4,566,534

GRAND TOTAL ALL
U.S. PROGRAMS

\$ 47,265,000

SAHEL DROUGHT ASSISTANCE Total International Contributions

I. Major Food Contributions

	Tons of cereals	
United States	256,000	\$ 40,818,000 ¹
European Economic Community	111,000	11,100,000 ²
France	78,000	7,800,000 ²
Canada	26,000	2,600,000 ²
Germany	36,000	3,600,000 ²
China	95,000	9,500,000 ^{2,3}
Russia	22,000	2,200,000 ²
Other donors and concessional imports	100,000	10,000,000 ²
Estimated value of contributions of foods by various bilateral and international donors—dried milk, CSM, etc.		3,000,000

TOTAL FOOD
CONTRIBUTIONS
AND IMPORTS

\$ 90,618,000

TOTAL
QUANTITY FOOD
CONTRIBUTIONS
AND IMPORTS 724,000 MT

¹ Value of food plus ocean freight plus inland transport.

² Estimated market value.

³ Includes 45,000 MT contributed through Chinese Red Cross.

II. Major Other Expenditures for Disaster Relief Purposes

United States	\$ 6,147,000*
European Economic Community	22,000,000
Nigeria	3,750,000
Zaire	110,000
United Nations (Sahel Zone Trust Fund)	8,290,000
Kuwait	300,000
Libya	760,000

TOTAL CASH CONTRIBUTIONS \$ 41,357,000

*Excludes \$300,000 U.S. contributions to Sahel Trust Fund.

III. Various Contributions in Kind

Belgium—Airlift and financing of ground support
Canada—Airlift and well drilling programs
France—Airlift and support of country budgets
Federal Republic of Germany—Airlift and ground support
Libya—Airlift
Spain—Airlift and ground transport
United Kingdom—Airlift
USSR—Airlift
Other—South Korea, Taiwan, USSR and several other countries have made grants up to \$50,000 each to Upper Volta.

ESTIMATED TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS	
IN KIND	\$ 22,000,000
TOTAL	<u>\$153,975,000</u>

U.S. and Yugoslavia Discuss Cultural Exchanges

Following is a joint statement released at Washington on October 10 at the conclusion of meetings between U.S. and Yugoslav cultural delegations.

To improve cooperation between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States of America and to discuss ways and means for carrying out mutually beneficial cultural exchanges, the American and Yugoslav delegations met in Washington, D.C. on September 24 and on October 9 and 10, 1973. The respective delegations consisted of the following members:

For Yugoslavia:

1. Mrs. RANKA KAVCIC-BOZOVIC, Deputy Director, FAISECTC [Federal Administration for International Scientific, Educational, Cultural, and Technical Cooperation], Belgrade, Head of Delegation
2. Mr. IVAN GADJANSKI, Counselor, FAISECTC, Belgrade
3. Mr. TVRTKO KULENOVIC, Writer, Sarajevo
4. Mr. MIROSLAV POLJANEC, Director, Concert Agency, Zagreb
5. Mr. MIODRAG PROTIC, Director, Museum of Modern Art, Belgrade

For the United States:

1. Mr. MICHAEL STRAIGHT, Deputy Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts
2. Mrs. FANNIE TAYLOR, Director of Program Information, National Endowment for the Arts
3. Mr. GLYNN ROSS, Director, Seattle Opera
4. Mr. THOMAS FLEMING, Vice-President of the

American PEN [Poets, Essayists, and Novelists] Club, New York

5. Mr. SIMON MICHAEL BESSIE, President, Athenaeum Publishers, New York
6. Ms. MARTHA COIGNEY, Director, International Theater Institute, New York
7. Mr. JOSHUA TAYLOR, Director, National Collection of Fine Arts, of the Smithsonian Institution
8. Mr. GRIFFITH JOHNSON, Vice-President, Motion Picture Association of America
9. Mr. JACK MCBRIDE, Director, Nebraska Educational Television Commission, Lincoln, Nebraska
10. Dr. PAUL HORECKY, Director, Slavic Division, Library of Congress

While in the United States, members of the Yugoslav Delegation visited many cities and met with prominent American civic and cultural leaders. Discussions were held with these civic leaders on ways and means of continuing and expanding existing bilateral cultural exchanges through direct contacts and through the initiation of special projects. For example, the American Bicentennial was welcomed as an important occasion during which examples of each nation's finest cultural achievements could be exchanged.

Keeping in mind the previous Belgrade Talks as well as recent contacts in the United States, both sides have agreed that cooperation, although positive and extensive up to now, has not always resulted in the presentation of the best cultural achievements of either country. In the interest of improving exchanges, both recommend:

A. that additional initiatives in all fields be encouraged on public, private and government levels to promote greater appreciation for the cultural achievements of the United States and Yugoslavia.

B. that public and private institutions as well as government agencies, both local and federal, be encouraged to give more financial and administrative support to worthy exchange projects than has been the case in the past.

Following their visit to many areas in the United States, the Yugoslav Delegation reported on the various possibilities for cultural exchanges which were discussed with American cultural leaders. The following projects were jointly reviewed by the U.S. and Yugoslav Delegations at their concluding meeting:

I. FINE ARTS:

1. A representative exhibit of Yugoslav modern art, organized in cooperation with the Guggenheim Museum, to be shown in New York, Chicago, Washington and elsewhere.

2. Traveling exhibitions of Yugoslav graphics and other art forms, sponsored by the American Federation of Arts and the Smithsonian Institution's Traveling Exhibition Service.

3. An exhibit of contemporary American art to be presented in the Museum of Modern Art in Belgrade, Gallery of Modern Art in Zagreb, Gallery of Modern Art in Ljubljana, and in the Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje, organized by the Museum of Art in New York in collaboration with the above-named Yugoslav museums.

4. An exhibition of a leading modern American artist to be shown throughout Yugoslavia.

5. Reciprocal exchanges of art critics, art historians, and directors of museums and galleries.

II. PERFORMING ARTS:

1. A tour of a representative Yugoslav ensemble presenting a repertory of contemporary Yugoslav and Slavic composers in New York, Chicago, Washington, Pittsburgh and other American cities.

2. A presentation, within the framework of the Bicentennial, of the drama, "Columbus", by Miroslav Krleža, performed by the Dubrovnik Summer Festival Company.

3. A festival of Yugoslav animated films at the Museum of Modern Art in New York for showing in New York and elsewhere.

4. A tour of the Chicago Symphony or other renowned American Orchestras to major cities in Yugoslavia.

5. Participation by a major U.S. opera company, such as the New York City Opera, presenting a contemporary American work, at the Zagreb Biennale.

6. Participation by a top American experimental theatre group in the annual festival of chamber and experimental theatre in Sarajevo.

7. Participation of leading American ensembles of modern dance in the Festival of Opera and Ballet, Ljubljana.

8. Reciprocal exchanges of responsible cultural administrators.

III. OTHER FIELDS:

1. Continuation and encouragement of collaboration in the fields of literature and publishing, including publication of:

- a) the Yugoslav Maritime Encyclopedia
- b) an anthology of modern Yugoslav poetry

2. Development of existing proposals for mutual collaboration in ETV, including the exchange of films.

In conclusion both sides agreed to seek out and support worthwhile cultural exchange projects and to encourage the appropriate governmental agencies and public and private institutions to lend support to these projects.

Both sides agreed to keep each other informed on the progress of such projects, through the Federal Administration for International Scientific, Educa-

tional, Cultural, and Technical Cooperation, the National Endowment for the Arts, and the Department of State.

MADE in Washington, D.C. on October 10, 1973.

For the American Delegation: For the Yugoslav Delegation:

MICHAEL STRAIGHT

RANKA KAVCIC-BOZOVIC

THE UNITED NATIONS

Composition of U.N. Emergency Force Agreed Upon by Security Council

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on November 2, together with the text of a statement representing the agreement of members of the Council which was made that day by Austrian Representative Peter Jankowitsch, President of the Security Council for November.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 107 dated November 2

My delegation is deeply gratified that the Council has reached agreement on important steps to be taken in implementation of Security Council Resolution 340.

In the lengthy consultations that have led to this result, my delegation has held firmly to the view that our first responsibility has been to create an effective UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force].

Of course, my government fully believes in a broadly based geographic representation in the peacekeeping force. But I am confident that no member would disagree that it must be consistent with the overriding importance of having an effective force. We must remember that we now enter the phase of practical operations. We are dispatching

the forces of several nations into lines which only a few days ago were battlefields. Three armies have fought in harsh conflict in this area. The lines are tenuous and uncertain in many places. The situation remains tense and dangerous. The unforeseen can easily happen. It is critically important that we have an integrated, harmonious, and impartial force which can efficiently carry out its duties. To do less is to betray the trust of those countries which have generously offered their young men for this delicate and dangerous task. We wish them well in their mission. Our plan is perhaps less than perfect. We shall be trying to improve it in the days ahead.

For the present, we can take satisfaction that this Council has worked tirelessly and constructively to fulfill in this instance one of its highest responsibilities under the Charter—that of peacekeeping.

We can only hope that our efforts will make possible a further success—the creation of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL¹

United Nations Emergency Force (Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973): implementation—second phase

1. The members of the Security Council met for informal consultations on the morning of 1 November 1973 and heard a report from the Secretary-General on the progress so far made in the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973).

2. After a lengthy and detailed exchange of views it was agreed that in regard to the next stage of implementation of resolution 340 (1973):

(i) The Secretary General will immediately consult, to begin with, Ghana (from the African regional group), Indonesia and Nepal (from the Asian regional group), Panama and Peru (from the Latin American regional group), and Poland (from the Eastern European regional group) and Canada (from the Western European and Other States group), the latter two with particular responsibility

for logistic support, with a view to dispatching contingents to the Middle East pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973). The Secretary-General will dispatch troops to the area from these countries as soon as the necessary consultations have been completed. The Council members agreed that at least three African countries are expected to send contingents to the Middle East. The present decision of the Council is intended to bring about a better geographical distribution of the United Nations Emergency Force.

(ii) The Secretary-General will regularly report to the Council on the results of his efforts undertaken pursuant to paragraph (i) so that the question of balanced geographical distribution in the force can be reviewed.

3. The above-mentioned agreement was reached by members of the Council with the exception of the People's Republic of China which dissociates itself from it.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

Accession deposited: Nicaragua, November 6, 1973.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, November 6, 1973.

Fisheries

Convention for the establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. Done at Washington May 31, 1949. Entered into force March 3, 1950. TIAS 2044.

Adherence deposited: Nicaragua, November 6, 1973.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Republic (with a declaration), September 25, 1973.

¹ U.N. doc. S/11072.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, October 15, 1973.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.¹

Accession deposited: Malawi, October 4, 1973.

Space Research

Agreement relating to a space research project using sounding rockets, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchanges of notes at Brasilia October 17, 18, and 19, 1973, between the United States and Brazil and the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Entered into force October 19, 1973.

United Nations

Amendment to article 61 of the United Nations Charter, as amended (59 Stat. 1031, TIAS 5857, 6529), to enlarge the Economic and Social Council. Done at New York December 20, 1971. Entered into force September 24, 1973.

Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, September 20, 1973; Mali, August 30, 1973; Pakistan, August 21, 1973; Poland, September 19, 1973.

BILATERAL

Denmark

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen October 11, 1973. Entered into force October 11, 1973.

France

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris August 29 and September 26, 1973. Entered into force September 26, 1973.

Arrangement relating to certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris August 6 and December 14, 1956. Entered into force December 14, 1956. TIAS 3736.
Terminated: September 26, 1973.

Germany

Agreement supplementing the agreement of November 20, 1962, as supplemented (TIAS 5518, 7386, 7507), for conducting certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn and Bonn-Bad Godesberg September 3 and 18, 1973. Entered into force September 18, 1973.

Jamaica

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with annex. Signed at Kingston October 11, 1973. Entered into force October 11, 1973.

Jordan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 20, 1973 (TIAS 7716). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman September 25 and 29, 1973. Entered into force September 29, 1973.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 (TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon October 12, 1973. Entered into force October 12, 1973.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 (TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon October 19, 1973. Entered into force October 19, 1973.

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Israel: A 25-Year Perspective. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series is an address by Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, delivered at the celebration of Israel's 25th anniversary May 7, 1973, at the Sheraton Park Hotel at Washington, D.C. Pub. 8721. Near East and South Asian Series 82. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S1.86:82).

Niagara River Treaty—Utilization of Eastern Daylight Saving Time to Determine Hours of Flow. Agreement with Canada interpreting article IV of the treaty of February 27, 1950. TIAS 7599. 2 pp. 10¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7599).

Finance—Debt Rescheduling Under Certain Credit and Loan and Agricultural Commodity Agreements. Agreements with India. TIAS 7601. 11 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7601).

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*401	11/6	U.S. track and field teams extending tour of Asia.
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*404	11/7	Advisory Panel on Music, Nov. 29.
*405	11/7	Advisory Panel on Academic Music, Nov. 30.
*406	11/8	Kintner sworn in as Ambassador to Thailand (biographic data).
*407	11/8	Regional foreign policy conference, St. Louis, Mo., Nov. 20.
†408	11/8	Kissinger: departure remarks, Amman.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXIX, No. 1797

December 3, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

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The Dilemma of Choice

Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush¹

Last week as I was considering my talk here tonight and the concerns you would like me to address, one of my colleagues recalled for me a commentary by Hillel: "If I am not for myself, who is for me; if I am only for myself, what am I? If not now, when?"

The interpretation of wisdom is traditionally more the sphere of rabbis than of Deputy Secretaries of State, but real wisdom speaks to the hearts of all men. Therefore I will offer two meanings I see in these famous lines.

First, they remind me of the importance of having friends and of standing by them in their time of need. I believe that the last several weeks have once again shown the importance of this idea for America and its relevance to our position in the world as a people. Our support of Israel is not simply a political act; it is an act of helping someone in need. This is an answer to the question: "If I am only for myself, what am I?"

Second, Hillel's words also seem to speak of choice—of the necessity, the inevitability, and the difficulty of choosing. They underline the importance of considering consequences of choice, the artificiality of thinking that choice can be avoided, and the imperative of considering costs involved in various courses of action. They speak as well of the need for choice in time.

Nations, like men, must make choices. If they are intelligent, they consider their in-

terests, their values, and their goals before choosing. If they are mature, they accept the philosopher's wisdom that choice will often involve compromise. They will seek to realize the good because it is attainable but never forget the best, even though it remains beyond their grasp. They choose what is good because to fail to do so would bring about infinitely worse consequences.

When President Nixon came to office nearly five years ago, he did so with a clear conception of the difficulty and the necessity of choice in foreign affairs. He also clearly perceived the direction that our choices would have to take us if we were to avoid the dangers and achieve the possibilities available to our Nation. Thus, he set out, as he has said, to "forge a network of relationships and of interdependencies that restrain aggression and that take the profit out of war."²

I believe that the choices we have made have moved us far closer to that goal than many would have imagined:

—Berlin has been defused as a constant flashpoint for European tensions.

—The U.S. combat involvement in the Indochina war has ended.

—We established a new relationship with Communist China.

—We altered our relationship with the Soviet Union.

Only the Middle East proved resistant to efforts to bring about an easing of tensions,

¹ Made before the United Synagogue of America convention at Kiamesha Lake, N.Y., on Nov. 13 (press release 411).

² For an excerpt from President Nixon's address to the Nation on Nov. 2, 1972, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1972, p. 605.

with the tragic warfare of the past weeks as a consequence.

It is bitterly ironic that the Middle East, an area which gave our world so many of its basic values, should once again remind us how fragile our progress is toward achieving these values.

From the time the most recent round of fighting erupted on October 6, we sought to end the bloodshed in a manner which could lead to a secure and decent peace for all peoples in the area. This goal demanded first an early cease-fire as a prelude to getting at and correcting the causes of the conflict.

From the outset of the fighting we were anxious to avoid two possible outcomes:

—First, a fight to exhaustion, which could produce enormous human suffering and almost certainly lay the basis for a renewal of the fighting at a later date.

—Second, that as the struggle was prolonged, the United States and the Soviet Union would be drawn into a direct confrontation with one another, making the Mideast war a catalyst to a far greater threat to all men.

But if our fears were real, so was our concern for and commitment to more positive purposes. The task was to use statesmanship in the midst of war to point the way to peace.

—Thus, the Soviet Union and we used our improved relationship and communications not only to ease the chances of direct confrontation between us but also to make a contribution to bringing an early halt to the war and a start toward peace.

—We also sought to impress upon both sides that in a time of crisis new possibilities had arisen for creating a desirable peace.

—We sought to turn what seemed to be another failure of the United Nations into an opportunity for that organization to play a vital role in restoring and keeping the peace.

The fighting in the Middle East has been stopped, but progress toward a secure and lasting peace has only just begun.

Dr. Kissinger's trip to the Middle East

achieved its first goal—firming up the shaky halt in the fighting. It has produced encouraging movement toward negotiations between the parties to the dispute, and most importantly for the future, it also has contributed to confidence on both sides that the United States is committed to working for a just and lasting peace.

There have been suggestions in some quarters that the U.S. policy in the Middle East might be affected by the oil situation. I believe Secretary Kissinger responded directly to that issue yesterday [in an interview at Peking], stating, and I quote:

The United States has supported Israel because of the emotional ties that have existed, because of the democratic tradition of Israel, because of the fact that it is a going concern in this area, and because, as I have said, about our opposition to the domination of one nation by force to others. The oil situation will continue for the indefinite future, and while we are highly respectful of the views of the Arab world it is not possible for us to be swayed in the major orientation of our policy by the monopoly position, or the temporary monopoly position, enjoyed by a few nations.

In the past Arab and Israeli concepts of self-interest and their perceptions of the other's intentions have made peace impossible. But if the latest war has proven nothing else, it has demonstrated that an equilibrium of armed camps is not enough.

For Israel the issue remains security. The United States has a special affinity for Israel and is committed to its safety and survival. President Nixon's ordering of the resupply last month demonstrated the depth of that commitment.

For the Arabs the issues are justice, dignity, and sovereignty. The peace we seek for the Middle East must take into account these aspirations if it is to be something more than a halt in the cycle of fighting.

We believe that the goals of the Arabs and the Israelis can, through negotiation, be made compatible. We want to be helpful in this process. For the first time in years, we have engaged with both sides in a serious dialogue. But only the peoples of the area can make the decisions that are prerequisite to accommodation. And only they can build

the structure for a lasting peace between them. For lasting peace to come about, both sides must accept that peace involves self-imposed compromise and limitation.

The Mideast war came at a time when this Nation was asking itself: "What are the goals of détente with the Soviet Union?" There has never been any doubt in this administration of the profound differences between ourselves and Moscow. As President Nixon stated in 1972:

—Our national experiences are disparate, and our peoples are conditioned by 50 years of distrust and hostility.

—We are ideological rivals and military and political competitors on a global scale.

But if we were aware of our differences we were also concerned with the imperative and unprecedented opportunity to construct a relationship between the two superpowers based on something besides sterile confrontation. For 25 years international relations had been dominated by the fears, threats, and anxieties of the cold war. By 1969 both nations had the power to annihilate not only the other but also all mankind. But by 1969 international conditions had evolved to a point where it was deemed possible to push back that awesome specter by bringing closer a truly constructive relationship between our countries.

We never expected that as we sought this new relationship the Soviet Union would sacrifice its interests. We never intended to sacrifice ours to those of our friends.

But détente was also based on the expectation that each nation would exercise self-restraint in the pursuit of its interests. We believed most fundamentally that détente had to be based upon a mutual recognition that a general improvement in our relationship demanded an end to the pursuit of narrow advantage.

The violence in the Middle East tested the Soviet commitment to these principles. But in the wake of the war we can draw several conclusions:

—That without the very considerable progress we had made over the past five

years in changing the nature of the relationship between our two countries, the hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis could have immediately become a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union;

—That in today's world there is no rational alternative to establishing a productive and positive U.S.-Soviet relationship; and

—That the new relationship is still fragile and the commitment of both nations to it must be broadened, deepened, and strengthened.

In the past, changes in U.S.-Soviet relations have been brief and usually occurred in climate rather than in substance. We remain convinced that there is a unique opportunity to establish a long-term cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union so that both countries can make a major contribution to world peace.

Over the past five years we have succeeded in working with the Soviet Union to ease or remove many of the world's potential causes of war—Berlin, Indochina, and now, hopefully, the Middle East. Détente will always be on trial, but we must not judge it by one case alone. We must look at our overall relationship, our agenda of common concerns and possible agreements. We must understand the costs of failure to build a better relationship with the Soviet Union, as well as the benefits of success.

Together with our NATO allies we have just launched negotiations with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations to relieve tensions in the heart of Europe by the mutual reduction of forces. Despite the enormous complexity of the issues involved, it is clear that these negotiations can succeed—that we can both satisfy the insistent economic and political pressures in this country for withdrawal of American forces and bring about greater stability in an area which has ignited two world wars.

But it is clear that the negotiations will have no chance of success if we push our relationship to the breaking point in other areas or if the United States withdraws its

forces unilaterally. And it is clear that such withdrawals would have a devastating effect upon the still-fragile détente.

We are also engaged with the Soviet Union in strategic arms negotiations. President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev have pledged our nations to make serious efforts to achieve in 1974 a permanent agreement to limit offensive weapons. And they have agreed not only to limit these weapons but to achieve their subsequent reduction.

These are negotiations of truly historic significance—for the United States and the Soviet Union have a unique relationship. Each of us possesses nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity. Thus both of us have a special responsibility to insure that these weapons are never used.

Just as we are seeking to build the political and military dimensions of our relationships, so must we develop an economic dimension.

Without normalizing our economic relations, it is difficult to conceive of normal political relations. Thus, we seek to engage the Soviet Union, as well as China and other Communist nations, in mutually beneficial trade and investment.

In evaluating proposals to deny the Soviet Union a normal commercial relationship, we must consider the effect of such denial upon our overall relationship. What issues are sufficiently important to risk reversing the momentum of détente? What are the issues which outweigh the economic and political benefits of mutual force withdrawals, the pushing back of the threshold of nuclear catastrophe, and the new communication which made it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid direct confrontation and to cooperate in bringing about an early cease-fire in the Middle East?

Consider, for example, the case of emigration from the Soviet Union, an issue of particular concern to most of you here this evening and to the administration. Today the rate of Jewish emigration is in the tens of thousands, where once it was a trickle. From 1960 to 1965 a total of 5,000 Russian

Jews arrived in Israel; in 1968 there were only 400 arrivals from the Soviet Union. In 1971 there were 13,000 total arrivals; in 1972 the figure more than doubled, to 31,600.

Most impressively, the totals this year are running ahead of last year's record rate, a pace that has been maintained despite complicating international tensions.

The Soviets have without question continued to live up to their March 1973 assurances to the President that they would maintain their then-current emigration policy.

The past three years have seemed to confirm the success of the approach taken by the administration. There is an important difference between utilizing public opinion to conduct effective diplomatic efforts and making formal demands either through official statements or through legislation such as the Jackson-Vanik amendment. We doubt the wisdom and the efficacy of formal demands. We have witnessed the effectiveness of the administration's approach.

It seems incontrovertible that emigration has grown and been sustained because we now have an altered relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship that allows the leaders of that country to expect future and substantial benefits from the pursuit of détente. It seems equally clear to me that by undercutting that expectation through denial of most-favored-nation treatment or of credits, to which we are committed, we undercut the conditions that help sustain the emigration.

Emigration is continuing and even at a higher rate than a year ago. Delicate negotiations are going forward in the Middle East. We must ask what signal we wish to send the Soviet Union. Would congressional action blocking normal commercial relations have a positive or negative impact at this crucial point in our relations?

I agree with Senator Fulbright, who recently said:

My own view is that the best—and most—we can do to advance the cause of liberties within the

Soviet Union is to build an international atmosphere or climate of security and confidence through trade, investment, cultural exchange, frequent political contacts, and above all, arms control. These are also the best we can do for world peace—and for peace in the Middle East.

Tonight I suggest we recognize our difference on this issue but agree to take no action during this sensitive period. The spirit of détente has been tried by the October war, but it is still alive. We should not burden Soviet-American cooperation, which is essential to further progress in the Middle East, with a heated debate over trade and emigration.

But ultimately let us recognize that by weaving a network of economic and political ties with the Soviet Union, we can make greater contributions to peace. By refusing to build such a relationship, we can only face renewed tensions and heightened risk of nuclear confrontation.

In the Middle East and with the Soviet Union, this Nation confronts the issue of choice. Theodor Herzl once observed that the hardest choices are not between good and bad but between conflicting goods.

There is no way such choices can be made easy. But if we approach our decisions in a purposeful manner we can at least make them wisely. I believe that the central purpose of President Nixon's foreign policy offers a useful reference point for such choices. That purpose is the achievement of what the President described as "a structure of peace to which all nations contribute and in which all nations have a stake."³

It is only that sort of structure that can give us the just and lasting peace we seek as a nation for the peoples of the Middle East and for the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States.

³ The complete text of President Nixon's foreign policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9, 1972, appears in the BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1972; "Part I—1971—The Watershed Year—An Overview" begins on p. 314.

International Scientific Conference on Narcotics Control Held at Paris

Press release 399 dated November 2

The United States was host for a meeting of 12 nations at Paris October 23–26 to exchange information and data and to report on developments in scientific and technological research and development applicable to control of the production and supply of illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs.

Countries participating in the meeting were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations and INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization] sent observers.

The meeting examined in depth scientific and technological developments potentially useful in criminal information collection, surveillance, detection, inspection, and other areas of importance to national programs of drug control.

Delegates represented both the scientific and drug enforcement agencies of the participating countries.

This was the first international meeting on the use of modern science and advanced technology for the control of the supply of narcotics and dangerous drugs. A number of promising avenues of research and development were identified. Additional cooperative activities, specifically in research and development, are foreseen as a result of this meeting.

The conference was cosponsored by the Department of State and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, with Herman Pollack, Director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, serving as chairman, and Frederick M. Garfield, Director of DEA's Office of Science and Technology, as vice chairman.

The United Nations: Instrument for International Cooperation

Address by John Scali

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The march of history often passes right by those watching for noteworthy moments in the life of mankind. The recent clamor and now the uneasy stillness that has fallen over the Middle East battlefields have focused attention on the needs of the moment. The desperate urgency of day-to-day events has left little time for long-term analysis. It is still too early to offer any final judgment on what the United Nations has accomplished in responding as it has to war in the Middle East. But it is conceivable, perhaps even likely, that we are witnessing a historic revitalization of that organization, a decisive renewal of its capacity to deal with the real world.

Such a statement may sound strange coming as it does from a man who has cast more vetoes in the Security Council than all the other American representatives, from 1946 to the present, combined. Soviet Ambassador Malik is the unchallenged expert in this field, having cast 21 vetoes on behalf of his government. Yet how times change. These days Ambassador Malik has taken to calling me Mr. Veto, in criticism of my consistent, and sometimes lonely, insistence that the United Nations should act responsibly or not at all.

Since the day I accepted the President's appointment as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, I have been guided by the belief that unless the United Nations could achieve realistic and visible results toward keeping the peace and preventing war, it

would fail its most important task. I do not dispute the valuable work done by the United Nations in fields not even envisaged by its founders, such as outer space, drug control, and the environment. I fully understand the importance many member nations place on economic development, and I do not regret that 90 percent of all United Nations resources go to development-related activities.

However, the United Nations is primarily a political, not a technical, organization. Its success or failure must therefore be principally judged on its record of political achievement, of resolving disputes and reconciling adversaries. The general public understands this very well. That is why they have in recent years been disappointed with the U.N.'s performance despite its recognized contributions in many technical fields. And that is why the last few weeks have seen a renewal of public faith in the United Nations of historic proportions.

Work at the U.N. is intense, exciting, and exhausting. I haven't had much time for tennis recently or even for my favorite exercise—watching football. My only diversions have been those so popular among diplomats—fishing in troubled waters and skating on thin ice.

The United Nations pursues its activities in a small special world of its own. Once in a while when I have a moment, I pause to look out and to wonder whether this small world bears any relationship to the huge one that surrounds it. Sometimes, when the 11th hour sounds, and the 11th speaker of the evening takes the floor, I doubt. But as I have gotten to know it better, I have begun

¹ Made before the Economics Club dinner at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 13 (USUN press release 110).

to appreciate how the United Nations in its triumphs and in its frustrations reflects the world we live in, and the role the United States plays in it.

We all know that the world has changed a lot since World War II. The United Nations is a good place to see how. The United Nations in 1946 had 51 members. Today it has 135. In 1946 the United States, as the driving force behind the U.N.'s creation, its host country, and the unchallenged leader of the West, was in a position to treat the United Nations almost as an instrument of American foreign policy—to be used when we thought it desirable, bypassed when we did not.

In today's United Nations, it is no longer sufficient that the United States merely propose a good idea for it to be adopted nor that we oppose a bad one for it to be defeated. We no longer command that "automatic" majority.

The 1946 United Nations, like the 1946 world, was divided, often bitterly, between East and West. Now East and West combined form only a minority of the U.N.'s membership. A third group, the nonaligned, claims to represent the aspirations of 75 member states and has begun to exercise the sort of influence within the U.N. that their dominant voting strength gives them. As their name would suggest, the nonaligned originally had little in common except an absence of alignment with East and West. Recently, however, this group has shown a surprising ability to concert their aims and their actions.

The World Food Situation

I would like to give you an idea of what the United States hopes to accomplish through the United Nations and how we are going about it. The best and probably the most interesting way to do this is to offer some specific examples. I have chosen three: the world food situation, the multinational corporation, and the Middle East, each of which is under active consideration by the United Nations. In each case, I think a look at what the United Nations is doing can

shed some light on what the United Nations can and cannot hope to achieve and on the role the United States is trying to play in the process.

Let's start with food. After the excellent meal we have just completed, this may seem a bit redundant. But even if the quality of the Waldorf kitchen is not under any immediate threat, our household budgets are, as we discover each time we go to the supermarket.

The fluctuation, mostly upward, in the price Americans pay for food is only a ripple at the edge of a much wider pool. The effects on those at the center of the pool, where the stones of drought, crop failure, flood, earthquake, and overpopulation are falling, are death by starvation or life warped by malnutrition.

In the neutral language of the economist, the problem we face is an imbalance between the world's supply and its demands for food, particularly cereal grains. Supply has been affected over the past few years by various natural disasters of unusual magnitude. Perhaps even more alarming in the long term, however, is the rapid expansion of world demand for food, resulting from population growth in poorer parts of the globe and rising incomes in richer parts. As a result, while this year's cereal production in the United States will be the largest in our history, our stockpiles are at their lowest level since the Korean war.

This is a problem of worldwide proportions. It is a problem about which the United States, as the world's largest food producer and largest food exporter, can certainly do something. But it is not a problem we can solve by ourselves. The American farmer has achieved miracles, but he can't meet the growing world demand for food singlehandedly. Nor can we cut ourselves off from the world market without jeopardizing the rest of our international trade, upon which the prosperity of all Americans rests.

The problem, then, is one in which international action is necessary, action in which the United States can play a central role. On September 24, just two days after he

was sworn in as Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger took the initiative. He proposed to the General Assembly of the United Nations that a world food conference be convened sometime in 1974.

Now, as you may imagine, the wheels of the international bureaucracy grind even more finely than do those of our national governments. Thus, Secretary Kissinger's call for a major world conference as early as 1974 is an indication of just how urgent we believe the situation to be. World food reserves have declined so precipitously in recent years that even with bumper crops they may not be built up again in this decade. Without these reserves, we are all dangerously dependent on current production and thus that most undependable phenomenon: the weather.

But if the problem is urgent in the short run, it is far from hopeless of long-term solution. Actions that can be taken include reemphasis on agricultural production in developing countries, the general use of more efficient production methods, the control of population growth, the creation of a global program of food stocks, and better planning for disaster relief. As a prerequisite for coordinated programs of this sort, the world needs more accurate projections of our long-term needs for food of various types.

Plans for the conference proposed by Secretary Kissinger are moving smoothly through the United Nations machinery, and I expect that we will see such a conference take place next year. I further expect that we will benefit from the results of this conference for many years to come.

U.N. Study of Multinational Corporations

I know that the subject of food lacks "sex appeal," that calling for a world food conference attracts less attention than, say, a call for a world disarmament conference. But food is, you will forgive me, a gut issue. It's an issue that the United Nations can do something about. And it's an issue to which the United States can make a constructive contribution.

The lack of passionate public interest in the announcement of a world food conference

has one advantage—there is the hope that discussion at the conference will be able to avoid the sort of polemics and politicization which destroys rational intercourse.

The United Nations is not always so fortunate. Certain words, like imperialism, colonialism, or racism, take on, after endless repetition, a coloring which precludes meaningful discussion. These words lose their ability to transmit ideas; they convey only emotions. Any conversation in which they are employed soon degenerates into mutual commiseration or mutual recrimination.

There is a danger that a new phrase may be added to this list: "the multinational corporation." The search for an external scapegoat is a natural, if regrettable, phenomenon, and multinationals offer an inviting target. Multinationals are large; they are powerful. Many nations are neither.

This is not to say that corporations, like men, do not err, occasionally justifying the criticism they invite. However, certain non-aligned countries of the more paranoid variety have tended to picture the relationship between developing country and multinational investor as a form of statutory rape, in which the young inexperienced country, not yet fully responsible for its actions, allows the multinational access to its economy, only to find itself the helpless victim of brutal exploitation.

I wonder myself whether the case isn't often the reverse; that is, of seduction as opposed to rape. How many times have we seen multinationals enticed into investment with fulsome promises, only to find that the promises are broken, their property nationalized, and their hopes of a permanent relationship shattered.

I admit that IBM, Shell, and General Motors are not easily pictured as ravished maidens. My real point is that serious consideration of the role of multinational corporations must begin with the principle that the responsibilities of the investor and of the country in which he invests are reciprocal. The fact that one is a sovereign state and the other a foreign-based company relieves neither of its obligations.

The United Nations is presently em-

barked on its own study of the multinational corporation. This study is being undertaken by a group of "20 eminent persons," including, from the United States, Senator Jacob Javits and Cummins Engine Company President J. E. Miller. The makeup of this group does not preclude a balanced, constructive result. The multinational corporation is certainly an international phenomenon of some significance, and it is not on the face of it unreasonable that the United Nations should be seized of the question. But there are pitfalls.

The preliminary findings of the United Nations reveal some interesting facts concerning the multinationals, such as:

—That the turnover of each of the four largest multinationals is over \$10 billion a year, larger than the GNP of the majority of U.N. member countries;

—That eight of the 10 largest multinationals are American; and

—That while only one-third of the income and investments of multinationals takes place in the developing countries, its impact is disproportionate; first, because the multinationals have concentrated their activities in the extractive and manufacturing sectors and, secondly, because of the relatively small size and fragility of most developing economies.

The importance of the multinational corporation to the development process is illustrated by the U.N.'s finding that multinational operations over the past 20 years have surpassed all other forms of international trade as a mechanism for the exchange of goods, services, and technology.

Some of the proposals concerning multinationals being floated in and about the United Nations include creating a multinational code of conduct, putting a U.N. staff at the disposal of developing countries to assist them in reaching agreements with multinationals, requiring the international registration and licensing of multinationals, establishing standards of fair practice and of financial disclosure, writing a worldwide tax policy, and setting up an organization to regulate it.

I personally am of the view that the United Nations, a political organization of 135 sovereign states, is not the ideal instrument for any international policing of the multinational corporation. I believe it important that in considering this question the United Nations neither undertake nor recommend steps which would serve to restrict the tremendous contribution that the multinationals make to world trade, world production, and economic development.

At the same time the multinational corporations do have obligations, both to the countries they operate from and to the countries they operate in. To the extent that the multinationals themselves can fashion and adhere to a generally acceptable code of conduct, they will greatly lessen the pressure for international action.

The Middle East

The last example of United Nations activity which I want to discuss with you is the Middle East. I raise this not only because it represents an accomplishment, fragile and tender to be sure, but one to which we can point with some pride. It also, I believe, provides an example of how the United Nations operates at its best.

Let me first briefly run through the events at the United Nations of the past month:

—On October 6 in the early hours of the morning, Secretary Kissinger, in New York for a series of meetings with other United Nations members, learned of the imminent possibility of hostilities in the Middle East. Unfortunately, his efforts to avert the fighting were frustrated due to lack of time.

—On October 7, the United States called for Security Council consideration of the Middle East situation. In the absence of any agreement within the Council on the Middle East, we refrained from proposing specific action, the rejection of which might have frozen diplomatic positions and hindered future action.

—On October 21, the United States and the U.S.S.R. proposed a joint resolution calling for a cease-fire-in-place and negotiations on a permanent settlement. The Security

Council passed the resolution at 1:00 a.m. the following day.

—On October 23, the United States and the U.S.S.R. proposed, and the Security Council passed, a second resolution, reaffirming the Security Council's call for a cease-fire.

—On October 24, the eight nonaligned members of the Security Council proposed the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force and its dispatch to the Middle East. The Security Council accepted this proposal, with an American-inspired amendment that the permanent members of the Security Council be barred from serving on the Force.

—On November 2, the Security Council agreed on the composition of the Emergency Force. The majority of national components of this Force are, for the first time in United Nations history, to be non-European, non-Western; in other words, nonaligned.

—On November 9, I handed Secretary General Waldheim a note informing him of an agreement reached, with Secretary Kissinger's assistance, between the Governments of Egypt and Israel. This agreement, in implementation of the United Nations cease-fire, established a U.N.-supervised corridor to the Egyptian 3d Army on the east bank of the Suez Canal, provided for the exchange of all prisoners of war, and for the regular provision of food, water, and medical supplies to the town of Suez.

—On November 11, Egyptian and Israeli representatives, meeting under U.N. auspices, signed this agreement.

The trend of events I have just outlined is the most hopeful I have seen in the last quarter century—hopeful for a real peace in the Middle East and hopeful for a really effective United Nations. I realize that for the moment all we have is another cease-fire and another United Nations Emergency Force. We have had both before, and both have failed to bring lasting peace. These by themselves are certainly no cause for premature rejoicing. No, I see hope, not so much in the details of what we have achieved

over the past few weeks as in the way we have achieved it.

The movement toward peace began with a joint U.S.-Soviet cease-fire initiative. It continued with a nonaligned initiative setting up the Emergency Force. And, finally, on Sunday, we achieved a first measure of agreement among the parties themselves.

Reflecting on what has happened, I would note that:

—There was virtually no possibility of the United Nations taking any meaningful action in this instance until the United States and the U.S.S.R. had reached at least a minimal agreement on steps to be taken.

—The rest of the United Nations membership were prepared to take advantage of U.S.-Soviet agreement but insisted on doing more than merely rubberstamping a series of superpower accords.

—The nonaligned, in putting forward their own proposals, showed themselves capable of acting effectively and responsibly.

—Once agreement had been arrived at, the United Nations was capable of expeditious, decisive, and effective action.

—In sum, East-West cooperation is a prerequisite for a more effective United Nations, but it is not enough. The rest of the United Nations membership must be willing to take advantage of this new situation. The United States, for its part, must be prepared to allow the rest of the United Nations membership to play an important role in determining that organization's and the world's future.

The United Nations has in the last few weeks demonstrated that it is an important instrument for international cooperation. But it is only an instrument. It does not replace cooperation; it merely gives effect to it. What we have seen has been a graphic demonstration that the sort of masterful bilateral diplomacy for which President Nixon and his Secretary of State have become so famous is not an alternative to multilateral diplomacy but a necessary prerequisite and accompaniment to cooperation in the multilateral forum.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September, Secretary Kissinger called for the institutionalizing, through the United Nations, of the structure of peace which President Nixon has sought to build. Many took this as polite but meaningless rhetoric—the gentle nod to an old lady, the United Nations, expected of a new visitor. How wrong they were.

A just and lasting peace in the Middle East is still a long way off. There is no certainty that the United Nations will show the wisdom, that the governments of the Middle East will show the courage, or that the great powers will show the forbearance necessary to produce a true settlement. But President Nixon's foreign policy has created an international atmosphere in which peace is possible. The United Nations has, in the past few weeks, shown that it can still rise to a great occasion. A historic opportunity for peace exists. If we do not seize it now, we may not have another chance.

Letters of Credence

Bahamas

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Livingston Basil Johnson, presented his credentials to President Nixon on November 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 9.

Central African Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Central African Republic, Gaston Banda-Bafiot, presented his credentials to President Nixon on November 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 9.

Chile

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Chile, Walter Heitmann, pre-

sented his credentials to President Nixon on November 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 9.

Ireland

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ireland, John Gerald Molloy, presented his credentials to President Nixon on November 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 9.

Lesotho

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Lesotho, Ephraim Tsepa Manare, presented his credentials to President Nixon on November 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 9.

Norway

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Norway, Søren Christian Sommerfelt, presented his credentials to President Nixon on November 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 9.

Swaziland

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Swaziland, James Lawrence Funwayo Simelane, presented his credentials to President Nixon on November 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 9.

Trinidad and Tobago

The newly appointed Ambassador of the State of Trinidad and Tobago, Victor McIntyre, presented his credentials to President Nixon on November 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 9.

A Comprehensive Development Policy for the United States

*Address by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

Government officials who speak in public on development and foreign assistance sometimes feel like the proverbial Christian being thrown into the lion's den. Appearing here today I have more a feeling of being cast into the communion of saints. The Overseas Development Council needs no evangelizing on our relationship with the less developed countries (LDC's). As a matter of fact, given some of the criticisms that you have made about U.S. policy toward the less developed countries, perhaps I should feel like a beleaguered lion being thrown into a den of Christians.

But the very fact that so many audiences today question the involvement of the United States in the development process indicates that something may be amiss. Our governmental role in the economic and social development of the poorer countries of the world was launched about a quarter of a century ago. Most of the tools which we are using today date from a decade ago. Dwindling appropriations for development purposes bespeak the need for a new thrust and a new articulation of our self-interest in development. This organization, along with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, produced a valuable new initiative to serve both our self-interest and humanitarian purposes in the concept of a special export credit fund to bring technology and modern productivity embodied in American equipment to poor

countries to further their development programs. I'd like to take this occasion to pay tribute to Senator Humphrey for his gallant fight to resurrect the Export Development Credit Fund after it was voted down on the floor of the House.

For 1974 and beyond, where do we find the real and durable rationale for development assistance which will command public acceptance? I believe it lies in the combination of the humanitarian aspirations which have always moved large numbers of Americans and our self-interest in an international economic system which works better and in which nations and their policies mesh better. I believe that the fuller participation of the poorer countries in the world economic system is as necessary to make that system work right as it is to the social and economic development of the poor countries.

We hear a lot about the three pillars of money, trade, and investment on which the new and better international economic system is to be built. I believe that there must be a fourth pillar to support that structure. I believe that development is that fourth pillar; and I believe that it consists of transfers of resources, technology, and training to the poor countries so that they can both benefit from and contribute to the worldwide flow of money, trade, investment, and technology. I believe that represents a rationale for loans and grants and technical assistance which can carry us through the second 25 years of development.

Seventy-five percent of the foreign ex-

¹ Made before the Overseas Development Council at Washington on Oct. 25.

change earnings of the developing countries come from their exports. Their ability to earn their own way through trade is compatible with their national dignity and economic aspirations. It is also compatible with our economic interests. We want to see the scarce resources which our economy needs produced efficiently and exported to us. We want to be able to buy abroad the products that can be better produced there and to sell abroad the products that we can produce better here.

The United States has a particular role to play. We must keep up the momentum toward increasing liberalization of world trade. This policy has become traditional for us and has today a significant practical dimension. From an economic point of view, as the world's largest trading nation we stand to be large gainers from trade liberalization. LDC's are important to us in this respect, for they are the market for 30 percent—some \$15 billion last year—of our annual exports. From a political point of view, as these countries acquire a larger stake in international trade they will be less likely to take political actions that would disrupt international economic and political systems. In this sense, our approach to trade with the LDC's is consistent with our approach to trade with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries.

This administration has taken a forward position on trade with the developing countries. We have opposed the formation of trading blocs that would artificially restrict trade, and we have pressed for the inclusion of developing countries in multilateral trade negotiations, where we share substantial interests with them—especially in freer trade in agricultural products. Our record in trade with the LDC's is good. The United States alone takes 40 percent of LDC manufactured exports. We can and should take more, but others must also. Europe and Japan must share with us the benefits and the costs of a more open trading system.

As you know, we already have prepared a program that would represent a giant step

forward. The administration remains firmly committed to the generalized system of preferences set forth in title V of the Trade Reform Act of 1973. This act provides a framework for the U.S. role in a more open global trading system. Title V, which would authorize the President to grant preferential treatment to the exports of developing countries, is an integral part of this framework.

If this country is serious about helping the developing countries help themselves, we must participate in a generalized system of preferences. The developing countries must be given a chance to increase their export earnings, particularly in the areas of low-technology manufactures where they can achieve a natural competitive advantage. But they can only do this if they have access to markets in the developed countries such as the United States—where, in fact, low-technology manufacturing is increasingly uneconomic and unsatisfactory to both labor and capital. A generalized preference system would have to be well safeguarded, of course; and its duration and availability would be limited in time—until the LDC exporters become competitive in international markets.

The developing countries themselves must also take the actions necessary to rationalize international trade. They must concentrate on areas where they do in fact enjoy a comparative advantage and move away from artificial incentives, unnecessary import substitution, reverse and special preferences, and regional trading arrangements that are not economically sound. And of course we can reasonably expect these countries to dismantle unnecessary import-restriction policies that deprive them of enjoying the comparative advantage possessed by others.

What this means is that the principle of comparative advantage must come out of the textbooks and be reflected in actual policy. As resource supply becomes a greater problem, we must make sure that available resources are used more efficiently. If disruptions in trade patterns lead to short-term domestic difficulties, we must provide the

mechanisms for facilitating adjustments. The cost of the adjustments—both human and economic—should not be underestimated. But we must keep in mind the ultimate benefit to both the individual U.S. consumer and the U.S. economy as a whole.

Private Investment in Developing Countries

Although investment flows are small compared to export earnings, investment not only provides capital but brings with it a whole series of ancillary benefits in technology, management, and training that neither trade nor governmental aid can normally provide.

Our basic view on private investment in developing countries is that market forces should determine allocation. And we do not want to press our investment in areas where it is not wanted; to do so would only create political problems. We do, however, have legitimate reason to wonder how effectively a country is committed to economic development when it impedes mutually beneficial investment. Certainly we are not prepared to look to governmental assistance to fill gaps that could equally well be filled by private sources. Our technical assistance, development assistance, and export credits can compound benefits when they stimulate investment in LDC's from local or foreign capital and particularly when they generate indigenous capital markets and other sources of local funding.

We must work to make American investment abroad more compatible with the attitudes of the recipient countries. This is a process in which the U.S. Government can play primarily an advisory role, for investors and recipient governments must work out arrangements that meet their own needs. But we should encourage potential investors to consider new investment arrangements. There are formulas, such as equity participation rather than wholly owned subsidiaries or a phased evolution from one to the other, that would permit an investor-host relationship acceptable to all parties. I have confidence in the ingenuity of the U.S. businessman to respond to this challenge.

The International Monetary System

Whether we reach our trade, investment, and development goals will be closely linked to our success in renovating the international monetary system. LDC trade is closely linked to international economic patterns that interact sensitively with monetary matters. The recent monetary crises affected the economic life of many LDC's in clearly measurable terms. The developing countries are aware of this.

In addition, a number of developing countries have very large sums of foreign exchange reserves—derived in the most part from petroleum exports. These funds find only limited absorption at home and thus enter international markets. By 1980, the oil-exporting countries will be accumulating \$55 billion a year over their domestic needs. They are entitled to a fair return on their holdings. We and other countries are entitled to expect that these holdings will not be used to the detriment of the world community as a whole.

Our philosophy in approaching the international monetary problem is simple: These relationships should be managed in a way that is orderly and designed to bring benefit to all. This entails strict responsibility on the part of all participants in the system and cooperative efforts to build a sense of confidence—for without confidence the system simply will not work.

I would like to touch on two aspects of U.S. policy on monetary matters that are of particular concern to the less developed countries.

First, we have taken leadership in involving representatives of the less developed countries in monetary decisionmaking. It was on our initiative that LDC representation was brought into the Committee of Twenty. I believe that this was an extremely constructive step—politically in the short run and economically as we look further into the future.

On the other hand, the United States has felt it necessary to take a position with regard to the allocation of special drawing rights (SDR's) that is not popular in the

less developed world—and I would guess not popular at this luncheon.

Our position on SDR's rests on the conviction that the monetary system is critical to trade, investment, and development and that it must be orderly and command confidence. SDR's have a crucial role to play in this new system, and they can play it only if there is confidence that their creation will be limited by the need for liquidity in the world trading system. If we create them for other purposes we will impart a bias and a lack of confidence which will be inflating. We have seen that inflation hurts LDC's most of all. SDR's were not intended to be a means of reallocating resources among countries; to give them this role would run the risk of undermining a novel and sensitive mechanism to the detriment of all of those who have a stake in it—including the less developed countries. There is a real need for transferring resources to the poorer countries. I believe that it must be met directly and that if we short-circuit the appropriations process, the public will resent it and legislators will turn away from development assistance.

Official Development Assistance

Official government assistance transfers, either bilateral or through multilateral organizations, receive by far the lion's share of attention in most discussions of development. Yet aid contributes only a tenth of the foreign exchange receipts of the LDC's and represents only 2 percent of their total GNP. It is tempting to minimize the role of aid in light of these figures and thereby rationalize the declining contribution of our own country in the development assistance field.

But aggregate statistics are deceptive. Given the proper environment, aid can perform and has performed a critical role in providing the impetus for rapid development. The success stories of our aid programs—ranging from Germany through Korea—are familiar and gratifying to us all. While there have also been failures, the historical record of our aid programs over

25 years, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, is one of which we can be proud.

Official development assistance has a political and symbolic importance that cannot be captured in statistics. It provides tangible evidence of American concern for a large and important part of the world and is part of the price that we pay to bring the developing countries into the relationships of interdependence that in the long term benefit us. In addition, of course, aid frequently plays an important short-term role in providing support to governments that have interests parallel to our own or as a *quid pro quo* for direct benefits that we may receive from certain governments.

Aside from these "practical" concerns, the American aid program is a manifestation of the traditional American desire to help others who are in need. Too often, in an age where calculations of national interest are seen as the only acceptable basis for policy, we have played down this humanitarian aspect. Were the United States, with its unparalleled wealth and standard of living, to turn away from development assistance as "not cost effective," this country would make a tragic break with its traditions and values.

Secretary Kissinger said in his speech before this year's U.N. General Assembly: "A world community cannot remain divided between the permanently rich and the permanently poor"—just as our own nation was unable to continue half slave and half free a century ago. A world that is so permanently and unjustly divided is not the kind of world that either the rich or the poor can live in. It is not the kind of world that you and I would want to live in.

But an aid program must deal with realities. A recipient will benefit from aid only if it is willing and able to mobilize its own efforts. Aid can only be effective where there is a mutuality of interest between recipient and donor. There have to be clearly understood ground rules governing aid programs in both the economic and political fields. Aid should not be given to those who do not want it or are not willing to use it effec-

tively—there are too many competing claims on our resources both abroad and at home.

Where aid is wanted and can be effectively used, it must take into account that growth must be spread in some equitable manner among the peoples and nations of the world. This does not mean that the United States should not concentrate its efforts where its interests are greatest. But we cannot be satisfied with aggregate performance statistics that show glowing rates of growth but hide the fact that great numbers of people have seen their lot in life stagnate while others grow prosperous around them. I would hope that we will get away from using statistics that show an annual growth rate of LDC's of 6 percent but neglect to mention that the largest of the less developed countries, India, has barely grown at all on a per capita basis. And we should be suspicious of statistics that show prodigious growth rates for individual countries but are not disaggregated to show whether all social and regional groups in the country have participated in that growth.

It is scarcely necessary to discuss before this group the various modalities of development assistance: the bilateral versus multilateral question; the relative importance of technical, sectoral, and other program types; and the many other issues with which the Overseas Development Council has dealt so penetratingly and intelligently.

There is little of a concrete nature for me to say about aid levels except that we are sending a request for \$1½ billion in IDA [International Development Association] replenishment up to the Hill and that in 1974 we must start anew to work toward a proper level of continuing development assistance. That's why it's so critical now that we properly relate development and its importance to both the United States and the LDC's to the other elements in an effective worldwide international economic system. We must create better and broader public understanding that the international economic order can run into difficulties and political order can be jeopardized if the poorer countries are not brought into successful participation

in a reformed world economic system and thereby afforded the opportunity to achieve their development aspirations. The United States and the rest of the industrialized world share with the developing countries a mutual interest in a renewed and open world economic system—built on the four pillars of trade, investment, development assistance, and monetary reform—from which all nations can benefit.

Development Policy and U.S. Interests

U.S. policies toward the LDC's must be consonant with our perceived national interests. Foreign policy considerations—long term rather than short term—will include security and strategic factors and our desire to foster a climate of international cooperation conducive to solution of such problems as preservation of the environment, narcotics control, sanctity of contracts, and security of travel. International economic considerations include the implications of our policies on U.S. access to needed raw materials, on expanded export markets, and on the investment climate in LDC's. Domestic economic considerations are equally relevant: balance of payments and budget constraints, the possibility of shortrun employment dislocations, the interests of our consumers, the long-term efficiency of the U.S. economy.

These U.S. interests are clearly interrelated. We recognize that all nations benefit most under an international economic system where scarce resources are used most efficiently. Our purchases of LDC raw materials and manufactured goods contribute to the well-being of U.S. industry and consumers while providing the LDC's with foreign exchange for their development requirements and for purchases of U.S. products. Similarly, when the LDC's can attract private U.S. investment, they open up an invaluable source of capital, technology, and managerial skills to contribute to their further development.

For its part, the United States needs the foreign exchange from expanded exports and from investment earnings to pay for

our growing raw material requirements. The expansion of markets for our own exports of those goods and services which we produce best, and our purchase of resources from the lowest cost foreign suppliers, will contribute to higher productivity of the U.S. economy. For the United States, higher incomes, foreign exchange earnings, and gross employment all flow from the most efficient use of resources. This in turn will permit easier absorption of relatively less efficient domestic industry and labor which are temporarily displaced in the course of this evolution of the world economy. Thus, U.S. interests are more than ever directly affected by the degree to which other countries develop and become successful participants in a market-oriented world economy.

At the same time, development can be accelerated in the LDC's by focusing financial and technical assistance more sharply on increasing their participation in and commitment to an open market-oriented world economy. Increased trade enables the LDC's to increase their export earnings, which are their largest source of development funds. Export growth generates foreign investment in export industries and in sales, service, and financial industries which are attracted by increased foreign exchange earnings. The increased LDC dependence upon world markets helps to protect our investment from arbitrary actions by LDC governments.

In addition, a trade policy emphasizing comparative advantage encourages the LDC's to forgo wasteful import-substitution industries which deprive us of important markets. Finally, as the LDC's build manufacturing, agricultural, and raw material processing industries that depend upon developed country markets, they have less need for artificially high mineral and petroleum prices and are less well situated to withhold production. Our specialized technical assistance can foster market-oriented growth and help the private sector, which is crucial to the development of LDC export industries.

In this world of growing economic interdependence, the U.S. self-interest requires

that we play a significant role and provide our "fair share" in support of the development process. To do otherwise would jeopardize our political and economic relations with both developing and developed countries. We could find it more difficult in the future to wield sufficient influence on matters of importance to us.

The way in which we play this role, however, must reflect the realities of recent important developments in the world economic system. Sustained high levels of growth in other industrialized countries enable these countries to assume a larger share of the development assistance burden; balance of payments, inflation, and budgetary problems in the U.S. require solution; the international monetary system is in need of reform; growing differences among LDC's require different packages of development tools. As the health of the U.S. economy improves, the United States should move forward and again provide leadership in formulating for the 1970's and 1980's development policies which recognize that we and other industrialized countries are linked to developing countries by mutual interests of trade and investment. What is required are flexible and realistic development policies which, with continued attention to basic human problems, interrelate trade, investment, technological developments, and foreign assistance.

To realize the goals of development, the world must, as Secretary Kissinger said in his address to the General Assembly, draw upon the world's best minds for new and imaginative solutions to the problems of development. Concrete contributions are needed in such fields as food production, sectoral development, indigenous economic institutions like capital markets and distribution and servicing systems, and the myriad problems attendant upon development—the critical issue of our time and the years to come. We can spend no less effort on development than we have on dealing with monetary reform, trade, and investment problems. Each element must be equally strong; each must contribute to the other.

I would like to conclude my remarks with some observations that are primarily political in tone but reflect considerations that are integral to any development effort.

We should not hesitate to stand up for our principles in international forums—alone if necessary. But I am disturbed by the U.S. isolation in such groups as the U.N. Economic and Social Council and UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development], where the majority of members are less developed. We need to find ways of relating better to the dissatisfied and restive majority of humanity—ways that are acceptable to them and can form the basis for fruitful cooperation. The issues are no more intractable than those that we face in our economic dealings with the developed countries.

We cannot carry on economic negotiations in an atmosphere of peremptory demands and confrontation. This is eminently a field where all gain or all lose. The nations of the world are inextricably tied together, and the intensity with which economic interests are pursued reflects not a basic disparity of interest, but the closeness of our interdependence.

By building on this interdependence with a comprehensive policy such as I have outlined this afternoon, we and our neighbors on this planet can have a realistic expectation of success in meeting the challenge of development.

Multilateral Agreement Reached on Atlantic Fisheries Problem

*Department Announcement*¹

Agreement was reached at a special meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) at Ottawa October 15–19 to conserve depleted fisheries and protect the interests of U.S. fishermen on the important fishing grounds off the Atlantic coast of the United States. The special meeting had been called as the

result of failure of the 16-nation body to reach agreement at its regular meeting in June. Then-Secretary of State William P. Rogers had called this situation a crisis in late August in personal messages to the Foreign Ministers of the other ICNAF nations.²

Agreement was reached on a three-year program which is pledged to allow the stocks to recover to a level which will produce the maximum sustainable yield. Agreement was also reached on a gear restriction which will keep almost all foreign-bottom trawls out of the relatively shallow waters off New England for six months of the year. This will be of direct and immediate benefit to American fishermen since the foreign-bottom trawls in this area have caused them both severe competitive disadvantages and the loss of species which are of most interest to the American market. The attached chartlet shows the area of this restriction.³

The agreement calls for an overall catch limitation in 1974 of 923,900 metric tons, going down to 850,000 metric tons in 1975. In 1976 the ICNAF regulation will require this limitation to be set at a catch which will allow the biomass to recover to a level which "will produce the maximum sustainable yield." These limitations apply in the region from the Canadian border to North Carolina.

The 923,900 figure in 1974 may be compared to overall catches of the species covered of 1,144,700 in 1971, 1,188,400 in 1972, and a projected catch of about the same this year. Thus there will be an immediate savings of about a quarter million tons of fish not being caught. These fish will be left in the stock, with an additional amount in 1975 and in 1976 to accelerate the rebuilding to the level which will produce the maximum sustainable yield. Virtually all fisheries outside the U.S. 12-mile fisheries limit are covered.

Individual allocations of these overall

¹ Issued on Oct. 26 (press release 392).

² For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 1, 1973, p. 439.

³ Not printed here.

quotas were made which will permit the United States and Canada increased catches in 1974 over the 1972 catch and the projected catch for 1973. At the same time, all nine distant-water fleets which received individual allocations will be permitted 1974 catches less than their 1972 catches and projected 1973 catches. The overall catch reduction for 1974 represents nearly a 30 percent reduction in catch for these foreign fleets off our coast.

A striking feature of the new regulation is that the overall quota is a second-tier quota imposed over and above individual quotas on specific species or stocks. The second-tier quota for each country will be less than the sum of the total of the individual species quotas in the first tier. This means that fishing effort must be directed in as efficient a manner as possible if the most desired species are to be caught. This reduces the chances of incidental catches when fishing for other species, a problem which has been particularly vexing to the American fishermen. It also means that the scientific goals for individual species protection will be more attainable. This two-tier quota system has never been utilized in fisheries management before, and this most innovative approach was not even being discussed in ICNAF six months ago.

The U.S. Commissioners at the meeting were Ambassador Donald L. McKernan, Coordinator of Ocean Affairs and Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of State; Ronald W. Green, now retired after many years as a fisheries official in the State of Maine and now associated with the fishing industry; and David H. Wallace, Associate Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce. The U.S. delegation included many representatives of the fishing industry and fisheries officials of the States of Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, as well as scientists and officers from the Departments of Commerce and State and the U.S. Coast Guard.

ICNAF members are Bulgaria, Canada,

Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All significant fisheries in the region off the U.S. coast are conducted by members of ICNAF except that of the German Democratic Republic. The GDR fishery is the fourth largest in the region. GDR fisheries officials participated in the Ottawa meeting, expressed a cooperative attitude toward the conservation program, and indicated that there is a good possibility the GDR will become a member of ICNAF in the near future.

U.S. and Indian Scholars To Discuss Collaboration in Educational Fields

*Department Announcement*¹

A group of distinguished Indian and American scholars will meet in New Delhi in January 1974 under the joint auspices of the University Grants Commission and the United States Educational Foundation in India.

The meeting is the outcome of a proposal made by the board of directors of the foundation, which consists of five Indian members nominated by the U.S. Ambassador in India. This has been accepted by the Government of India and by the Board of Foreign Scholarships of the United States, which is responsible for framing policies for the Fulbright programs all over the world.

The meeting, to be presided over by the chairman of the University Grants Commission, will discuss the areas of collaboration in educational fields which would be most profitable and mutually beneficial from the point of view of both the countries.

It is hoped that the deliberations of the meeting will lead to further strengthening of educational and cultural exchange between the two countries.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships, drawn

¹ Issued on Sept. 28 (press release 356).

principally from the American academic community, is a 12-member Presidentially appointed body responsible for supervising the academic exchange program conducted by the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Act), including the selection of all students, teachers, and professors receiving awards under the act.

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Legislation To Deal With Energy Emergency

Following is a statement by Julius L. Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Resources and Food Policy, submitted to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on November 14.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your committee to testify in connection with H.R. 11031, the National Emergency Petroleum Act.

On October 17 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced the adoption of a boycott of oil in support of the Arab war against Israel. OAPEC members agreed at that time to reduce overall production by 10 percent, to embargo all exports to the United States, and to reward "friendly" nations with continuing supplies of oil. The OAPEC boycott has now been expanded to the point where overall production by OAPEC members has been reduced by 25 percent, with an addi-

tional 5 percent scheduled for the month of December.

In addition to the United States, the Netherlands has been singled out for full embargo treatment, but reports as to other countries are contradictory. Certain other countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Brazil, have been designated as "preferred" countries and as such will be permitted to receive Arab oil at a level equal to their Arab oil purchases during the first nine months of 1973. Most other nations, including such major importing countries as Japan, West Germany, and Italy, are classified as "nonpreferred" and will have to share pro rata any oil remaining from reduced production after the preferred customers have been satisfied. Thus, the impact on this latter group of countries will increase should the boycott continue with progressively larger reductions in production month by month.

As a result of the 25 percent limitation of production now in effect, the availability of oil in the world will be reduced by more than 5 million barrels per day. Should another 5 percent reduction come into effect in December, the decrease in world availabilities could exceed 6 million barrels per day.

Prior to the imposition of the Arab boycott, the United States was importing about 6.3 million barrels per day, of which the Arab producers furnished 1.7 million in direct shipments of crude oil and products refined from Arab oil in third countries. However, even before the cutoff of Arab oil most authorities had counted on importing about 500,000-750,000 additional barrels per day of heating oil from European refineries to cover the additional demands of the 1973-74 heating season. These European supplies will in large part now be lost as a result of the Arab embargo. Thus our total oil deficit during the winter months could be between 2 and 3 million barrels per day, or 10-17 percent of our consumption.

Mr. Chairman, I know that representatives of other agencies will want to address

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

themselves to the provisions of the bill relating to our domestic energy supplies and conservation. I would, however, like to reiterate what other State Department representatives have said in their testimony before Congress about the dangers to our national security of overdependence on imports from potentially insecure sources. The crisis now precipitated by the OAPEC boycott vividly dramatizes these dangers and emphasizes the need to proceed urgently in carrying out the "Project Independence" proposed by the President. A sound program of energy conservation and reduction in domestic demand is indeed an integral and vital part of any move toward energy self-sufficiency.

Although the thrust of H.R. 11031 is primarily domestic, the Department of State would like to suggest that any energy emergency act passed contain a provision giving the President the authority to negotiate any international understandings or agreements that would advance America's energy interests. A provision of this type would permit the negotiation of international energy arrangements, either bilaterally or multilaterally within the context of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or other international organizations. Although we do not presently contemplate the negotiation of such agreements, it is conceivable that emergency sharing arrangements might be concluded in the future. Specific authority of the type I suggest could serve to encourage mutual sharing or other joint contingency planning by consuming countries to deal with emergencies of the kind we are facing at this time.

Mr. Chairman, the Department of State strongly endorses constructive steps which will enable us to deal effectively and firmly with the present and possibly future energy emergencies. We look forward to working with your committee in developing an energy policy that will make an important contribution to our Nation's security and well-being.

Conventions on Transport Containers Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Nixon*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification (1) the Customs Convention on Containers, 1972, and (2) the International Convention for Safe Containers, both signed at Geneva on December 5, 1972. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Secretary of State with respect to the Conventions.

The Customs Convention on Containers, 1972, is designed to supersede and update the Customs Convention on Containers of 1956. The new Convention provides for the temporary importation of containers free of import duties and taxes and free of import prohibitions and restrictions. It also harmonizes and unifies technical provisions applicable to containers used for transport of merchandise under Customs seal and provides for the use of temporarily imported containers in internal transport operations under specified conditions. This Convention is important because it will insure United States-owned containers the same treatment in the territories of States parties to this Convention as that afforded in the United States to foreign-owned containers.

The International Convention for Safe Containers specifies structural requirements for certain transport containers to assure their safe operation. The need for an international convention on this topic became apparent with the threat of proliferation of individual State safety requirements which would be applicable to all containers transiting their respective borders. The safety record of the containerization movement has

¹ Transmitted on Nov. 14 (White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. X, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the conventions and the report of the Secretary of State.

been excellent and the present Convention is based on existing safety standards.

The Customs Convention on Containers, 1972, and the International Convention for Safe Containers will make a significant contribution to efforts to establish uniform international regulations regarding containers.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *November 14, 1973.*

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Texts of International Labor Organization Convention No. 135¹ and Recommendation No. 143. Communication from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations transmitting texts of International Labor Convention No. 135 and Recommendation No. 143, concerning protection and facilities to be afforded to workers' representatives in the undertaking. H. Doc. 93-135. July 30, 1973. 16 pp.

Amendments to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966. Report to accompany Ex. D, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-11. August 1, 1973. 2 pp.

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution. Report to accompany Ex. C, 93-1, S. Ex. Rept. 93-13. August 1, 1973. 5 pp.

Convention on Endangered Species. Report to accompany Ex. H, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-14. August 1, 1973. 4 pp.

Defense Production Act Amendment of 1973. Report to accompany S. 1980. S. Rept. 93-364. August 1, 1973. 4 pp.

Diplomatic Relations Between United States and Sweden. Report to accompany S. Res. 149. S. Rept. 93-374. August 2, 1973. 2 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Report, together with individual views, to accompany S. 2335. S. Rept. 93-377. August 2, 1973. 66 pp.

Texts of International Labor Organization Convention No. 136 and Recommendation No. 144. Communication from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations transmitting texts of Convention No. 136 and Recommendation No. 144, concerning protection against hazards of poisoning arising from benzene. H. Doc. 93-150. September 11, 1973. 12 pp.

Inclusive Tour Charters. Report, together with minority views, to accompany S. 1739. S. Rept. 93-387. September 11, 1973. 23 pp.

Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1973. Report, together with additional views, to accompany H.R. 981. H. Rept. 93-461. September 11, 1973. 49 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London and Moscow April 10, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Cyprus, November 13, 1973.

Customs

Customs convention on the ATA carnet for the temporary admission of goods, with annex. Done at Brussels December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30, 1963; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6631.

Accession deposited: Nigeria, October 1, 1973.

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.

Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, October 15, 1973.

Law

Statute of The Hague Conference on Private International Law. Done at the 7th session of the conference at The Hague October 9-31, 1951. Entered into force July 15, 1955; for the United States October 15, 1964. TIAS 5710.

Acceptance deposited: Australia, November 1, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.¹

Accession deposited: Nicaragua, October 24, 1973.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973.²

Ratified by the President: November 9, 1973.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Ratification deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, October 16, 1973.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967; as to the United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, September 10, 1973.

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space telecommunications, with annex. Done at Geneva July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973. TIAS 7435.

Notifications of approval: Hungary, August 14, 1973; Jamaica, August 3, 1973; Kuwait, July 4, 1973; Yugoslavia, July 29, 1973.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization. Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970.¹

Ratified by the President: November 14, 1973.

United Nations

Amendment to article 61 of the United Nations Charter, as amended (59 Stat. 1031, TIAS 5857, 6529), to enlarge the Economic and Social Council. Done at New York December 20, 1971. Entered into force September 24, 1973.

Proclaimed by the President: November 13, 1973.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 23, 1972.¹

Ratified by the President: November 13, 1973 (with declaration).

BILATERAL

Austria

Interim agreement concerning acceptance of transatlantic air traffic organized and operated pursuant to advance charter (TGC or ABC) rules. Effected by exchange of letters at Vienna November 6, 1973. Entered into force November 6, 1973.

Egypt

Agreement extending the agreement of September 30 and October 5, 1970, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 5 and November 9, 1973, between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador of India (representing the interests of the Arab Republic of Egypt). Entered into force November 9, 1973.

Ghana

Agreement concerning United States participation on a voluntary, limited basis in the Ghanaian social security system. Effected by exchange of notes at Accra May 16, September 10, and October 30, 1973. Entered into force October 30, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$16.35; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$14.50; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 20¢ each.

Egypt	Cat. No. S1.123:EG9
	Pub. 8152 8 pp.
Japan	Cat. No. S1.123:J27
	Pub. 7770 13 pp.
Luxembourg	Cat. No. S1.123:L97
	Pub. 7856 4 pp.
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	Pub. 8021 10 pp.
Sri Lanka	Cat. No. S1.123:C33
	Pub. 7757 7 pp.
Tunisia	Cat. No. S1.123:T83
	Pub. 8142 4 pp.

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products. Agreement with the Republic of China adding annex C to the agreement of December 30, 1971, as amended. TIAS 7591. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7591).

Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Rinderpest. Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 7604. 11 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7604).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 7605. 6 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7605).

Reciprocal Fishing Privileges. Agreement with Canada amending and extending the agreement of April 24, 1970, as extended. TIAS 7606. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7606).

Education—Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany supple-

menting the agreement of November 20, 1962, as supplemented. TIAS 7607. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7607).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sudan. TIAS 7608. 14 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7608).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics extending the amendment of March 17, 1972, to the agreement of November 4, 1966. TIAS 7609. 6 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7609).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 7610. 10 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7610).

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. Agreement with Sweden. TIAS 7611. 8 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7611).

Cooperation in Combating Illicit International Traffic in Narcotics and Other Dangerous Drugs. Agreement with Paraguay. TIAS 7613. 5 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7613).

Peace Corps. Agreement with Oman. TIAS 7614. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7614).

Publications Distributed by Bureau of Public Affairs

Single copies of reprints, Bureau of Public Affairs news releases, and other publications listed below are available free of charge as long as supplies last and may be ordered from the General Publications Division-B, Office of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Arms Sales in Latin America. This study surveys arms sales in Latin America during the past six years, providing data on buyers and suppliers and reviewing various factors that affected arms purchase decisions. It also forecasts the outlook for arms sales to the region during the 1970's. Cuba is not included in the study. PA/MS news release. July 1973. 31 pp.

Sub-Sahara Drought Seen as Long-Range Problem. Brief description of the problems faced by the peoples of the drought-stricken Sahelian states of West and Central Africa. Also discussed are coordinated relief efforts of world nations. PA/MS news release. July 1973. 4 pp.

United States Troop Levels in Europe. This report includes the testimony of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William J. Casey before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Subcommittee on European Affairs. PA/MS news release. July 1973. 22 pp.

World Population Growth: Prospects for Stabilization Remote. Report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State illustrating the long interval between the start of the sustained decline in the average number of births per woman and the cessation of population growth, the sizable growth of the total population during this transition, and the expected changes in the ratio between populations of developed and less developed countries. PA/MS news release. July 1973. 4 pp.

Economic Growth of OECD Countries, 1962-1972. Ninth edition of an annual publication assembling data on the gross national product and economic growth of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Comparative tables included. PA/MS news release. August 1973. 11 pp.

Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1972. Report includes economic and military aid and technical assistance data through the end of 1972 and complete trade statistics through 1971. Tables included. PA/MS news release. August 1973. 42 pp.

Emergency Disaster Relief for Sahel Africa. This is a report by Maurice J. Williams, the President's Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief to Sub-Sahara Africa, of the progress to date in relieving the devastating effects of the worst drought of the century affecting, directly and indirectly, 25 million people in Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, and Chad. PA/MS news release. August 1973. 8 pp.

Trade Patterns of the West 1972. The tables in this study show the 1972 trade of the enlarged European Community, the U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia, Western Europe, NATO, and the total OECD—with one another, with Communist countries, and with the rest of the world, by value and as a percentage of total trade of each country or area. PA/MS news release. August 1973. 16 pp.

Third Consolidated Plan for Foreign Affairs Research. This document describes the plan of ACDA, AID, NSC, Department of Defense, Department of State, and USIA for supporting external research on foreign affairs and sets forth their goals for fiscal years 1974 and 1975. PA/MS news release. September 1973. 128 pp.

Exchanges and Cooperation With the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 1972. This report prepared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs covers those U.S. exchanges with the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria that began during 1972. It includes officially negotiated exchanges as well as those privately sponsored. Excluded are visits primarily of a diplomatic, family, journalistic, or commercial nature and, in the case of Eastern Europeans, tourist visits. 17 pp.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to November 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 356 of September 28, 392 of October 26, and 399 of November 2.

No.	Date	Subject
†409	11/12	Kissinger: departure remarks, Islamabad, Nov. 10.
†410	11/12	Kissinger: interview, Peking.
411	11/13	Rush: United Synagogue of America, Kiamasha Lake, N.Y.
*412	11/15	Rush: House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Nov. 14.
†413	11/16	Kissinger: Foreign Service Day message.
*414	11/16	Study group I, U.S. National Committee for CCITT, Dec. 5.
†415	11/16	Kissinger: arrival remarks, Andrews Air Force Base.
*416	11/16	Retired Ambassadors Kennan and Willis honored at Foreign Service Day ceremony.

† Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXIX • No. 1798 • December 10, 1973

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE
OF NOVEMBER 21 701

SECRETARY KISSINGER VISITS MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA
*Remarks by and Interview With Secretary Kissinger and Texts
of U.S.-Egypt Announcement and U.S.-P.R.C. Communique 712*

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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December 10, 1973

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of November 21

Press release 423 dated November 21

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I will just make a very few brief observations about where we stand in the Middle East, where we expect to go, then say a word about our attitude toward the various oil pressures.

First, with respect to the situation in the Middle East. As I have pointed out before, our objective was to solidify the cease-fire so that we could move forward, together with the other interested parties, toward peace negotiations.

Now, in the complex situation that exists on the Egyptian-Israeli front, sufficient progress has been made on the cease-fire, in the cease-fire negotiations, so that we can look forward with some confidence to the beginning of peace negotiations.

Our effort will be to create the appropriate auspices called for in Security Council Resolution 338 and under the auspices of the United Nations, to begin a negotiating process—hopefully, during the month of December—that we believe and that we expect and hope will lead toward the just and lasting peace that all parties have pledged themselves to attempt to negotiate.

The United States has committed itself, in Security Council Resolution 338, to support the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.¹

We will make a major effort to narrow the differences between the parties, to help the parties move toward the peace that all the peoples in the area need and that the peace of the world requires.

Now, this will be our policy in the Middle East.

We stated this policy to the Arab Foreign Ministers at the United Nations prior to the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war. And I lay stress on this because the United States policy is determined not by the pressures that this or that nation may attempt to generate, but by the American conception of the national interest and of the interest of general peace.

Now, the United States has full understanding for actions that may have been taken when the war was going on, by which the parties and their friends attempted to demonstrate how seriously they took the situation.

But as the United States has committed itself to a peaceful process, as the United States has pledged that it would make major efforts to bring about the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, those countries who are engaging in economic pressures against the United States should consider whether it is appropriate to engage in such steps while peace negotiations are being prepared and, even more, while negotiations are being conducted.

I would like to state for the United States Government that our course will not be influenced by such pressures, that we have stated our policy, that we have expressed our commitments, and that we will adhere to those and will not be pushed beyond this point by any pressures.

Now, this is all I will say on the Middle East. But of course I will be delighted to answer your questions.

There is one matter that I wanted to raise with you ladies and gentlemen, growing out of my last press conference, in which I prom-

¹ For text of Security Council Resolution 338, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1973, p. 604; for text of Security Council Resolution 242, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

ised, within a week, to supply the material or the evidence on which our decision to go on alert was based. It was a statement that, quite frankly, I regretted having made in terms of the short deadline immediately afterward. The reason is that as we are now moving toward peace negotiations, which we expect to conduct with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, I do not believe any useful purpose would be served if the United States recited confidential communications that had taken place and tried to re-create an episode of confrontation that, hopefully, has been transcended.

As time goes on and as the spirit of cooperation which we are attempting to foster in the Middle East takes hold, as things can be seen in fuller perspective, we still expect to fulfill what I have stated.

I am also glad to note that whatever the formal cooperation of the government, reportorial enterprise and the reluctance of associates to admit anything less than full knowledge of participation in events have both combined to produce journalistic efforts that have given a fuller picture of events than those that were available on the morning of my last press conference.

So with these two observations, I will turn to your questions.

Middle East Economic Pressures

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your exposition on the situation in the Middle East, you said the United States will not be influenced by the pressures—I assume you are talking economic or otherwise. And I wanted to ask you whether the opposite side of that coin has any validity. In other words, Mr. [George S.] Vest, your spokesman, early this week ruled out any retaliatory economic measures against what he called the Arab blackmail. I don't know whether he used the term "blackmail." I shouldn't say that. But anyway he ruled out retaliatory economic measures. Then last night Under Secretary [for Political Affairs William J.] Porter in a speech indicated what some people thought was a possibility of economic retaliation by the United States when he said that this sort

of thing was a "two-edged sword." And then a number of eminent economists from your former neighborhood called upon the government to resist Arab blackmail and to consider taking countermeasures. Now, that is a long question, but what I want to know is, are you going to slap back at them in some way?

Secretary Kissinger: The principal objective in the Middle East now is to try to move the contestants toward a spirit of greater conciliation and toward a greater understanding that the requirements of world peace simply do not permit the constant warfare that has been characteristic of the past 20 years. We still hope that some of the steps that were taken when certain assumptions were made about the principal American objective in that area will be changed when it becomes apparent that we are attempting to bring about a just peace.

However, it is clear that if pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely, then the United States will have to consider what countermeasures it may have to take. We would do this with enormous reluctance, and we are still hopeful that matters will not reach this point.

Talks in People's Republic of China

Q. Mr. Secretary, during your talks in China there appears to have been a speedup in the normalization process. Would you say, please, what effect this may have on our relations in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia, and our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan?

Secretary Kissinger: First let me make a negative point. I have seen several stories to the effect that the United States on my trip to China attempted to bring about a full normalization of relations and failed. This is totally incorrect.

With respect to our relations to the People's Republic of China, we have always placed primary emphasis on the substance of the communications and on the substance of the consultations rather than on the form in which it took place.

On this trip, we brought about an expan-

sion of the functions of the Liaison Offices, a continuation of the exchange programs, an expansion of trade, and a substantial expansion of the consultative processes. This was the maximum that we had set ourselves as a goal.

With respect to future normalization, I think that there are certain indications in the communique which now remain to be explored as to the form that that might take.

With respect to the impact of normalization of relations or increased contacts between the People's Republic and the United States on Southeast Asia, it has always been understood that progress toward normalization would be aided by a general condition of stability and tranquillity in Asia and that both sides had an obligation to do their utmost to bring this about. So we are hopeful that the situation in Southeast Asia will not be exacerbated by the actions of any outside country.

With respect to our relations—with respect to the situation on Taiwan, there have been no changes in the basic relationship.

Reports of Nuclear Weapons in Egypt

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the Soviet Union has introduced tactical nuclear weapons into Egypt. Is that true, and if so, how do you view it?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no confirmed evidence that the Soviet Union has introduced nuclear weapons into Egypt. And there are public Soviet statements rejecting this allegation.

If the Soviet Union were to introduce nuclear weapons into local conflict, this would be a very grave matter and would be a fundamental shift in traditional practices and one hard to reconcile with an effort to bring about a responsible solution.

But I repeat—we have no evidence, or at least we have no confirmed evidence, that this has been the case.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have talked about the Arab boycott lasting perhaps unreasonably and indefinitely. Based on your conversations with Arab leaders, what in your

estimation will it take to get a lifting, even partial, of the boycott, and how soon might that happen?

U.S. Policy Not Determined by Pressures

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speculate as to the timing that Arab leaders foresee as to easing the boycott. I think the Arab leaders can take two positions. They can either give us a reasonable opportunity, once the negotiating process is underway, to see what we can do to make our contribution to bringing about the just and lasting peace to which we have committed ourselves, and which they affirm is their goal as well. Or they can attempt to deal with us by making a series of specific demands backed up by economic pressures.

We would not be in a position to be able to accede to that second procedure. And we believe that for the sake of our future relationships, for the sake of making clear that we conduct our policy for the interests of the general peace, that the first course is by far the more advisable for the Arab leaders. And the decision, of course, is up to them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what measures could the United States take to counter these economic pressures?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to speculate on what we might do under circumstances that we hope will not arise. But you should remember that 85 percent of our energy is produced in the United States, so that we are not a total prey to outside pressures.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do your remarks about external pressure apply equally to internal pressure—and I have in mind those traditional supporters of Israel versus those who believe that we ought to change our policy in order to get the Arab oil flowing again?

Secretary Kissinger: Our policy will be conducted on the basis of our assessment, our best judgment, of the national interest and our best judgment of the general interest of world peace, and they would apply to all special pressures.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to concentrate your answer about the alert on the contents of a confidential communication from the Soviet Union. And I have great difficulty with that answer, when you said that you saw no useful purpose that would be served by it. This is a democratic country of 200 million people who have been put on alert before, and this is the first time they have never been told why. The Russians certainly know what was in their note. And I would like to hear some more about why the American people cannot.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. O'Leary [Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington Star-News], I have given an account of these events to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. And there are in international politics situations in which, as I pointed out in my last press conference, there has to be a modicum of confidence between the public and the responsible officials. At this point to go through the whole sequence of events would only bring about a recitation of a situation of confrontation, a scorecard of who won or lost, which we do not believe would contribute to the atmosphere of confidence that is necessary.

We have given an account to elected representatives of the American people. We have given some account to the press. And I recognize the seriousness of your question. It is not any lack of confidence in our judgment as to the alert, but a plea for some understanding that there are greater imperatives at this moment—when we are trying to calm the situation, when we in a very delicate situation are trying to bring about a cooperative attitude on the part of all parties—not to recite, in this time frame, the elements of a situation of confrontation.

Q. Are you committed not to give—by a promise to the Russians—not to release that note?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not in the past released any of the private exchanges

between the Soviet leaders and the President, and it would therefore be a very serious matter if we suddenly began to do it on a selective basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir, you have explained why you cannot or will not go any further on this issue. Can you not, perhaps, clarify some of the existing apparent discrepancies on the record? You said at your press conference that there were certain ambiguities as to what the Soviet intent was. The President said that this was the gravest crisis since the Cuban missile crisis. Could you possibly clarify that fundamental issue for us?

Secretary Kissinger: When I gave my press conference, I was motivated by the same considerations that I have expressed here. I saw no purpose at that time to stress the aspect of confrontation. In any set of actions, unless the event which you are trying to prevent has in fact happened, there is always a certain element of uncertainty. We believed on the basis of evidence of an intelligence nature, coupled with specific communications, that there was a serious danger that we attempted to avoid. The President described his judgment of the seriousness of the event—had it occurred. The difference perhaps in characterization is due to the fact that I spoke before I was aware of the U.N. decision, and I attempted to influence a conciliatory attitude in the decisions that were to be taken.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the stories to which you referred, or one of them, to which I assume you referred in your opening comment, it stated and attributed to a Cabinet official that in the course of the decisions on the alert, the President empowered you and Mr. Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] to manage the crisis on your own, to conceive and carry out various moves, and the President himself only ratified those moves. Is that a correct characterization of his role?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go into the details, but I thought also I made

clear in my statement that not every official who comments to journalists is in equal possession of the facts.

Middle East Peace Conference

Q. Mr. Secretary, in one of your answers before, you left open the possibility that the first option available to Arab leaders, which is the preferable one from your point of view, wouldn't occur until after peace negotiations had begun. If we are talking about next month, talking about some movement in those peace negotiations, implicitly you are not holding out any hope for an end to the embargo before the beginning of the year. Is that fair?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I don't want to set a deadline to decisions that are not of our own making. I would have thought that the most constructive course would be to give the negotiating process a chance now that the point has been made and to permit the countries concerned to make their efforts. What the appropriate timing for their decision is I think should be left in the first instance to the leaders who have to make that decision. I didn't want to give a deadline.

Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News].

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how you envisage this peace conference? On the Israeli side there is one state; on the Arab side several. Is a veto to be implied? How do you see this developing?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course the conference, to be effective, would have to be left to a considerable extent to the decision of the participants. For example, there are many ways it could be conducted. It could operate through plenary sessions that then break up into a series of bilateral negotiations. It could address some issues of common concern in plenary sessions and then some issues of bilateral concern in separate meetings. I think the procedural possibilities are fairly wide and should be explored in the first instance by the parties concerned.

Obviously no agreement can be made, and

certainly no agreement can last, unless it has the willing participation and agreement of all the parties at the conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding of the modified Cooper-Church legislation on Indochina that it prohibits all direct U.S. military activity—land, sea, and air—with respect to North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia?

Secretary Kissinger: That has been my understanding of it, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Meir, addressing some Israeli troops today in the Sinai, said that the United States will put pressure on Israel to make some concessions. Could you now elaborate on what concessions you would expect Israel to make?

Secretary Kissinger: What the United States will do will depend on the process of negotiations. It is obvious that the conditions that produced the war that started on October 6 will have to be changed. And it is obvious, and it has always been understood, that a peace settlement will not ratify the cease-fire lines as they existed on October 6.

Therefore a peace settlement will have to have a number of elements. It will have to have an element of withdrawals. It will have to have an element of security arrangements between the parties concerned. And it may have to have an element of outside guarantees. In addition, there are such issues as the Palestinians and the future of Jerusalem. It will undoubtedly have to be discussed in some form or another at a peace conference.

We hope that Israel, as well as the Arab countries, will recognize that one of the clear consequences of recent events is that a purely military solution to the problems of the Middle East is impossible and that all countries therefore have the problem of the right balance between their security needs and the needs of legitimacy, acceptance, or whatever you want to call it.

We do not consider it axiomatic that this can only be achieved by pressure on Israel by the United States to make concessions. We expect to have full consultations with

Israel, as we expect to have discussions with the Arab participants; and the positions we will take as the negotiations develop depend on the positions the various parties take during the course of the negotiations and cannot be assumed ahead of time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what role do you foresee for the Palestinians at the peace conference?

Secretary Kissinger: This is a very difficult question that affects Israel, the other Arab states, and among the other Arab states, Jordan in particular. And it is a question which sometime in the course of the negotiation will require explicit discussion. Whether it is necessary to address it in the very first phases of the negotiations, when probably the military issues will loom largest, remains to be seen; and I would doubt it. But the Palestinian issue is of course one of the key questions that will come up.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions yesterday with the representatives of American oil companies, were you at all encouraged that these oil companies would take the effort, the American effort to produce a peace settlement in the Middle East, into consideration, particularly with emphasis on Japan, on the supply of oil to American troops stationed on Okinawa and Japan, and will they provide some of the scarce reserves that they have to help the Japanese, particularly?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem of the worldwide energy crisis has been a very profound challenge to all of the oil-consuming countries. At a minimum, we have an obligation to study seriously what we can do to alleviate difficulties that have been caused either by policies which we consider responsible during the war, which would be the case with the Netherlands, or which are produced by the stationing of American troops, which would be the case in Japan.

We are now looking at this problem very seriously and hope to formulate some position by the early part or by the middle part of next week.

The meeting with the oil executives was not primarily concerned with these more

or less technical issues. It was rather concerned with the fact that here are representatives of American companies that are operating in many of these countries and that need to understand what the basic direction of our policy is so that in their own economic activities they are at least aware of how we conceive the national interest.

U.S.-Soviet Relations and Middle East Crisis

Q. Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon has been saying that the personal relationship between himself and the leaders of the Soviet Union played some kind of role in connection with this alert. But the facts as far as we know them, which by your new policy is virtually zero, suggest that the communication was so bad that you had to call a military alert to get your message across.

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't understand the question.

Q. What I am trying to ask is whether or not—or exactly what role President Nixon's personal relationship with Mr. Brezhnev played in the recent alert.

Secretary Kissinger: The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States is an inherently ambiguous one. We have never said that détente indicates that we have parallel objectives or that it indicates that we have compatible domestic structures. Our view has been that the détente is made necessary because as the two great nuclear superpowers, we have a special responsibility to spare mankind the dangers of a nuclear holocaust.

And if one looks at history and sees how often it has happened that wars have been produced by the rivalries of client states without a full consideration of the worldwide issues, how easily misunderstandings could produce confrontations that could have catastrophic consequences, the overriding need of finding a solution to the problem of worldwide general nuclear war becomes overwhelming.

As I pointed out in my last press conference, this is the central problem of our period, and it is a problem that will have to be

solved either by this group of officials or by their successors. But it cannot be avoided.

Now, in this situation, in this relationship, one will always have an element both of confidence and of competition, coexisting in a somewhat ambivalent manner. The relationship that has developed between the Soviet Union and the United States since 1971 has been one of considerable restraint, and there have been very frequent, very confidential exchanges between General Secretary Brezhnev and the President. At the same time it is perfectly conceivable, and indeed it has happened during the Middle East crisis, that longstanding commitments or ideological pressures produce actions that bring these two sides into confrontation. At that point it is important that enough confidence exists so that the confrontation is mitigated.

And therefore one has to judge not only the fact that a confrontation occurred, really in the aftermath of a settlement and as a result of actions which could not be fully controlled by either of the two sides, because it happened the immediate cause was the violation of the cease-fire. But one also has to consider how rapidly the confrontation was ended and how quickly the two sides have attempted to move back and are now moving back to a policy of cooperation in settling the Middle East conflict.

I would therefore say that the relationship that had developed between the two governments and between the two leaders played a role in settling the crisis even though it had not yet been firm enough to prevent the crisis.

Q. That it played the role is one thing. But what kind of a role was that in this particular instance?

Secretary Kissinger: I have tried to give my best—

Q. It had to be some kind of a role.

Secretary Kissinger: It played in my judgment a significant role, the degree of which one will have to assess over a period of time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have referred sev-

eral times to peace negotiations within the next several weeks. Yet Prime Minister Meir has said this is impossible until after the Israeli election December 31. Do you have assurances from the parties concerned of a place and a date and which parties will participate, and may we know them?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no absolutely firm assurances, but we have some rather substantial understandings with all of the parties of the time frame which I indicated. The participants remain fully to be determined, but we are close to an agreement on that as well. And we will also agree then on the site.

We hope that this process should be completed during the next week, and we will then announce it as soon as all the parties have agreed to it.

Complexity of Energy Sharing

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said that the United States had—

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you—

Secretary Kissinger: I am trying to understand this process where I look at one person and another speaks. But ladies first. Go ahead, Marilyn [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post].

Q. You said the United States produces 85 percent of its energy, and it has been noted that other countries are not that fortunate. Is the United States, among the things it is considering, thinking of sharing some of its energy sources with Japan and the Netherlands and other countries less fortunate in a time of embargo?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, our first problem is to understand exactly what needs to be done to get our own energy crisis under control, and I am told that energetic steps in that direction are being taken.

The degree to which we can share our energy sources with other countries is a very complex matter, and of course, the more broadly the sharing is conceived, the more difficult it becomes. But with respect to specific needs, such as in the case of the Nether-

lands, and the particular issue that Mr. Wallach [John P. Wallach, Hearst Newspapers] mentioned in the case of Japan, require our careful study, and we are trying very hard to look into it.

The second issue that is raised by your question is the attitude that the more vulnerable countries should take in this crisis, with all understanding for their vulnerability; and they have to consider whether, by taking isolated actions, they will contribute more to the peace settlement on which, after all, the ultimate solution of this problem depends or whether their better course would not be to try to work as closely with us in the responsible efforts that we are trying to undertake.

Effectiveness of the United Nations

Q. Mr. Secretary, during your confirmation hearings, you said that the United Nations could not, or would not, be able to play a useful political role because of the veto that the superpowers, or the major powers, have in the Security Council. In the event, during this Middle East crisis, it looks as if the United Nations was able to play a useful role. First, have you changed your opinion, and second, what does this forecast for the U.S. use of the United Nations in the future?

Secretary Kissinger: I must say that the United Nations played a more effective role in this crisis than could have been deduced from my theoretical statements as a professor or from my statements during my confirmation hearings.

It proved to be an extremely effective sounding board, the most rapid means of communication among the parties, and when the chief participants had decided on a settlement, the most effective way by which the settlement could be achieved. Finally, it performed the absolutely essential role of providing the buffer that prevented the confrontation that could have occurred without it.

So we believe that the United Nations

played a very useful role, and we will take very serious account of that in the solution of other problems.

Reopening of the Suez Canal

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the evident and considerable advantage to Russia inherent in the reopening of the Suez Canal, granting their large Mediterranean Fleet access to the Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf, and so on, can you tell us why, as I think is the case, the United States so strongly favors the reopening of the Suez?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has not favored the reopening of the Suez Canal in the abstract; the United States has favored the evolution of the Middle East policy of such a nature that some reasonable prospect toward a final settlement was opened up to the chief participants.

If anything has become clear in recent years, it is that the situation as it existed prior to October 6 was simply unacceptable to enough of the Arab countries and to the Middle East so that it would constantly produce the danger of renewed warfare—and of a kind of warfare that, as the war has made clear, is not in the long-term interest of Israel either. Therefore the opening of the Suez Canal ought to be seen not in the context of the strategic movements of the Soviet Fleet, but in the context of world peace in general.

Now, with respect to the greater ease of movement of the Soviet Fleet from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean, there is a great danger of looking at the developments in this area in terms of a strategy that is more appropriate to the previous century than now.

Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean will not depend primarily on the number of ships it can deploy into the Indian Ocean. And I am confident that to the degree that power becomes the principal factor in the Indian Ocean, we will be able to generate a fleet of sufficient size in that area so that we could counterbalance anything that the Soviet

Union might put into the Indian Ocean, as the recent visit of the *Hancock* in that area has demonstrated.

Q. Are you favoring a permanent U.S. Indian Ocean Fleet, or inferring that?

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying that the future of the Middle East should not be deduced from the steaming time of the Soviet Fleet from the Black Sea into the Indian Ocean and whether adding 10 days to it, or cutting 10 days off it, will not be the determining factor.

Therefore the United States attitude toward the opening of the Suez Canal and to the military disengagement of forces in that area will be determined primarily, first, by the contribution this would make toward the general peace in the area and, secondly, by the possibilities it gives to reduce the influence of outside powers in general by focusing matters on Middle East concerns. That is the principal issue, and this is the best way to reduce Soviet influence and, for that matter, any outside influence in that area.

U.S. Role in Middle East Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, a three-part question. In your opening statement, you referred to the peace talks under U.N. auspices; I think at your last press conference, you talked about Soviet-American auspices. Is this a slight change? And secondly, after your appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday you said you had no plan but certain principles that you would like to see in an agreement. Chairman Fulbright, in his talk with newsmen yesterday, went through certain principles, including which he said he favored the Rogers plan of Israeli pullbacks to the old boundaries with insubstantial changes. I wondered how you felt on that question.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the procedural issue, we still believe that the appropriate auspices foreseen in Security Council Resolution 338 could best be pro-

vided by the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe, however, also, that these auspices should be generally blessed by the United Nations, and we would have no objection—in fact, we would welcome some participation by the Secretary General of the United Nations to symbolize this United Nations aegis.

With respect to the specifics of an American position, our attitude—I have stated the general principles with respect to Security Council Resolution 242 and some of the elements that we believe are likely to be contained in such a negotiation.

We do not believe it is effective for the United States to put forward a proposal in all its details which then will enable both parties, or will tempt both parties, to start shooting at the American proposal rather than to concentrate on what it is that they should accomplish.

We believe that the process that was followed in bringing about the six-point agreement solidifying the cease-fire may be more effective—in which the parties assume responsibility for their own positions. And once they put their positions on the table, then the United States can attempt to bring about a closing of the gap and perhaps inject its own ideas where those appear to be useful.

North Atlantic Relationships

Q. NATO proved to be a rather fragile vessel at the height of our airlift, Mr. Secretary, and some hard words were exchanged openly and privately. Would you give us your estimate of the damage that has been done to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and what can be done to shore it up, if anything?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me say, first of all, that the relationships in the Atlantic area remain the absolutely core element of American foreign policy. We remain convinced, as we have been convinced—on a bipartisan basis in the entire postwar period—that if the free nations of the North At-

lantic cannot regulate their relationships with each other, it is hard to see how they can cope with the problems on a global basis that they confront.

On the other hand, it is necessary to realize that serious difficulties arose in recent weeks. These difficulties were not accidental, but have reflected strains that have been apparent for a good part of this year.

Now, I have read a great deal of speculation which ascribes this to inadequate consultation by the United States. And of course, senior officials have a tendency toward a conviction in their infallibility, and they rarely admit that mistakes might have been made. But I don't even want to argue that point. Any process of consultation can be improved. The key question one has to ask oneself, however, is—and that one has to answer—is this: It is a root fact of the situation that the countries that were most consulted proved among the most difficult in their cooperation and those countries that were most cooperative were least consulted. So that there is at least no automatic relationship between consultation and agreement.

Secondly, if we deal with the question in its deepest aspect, are the objections that were raised due to inadequate information or to a different perception of their role. And one cannot avoid the perhaps melancholy conclusions that some of our European allies saw their interests so different from those of the United States that they were prepared to break ranks with the United States on a matter of very grave international consequence and that we happen to believe was of very profound consequence to them as well.

Now, I don't want to debate the merits of this issue. And in answering your question about what damage has been done to the Atlantic alliance I would say the recent weeks made evident the need, which the United States tried to underline by its initiative for these declarations, of defining just what it is that the nations of the North Atlantic

can do together and what they should do separately, of defining what forms of consultation are appropriate, how the nations of the North Atlantic can cooperate. This is what we put before the Europeans in April. This is what we hope to achieve. And this is why the need for it should have been made evident to both sides of the Atlantic in recent weeks. And if that is the conclusion that is drawn on both sides of the Atlantic, as it is on this side of the Atlantic, then I think it will have been a good thing and it can lead to a new period of progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect to accomplish on that issue?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are having a NATO ministerial meeting on December 10 and 11, and this gives an opportunity for the Foreign Ministers of all NATO nations to discuss the state of the alliance. We expect to do this candidly and in a constructive attitude and with the determination to put new vitality into Atlantic relationships.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us what led you to pledge the documents on the U.S.-Soviet situation? Particularly, was it the American domestic turbulence at that time that encouraged you, particularly with that short deadline which you gave?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a mistake to assume that everything that is said in a press conference is fully considered. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, does it remain the intention of the U.S. Government to ask the Congress for the full \$2.2 billion in aid to Israel, and has the United States committed itself to delivering that full total in armament to Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: We maintain our request, and we will judge what will be done with it on the basis of the needs as they will be jointly assessed between Israel and the United States.

The press: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

U.S. Transmits to U.N. Agreement Accepted by Egypt and Israel

Following is the text of a letter dated November 9 from Secretary Kissinger to United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

White House press release dated November 9

NOVEMBER 9, 1973.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the governments of Egypt and Israel are prepared to accept the following agreement which implements Article I of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 and Article I of United Nations Security Council Resolution 339.¹

The text of this agreement is as follows:

A. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the ceasefire called for by the UN Security Council.

B. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the UN.

C. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.

D. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East Bank.

E. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road Israeli officers can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the Canal.

F. As soon as the UN checkpoints are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including wounded.

It has also been agreed by the two parties

that they will hold a meeting under the auspices of the United Nations Commander at the usual place (kilometer 109 on the Suez-Cairo road) to sign this agreement and to provide for its implementation. I would be most grateful if you would take the appropriate steps to insure that a meeting is held on Saturday, November 10, 1973, or at such other time as may be mutually convenient of representatives of the parties to take the appropriate steps.

We intend to announce publicly the agreement at noon New York time on Friday, November 9, 1973.

Best regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Ambassador Bunker Visits Panama for Orientation on Canal Talks

*Department Announcement*¹

Ambassador at Large Ellsworth Bunker will leave for Panama on November 26 for talks with the Foreign Minister of Panama Juan Antonio Tack on a new approach toward reaching agreement on a modernized Panama Canal Treaty.

The United States and Panama have agreed to resume canal treaty negotiations.

This will be Ambassador Bunker's first visit to Panama and will afford him an opportunity to become acquainted with Panama and its leaders, thus providing the basis for later substantive negotiations.

¹For texts of the resolutions, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1973, p. 604.

¹ Issued on Nov. 23 (press release 424).

Secretary Kissinger Visits Middle East and Asia

Secretary Kissinger left Washington November 5 for a trip to Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger during the trip, an interview with Secretary Kissinger at Peking, the texts of a joint U.S.-Egypt announcement and a joint U.S.-P.R.C. communique, and remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at Andrews Air Force Base upon his return November 16.

DEPARTURE REMARKS, RABAT, NOVEMBER 6

Press release 402 dated November 7

I wish to thank King Hassan and Moroccan officials for the extraordinary courtesy with which we have been treated, the warm hospitality that's been extended, and the extremely useful talks that we have had.

This is the first Arab country I have visited, and it is of course my first stop on a trip which I hope will contribute to a permanent and just peace for the Middle East. It was therefore particularly appropriate that this visit should be to a country which is at one and the same time a close friend of the United States and also closely allied with its brothers in the Arab world.

The conversations with His Majesty were conducted with an attitude of friendship, but they also contributed greatly to my understanding of the point of view of the Arab countries. I leave here with greater determination and I hope greater courage to contribute to peace in the Middle East that extends to all of the people of the Middle East.

We also had some discussions of bilateral

problems between the United States and Morocco, and Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs David D.] Newsom is returning here on November 15 for more extended talks with the Foreign Minister.

Thank you very much.

JOINT U.S.-EGYPT ANNOUNCEMENT, NOVEMBER 7¹

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated November 12

The Governments of the United States and of Egypt have agreed in principle to resume diplomatic relations at an early date. The two Governments have also agreed that in the meantime the respective interests sections of the two countries will be raised immediately to the Ambassadorial level. The Government of Egypt has named Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal. The United States has designated Ambassador Hermann Eilts. They will take up their posts promptly.

DEPARTURE REMARKS, AMMAN, NOVEMBER 8

Press release 408 dated November 8

I have just completed rather extensive and extremely useful talks with the Prime Minister and His Majesty. As the United States improves its relationships with all the countries in the area, it will not forget its close friends that have stood with it for many years. We spoke mostly about the construction of a just and lasting peace in the area, in the negotiations in which Jordan will play a principal role from the very beginning. I

¹ Issued simultaneously at Cairo and Washington

think we achieved a very close correspondence of views.

Q. What are the prospects of peace at this stage?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that is what I am traveling through this area to discover. The United States is committed to making a major effort, and we will make a major effort, to help promote it.

Q. Do you think that Israel will change its policy toward a more moderate one?

Secretary Kissinger: I won't characterize the foreign policy of any country. I am here to discuss what the United States is going to do. That is the only question.

Q. Did you discuss the status of the West Bank of Jordan?

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed all the elements that would enter into a peace negotiation.

Q. How about Jerusalem?

Secretary Kissinger: I won't go into any further details.

DEPARTURE REMARKS, ISLAMABAD, NOVEMBER 10

Press release 409 dated November 12

Ladies and gentlemen: We think it is appropriate that we should end the first part of this journey in Pakistan with our old friends.

Pakistan, as you all know, has close and historic ties with the countries of the Middle East, and it is also a valued friend of the United States.

I therefore had an opportunity to review our efforts with Prime Minister Bhutto, and we agreed that a lasting and just peace in the Middle East is in the interest of all mankind and that we would undertake, each in our own way, major efforts in that direction.

I am leaving now for the People's Republic of China on the same route that I took the first time on what was then a secret trip and

the opening of the relationship with the People's Republic of China. Indeed, some of the Chinese officials traveling with us to Peking were on the first trip.

We attach great importance to our relationship with the People's Republic of China. We think it is an essential component in the structure of peace that the President is developing around the world, and we are grateful to our friends in Pakistan for having arranged it the first time and for having treated us so well as we depart on this journey today.

Thank you very much.

INTERVIEW AT PEKING, NOVEMBER 12²

Press release 410 dated November 12

Q. Mr. Secretary, what have you been talking to the Chinese about?

Secretary Kissinger: Ever since we established contact with the Chinese we have been meeting at this level twice a year, and there is generally an exchange of views about the whole range of international problems and also a discussion of where Sino-U.S. relations should go over the next period, and that has been the main subject of our conversation.

Q. Can you be more specific about what you have been discussing?

Secretary Kissinger: In general, you can assume we have discussed all outstanding international issues as well as Sino-U.S. relationships.

Q. On the Middle East, when and how will the peace conference proceed?

Secretary Kissinger: We have had from the beginning two objectives: One is to stabilize the cease-fire, and then once the cease-fire was stabilized, we move from there to a peace conference. As you know, Israel and

² Conducted by ABC, CBS, and NBC correspondents.

Egypt yesterday signed the cease-fire stabilization arrangement that was worked out last week.³ They have to negotiate some of the implementation of modalities of this. When that is completed, which we hope will be soon, we will move into setting up the peace conference. Our expectation is that this should not be more than a matter of weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it inherently dangerous for the superpowers, the United States and Russia, to become committed to guaranteeing peace arrangements in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: So far, Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News], there has not been any precise discussion of guarantees. What we have done up to now is not guarantee any particular settlement but try to be helpful to the parties in narrowing the difference between them. The Arab nations and Israel have been fighting each other for nearly a generation, and many issues are fraught with tremendous emotion with them. Therefore, if we can strip away some of the emotion and present it in a way that is more acceptable to both sides, we can make some progress as was made last week.

We have not yet given any particular guarantees. However, I would assume that if the peace negotiations succeed, there will be a very serious problem, especially for Israel, of how its security can be assured under conditions when the final borders will certainly be different from the cease-fire lines and when withdrawals are involved as Security Council Resolution 242 provides.⁴

At this point the question of guarantees will arise, and we have to then ask the question: What sort of guarantees—unilateral, several countries, and so forth? Second, moreover, the great powers are already involved to some extent in the Middle East.

³ See p. 711.

⁴ For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

What we have to do is to try to prevent every crisis from turning into a clash of the superpowers. In that respect I agree with you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much pressure is the United States willing to apply to get Israel to make the kind of concessions that will be necessary for a fair settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: First, you are assuming something that will still remain to be revealed through the process of negotiation. Israel has always agreed that the final borders will not be the cease-fire lines either of 1967 or 1973, and we have every hope that through the process of negotiation a mutually acceptable settlement will be achieved. The United States stated during the conflict and has stated since that it would make a major effort to bring the parties together. That will be our intention. We don't expect that it will require major pressure on either of the sides.

Q. Are you satisfied that the major powers in sponsoring this peace conference will not try to use it in the future to gain a major edge in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The temptation is always there to exploit a situation to the advantage of one or the other of the superpowers. However, if the superpowers understand their own interests and the world interests, they ought to realize that the other side can always match them in terms of military equipment and that the attempt to turn this into a superpower confrontation must lead to a constantly increasing danger of war. The effort may be made. When it is made, we will resist it as we have in the past. We hope, and that will certainly be our attitude, that the Soviet Union will approach these negotiations with the same spirit we shall; namely, that a settlement just to all parties is in the interest of everybody. If they do not, then we will have to see what else can be done.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union has

direct bilateral arrangements with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and a number of other Arab countries. Senator Fulbright in the past has called for the establishment of a bilateral treaty between the United States and Israel. Would the administration support that?

Secretary Kissinger: It has been a constant American policy supported in every administration and carrying wide bipartisan support that the existence of Israel will be supported by the United States. This has been our policy in the absence of any formal arrangement, and it has never been challenged no matter which administration was in office. The question, then, is where are the borders and what are the security arrangements, and this is what is going to be negotiated in the next phase in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. Whether the security guarantees should be expressed in some formal document or in some other way, I think we should wait until the negotiations are completed; but it is one of the ideas that is under consideration.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, given the oil situation, the number of people and territory involved, the new relationship with the Soviet Union, why is it in the American national interest to support Israel so strongly? I ask that within the context of guaranteeing the existence of Israel.

Secretary Kissinger: The United States in the entire postwar period has supported the concept that international conflict should not be settled by force. It has, moreover, supported the concept that nations should not be eliminated simply by the superior numbers or in any manner of their neighbors. The United States has supported Israel because of the emotional ties that have existed, because of the democratic tradition of Israel, because of the fact that it is a going concern in this area, and because, as I have said, about our opposition to the domination of one nation by force to others. The oil situation will continue for the indefinite future,

and while we are highly respectful of the views of the Arab world it is not possible for us to be swayed in the major orientation of our policy by the monopoly position, or the temporary monopoly position, enjoyed by a few nations.

Q. Do you get no indication from King Faisal or others in your recent journey that the oil restrictions might be changed?

Secretary Kissinger: We had very extensive talks with King Faisal and with his advisers, and it is a problem that has many complexities both for us as well as for King Faisal. I think that both sides are studying its adaption in the light of the developing situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you get into the formal negotiations now, is it safe to assume that arms deliveries by the United States to Israel, the Soviet Union to the Arabs, will continue, or do you have some kind of arrangement already with the Soviet Union that when you reach a point in the negotiations both of the superpowers will knock down the flow of arms?

Secretary Kissinger: No such arrangement exists as of now, but the United States has always held the view that it was prepared to discuss limitation of the flow of armaments into the Middle East in order to avoid the present situation of the piling up of armaments on both sides. If there is a limitation of the flow of armaments, it has, however, to include all those countries which might transfer their arms to one or more of the combatants and not just the parties in the last war.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some people who argue that détente was exposed as a myth during the Middle East crisis because the Russians threatened to use military force even though their own vital interests were not affected. How do you answer them?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been a misunderstanding in many respects about détente. There has been the idea that détente

reflects the fact that the two sides agree with each other and that it reflects an era of good feeling or similar domestic structures. We have always believed that détente is necessary precisely because we have opposing interests in many parts of the world and totally different social systems. Détente is necessary because of the danger posed by the accumulation of nuclear weapons on both sides. We are in favor of détente because we want to limit the risks of major nuclear conflict. That gives us an opportunity to communicate and to move rapidly if we want to. It does not eliminate the conflicting interests. It does not prevent occasional clashes—what it does make possible is a more rapid settlement and a certain amount of restraint when crises develop when both of these things occur. But there are limitations beyond which it cannot go.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your time.

JOINT U.S.-P.R.C. COMMUNIQUE, NOVEMBER 14⁵

White House press release dated November 14

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 10 to November 14, 1973. He was accompanied by Robert Ingersoll, Robert McCloskey, Arthur Hummel, Winston Lord, Oscar Armstrong, Jonathan Howe and Richard Solomon.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung received Secretary Kissinger. They held a wide-ranging and far-sighted conversation in a friendly atmosphere. Secretary Kissinger conveyed greetings from President Nixon, and Chairman Mao Tse-tung sent his greetings to the President.

Secretary Kissinger and members of his party held frank and serious talks with Premier Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jung, Director Lin Ping, Director Peng Hua, Tsien Ta-yung, Ting Yuan-hung and others.

⁵ Issued simultaneously at Peking and Washington.

Officials of the two sides conducted counterpart talks on bilateral issues of mutual concern and made good progress.

The two sides reviewed international developments since Dr. Kissinger's visit to the People's Republic of China in February, 1973. They noted that international relationships are in a period of intense change. They reaffirmed that they are committed to the principles established in the Shanghai Communiqué and that disputes between states should be settled without resorting to the use or threat of force, on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.⁶ In particular, they reiterated that neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other part of the world and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

The two sides agreed that in present circumstances it is of particular importance to maintain frequent contact at authoritative levels in order to exchange views and, while not negotiating on behalf of third parties, to engage in concrete consultations on issues of mutual concern.

Both sides reviewed progress made during 1973 in their bilateral relations. The U.S. side reaffirmed: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; the United States Government does not challenge that position. The Chinese side reiterated that the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China.

Both sides noted with satisfaction that the Liaison Offices in Peking and Washington

⁶ For text of a communiqué released at Shanghai on Feb. 27, 1972, during President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435.

are functioning smoothly. Both sides agreed that the scope of the functions of the Liaison Offices should continue to be expanded.

Exchanges have deepened understanding and friendship between the two peoples. The two sides studied the question of enlarging the exchanges between the two countries and agreed upon a number of new exchanges for the coming year.

Trade between the two countries has developed rapidly during the past year. The two sides held that it is in the interest of both countries to take measures to create conditions for further development of trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The two sides stated that they would continue their efforts to promote the normalization of relations between China and the United States on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger and his party expressed their gratitude for the warm hospitality extended to them by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

**REMARKS AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE,
NOVEMBER 16**

Press release 415 dated November 16

Ladies and gentlemen: As we return from 10 countries and 25,000 miles, I wanted to say on behalf of all my colleagues how much we appreciated the courtesies and hospitality that were extended to us everywhere.

We intended on this trip to carry out the President's foreign policy in ending the fighting there and improving relations with adversaries and in strengthening existing ties with old friends.

As you all know, in the Mideast we contributed to stabilizing the cease-fire, and now our task is to work with conviction and energy on getting the peace negotiations started.

In China, we made further progress toward normalization of relations and also strengthened the bilateral ties.

And in Japan and Korea, we strengthened

the friendships that have lasted now for most of the postwar period.

As we look back on this trip, all of us can well keep in mind that America remains the hope and the inspiration for all people who seek peace and good will; and all of us have drawn courage and greater determination from this fact.

Thank you very much.

**Review Directed of Import Quotas
for Certain Agricultural Products**

Following are texts of letters dated October 31 from President Nixon to Catherine May Bedell, Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission.

TEXT OF LETTER ON BUTTER

White House press release dated November 1

OCTOBER 31, 1973.

DEAR MADAM CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture, and I agree with him, that there is reason to believe that additional quantities of butter, butter substitutes containing butterfat, and butter oil may be imported during a temporary period without rendering or tending to render ineffective, or materially interfering with, the price support program for milk now conducted by the Department of Agriculture, or reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic milk.

Specifically, reference is made to the following articles presently subject to Section 22 quantitative limitations under items 950.05 and 950.06 of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States:

TSUS	Article
950.05	Butter, and fresh or sour cream containing over 45 percent of butterfat, provided for in part 4B of schedule 1 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.
950.06	Butter substitutes containing over 45 percent of butterfat provided for in item 116.30, part 4B, schedule 1, of the Tariff Schedules of the United States and butter oil however provided for elsewhere in such schedules.

The Secretary has also advised me, pursuant to Section 22(b) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, that a condition exists requiring emergency treatment with respect to these articles and has, therefore, recommended that I take immediate action under Section 22(b) to authorize the importation of 56,000,000 pounds of the articles provided for in TSUS item 950.05 and 22,600,000 pounds of the articles provided for in TSUS 950.06 during a temporary period ending December 31, 1973. I have, therefore, this day issued a proclamation establishing special temporary quotas in such amounts for such articles, which quotas are to be effective through December 31, 1973, pending further action upon receipt of the report and recommendation of the Tariff Commission. These quotas are in addition to the quantities otherwise authorized to be imported under Section 22 quantitative limitations.

The United States Tariff Commission is, therefore, directed to make an investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and to make findings and recommendations as to whether 56,000,000 pounds of the articles provided for in TSUS item 950.05 and 22,600,000 pounds of the articles provided for in TSUS item 950.06 may be imported during a temporary period ending December 31, 1973, in addition to the quantities of such articles otherwise authorized to be imported under Section 22 quantitative limitations, without rendering or tending to render ineffective, or materially interfering with, the price support program for milk now conducted by the Department of Agriculture or reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from milk.

The Commission is directed to report its findings and recommendations at the earliest practicable date.

Respectfully,

RICHARD NIXON.

TEXT OF LETTER ON COTTON

White House press release dated November 1

OCTOBER 31, 1973.

DEAR MADAM CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture, and I agree with him, that there is reason to believe that the import quotas on certain cotton, cotton waste, and cotton products may be suspended without rendering or tending to render ineffective, or materially interfering with, the programs for cotton now conducted by the Department of Agriculture, or reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestically produced cotton.

Specifically, reference is made to the articles

presently subject to Section 22 quantitative limitations as described in items 955.01 through 955.06 of Part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

The United States Tariff Commission is therefore directed to make an investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The investigation shall be for the purpose of making findings and recommendations as to whether the annual quotas for each of the above-described articles may be suspended without rendering or tending to render ineffective, or materially interfering with, the programs now conducted by the Department of Agriculture for cotton, or reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestically produced cotton.

The Commission shall report its findings and recommendations at the earliest practicable date.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

TEXT OF LETTER ON WHEAT

White House press release dated November 1

OCTOBER 31, 1973.

DEAR MADAM CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture, and I agree with him, that there is reason to believe that the import quotas on wheat and milled wheat products may be suspended without rendering or tending to render ineffective, or materially interfering with, the programs for wheat now conducted by the Department of Agriculture, or reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic wheat.

Specifically, reference is made to the articles presently subject to Section 22 quantitative limitations as described in item 950.60 of Part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

The United States Tariff Commission is therefore directed to make an investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and to make findings and recommendations as to whether the import quotas on wheat and milled wheat products may be suspended without rendering or tending to render ineffective, or materially interfering with, the programs for wheat now conducted by the Department of Agriculture, or reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic wheat.

The Commission shall report its findings and recommendations at the earliest practicable date.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

President Nixon Increases
Import Quotas for Butter

A PROCLAMATION¹

AMENDING PART 3 OF THE APPENDIX TO THE TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPORTATION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), limitations have been imposed by Presidential proclamations on the quantities of certain dairy products which may be imported into the United States in any quota year; and

WHEREAS the import restrictions proclaimed pursuant to said section 22 are set forth in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States; and

WHEREAS the Secretary of Agriculture has reported to me that he believes that additional quantities of butter, butter substitutes containing butterfat and butter oil provided in items 950.05 and 950.06 of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) may be entered for a temporary period without rendering or tending to render ineffective, or materially interfering with, the price support program now conducted by the Department of Agriculture for milk or reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic milk; and

WHEREAS, under the authority of section 22, I have requested the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation with respect to this matter; and

WHEREAS the Secretary of Agriculture has determined and reported to me that a condition exists with respect to such articles provided for in items 950.05 and 950.06 of the TSUS which requires emergency treatment and that the quantitative limitation imposed on such articles should be increased during the period ending December 31, 1973, without awaiting the recommendations of the United States Tariff Commission with respect to such action; and

WHEREAS I find and declare that the entry during the period ending December 31, 1973, of additional quantities of 56,000,000 pounds of the articles provided for in item 950.05 of the TSUS and 22,600,000 pounds of the articles provided for in item 950.06 of the TSUS will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price support program which is being undertaken by the Department of Agriculture for milk and will not reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic milk; and that a condition exists which requires emergency treatment and that the quantitative limitations imposed on such articles should be increased during such period without awaiting the recommendations of the United States Tariff Commission with respect to such action;

Now, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President, and in conformity with the provisions of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby proclaim that headnote 3(a) of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States is temporarily amended by adding a new subdivision as follows:

(viii) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, 56,000,000 pounds of the articles described in item 950.05 and 22,600,000 pounds of the articles described in item 950.06 may be entered during the period beginning November 1, 1973, and ending December 31, 1973, in addition to the annual quota quantities specified for such articles under items 950.05 and 950.06, and import licenses shall not be required for entering such additional quantities. No individual, partnership, firm, corporation, association, or other legal entity (including its affiliates or subsidiaries) may during such period enter pursuant to this provision an aggregate quantity of such additional articles in excess of 2,500,000 pounds. The 56,000,000 pounds of the articles described in item 950.05 shall be allocated among supplying countries as follows:

(viii) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, 56,000,000 pounds of the articles described in item 950.05 and 22,600,000 pounds of the articles described in item 950.06 may be entered during the period beginning November 1, 1973, and ending December 31, 1973, in addition to the annual quota quantities specified for such articles under items 950.05 and 950.06, and import licenses shall not be required for entering such additional quantities. No individual, partnership, firm, corporation, association, or other legal entity (including its affiliates or subsidiaries) may during such period enter pursuant to this provision an aggregate quantity of such additional articles in excess of 2,500,000 pounds. The 56,000,000 pounds of the articles described in item 950.05 shall be allocated among supplying countries as follows:

<i>Supplying Country</i>	<i>Quantity in pounds</i>
New Zealand -----	28,560,000
Member States of the European Economic Community -----	24,640,000
Other Countries as follows:	
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland	2,800,000

The additional quota quantities provided for herein shall continue in effect pending Presidential action upon receipt of the report and recommendations of the Tariff Commission with respect thereto.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have herunto set my hand this thirty-first day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-eighth.

Richard Nixon

¹ No. 4253; 38 *Fed. Reg.* 30427.

United States Energy Relations With Canada

Following is a statement by Julius L. Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Resources and Food Policy, made before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 15.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss our energy relations with Canada. Canada is not only our closest neighbor; it is also our principal trading partner. We share a continent, many of the same aspirations, and many of the same problems. As with all good friends, differences arise. But in times of crisis we pull together. Today is a time of crisis. I am confident that Canada and the United States, in their individual responses and in the measures we might take together, can solve the energy problems which confront us both.

First, I would like to discuss the energy relationship which has grown between our two countries over the years. Of greatest importance is oil. The Canadian industry was developed in large part by American industry and technology. American investment in Canadian oil represents a significant proportion of the \$35 billion in U.S. investment in Canada. Our investments in this one industry are greater than total U.S. investment in most other countries of the world. Canada currently supplies us with approximately one-fifth of our oil imports, over 1 million barrels per day.

We also import from Canada about 1 trillion cubic feet of gas per year, approxi-

mately one-half of total Canadian production. In recent years the United States has sold approximately 18 million tons of coal to Canada annually, with a value of about US\$200 million. The bulk of our coal exports go to the Province of Ontario. Almost one-half is consumed by Ontario Hydro, which generates electric power for use in both Canada and the United States. This company is considering installation of additional hydroelectric generating capacity to produce electric energy principally for sale in the United States. Canada itself exported over 9 million tons of coal last year, primarily to Japan from fields in British Columbia.

U.S. and Canadian electric power grids are interconnected at a number of points. The exchange is of critical regional significance to utilities on both sides of the border. Canada's hydroelectric generating capacity currently is 32,500 megawatts. Remaining undeveloped potential is estimated at 60-80,000 megawatts, perhaps the largest in the world after the U.S.S.R. It constitutes the only significant block of potential low-cost power remaining in North America.

Oil, however, remains the principal commodity in U.S.-Canada energy trade. Because the Canadian industry is similar to that existing in the United States and because of the friendly and inviting environment in the Canadian industry, we frequently forget that Canadian oil is not our own and that the Canadian industry is governed by Ottawa, not Washington.

This is a distinction which many Americans fail to make, and it can be the cause of misunderstandings. In addressing the problem of Canadian oil supply, we must recognize clearly that we are dealing with a problem between nations and that Canadian views and policies must be recognized and respected.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

We must also recognize that the oil scene is changing in Canada, just as it is changing in the United States and in the rest of the world. Canada became a net exporter of oil only in the past two years. Canadians now have real doubts that their country's reserves of conventional oil will be adequate to meet their own future needs. They are disappointed that large new reserves have not been found in the Canadian Arctic or off the coasts of the Maritime Provinces. The National Energy Board (NEB) has suggested that by as early as 1979 Canada may have no conventional oil available for export if a cumulative reserve requirement of 15 years is adopted as a condition to continued exports. Public hearings on this subject will be held later this year. Canadian law requires, among other things, that before exports can be licensed, the NEB must "satisfy itself that the quantity of oil to be exported does not exceed the surplus remaining after due allowance has been made for the reasonably foreseeable requirements for use in Canada."

Many Canadians question whether such surpluses now exist. Before 1960 Canadian exports of oil to the United States averaged less than 100,000 barrels per day. They did not reach 500,000 barrels per day until 1969. Last year, when the United States permitted virtually unlimited imports, they totaled almost 900,000 barrels per day. In March of this year, when exports to the United States exceeded 1.2 million barrels per day, Canada decided to impose export controls on crude oil. Canada permitted exports of 1.3 million barrels per day in April—an alltime high—to help meet the anticipated shortage of gasoline in the United States during the summer months. Authorized exports of oil were 1.1 million barrels per day in September and in excess of 1 million barrels per day in November.

It is not my purpose to defend the imposition by Canada of limits on export licensing of oil to the United States. I believe, however, that it is important that we understand their policies. Canada does not have an unlimited pool of oil reserves from which all the de-

mands of U.S. and Canadian consumers can be met. We cannot expect Canada to play the major role in the resolution of our oil problem.

Canadian export levels to the United States for December have not yet been announced. We expect that authorized exports may dip slightly below the 1-million-barrel-per-day mark. We will be disappointed if this occurs, but we cannot claim to be surprised, particularly in light of recent developments on the world oil scene. It would be irresponsible of us to base our planning on unlimited supplies of Canadian oil. American consumers dependent on Canadian oil would be equally unrealistic if they made this assumption.

We in the Department of State have been disappointed over the Canadian decision to impose a tax on crude oil exports. This subject was discussed during Governor Love's [John A. Love, Director, Energy Policy Office, and Assistant to the President] recent visit to Ottawa to review oil matters with Energy Minister Macdonald [Donald S. Macdonald, Minister of Energy, Mines, and Resources]. No agreement was reached on the subject of prices. At a time when supplies are uppermost in our minds, we obviously simply had to agree to disagree.

In the past Canada has not been a large supplier of petroleum products to the United States. Small quantities of propane and butane were sold in border areas. In recent years, exports of heavy fuel oil became important, principally from a refinery owned by Gulf Oil at Point Tupper on the Atlantic coast. A new refinery, owned by Shaheen Resources, recently was inaugurated at Come-by-Chance, Newfoundland. We had great expectations, before recent developments in the Middle East, that these two refineries could provide upward of 150,000 barrels per day of residual fuel oil to New England during the coming winter months. This now seems doubtful.

Eastern Canada is almost entirely dependent on imported overseas oil, including some product imports, to meet demand estimated at about 900,000 barrels per day at the pres-

ent time. Over one-half historically has been imported from Venezuela. Almost 25 per cent, or 200,000 barrels per day, has been imported from Arab countries. The present situation is not entirely clear. If the Arab states impose a total embargo on exports, eastern Canada obviously will have a serious shortage of oil available for consumption.

About 500,000 barrels per day of imported oil normally is supplied to the Montreal area through a pipeline from Portland, Maine. Practically all Arab oil imports move through this line, a circumstance which suggests the Montreal area could be hard hit during the current crisis. A number of communities on the U.S. side of the border also are almost totally dependent on supplies from the Montreal area. Although usable crude and product stocks in eastern Canada are equivalent to about 40 days' supply, a disproportionate share is held in the Maritime Provinces and Quebec and will not readily be available in Montreal.

The Canadian Government has informed us that it intends to move now to assure supplies during the coming winter for Montreal. Among steps contemplated are increased shipments by tanker through the Great Lakes (until mid-December when the lakes freeze) and possibly by rail to Montreal. They are exploring reversing the Toronto-Montreal products pipeline (the Northern Pipeline) to ship more Canadian crude east. These actions could divert between 50,000 and 100,000 barrels per day of western Canadian crude to Montreal. Consideration is also being given to diverting some Canadian crude through the Trans Mountain Pipeline to Vancouver for shipment by tanker to Montreal via the Portland-Montreal pipeline. Finally, we understand that the Canadian Commercial Corporation, a division of the Federal Department of Supply and Services, is actively seeking to buy heating oil from unspecified foreign sources to meet eastern Canadian needs. Some of these actions directly or indirectly will affect the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to the United States during the coming winter.

The interdependence of the United States

and Canada in the energy field requires that both nations work together in a spirit of cooperation in the face of the energy realities of our time.

Officials of the Department of State and our Embassy in Ottawa have been in almost daily contact with Canadian authorities on matters related to oil supply in recent weeks. We have received clear assurances that, consistent with steps necessary to insure Canada's own minimum supply requirements, every effort will be made to minimize the effect of Canadian actions on American consumers now dependent on Canadian energy. We understand that the NEB approved exports yesterday of approximately 600,000 barrels per day of heavy fuel oil. The Canadian Embassy in Washington has provided us with a breakdown of authorized exports during 1972 and 1973, with more detailed information concerning licensed fuel oil exports since October 15.² This breakdown, which does not include yesterday's authorization, is attached to my statement.

Mr. Chairman, we received two days ago an aide memoire from the Canadian Government outlining its views on the Canadian energy supply situation as it may affect the United States.² It is my understanding that the Canadian Government desires to have this communication made public, and I offer it to the committee with the thought that you might wish to make it a part of this record.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Report, together with separate and individual views, to accompany H.R. 9286, on authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1974 for military procurement, research and development, construction authorization for the safeguard ABM, and active duty and selected purposes. S. Rept. 93-385. September 6, 1973. 205 pp.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Report to accompany S. 2335. S. Rept. 93-386. September 10, 1973. 4 pp.

² Not printed here.

To Grant an Alien Child Adopted by an Unmarried U.S. Citizen the Same Immigrant Status as an Alien Child Adopted by a U.S. Citizen and His Spouse. Report to accompany H.R. 7555. H. Rept. 93-462. September 11, 1973. 6 pp.

Protocol to the International Civil Aviation Convention. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the protocol, dated at Vienna July 7, 1971, relating to an amendment to Article 56 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. S. Ex. Q. September 12, 1973. 2 pp.

Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1974. Report to accompany S. 2408. S. Rept. 93-389. September 12, 1973. 67 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Wellington November 10, 1972, at the Seventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.¹

Notification of approval: Norway, October 19, 1973.

Aviation

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratification deposited: Lebanon, August 20, 1973.

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. TIAS 6768.

Ratifications deposited: Colombia, July 6, 1973; Pakistan, September 11, 1973.

Accession deposited: Nicaragua, August 24, 1973.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170). Done at New York March 12, 1971. Entered into force January 16, 1973. TIAS 7616.

Ratifications deposited: Austria, September 10, 1973; Mexico, September 4, 1973; Nicaragua, August 24, 1973.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Austria, September 10, 1973.

Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done at Oslo November 15, 1973. Enters into force 90 days after the deposit of the third instrument of ratification, approval, or accession.

Signatures: Canada, Denmark, Norway, United States, November 15, 1973.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: United States, November 16, 1973.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: United States, November 16, 1973.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.

Ratification deposited: South Africa, November 14, 1973.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for signature at Washington March 29 through May 3, 1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with respect to other provisions; for the United States July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.

Ratification deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, November 19, 1973.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement for promotion of safety on the Great Lakes by means of radio, 1973, with technical regulations. Signed at Ottawa February 26, 1973.¹

Ratified by the President: October 24, 1973.

Israel

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 13, 1972 (TIAS 7472). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 19, 1973. Entered into force November 19, 1973.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of September 10, 1973 (TIAS 7714). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad November 2, 1973. Entered into force November 2, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$16.35; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$14.50; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 20¢ each.

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Ivory Coast	Cat. No. S1.123:IV7	
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Korea, Democratic	Cat. No. S1.123:N81K	
People's Republic of	Pub. 8396	5 pp.
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Netherlands	Cat. No. S1.123:N38	
	Pub. 7967	7 pp.
Pakistan	Cat. No. S1.123:P17	
	Pub. 7748	8 pp.

U.S. Participation in the UN. Annual report by the President to the Congress for 1972. Pub. 8731. International Organization and Conference Series 108. 333 pp. \$1.75. (Cat. No. S1.70:108).

Finance—Final Settlement of Obligations Under the Postwar Economic Assistance Agreement and Certain Agricultural Commodity Agreements. Understanding with Japan. TIAS 7612. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7612).

Termination of Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Turkey. TIAS 7615. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7615).

International Civil Aviation. TIAS 7616. 9 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7616).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with France. TIAS 7617. 9 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7617).

North American Air Defense Command. Agreement with Canada extending the agreement of May 12, 1958, as extended. TIAS 7618. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7618).

Social Security. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 7619. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7619).

Social Security. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7620. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7620).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of October 2, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7621. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7621).

Colorado River Salinity. Agreement with Mexico extending Minute No. 241 of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, of July 14, 1972, as extended. TIAS 7622. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7622).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 7623. 7 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7623).

Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. Protocol to the agreement of May 25, 1972, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7624. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7624).

Military Assistance—Deposits Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. Agreement with Guatemala. TIAS 7625. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7625).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic extending the agreement of August 29, 1969, as extended. TIAS 7626. 2 pp. 10¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7626).

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 7627. 7 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7627).

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. TIAS 7628. 9 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7628).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Philippines amending the agreement of May 4, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7629. 2 pp. 10¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7629).

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Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia amending the agreement of December 31, 1970. TIAS 7631. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7631).

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products. Agreement with the Republic of Korea amending annex B to the agreement of January 4, 1972. TIAS 7632. 2 pp. 10¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7632).

Omega Navigational Station. Agreement with Liberia. TIAS 7635. 6 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7635).

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to November 19 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 402 of November 7, 408 of November 8, 409 and 410 of November 12, and 415 of November 16.

No.	Date	Subject
*417	11/19	Study Group on Negotiable Instruments, Advisory Committee on International Law, New York, Dec. 6.
*418	11/19	Study Group on International Sale of Goods, Advisory Committee on International Law, New York, Dec. 7.
*419	11/19	Advisory Committee on Law of the Sea, New York, Dec. 13.
*420	11/21	Cancellation of meetings of music advisory panels.
*421	11/21	Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Dec. 14.
*422	11/21	Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Dec. 14.
423	11/21	Kissinger: news conference.
424	11/23	Bunker to visit Panama.

* Not printed.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXIX, No. 1799

December 17, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

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U.S. Commercial Interests and Policy in the Persian Gulf Area

Following is a statement by Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 28.¹

I am very happy to meet with the subcommittee today to discuss U.S. interests and policy in the Persian Gulf, especially as they relate to U.S. commercial and trade activity in this important area of the world.

We believe that the United States can and should do more to foster stronger economic and commercial as well as cultural and political ties with the governments and peoples of this region. This has been one of our principal policy objectives. The publicity that has been given in the past, especially earlier this year, to previous arms sales agreements and speculation about possible new arms sales agreements has often overshadowed the importance and the wide range of activities already established or in process. It is these activities and ties that underlie our political relationship and which tend to persist throughout and moderate political difficulties.

The United States has close ties with most of the countries in the Persian Gulf, and with several our ties cover the whole nexus of foreign relations, where we have active exchanges on a wide variety of programs. However, we are faced at the present time with two problems. The first is the strain which the Arab-Israel conflict has placed on our economic as well as our political relations

with the Arab states of the gulf. The second is the rapid rise in oil prices and the changing relationships between the governments of the gulf oil producers and the oil companies.

These two problems are going to require considerable attention and hard work to keep them from affecting our overall relationship with the countries in the gulf. The politically motivated oil production limitation and embargo is, I hope, a transitory problem that will be ameliorated as progress is made toward a negotiated peace. In fact, it is difficult to see how meaningful progress can be made in the atmosphere which the oil embargo is creating.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to use this occasion to review in detail our efforts during the recent Middle East hostilities. I would note, however, that we have been successful in helping achieve a cease-fire and stabilize the military situation on the ground. Our efforts are now focused on laying the groundwork for a peace conference. The United States is thus deeply involved in seeking to work out a peaceful settlement within the framework of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 of November 1967 and 338 of October 1973. The extent to which we succeed will have a major impact on our relations with the Arab states of the gulf. Progress toward peace will improve the political climate for future negotiations among oil producers, oil consumers, and international oil companies.

The restoration of a political atmosphere conducive to the pursuit of our economic and other interests in the Persian Gulf is obviously our first task. We think we have made progress toward this end. However, we then have to focus once more on how we can estab-

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

lish the incentives which Arabian Peninsula oil producers have told us will be necessary if their oil production is to increase to meet anticipated world demands. This is a problem which in some respects is only slightly less complex than is the task of achieving a durable Arab-Israel peace. We also have to move energetically to expand exports to this region to offset rapidly growing imports. In the absence of the recent oil embargo, the value of U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf would have amounted to at least \$1 billion in 1973 and \$2 billion in 1974 (compared to \$506 million in 1972). While U.S. exports to Persian Gulf states should be at least \$1.5 billion in 1973, we are rapidly losing the trade surplus we have enjoyed in the past.

The choice of the oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf in determining their level of oil production and how they manage their surplus assets will be decided by economic as well as political factors. In Iran, we can expect that most additional oil income from higher prices and production will be invested to build up Iran's industry and for domestic economic development. This is also likely to be the case for Iraq.

For the oil producers of the Arabian Peninsula, however, their economic and social development cannot absorb the expected increase in foreign exchange holdings. Forecasts of the magnitudes of surplus capital that might be available therefore are difficult to make. These depend on production and price levels, the extent of producer-government participation, and the aid oil producers furnish to poorer countries. However, the cumulative total between 1973 and 1980 could range anywhere from \$50 billion to more than \$200 billion, with Saudi Arabia accounting for about half of this total and Kuwait and the lower gulf countries for the balance.

While world capital markets could absorb these funds and it would have a beneficial effect on world trade and monetary stability, what is actually invested abroad will depend on the assessments made by these surplus-revenue countries of the security of and potential return from these investments. It will

also depend on the extent to which we invite these countries to play an important role in international financial institutions and help their trained personnel to serve in these institutions. While Arab investment banking will undoubtedly grow, there may be compelling economic reasons to restrict oil production for the lack of adequate incentives.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that in pursuing our commercial, financial, and other interests in the Persian Gulf, the major role should first be played by the private sector. This is not an area where U.S. assistance programs can play an important role, nor is it an area where the United States plays a military role other than to sell equipment and training to support regional collective security efforts among Persian Gulf countries.

Prior to the most recent hostilities in the Middle East, different U.S. Government agencies were giving serious high-level study to the nature of this country's future economic relations with the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Realizing that even before the latest price hikes revenue earnings for several of the major oil producers would be beyond the absorptive capacity of their economies, we were examining what could be done on a government-to-government basis. We were also considering what the United States could do to meet the interest of oil producers to diversify their economies by encouraging American private interests to give serious attention to possible joint ventures which are high technology and capital intensive, such as industries making economic use of the enormous amounts of gas now being flared. This activity has been held in abeyance because of hostilities in the Middle East, but it will require our best attention once the political atmosphere improves. We will need to work closely with the American business community.

The Persian Gulf states have the ability, in most cases, to finance their development from their own resources. What they lack is technology and manpower skills. It is our view that these skills should be provided wherever possible by private sources. However, where we judge that use of U.S. Gov-

1972 IMPORTS BY PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES FROM UNITED STATES,
WESTERN EUROPE, AND JAPAN: VALUES (CIF) AND MARKET SHARES
(In US \$ millions)

Importing Countries	Exporting Countries			
	World	United States (%)	Western Europe* (%)	Japan (%)
Saudi Arabia	1,397	346 (25)	445 (34)	265 (19)
Iraq	843	26 (3)	313 (37)	35 (4)
Kuwait	762	102 (13)	283 (37)	134 (18)
United Arab Emirates	294	76 (26)	134 (46)	18 (6)
Oman	185	7 (4)	155 (84)	8 (4)
Bahrain	331	29 (9)	84 (25)	29 (9)
Qatar	102	15 (15)	67 (65)	—
Iran	2,675	617 (23)	1,368 (51)	358 (13)
TOTAL	6,589	1,217 (19)	2,848 (44)	846 (13)

*U.K. and "Industrialized Europe" (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland).

SOURCE: IMF/IBRD, *Direction of Trade: Annual 1968-72*, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.

NOTE.—Because of rounding, totals for the eight may vary slightly from the sum of country figures.

ernment resources is necessary or desirable, we have not hesitated to seek out these resources and to offer them for the most part on a reimbursable basis.

Examples of the kinds of things we have done in the last year or two include providing the Saudis on a reimbursable basis with the services of a social security adviser, census specialist, a radio broadcasting adviser, and a Federal Aviation Administration team to do an air traffic control study. In Kuwait, we have provided technical assistance teams from the Federal Highway Administration and the National Bureau of Standards. In Oman, we have offered U.S. Geological Survey assistance.

In other cases we have been helpful in steering governments to American private sources of expertise, such as the New Orleans Port Authority for the Oman Government. We are also working closely with the International Executive Service Corps, which has long been active in Iran. The IESC has recently established a regional office for the Arabian Peninsula in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, where it has incidentally helped establish a new Saudi Credit Assistance Bank to provide small loans to persons of limited income. In Kuwait, the IESC has

provided management assistance to the municipal transportation system.

During the past summer, we instituted Peace Corps programs in Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen. In Iran, the Peace Corps continues to make a valuable contribution.

We have also encouraged American educational institutions to help develop relationships with indigenous institutions of higher learning in the gulf area. For example, there is the Princeton-led consortium of six American colleges and universities which act as consultants to the Saudi Petroleum and Minerals College in Dhahran. Arrangements are now underway with an American graduate institution to establish a regional economic development institute in Kuwait for the gulf and an energy studies program in the United States. We have invited senior university officials from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to observe American educational institutions and consult with their counterparts, which has generated new ties with American universities. At the American University of Beirut AID regional scholarship program, we now have 74 students from countries in the Persian Gulf. There are at the same time some 10,000 students (8,000 from Iran alone) in the United States from Persian

Gulf countries under government scholarships or privately financed.

The growing range of our technical and cultural activities has been matched by the continued growth in the demand for U.S. goods and services in the area. The economies of countries in the gulf are heavily dependent on trade. Oil exports account for most government revenues, and government expenditures generate large demands for imported goods and services. Because of quantum jumps in oil revenues, the import markets in the gulf are among the fastest growing that the United States has in the world, with U.S. exports of consumer and capital goods (excluding military commodities) to Iran and Saudi Arabia alone expected to reach at least \$1 billion in 1973. Earlier this month, we opened a Trade Center in Iran to augment the efforts of our Embassy in developing this market.

Mr. Chairman, we are very much aware that the decision taken by the Arab oil-producing countries to stop the sale of oil to the United States and to reduce the production of oil generally raises the question of why we should place greater stress on our commercial relations with the Arab countries of the gulf at this time. We believe, however, this is not the time to relax our efforts to defend the rapidly growing commercial and other interests we have in the Persian Gulf. Rather, we think an even greater effort is needed now to protect what we have and to lay the groundwork for further improving our commercial-economic relations.

We believe that we have managed to do a good deal in the last two years with the limited resources available to us. The activities outlined above are those we will continue to pursue. But there is more that the United States could usefully do if additional resources and authority were available. We need to do more even in the absence of a definitive Middle East settlement since, under the present circumstances, we are going to have to make a greater effort than ever before to sell U.S. goods and services. Otherwise we risk losing our markets to our com-

petitors because of widespread misunderstanding of U.S. policy objectives in the Arab world.

Mr. Chairman, there seem to us to be five areas which deserve our special attention.

First of all, we need to augment our diplomatic presence in the lower gulf states by assigning resident Ambassadors and giving our existing mini-Embassies sufficient staff to meet their rapidly growing responsibilities. The scope of our relationships has expanded since we opened our diplomatic establishments in the lower gulf 18 months ago. These countries are increasingly anxious to have resident American Ambassadors; other Western countries are already beginning to assign Ambassadors. More senior staff is also needed to coordinate increasingly complex relationships and programs. In addition, while we hope a Middle East settlement will do much to relieve tension in the gulf, there will remain a number of persistent irritants arising from territorial or ideological quarrels that have nothing to do with Israel. We must continue to work for a regional security system that will contain these quarrels to avoid outside intervention. Through our diplomatic presence we can reflect the importance we attach to regional stability in this area as well as to our growing commercial interests.

Second, we need to augment the number of our commercial officers in the lower gulf, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and these officers must be provided with the travel funds needed for them to perform their functions properly. We must also be in a position to bolster our reporting on petroleum and financial matters in order to anticipate developments that may require U.S. Government action and to give the best possible support to U.S. companies seeking to do business in the area. The Department of Commerce will be discussing this matter in greater detail with the committee, as well as proposals it has for strengthening our trade promotion programs in the gulf.

Third, we need to look for ways to rationalize and strengthen our technical cooperation programs with countries in this area

OIL REVENUES OF SIX MAJOR PRODUCING COUNTRIES OF PERSIAN GULF
(In US \$ billions)

	1955	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974*		
								A	B	C
Kuwait	.307	.465	.671	.895	1.400	1.657	1.940	3.8	3.5	2.5
Saudi Arabia	.288	.355	.655	1.200	2.149	3.106	5.480	10.3	9.4	6.9
Iran	.091	.285	.522	1.136	1.944	2.380	3.741	7.7	7.7	7.7
Abu Dhabi	—	—	.033	.233	.431	.551	.990	1.9	1.7	1.3
Qatar	.034	.054	.069	.122	.198	.255	.420	0.7	0.6	0.5
Iraq	.207	.266	.375	.521	.840	.575	.860	2.2	2.0	1.5
TOTAL	.926	1.426	2.325	4.107	6.961	8.524	13.431	26.6	25.0	20.4

*For illustrative purposes, 1974 revenues are estimated on the basis of constant November 1, 1973, prices and three alternative assumptions regarding production in the five Arab countries. (Iranian production is unaffected.)

In Case A, annual production would be at the level of September 1973. In Case B, a one-third production cut for the first quarter only is assumed with production then returning to the September 1973 level. In Case C, a one-third production cut is assumed for the entire year.

NOTE.—Because of rounding, totals for the six may vary slightly from the sum of country figures.

to meet the growing number of their requests for government-to-government assistance. We now have a reimbursable technical assistance program with Iran; at the appropriate time, we plan to approach the Saudi Government with proposals on how a similar technical cooperation program could be established that would facilitate the assignment of U.S. Government advisory personnel. We are also hopeful that reconsideration might be given by the Congress to "topping off" salaries of American experts. This would give us greater flexibility in meeting requests for expertise outside as well as within the government sector in order to encourage development of natural resources of interest to the United States, to encourage a favorable climate for trade, and to stimulate markets for U.S. exports.

Fourth, we need to continue to study ways in which the United States as a government can assist those oil producers which are accumulating surplus revenues to use them constructively in diversifying their economies, investing safely and profitably in the industrialized world, and inviting them to play a much greater role in international financial institutions.

Fifth, we need to be alert to additional educational exchange opportunities where the U.S. Government directly or by encour-

aging private institutions can help through scholarships or the exchange of U.S. professors and administrators. An example is in our current search for an American to assume the post of registrar at a Saudi Arabian university. A Fulbright grant will help insure that a highly qualified candidate will be chosen.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation for the interest which your committee has shown in U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf. The integrity of the U.S. position in the gulf and peninsula remains intact in spite of the recent hostilities. If there is substantial progress toward a settlement, our position and ties with the region will expand rapidly. If there is no such progress, there will be increased pressures and strains in our relations throughout the area, which will make the pursuit of our interests more difficult but no less important.

The Persian Gulf has the potential in economic terms to be the fastest growing area in the world. A primary source of energy for the Western world, it is an area which will provide almost unlimited opportunities for the sale of every kind of U.S. good and service. It is an area which is ideally complementary to the high-technology and management services that the United States can provide. It is an area where there

is a lively interest in the United States, its ideals, its educational opportunities; and it is an area where U.S. economic and other interests will continue to grow and which deserves an increased U.S. commercial and diplomatic presence.

Foreign Service Day, 1973

Following is a message from Secretary Kissinger which was read by Deputy Secretary Rush on November 16 before the Department's ninth annual Foreign Service Day conference for retired Foreign Service personnel.

Press release 413 dated November 16

I had looked forward to attending Foreign Service Day this year and regret that I am not able to be with you.

This trip has confirmed my belief that the United States has entered a period in which the Department and the Service will confront unprecedented demands and unequalled opportunities to serve the Nation. We cannot re-create the condition of our early history in which the United States based its security on the breadth of two oceans. Nor can we recover the margins of resources which in the more recent past allowed us to try to overwhelm every problem through massive applications of strength. The technology which has shrunk the world has extended the range and complexity of international relations.

Today—at a time when there is an unusual opportunity to build a stable and lasting structure of peace—we must be both more thoughtful and more purposeful in our diplomacy: reaffirming ties to old allies, building new relations with former adversaries, and working to make the poorer nations full participants in global prosperity.

Thus I would like history to be able to record that in the next years a new level of

excellence in American diplomacy was achieved. A commitment to understand their own and other societies, a willingness to consider alternatives, and an ability to relate events to American interests are the hallmarks of great professionals—of men like [Robert D.] Murphy, [Charles E.] Bohlen, [Llewellyn E.] Thompson, and [George F.] Kennan.

I will do my best so that the career system will promote excellence and will work to see that it identifies individuals with both the ability and the desire to assume responsibilities. I will devote personal attention to finding and promoting only the very best people for ambassadorial and other senior positions.

Performance in the Department of State will determine the success of our policies. Our ability to do what is right rather than what is expedient will determine whether these policies endure.

As we seek a Foreign Service able to meet the challenges of the future, we must do so with a sense of common purpose. It would be unfortunate indeed if we were to perpetuate a view in which the policymaker is seen as the nemesis of the policy implementer, the manager as the adversary of the employee.

Over the past five years we have made great progress toward President Nixon's goal of handing on to future generations a more cooperative, more stable, and less dangerous world than the one he found upon coming to office. The Foreign Service has made important contributions to that goal—just as its professionalism has been a critical element in our efforts to deal with the Middle East crisis. The next few years will determine whether the excellence that has so frequently marked the Service will become a constant throughout its activities. As we pursue that goal, the experience and the wisdom of men and women like yourselves will be invaluable. I know that I will be able to call upon it in time of need.

Administration Stresses Importance of U.S. Action on Funding for IDA and ADB Replenishment

Following are texts of a statement made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on November 19 by George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury, and a statement submitted to the committee that day by William J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.¹

STATEMENT BY TREASURY SECRETARY SHULTZ

Department of the Treasury press release

I am happy to be here this morning to support the President's requests for new funding authority for the International Development Association (IDA) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). My statement will deal principally with the broad framework of international economic cooperation within which the President put these requests forward in his message on October 31.² For further background, you have before you the special reports of the National Advisory Council on the IDA and the ADB proposals, respectively.

This hearing is the culmination of a major effort we are carrying out not only with this committee but with other relevant committees to keep the Congress fully informed and involved in the formulation of U.S. policy and participation in all of the international development lending institutions: the World Bank Group, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. I pledge to you that this effort will

continue beyond this hearing so that we may mutually benefit from a greater flow of information and an ongoing frank dialogue. In a real sense the proposals to be discussed today have benefited from this consultative process.

The advantages of a multilateral approach to development are well understood by this committee. In the proposals before you today, financial contributions will be provided to these two banks first of all on the basis of a fair share from each of the developed country members—shares that have been renegotiated to reflect equitably the present relative economic strengths of industrial nations.

Second, all assistance will be provided in the form of loans which will finance sound development projects in developing nations, particularly in the poorest of those nations. The money will be spent not only for highways, dams, farming, and industrial developments but for programs such as health, education, and population programs that directly work with and for the people of poverty-stricken nations.

Third, because of their long experience, unmatched pool of technical expertise drawn from all countries, and freedom from political considerations, the International Development Association and the Asian Development Bank are in a strong position to influence developing countries to become both more productive and more self-reliant by improving their overall economic programs and policies.

Finally, these institutions form a part of an international system of cooperation and agreed-upon rules of economic behavior which we are attempting to improve and strengthen.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1973, p. 627.

Most of you will recall this as a principal theme sounded by President Nixon here in Washington at the 1972 meeting of the World Bank and Monetary Fund. He pointed out clearly that a new international economic order—based on updated rules, international cooperation, and a stronger institutional framework—is a basic part of creating a secure structure of peace.

Sharing Common Responsibilities

International monetary reform, international trade and investment, and improving the quantity and quality of international development assistance are all aspects of the same problem of constructing an enduring system of economic intercourse. Because they are inextricably linked, because we must negotiate in all these fields with the same countries and frequently with the same individuals, what the United States does or does not do in regard to sharing the international responsibility for assisting the developing nations will inevitably have a profound impact on what we are able to accomplish in the remaining fields. The stakes in monetary reform, trade, and investment are simply too high for us to do less than is required in the area of development.

I fully recognize that new questions—good questions—have arisen about the role the United States can and should play in foreign assistance. There is a feeling that the United States has been called on to do too much over too long a time and a feeling that too many domestic needs are still unmet to permit providing our resources overseas. Pressures on our balance of payments and on the dollar have tended to reinforce these feelings.

In the end, these are questions of appropriate priorities. They have led to a searching review within the Congress and the administration. I firmly believe that the legislation before you has been carefully analyzed in terms of consistency with our priorities—domestic and foreign—and represents the right policy for the United States in the period ahead. Let me explain the reasons for this conclusion.

The world economy and the U.S. role within it have undergone rapid change. We are

no longer so large relative to the rest of the world. Others should pick up more of the burden in such fields as development assistance. Under the proposals before you they are doing so. Indeed, healthy international development lending institutions—and they cannot be healthy without our participation—are one of the best assurances we can have that others will bear an equitable portion of the common responsibility.

Internationally, after a long period of decline and erosion our competitive position is now benefiting from major changes in exchange rates. Recent balance of payments figures are encouraging, and prospects are good for our external sector to become a strong plus factor generating more jobs and higher incomes in the domestic economy. Looking ahead—and the money being requested today will not be spent for some years—I believe we can handle the programs I am describing today without damage to the dollar and indeed with the expectation that they will help to generate international business for us.

Our domestic economy has now been relieved of the burden of a long and costly war. Our fiscal situation is moving to better balance. We can carry out these programs with fiscal responsibility. Our support for the multilateral lending institutions of course involves a significant amount of money. But as a small fraction of our resources and our budget—actually a smaller fraction than that of most other developed countries—these programs have been fitted into our overall financial and budget planning in a manner that reflects, I believe, an appropriate balance among competing demands.

All of these circumstances help provide a solid foundation for the commitments we request, which in turn are an essential element in our overall foreign economic policy.

Our relations with developing countries are important to the United States economically and politically. The developing countries provided a \$14.6 billion market in 1972 for U.S. goods and services. In fact, as a group they purchase more from us than we do from them. Perhaps more important, they provide us with one-third of our raw materials im-

ports, and that proportion will only grow in the future. All nations are facing today the problem of inflation. More raw materials and products from the developing countries will help abate that problem. It makes good sense for us to utilize proven vehicles, such as the international development lending institutions, for aiding the growth of nations that are at the same time such important sources and markets for us. Our benefits need not be at the expense of others' losses, for with growth all parties can be better off.

Beyond these economic benefits to the United States, the multilateral lending institutions—as President Nixon noted in his message—also play an important role in American foreign policy. There is a wide chasm between the wealth of the United States and other industrialized countries on the one hand and the extremes of poverty in developing countries on the other. The developing countries must be given hope in their efforts to reduce the disparity and must be encouraged to seek to do so as part of outward-looking, more market-oriented economies where a premium is placed on efficient use of funds.

These international development banks are well equipped to offer this hope and this encouragement. Conversely, a renewed U.S. commitment to multilateral development can give needed assurance to the world that the United States is not turning inward and that it is prepared to help tangibly—that we will maintain a leading position in global affairs. Secretary Kissinger agrees fully with the importance of these institutions in the spectrum of our foreign relations, and a representative from the Department of State will appear before your committee later this morning to elaborate on this concern.

This, then, is the general background for today's specific proposals. In presenting them to you, I want to say we have taken special care to emphasize to other donors that we could not make—and would not desire to make—international commitments to these institutions without congressional participation and assent. You will find explicit language in the respective reports of the Directors of IDA and the ADB that affirms the

principle that no commitments arise until legislative approval is obtained.

At the same time I also must underscore the fact that these proposals have been arrived at only after intensive discussions with other countries in which we have elaborated and emphasized the concerns of Congress against the background of our earlier consultations.

In the end, the interests of the various donor countries have been carefully balanced. What they do is inevitably dependent on what we do. A unilateral effort to reduce the amounts or institute other major changes would inevitably pose difficult problems in negotiating a satisfactory arrangement and greatly impede the continuity of the institutions' operations. If the United States should reject the proposal, the practical effect would, in my judgment, be the rapid unraveling of the effort we have made over the years to build these institutions which have become so central to the international development assistance effort.

For all these reasons, the proposals have the strongest support of the President, evidenced by his personal message to the Congress. As I promised you at Nairobi, the administration will press as hard as possible for their approval.

Let me turn now to the proposals themselves.

U.S. Share of IDA Replenishment

The International Development Association was established in 1960 as the concessional lending arm of the World Bank. It makes long-term loans to countries with a per capita annual income of \$375 or less. Twenty-five nations contribute funds for its operations, which are carried on in 70 countries located in all the major regions of the developing world. Contributions are mobilized for three-year replenishment periods, the latest of which, the third replenishment, runs through June 30, 1974.

Specifically, the IDA proposal before you calls for total contributions from all donors of \$4.5 billion over three years, which would permit IDA to make credit commitments during the period FY 1975-77. The most salient

feature of this fourth replenishment of IDA is the reduction in the U.S. share from 40 percent to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent. This would result in a U.S. contribution to the total replenishment that is lower by \$300 million than it would have been had our traditional share been maintained. Based on national income and other measures of financial capacity, a one-third share for the United States is entirely reasonable.

It is contemplated that countries will generally make payments under this replenishment in three equal payments beginning in FY 1975. However, options would be provided with the practical effect of permitting us to commence our payments in FY 1976 (after our final payment in FY 1975 under the current third replenishment) and to divide our payments over four years instead of three. Our present intention is to make use of these options. However, we would welcome the guidance of the Congress about this question, and we have drafted the proposed legislation so as to provide maximum flexibility.

On an annual basis, our contribution under the four-year payment option would be \$375 million per year, compared to our present annual contribution level of \$386 million. (Our original commitment to contribute annually \$320 million has been increased by \$66 million as a result of maintenance-of-value obligations resulting from devaluation.) Payments would be made in non-interest-bearing letters of credit to be drawn down over an extended period of years. Accordingly, we anticipate virtually no budgetary impact in the early years of our contribution, and the ultimate impact will be spread out over a number of years.

IDA's present resources will be fully committed by June 30, 1974. Its lending operations—which heavily emphasize social and economic improvement for urban poor, for small businessmen, and small farmers—would terminate at that time. Consequently, time is an important factor. I therefore urge early committee action on this item, which is the centerpiece of international development efforts for the world's poorest countries.

Asian Development Bank Proposals

The Asian Development Bank, established in 1966, is a regional development bank modeled on the World Bank-IDA Group. Its membership includes the developing nations of Asia, together with the developed countries of Europe, Asia, and North America. Like the World Bank, it makes hard loans on conventional terms from its ordinary capital window. Like IDA, it makes concessional loans from its Special Funds. It has developed in a few short years into a respected borrower in international financial markets and an important provider of financial and technical assistance to the developing countries of the Asian region.

There are two Asian Development Bank proposals before you today. The first relates to the Bank's concessional lending operations through a new Asian Development Fund to which the United States would make available \$150 million. However, recent international negotiations made clear that other nations will agree that \$100 million of funds already authorized by the U.S. Congress and now awaiting appropriation can be used for this purpose. Consequently, our request for new authority for this purpose is limited to \$50 million.

Although the United States was a founding member of the Asian Bank, we have never contributed to its concessional lending resources. Over a period of three years other nations have contributed about \$250 million. Now those funds are largely committed. Thus the Asian Development Bank will run out of funds for concessional lending by the turn of the year.

The proposed Asian Development Fund will avoid a cessation of concessional lending operations and sustain lending over a planned three-year period.

The funding by all donors is proposed to amount to approximately \$525 million. The suggested U.S. share of the new Fund of \$150 million would thus amount to 29 percent. However, as I indicated earlier, other donors, in a genuine spirit of cooperation and willingness to look forward in a con-

structive way, have indicated that the United States may credit toward its contribution to the new Fund \$100 million that had been authorized for Asian Bank concessional lending in 1972 and that is now pending appropriation. The new replenishment of \$525 million therefore would require only \$50 million additional funds from the United States—less than 10 percent of the total. It is that \$50 million for which authorization is now being requested.

This proposal seems to me to meet and even exceed any reasonable test of burden sharing. Other countries have already contributed over \$250 million for concessional lending by the Asian Bank. With the \$100 million already authorized and the additional \$50 million now requested, on a cumulative basis our overall share of Asian Bank Special Funds would be only about 20 percent.

Moreover, our \$100 million portion is, by agreement with the other donors, tied to procurement of U.S. goods and services, insuring direct benefits to U.S. suppliers and facilitating U.S. entry into key markets in Asia.

The second proposal relates to U.S. participation in a replenishment of the Bank's ordinary capital, for which I transmitted draft legislation to Congress on July 10 of this year. This would require a new authorization of \$362 million over three years, largely in the form of guarantee capital without budget impact.

The proposal is important from two standpoints. First, it will enable the United States to retain a voting position and influence in the Bank commensurate with our financial and policy interest in the Bank and in the region. Second, the resources it will provide the Bank in support of its lending operations—in this case, nonconcessional or "hard" loans—can and will be effectively used in areas of priority need.

I would emphasize that other member countries have already provided their share of a planned proportionate capital increase for the Bank. We have delayed our request because we believed other contributions, in-

cluding the \$100 million in concessional funds for the Asian Bank, deserved immediate priority. As a consequence, the voting strength of our shares was reduced from 17 percent to 8 percent. This is inadequate if we wish to have an ongoing effective voice in the Bank.

Our relative position can be restored at a small budgetary cost. Of three annual installments of approximately \$121 million each, only \$9.7 million a year would be cash. A further \$14.5 million would be in letters of credit to be drawn down over time. The bulk, some \$97 million a year, would be callable or guarantee capital. Contributions of callable capital are not expected to have any cash or budgetary impact, but they do provide a backstop guarantee for the Bank's borrowing in private capital markets.

Although much smaller than IDA, the ADB is an increasingly important institution on the Asian political-economic scene. While it is a vehicle for expressing continued U.S. interest and support for the region, the main responsibilities are properly carried by the Asians themselves. Japan has been by far the largest contributor, particularly to the soft funds. But neither the Japanese themselves, nor other Asians, want Japan to dominate the institution. Despite Japan's heavy contributions, I believe that is not the case today. But we and other members do want to maintain an appropriate balance. Today's legislative proposals are essential to maintaining an appropriate U.S. presence.

The authorization requests for these programs are a critical step in a complex process. Equally important will be the follow-through in terms of timely and adequate appropriations. The President has urged quick action on pending appropriations requests, noting that we are behind schedule in providing our contributions to all of the institutions. I would hope that, within the structure of the Congress, appropriate and innovative techniques might be worked out that would facilitate the handling of the multiyear funding programs that are essential to the orderly conduct of the business of the international development lending insti-

tutions. A solution to this problem must be, after the authorizations themselves, the highest item on our legislative agenda relating to the international banks.

Working with the Congress, I believe we have in the past year increased the flow of information to and interchange of ideas with the Congress at both Member and staff levels. We benefited greatly by contacts with you and with other Members of the Congress in preparing for negotiations with other countries. We have made plain to others that we view U.S. participation in these institutions as a partnership of the Congress and the administration and we could not commit the United States before the Congress has had an opportunity to consider and act on the proposals. The policies will continue. My hope is that the Congress itself will not only support this legislation but will provide assurances, at the earliest feasible date, that necessary appropriations will be forthcoming.

The most appropriate note for me to close on is President Nixon's summation in his October 31 message:

All nations which enjoy advanced stages of industrial development have a grave responsibility to assist those countries whose major development lies ahead. By providing support for international economic assistance on an equitable basis, we are helping others to help themselves and at the same time building effective institutions for international cooperation in the critical years ahead. I urge the Congress to act promptly on these proposals.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY CASEY

Thank you for the opportunity to speak in support of the administration's request for authorization of funds for the fourth replenishment of the International Development Association and the Special Funds of the Asian Development Bank. Secretary Kissinger is convinced of the importance of these institutions in our overall foreign political and economic policy. I would like to begin with some comments on the importance of these two institutions to U.S. foreign policy.

For the past two decades, a key facet of our relations with less developed countries

has been our aid programs designed to promote their economic development, itself an important foreign policy goal. Our desire for the development of less developed countries is based on more than altruism. Our increasing dependence on foreign sources of energy and raw materials brings with it a need for greater access to foreign markets and a need for investment income to pay for the larger volume of imports. We sell more to more prosperous countries. We invest more where the investment climate is best, and this normally is in stable countries. The less developed countries currently buy nearly one-third of our exports and account for over \$25 billion of our foreign investment.

International trade depends on an international economic and political order which will be in jeopardy if poorer countries do not participate successfully in it. The international economic reform now in process has four coequal elements: trade, investment, money, and development. Countries must believe that the overall system which evolves is as fair and equitable as is possible, since only then will there be fruitful cooperation necessary for sustained prosperity.

The leaders of less developed countries see economic development as a political necessity. The World Bank Group, of which the International Development Association is a part, and the Asian Development Bank have become significant factors in the economic planning of less developed countries throughout the world. It is not illogical for the political leaders of these countries to take the U.S. attitude toward these institutions as an important indication of our support and interest in their development plans.

Because of growing international economic interdependence and because of the importance the less developed countries place on these institutions, the U.S. self-interest requires that we play a significant role in the banks. If we do not provide a fair share in support of the development process, we will endanger our political and economic relations with both developed and developing countries.

Multilateral Framework for Assistance

We realize that the way in which we play our role and assume our fair share of the burden must reflect the realities of recent developments in the world economic system. The most efficient method of achieving our basic purpose of helping developing nations to mobilize their own resources to improve their living conditions is through complementary bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. The bilateral assistance programs can be used as a flexible instrument of national policy, focusing resources on countries and problems of particular interest to us. The multilateral framework helps us to share the development burden of tapping official and private market resources of other industrialized nations.

The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank stimulate a greater flow of assistance from other donors to less developed countries of interest to us than would be the case if only bilateral aid were given. In 1972, for example, the United States provided about 33 percent of total OECD-member [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] aid which went through multilateral institutions compared to 40 percent of total bilateral aid provided.

We have weighed the cost of this strategy against all our national priorities and found it to be appropriate. As Secretary Shultz pointed out, only a small budgetary impact is anticipated in the first years of the contributions, with the total impact spread out over a number of years. This is the result of payments being made in non-interest-bearing letters of credit drawn down over an extended period. Looked at from the concept of the overall burden, we are not doing more than our fair share. Our official development assistance in 1972 was \$3.35 billion, or a little less than one-third of 1 percent of our GNP. This percentage is lower than that of most other developed countries.

Both banks enjoy the status of impartial and expert observers of development issues. These institutions provide the opportunity for developing countries to assume primary

responsibility for their programs. This assumption of responsibility conforms with the U.S. desire to reduce our overseas staffs.

A major benefit from the banks, in our opinion, has been their contribution to development planning based on Western-oriented economics. The method of country and project analysis of these institutions is generally accepted in most of the developing world. It encourages borrowers to consider their priorities in a Western-oriented framework. Concepts such as self-help, macroeconomic performance criteria, fiscal responsibility, sound foreign exchange management, rate of return, and free movement of goods and capital are stressed by this methodology.

IDA Contribution to Development Needs

Having made these general observations, I would now like to present some comments about the individual proposals. First, the donor countries of the International Development Association, the concessional loan window of the World Bank, have agreed to seek a replenishment of \$4.5 billion over three years, although the U.S. contribution can be made over a longer period, as explained by Secretary Shultz. Without these funds the International Development Association will not be able to continue its program of assistance to the world's poorest countries beyond June 1974.

In 1973 over 70 percent of the International Development Association's credits went to countries whose per capita GNP was \$120 or less. The International Development Association's substantial contribution to the development needs of these countries would not be made up from other sources were it to go out of business. Their lending record is remarkable when one considers that many of the recipient countries are short of economic infrastructure and trained manpower. Their putting together such a volume of good projects represents an impressive achievement given the limitations.

At the Nairobi annual meeting of the World Bank, which was attended by many

members of the Congress, donor countries agreed that the proposed U.S. share of the fourth International Development Association replenishment would drop from 40 percent of previous replenishments to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent, or \$1.5 billion. This was done in recognition of the changed world economic picture. In effect it means that for every dollar the United States contributes in this replenishment, the other donor countries will contribute two. This is impressive financial leverage.

The U.S. position in Nairobi was decided on only after extensive give-and-take between representatives of the executive and legislative branches of the government. The results of this give-and-take are reflected in the final agreement we and the other donors reached on the fourth replenishment. We agreed to present the proposed contribution to the Congress for its approval and to vigorously seek its enactment. These hearings constitute a further stage of these consultations.

The procedure we have attempted to follow was to get the advice of the Congress at an early stage of the international deliberations. Quite clearly, the Congress could not commit itself in advance on the U.S. share or our total contribution. Equally, in a negotiation involving many countries, in which the share of each is conditioned on what others do, others are not prepared to reach some understanding unless we also contribute to the dialogue. What we attempted, therefore, was to get the best advice of the Congress without committing you, use this advice in our multilateral discussions, and then come back to you again—which is what we now are doing.

It should be understood that a unilateral change in these terms made now by the United States would cause the entire agreement to unravel. We would be forced to renegotiate these changes with all the other donor countries.

ADB and Asian Stability

The Asian Development Bank is primarily an Asian institution, which has contributed to the U.S. policy goal of encouraging self-

reliance for the countries in the area. The Bank has succeeded, at the same time, in obtaining resources for Asian development from countries outside the area. The United States, Canada, and 13 European countries, as well as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, have contributed to the Special Funds.

I am convinced that the Asian Development Bank supports our interests in Asia. It does so by contributing to the economic development and thus the stability of our Asian friends. Over the last 10 years, Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Republic of China, and Indonesia received 88 percent of Asian Development Bank lending.

The proposed U.S. contribution would bring the U.S. share of Special Funds from zero to about 20 percent of the total. This compares to over 40 percent for Japan. Without new contributions the Fund's ability to commit resources will soon be severely limited. Moreover, the relative preponderance of Japanese financing is causing concern to the Japanese Government and our other Asian friends.

I would like to insert a background note on the \$100 million authorized for the Bank in 1972 but not yet appropriated by the Congress. The entire sum could be applied toward the U.S. share of the new Special Funds. Moreover it could be tied to U.S. procurement. If we add the \$50 million in the pending authorization request, other donor countries will match what we give with \$375 million in new contributions.

The U.S. contribution in conjunction with the other contributions which it will stimulate will determine what kind of institution the Asian Development Bank will be. Without U.S. participation the Bank will be financially weak and dependent on one major donor. Its resources will be so limited it will be unable to play the role it should in the development of Asia. If, on the other hand, the United States and others make their contributions, the financial base and political grounding of the Asian Development Bank would be greatly strengthened. It could provide the multilateral effort we

would like to see applied to the economic development needs of Asia in the 1970's.

In conclusion, these international financial institutions have demonstrated that they are effective and responsible. They provide a Western-oriented framework within which the industrialized and developing nations can conduct a fruitful dialogue. To enable these institutions to continue making their substantial contributions, I strongly urge that Congress approve the proposed funding for the fourth replenishment of the International Development Association and the Special Funds of the Asian Development Bank.

Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Preventing Collisions at Sea

Message From President Nixon¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to acceptance, the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, done at London October 20, 1972. The report of the Department of State is enclosed for the information of the Senate.

The Convention is designed to revise and bring up to date the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1960, in the light of technological developments and increased use of the marine environment since those Regulations were concluded.

International concern for the protection and effective management of our oceans has been growing in recent years. The international community has also become more aware that the effects of marine casualties are not confined to the men and vessels immediately involved but, through the increased risk of marine pollution, can extend

well beyond. I recommend that the Senate give prompt consideration to this Convention and consent to its acceptance.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, November 9, 1973.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Texts of Various International Labor Organization Conventions and Recommendations Concerning Maritime Matters, Pursuant to Article 19 of the Constitution of the I.L.O. Communication from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations transmitting the texts of conventions and recommendations. H. Doc. 93-142. September 5, 1973. 27 pp.

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Amendment to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945. Report to accompany S. 1868. S. Rept. 93-412. October 1, 1973. 10 pp.

War Claims—Viet-Nam Conflict—American Civilian Interests. Report to accompany S. 1728. S. Rept. 93-434. October 4, 1973. 3 pp.

¹ Transmitted on Nov. 9 (White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. W, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the convention and the report of the Department of State.

United Nations Approves Program for Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination

Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly on September 28 by U.S. Representative Margaret B. Young, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on October 5 and by the Assembly on November 2.

STATEMENT BY MRS. YOUNG

USUN press release 88 dated September 28

As you and the members of this distinguished committee know, Mr. Chairman, my government strongly supports the concept of a Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. I have waited until now, however, to speak because as a new representative to the 28th General Assembly, I requested the responsibility of studying the document in its entirety, seeing background material, and writing my own response. In so doing, I was reminded that the difficult we can do today, the impossible takes a little bit longer.

Now I have studied the draft program¹ and am happy, on behalf of the U.S. delegation, to endorse it.

As an American, the realities of racism and racial discrimination are not new to me. The historical and current impact of the civil rights struggle in the United States has been felt around the world. In fact, the song "We Shall Overcome" has been sung by now in several languages, and our nonviolent demonstrations seen by way of the satellite are no strange phenomena to many of you.

The United States endorses this document,

acknowledging that we still have many serious problems. While one can be proud of past achievements in race relations, we realize that we must measure our progress not in terms of how far we have come but of how far we have to go.

This endorsement by my country has a personal significance for me. My late husband, Whitney M. Young, Jr., was a civil rights leader, the executive director of the National Urban League. The league's concerns are with discrimination in employment, education, housing, health, welfare, and voter registration. The decade of the sixties was a frustrating but exciting period for all of us involved in that struggle. Now, in the seventies, the aim is to make secure the gains that have been made, to exercise our voting rights, and to stress preparedness and excellence on the part of our black youth for the gains yet to be won. At the same time, the unmet aspirations of the American Indian, Spanish-speaking Americans, and underprivileged white citizens are not to be ignored.

The decade of the sixties, while having some gains, also suffered losses in our leadership, among them, Dr. Martin Luther King, Malcolm X. And then in 1971 we lost my husband, who drowned in Lagos, Nigeria, while attending the African-American Dialogue; I must mention, too, Dr. Ralph Bunche, my dear friend, also 1971.

The significance to me of those whom I have named is that their concerns stretched beyond these shores. These men, as they traveled, saw a commonality of the strains and stresses that discrimination causes. In far lands, the swollen stomachs of little chil-

¹ U.N. doc. A/9094, annex I.

dren spelled poverty and hunger; small huts on stilts spelled segregation and denial of decent housing and a decent living; barbed wire fences spelled the lack of freedom to travel; closed synagogues spelled the denial of the freedom to worship; quarantined living areas and refugee camps spelled the control of the powerful over the powerless. There are some countries where blatant denial of basic human rights is so inhuman and so ungodly that those who suffer most have right to the greatest priority for redress. The inhuman condition of the black peoples in southern Africa, already under serious consideration by other United Nations bodies, is one of the justifiable and necessary items for this next decade's agenda. At the same time, it ill behooves any of the 135 members of the United Nations to take a "not me, but thou" attitude.

The whole concept behind racism presupposes a posture of superiority over someone else or some other group or groups. Discrimination is the manifestation of this holier-than-thou attitude that allows persons or governments to impose their will on others to their detriment and denial. Perhaps, then, if we accept the challenge of addressing ourselves to the eradication of racism and racial discrimination in the next decade, there will be ripples as a result of this one pebble which will affect class, caste, religious, tribal, sectional, and sex discriminations as well. The issue then could move from the oppressor and the oppressed to that of brotherhood and the betterment of all mankind.

Three days ago, three astronauts splashed down in the Pacific Ocean, after spending 59 days in outer space. They passed over every continent, and this should remind us that our world is smaller than it was 25 years ago when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. With modern technology, a decade becomes one brief interlude. It behooves us, then, to get on with our task.

In our view the draft program before us provides for the kind of broad-scale action we believe to be necessary. It avoids extremes since it is a compromise, but it is a happy compromise that deserves the wide support

it has received. No document is, of course, sacrosanct; and while we appreciate the scope of the program and the hard negotiations that went into drawing it up, we do have three suggestions which we believe would improve it.

The first concerns the proposed world conference and the regional conferences. There is the danger that these would merely duplicate regularly scheduled meetings of the U.N. organs where racial discrimination is already being thoroughly discussed. I do not, however, reject the concept of these special conferences. On the contrary, I see in them the possibility for breaking the pattern of dealing with racism and racial discrimination in the accustomed, somewhat fractionated way and for taking a new, more comprehensive look at the problem. New and more effective initiatives might result from such a look.

Our second concern is the international funds called for in paragraphs 13(c)² and 17 of the program. Special funds for similar purposes have already been established within the United Nations system. We believe the establishment of new funds may well do no more than divert resources from existing funds and actually reduce the total resources available by increasing the cost of administering them.

Our most serious concern is the coordinating mechanism recommended in paragraph 18.³ The original draft program, as proposed by the Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities assigned responsibility for coordinating the Decade to the Economic and Social Council. We thought that was the correct body to assume that responsibility, and we still think so. While, in our view, there is no need to set up a special coordinating committee because the ECOSOC already has that capability, if any special committee is established it should be responsible to the Economic and Social Council. Necessary resources to support the Decade in the Secretariat must be found by whatever means necessary. This Decade should provide us with bold and cre-

² Par. 13(d) of the program as adopted.

³ Par. 18 was amended in Committee III.

ative approaches to an old and aggravating problem.

The hour is late. Our target date for launching this exciting venture, December 10 of this year, is upon us. The next 10 years will be measured not by what we say, but by what we do. Let us begin.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ⁴

The General Assembly.

Reaffirming its firm resolve to achieve the total and unconditional elimination of racism and racial discrimination, against which the conscience and sense of justice of mankind have long been aroused and which in our time represent serious obstacles to further progress and to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its decision, in resolution 2919 (XXVII) of 15 November 1972, to launch the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and to inaugurate the activities thereof on 10 December 1973, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Having examined the draft programme for the Decade transmitted to it by the Economic and Social Council, and the views on the draft programme expressed by Governments,

1. *Designates* the ten-year period beginning on 10 December 1973 as the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination;

2. *Approves* the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination annexed to the present resolution and calls upon all States to co-operate in every possible way in its implementation;

3. *Invites* Governments, United Nations organs, the specialized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship concerned, to participate in the observance of the Decade by intensifying and expanding their efforts towards ensuring the rapid eradication of racism and racial discrimination;

4. *Calls upon* all Member States to submit every two years to the Economic and Social Council, a report on the action taken under the Programme;

5. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to assume, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, responsibility for co-ordinating the Programme and evaluating activities undertaken during the Decade as provided in the Programme;

6. *Recommends* that the Economic and Social

Council should perform these functions in plenary meetings;

7. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to report annually to the General Assembly on the implementation of the Programme;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To transmit the Programme to Governments and to the specialized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations for such action as they may undertake in order to give effect to the suggestions contained therein;

(b) To transmit the Programme and the recommendations on the role of non-governmental organizations to the non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship concerned;

(c) To take the necessary measures for the implementation of those suggestions contained in the Programme which fall within the Secretary-General's area of responsibility or which require action by other organs of the United Nations;

(d) To serve as a central point from which information relating to the implementation of suggestions contained in the Programme may be obtained;

(e) To ensure the closest possible degree of collaboration between United Nations bodies and their respective staffs in the work required for the implementation of the suggestions contained in the Programme;

9. *Decides* to consider this question annually on the basis of the report of the Economic and Social Council on the implementation of the Programme.

ANNEX

PROGRAMME FOR THE DECADE FOR ACTION TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

1. The United Nations, having solemnly proclaimed, in the Preamble to the Charter, faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, is determined:

(a) To establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained;

(b) To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

2. The United Nations has opposed all manifestations of racial discrimination and has in particular condemned the policy of *apartheid* and similar policies based on racial theories and, consequently, its competent organs have:

(a) Declared that discrimination between human beings on the ground of race, colour or ethnic origin is an affront to humanity and shall be con-

⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/3057 (XXVIII); adopted by the Assembly unanimously on Nov. 2.

demned as a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and as a factor capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples;

(b) Declared that any Government or régime whose official policy or actual practice is based on racial discrimination contravenes the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and called upon them to desist forthwith from pursuing such policies;

(c) Condemned all military, economic or political collaboration with the racist régimes that enables and encourages these régimes to enforce and perpetuate their racist policies, and called for an immediate end to such collaboration;

(d) Reaffirmed time and again the legitimacy of the struggle of all oppressed peoples, in particular in the territories under colonial, racial or alien domination, to obtain racial equality and freedom, and called for increased and continued moral and material support for those peoples.

3. Action has been taken by a number of countries, as well as international and national institutions, to oppose racial discrimination and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, irrespective of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, through:

(a) Ratification of or accession to, and implementation of, the widely-accepted International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and other international instruments with similar objectives;

(b) The continuing efforts of specialized agencies such as the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and of United Nations bodies such as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research;

(c) Instruments, procedures and programmes instituted by regional organizations;

(d) The enactment of legislation and the putting into effect of procedures by Governments to combat racism and racial discrimination and improve relations among racial groups;

(e) Activities carried on internationally or within a particular country to reduce and even eliminate racial hostility and prejudice, protect persons and groups from discrimination, and promote respect for all people regardless of race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin or other status.

4. The actions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above have been successful in promoting a greater understanding of the fallacy and injustice of racist dogmas and practices but have been disregarded by a number of Governments and racist régimes, in

particular in southern Africa; it is also noted that in several countries, segments of the population have continued to maintain attitudes based on racial prejudice and discrimination.

5. The United Nations is convinced more than ever of the need for constant national, regional and international efforts to eliminate racism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

6. The ultimate success of the efforts of the United Nations and other bodies in combating racial discrimination will depend upon:

(a) Full adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter in creating conditions of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin;

(b) The vigour with which action is taken by individual Governments and the degree of co-operation between them, inside and outside the United Nations, to fulfil the purposes and principles of the Charter and to implement the resolutions relating to the eradication of racist policies and practices, as well as colonialism;

(c) The full utilization of the desire and readiness of men and women to devote their energies, talents and abilities to the benefit of society and more particularly to combat racism and racial discrimination.

7. To this end, the General Assembly proclaims the years 1973 to 1983 as the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

Goals and objectives

8. The ultimate goals of the Decade are to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, especially by eradicating racial prejudice, racism and racial discrimination; to arrest any expansion of racist policies, to eliminate the persistence of racist policies and to counteract the emergence of alliances based on mutual espousal of racism and racial discrimination; to resist any policy and practices which lead to the strengthening of the racist régimes and contribute to the sustainment of racism and racial discrimination; to identify, isolate and dispel the fallacious and mythical beliefs, policies and practices that contribute to racism and racial discrimination; and to put an end to racist régimes.

9. To this end, appropriate measures should be taken to implement fully United Nations instruments and decisions concerning the elimination of racial discrimination, to ensure support for all peoples striving for racial equality, to eradicate all forms of racial discrimination, and to pursue a vigorous world-wide campaign of information designed to dispel racial prejudice and to enlighten and in-

volve world public opinion in the struggle against racism and racial discrimination, emphasizing *inter alia* the education of youth in the spirit of human rights and fundamental freedoms and in the dignity and worth of the human person and against theories of racism and racial discrimination, as well as the full involvement of women in the formulation and implementation of these measures.

Policy measures and target dates

10. The above goals and objectives call for a continuing effort by all peoples, Governments and institutions to eradicate racial discrimination and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, irrespective of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, both within their national jurisdiction and universally.

11. To this end, the following measures need to be taken at the national, regional, international and United Nations levels:

National

12. (a) Measures in the economic, social, cultural and political fields that would ensure the full equality of all peoples and individuals, without distinction of any kind on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, should be prepared and implemented. This would necessitate:

(i) Assistance on a bilateral basis to peoples which are victims of racial discrimination;

(ii) No support being given to Governments or régimes which practice racial discrimination that will enable them to perpetuate racist policies or practices;

(iii) In the case of States not parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the urgent enactment as a matter of the highest priority of appropriate legislation and other suitable measures to prohibit and bring to an end racial discrimination, to abrogate, amend, rescind or nullify any policies or regulations that have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial hatred, and with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the rights set forth in article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to declare the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority and hatred to be an offence punishable by law;

(iv) The establishment by every national and local Government of recourse procedures to be invoked against any acts of racial discrimination which may be suffered by an individual and which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms; it is necessary that there should be adequate machinery and procedures for handling complaints, with easy access thereto, facilitated by all appropri-

ate encouragement and support to persons in the protection of their rights;

(v) The granting of scholarships by the competent authorities and institutions to the youth of the territories where racial discrimination prevails, in particular through increased contributions to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa;

(vi) The encouragement of the preparation and publication of studies based, in particular, on the provisions of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;

(vii) The wide publicizing of the contents of this Programme by Governments and all institutions concerned, using every means at their disposal, including all the appropriate media of communication;

(viii) Ratification of or accession to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, on a universal basis, and the effective implementation of that Convention, in co-operation with the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in particular by the preparation of full and comprehensive reports under article 9 of the Convention;

(ix) No discrimination for any reason or on any basis whatsoever in education and school systems; this should be implemented as rapidly as possible during the first half of the Decade;

(x) No discrimination on any of the grounds mentioned above in the laws and policies of immigration; this should be attained as soon as possible and in any event not later than the end of the Decade.

(b) The inclusion in the curricula of education of children and youth of the subject of human rights, with special emphasis, in the primary stages of education, on the equality of all human beings and the evils of racial discrimination, should be attained as soon as possible during the Decade.

(c) The use of available media of information to educate the public continuously and systematically in the spirit of respect for human rights and, in particular, against all policies, practices and manifestations of racism and racial discrimination should be embarked upon as from the first year of the Decade.

Regional and international

13. (a) As a major feature during the Decade, a world conference on combating racial discrimination should be convened by the General Assembly as soon as possible, but preferably not later than 1978. The conference should have as its main theme the adoption of effective ways and means and concrete measures for securing the full and universal implementation of United Nations decisions and resolutions on racism, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, decolonization and self-determination, as well as

the accession to and ratification and enforcement of the international instruments relating to human rights and the elimination of racism and racial discrimination.

(b) The convening of international and regional seminars, conferences and other similar activities in line with the goals and objectives of this Programme should be undertaken; the Secretary-General should be informed of all the activities undertaken in this connexion.

(c) Activities undertaken in connexion with the International Women's Year should recognize the importance of women's effective contribution to the struggle against racism and racial discrimination.

(d) The consideration of ways and means of preparing concrete proposals in support of the efforts of all oppressed peoples suffering from racism and racial discrimination, including the establishment of regional funds on a voluntary basis to support the efforts of those peoples, should be undertaken; reports on the subject would be forwarded to the Secretary-General every two years.

(e) Racist régimes should be denied any support or assistance that could enable them to perpetuate racist policies or practices, including policies aimed at depriving the indigenous people of their inalienable rights.

(f) States should adopt measures to prevent the activities of persons and groups which incite sectarian and racial passions that would provoke people to leave their land and settle in lands belonging to others in accordance with policies designed to consolidate settler-colonialism or to settle natives in reservations, thus condemning them to a miserable existence.

(g) It is essential to consider ways and means of ensuring the international and regional isolation of racist régimes.

(h) It is essential to provide support and assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the relevant United Nations declarations and resolutions, to liberation movements struggling against colonialism and racial discrimination, as well as to Governments that wish to embark on concrete programmes to eradicate racial discrimination.

(i) The implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as United Nations resolutions on this question, is imperative; the regional organizations should be invited by the United Nations to give attention to this question in order that the total eradication of all forms of racial discrimination may be attained within the shortest possible time.

(j) The adoption of new international instruments regarding the elimination of racial discrimination in all its forms and the suppression of the crime of *apartheid* should be considered.

(k) The co-ordination by all Governments of

their activities in the field of information is advisable; such co-ordination should be achieved through the United Nations, the regional organizations or through bilateral or multilateral agreements.

United Nations system

14. In addition to the measures referred to above, the activities set forth below should be undertaken by organizations within the United Nations system.

Research and study

15. (a) The existing studies and research in the field of *apartheid* and racial discrimination should be updated and developed.

(b) Student workshops should be organized for the teaching of international law, with particular reference to topics related to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which refers to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

(c) Further research and publications should be envisaged dealing with racial discrimination in regard, *inter alia*, to:

(i) The right to security of persons and protection by the State, in particular judicial or quasi-judicial guarantees against violence, maltreatment or arbitrary measures exercised by government officials or by any individual, group or institution;

(ii) The right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public, such as transport, hotels, restaurants, cafés, theatres and parks.

(d) Pilot studies on racism and racial discrimination in the economic, political, social, cultural, sociological and other fields should be undertaken, continued and co-ordinated, and special attention should be given to:

(i) The kinds of situations that lead to racism;

(ii) Charting the spread or decline of racism or racial discrimination, diagnosing and detecting the introduction of racism or racial discrimination into any area early enough to permit effective preventive action;

(iii) The propagation, consciously or otherwise, of racial prejudice by the press, cinema and television, in particular in publications and programmes for children and youth;

(iv) The role of education and science, especially social science, in combating racism and racial discrimination and in solving racial problems;

(v) The preparation and implementation of economic, social and political measures that would ensure the real equality of all peoples and individ-

uals, without distinction of any kind on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin;

(vi) Problems of discrimination arising in connexion with immigration of men, women—married and unmarried—and their children and foreign workers of both sexes;

(vii) The crime of *apartheid* under international penal law, with particular reference to the responsibility of individuals;

(viii) Problems of racial discrimination arising in connexion with housing, sporting activities, and so forth;

(ix) The role of private group action in combating racism and racial discrimination, consistent with the objectives of this Programme.

(c) Seminars on special aspects of combating racism and racial discrimination and promoting racial harmony should be organized at both the international and regional levels.

(f) The United Nations should address an appeal to various scientific international organizations (for example, associations of jurists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, economists) to devote special efforts during the Decade to the analysis and study of aspects of racial discrimination within their competence.

Education, training and information

16. (a) The need for interagency co-ordination and co-operation in the field of education and training on problems and activities concerning the elimination of racial discrimination undertaken in the implementation of this Programme should be identified.

(b) The procedures and types of action used by various agencies in the field of education and training related to racial discrimination with a view to any necessary harmonization should be examined in the light of the experience acquired.

(c) New educational and information materials should be prepared to dispel racial prejudice and to combat racism and racial discrimination, such as teaching materials for use in every type of institution of learning, at the elementary, secondary and higher levels of education.

(d) Popular publications, films and radio and television programmes should be produced for distribution or broadcasting to the general public.

International funds

17. The General Assembly should establish an international fund on a voluntary basis to help the peoples struggling against racial discrimination and *apartheid*.

Co-ordination, review and appraisal, and reporting

18. (a) The General Assembly shall entrust the Economic and Social Council, in co-operation with the Secretary-General, with the responsibility for

co-ordinating the programmes and evaluating the activities undertaken in connexion with the Decade.

(b) The Economic and Social Council shall, during the period of the Decade, submit an annual report to the General Assembly containing *inter alia*:

(i) An enumeration of the activities undertaken or contemplated to achieve the objectives of the Decade, including the activities of Governments, United Nations organs, the specialized agencies and other international organizations;

(ii) A review and appraisal of those activities;

(iii) Its suggestions and recommendations.

(c) The Economic and Social Council shall also act as the preparatory committee for the world conference to be convened as a major feature of the Decade.

(d) The Secretary-General shall provide the Council with such assistance as may be necessary for the performance of its functions relating to the Decade.

(e) Governments should forward a report every two years on the action taken under the Programme for the Decade, on the basis of a questionnaire circulated by the Secretary-General; these reports shall be transmitted to the Economic and Social Council for its consideration.

(f) The Secretary-General shall submit to the Economic and Social Council an annual report containing:

(i) A summary of the actions, suggestions, trends, etc., emerging from the deliberations of United Nations organs and bodies and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, as well as from the deliberations of the specialized agencies concerned with the question of racial discrimination and *apartheid*;

(ii) A summary of information relating to the elimination of racism and racial discrimination as may be received by the United Nations under the system of periodic reports on human rights;

(iii) Information concerning the activities undertaken or contemplated during the Decade under the programme of advisory services in the field of human rights in regard to the elimination of racial discrimination;

(iv) Information submitted by non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship concerning activities undertaken or contemplated during the Decade;

(v) A report on the action of the Office of Public Information with respect to the Decade;

(vi) A report on any action by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research in relation to the Decade.

(g) Adequate resources shall be made available to the Secretary-General to enable him to undertake the activities entrusted to him under the Programme for the Decade and, in particular, to en-

able him to provide the Economic and Social Council with such assistance as may be necessary for the performance of its functions relating to the Decade.

(h) The General Assembly shall consider annually the item entitled "Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination" on the basis of the report of the Economic and Social Council and of other relevant reports which it may receive from the Secretary-General, and shall review the implementation of this Programme.

(i) The General Assembly shall address itself at the earliest opportunity to the question of ways and means of ensuring the implementation of United Nations resolutions on *apartheid*, racial discrimination and related matters.

General Assembly Adopts Resolution for Conference on Law of the Sea

Following is a statement by John R. Stevenson, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference, made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 18, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on November 6 and by the Assembly on November 16.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

USUN press release 95 dated October 18

In considering a draft resolution calling for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, our principal task must be to create the conditions for the timely conclusion of a law of the sea treaty—a treaty which can be widely supported by nations from all geographic and other groupings and which will truly establish a universally respected legal regime for the oceans.

The considerations which led the 25th General Assembly in 1970 to call for a conference on the law of the sea have, with the passage of time, the progress of technology, and the almost daily increasingly conflicting uses of the oceans, become even more compelling. Thus it has become even

more important to conclude these negotiations in a timely fashion and to establish a stable and equitable regime for the oceans which will benefit all nations.

It is essential that this committee and the organizational session of the Law of the Sea Conference take the necessary steps so that the conference can promptly initiate and complete the work. My delegation is convinced that with good will and hard work a successful treaty can and must be achieved within the time specified by the U.N. General Assembly in last year's Resolution 3029.¹

In commenting on the specifics of the constructive draft resolution proposed by the distinguished chairman of the Seabed Committee, Ambassador Amerasinghe [Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, of Ceylon], Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that there is no one way to establish conditions for an efficient and meaningful conference. The important thing is that we not lose sight of this goal. Delay, inefficient procedures, procedures which favor any one group or country at the expense of others, or procedures which fail to emphasize the need for a widely acceptable treaty ultimately work against us all.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the draft resolution which proposes two substantive sessions in 1974 is useful in emphasizing the need for meaningful opportunities for negotiations if we are to conclude our work in a timely fashion. Two sessions would be the most effective means to continue the pace of negotiations, and we would favor this schedule. However, if this committee prefers instead a single session, we believe that it is important as a minimum that the single substantive session be of sufficient length to permit meaningful negotiations. In our view, this would require at least 10 weeks of substantive work. Further, we think it particularly important that, if there were to be a single session, the U.N. General Assembly should agree on an effective intersessional program of work and the resolution should reflect this agreement. Provision should be

¹ For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1973, p. 115.

made for the completion of consolidated draft texts of articles or alternative texts by any suitable means and to encourage the necessary negotiations either under conference auspices or unofficially.

The distinguished delegate of Mexico yesterday suggested one interesting proposal for achieving these goals—through holding a meeting of a main committee of the conference. There may well be others. Perhaps the committee chairman could be empowered to work with individual delegations in seeking to consolidate proposals. What is important is that we now leave the preparatory phase and establish the mechanisms for real negotiations.

On the question of procedure, my delegation would like to stress one concern which we believe is of the greatest importance: that the conference procedure should be such as to assure that we can achieve an overall package settlement with the widest possible support. If the new law of the sea treaty has the support of only certain groups of countries or of only certain regions, then we will have failed in our efforts. We are satisfied that common ground does exist and that a convention of genuinely broad acceptability can be achieved.

In order to obtain broad support, we should have not only efficient procedures but procedures which will allow meaningful negotiations to be carried out. We believe that a key to this is a mechanism which will assure an orderly and timely shift from consensus procedures—which of course do not require unanimity—to conference voting only when the basis has been laid for a comprehensive general settlement.

Again, Mr. Chairman, my delegation attaches great importance to a satisfactory arrangement of this voting question. A method must be found which will assure that voting at the conference should only occur when there is broad general agreement among delegations that the time is ready.

In conclusion, let me reiterate the conviction of my delegation that we not only can, but we must, move forward rapidly into a genuine negotiating phase.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ²

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2467 (XXIII) of 21 December 1968, 2750 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, 2881 (XXVI) of 21 December 1971 and 3029 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972.

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction on the work of its sessions in 1973,³

Recalling in particular paragraph 2 of resolution 2750 C (XXV),⁴

Considering that the Committee has accomplished, as far as possible, within the limits of its mandate, the work which the General Assembly entrusted to it for the preparation of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and that it is necessary to proceed to the immediate inauguration of the Conference in 1973 and the convening of a substantive session in 1974, in order to carry out the negotiations and other work required to complete the drafting and adoption of articles for a comprehensive convention on the law of the sea,

Recalling further its resolutions 2480 (XXIII) of 21 December 1968, 2539 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969, 2736 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 and 3009 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 concerning the composition of the Secretariat, as well as the general dispositions on the same matter recommended by the Fifth Committee and adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions,

1. *Expresses its appreciation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction on the work it has done in preparing for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea;*

2. *Confirms its decision in paragraph 3 of resolution 3029 A (XXVII) and decides to convene the first session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in New York from 3 to 14 December 1973 inclusive for the purpose of dealing with matters relating to the organization of the Conference, including the election of officers, the adoption of the agenda and the rules of procedure of the Conference, the establishment of subsidiary organs and the allocation of work to these organs and any other purpose within the scope of paragraph 3 below;*

² U.N. doc. A/RES/3067 (XXVIII); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 16 by a vote of 117 (U.S.) to 0, with 10 abstentions.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/9021 and Corr.1 and 3).* [Footnote in original.]

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1971, p. 158.

3. *Decides* that the mandate of the Conference shall be to adopt a convention dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea, taking into account the subject-matter listed in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2750 C (XXV) and the list of subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea formally approved on 18 August 1972 by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction⁵ and bearing in mind that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole;

4. *Decides* to convene the second session of the Conference, for the purpose of dealing with the substantive work of the Conference, for a period of ten weeks from 20 June to 29 August 1974 at Caracas and, if necessary, to convene not later than 1975 any subsequent session or sessions as may be decided upon by the Conference and approved by the General Assembly, bearing in mind that the Government of Austria has offered Vienna as the site for the Conference in 1975;

5. *Invites* the Conference to make such arrangements as it may deem necessary to facilitate its work;

6. *Refers* to the Conference the reports of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction on its work and all other relevant documentation of the General Assembly and the Committee;

7. *Decides*, having regard to the desirability of achieving universality of participation in the Conference, to request the Secretary-General to invite, in full compliance with General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971, States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency and States parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as well as the following States, to participate in the Conference: Republic of Guinea-Bissau and Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To invite to the Conference intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 3029 A (XXVII);

(b) To invite the United Nations Council for Namibia to participate in the Conference;

(c) To provide summary records in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 3029 A (XXVII);

9. *Decides* that the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Secretary-General of the Conference and authorizes him to appoint a

special representative to act on his behalf and to make such arrangements—including recruitment of necessary staff, taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation—and to provide such facilities as may be necessary for the efficient and continuous servicing of the Conference, utilizing to the fullest extent possible the resources at his disposal;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare appropriate draft rules of procedure for the Conference, taking into account the views expressed in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction and in the General Assembly, and to circulate the draft rules of procedure in time for consideration and approval at the organizational session of the Conference;

11. *Invites* States participating in the Conference to submit their proposals, including draft articles, on the substantive subject-matter of the Conference to the Secretary-General by 1 February 1974 and requests the Secretary-General to circulate the replies received by him before the second session with a view to expediting the work of the Conference;

12. *Decides* that the provisions of paragraph 11 above shall not preclude any State participating in the Conference from submitting proposals, including draft articles, at any stage of the Conference, in accordance with the procedure adopted by the Conference, provided that States which have already submitted any proposals and draft articles need not resubmit them;

13. *Dissolves* the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction as from the inauguration of the Conference.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.

Economic and Social Council

Economic survey of Europe in 1972. Summary. E/5311. May 10, 1973. 4 pp.

Survey of economic conditions in Africa, 1972. Summary. E/5312. May 15, 1973. 28 pp.

Outstanding aspects of the Latin American economy in 1972. Summary. E/5314. May 16, 1973. 25 pp.

Economic survey of Asia and the Far East, 1972. Summary. E/5313. May 29, 1973. 17 pp.

⁵Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/8721 and Corr.1), par. 23 [Footnote in original.]

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971.¹
Senate advice and consent to ratification: November 26, 1973.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Ratifications deposited: Argentina, November 26, 1973; Dominican Republic, November 28, 1973.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.¹

Signatures: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (with a statement), Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (with a statement), October 22, 1973.

Exhibitions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: November 26, 1973 (with reservation).

Law of the Sea

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200;

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578;

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 10, 1964. TIAS 5639;

Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force March 20, 1966. TIAS 5969.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Lesotho, October 23, 1973.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. En-

tered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, November 29, 1973.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971.¹

Ratified by the President: November 21, 1973.

Sea, Exploration of

Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen September 12, 1964. Entered into force July 22, 1968; for the United States April 18, 1973. TIAS 7628.
Notice of denunciation received: Italy, October 17, 1973, effective October 17, 1974.

Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Done at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973.²
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, November 7, 1973.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement constituting appendix I, relating to gross reductions in inputs of phosphorus to Lakes Superior and Huron, to the Great Lakes water quality agreement of April 15, 1972 (TIAS 7312). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 21, 1973. Entered into force November 21, 1973.

Haiti

Agreement amending the agreement of October 19 and November 3, 1971, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 13 and 23, 1973. Entered into force November 23, 1973.

Khmer Republic

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of July 25, 1973 (TIAS 7703). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh November 10, 1973. Entered into force November 10, 1973.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of July 25, 1973 (TIAS 7703). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh November 15, 1973. Entered into force November 15, 1973.

Mexico

Agreement relating to the provision by the United States of technical assistance in an epidemiological study of drug abuse in Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico October 26 and November 7, 1973. Entered into force November 7, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo October 18 and 26, 1973. Entered into force October 26, 1973.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of September 10, 1973 (TIAS 7714). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad November 12, 1973. Entered into force November 12, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations. 25th annual report in the State Department's series of estimates of the strength of the Communist movement throughout the world, excluding the United States. It presents data available through December 1972. Pub. 8732. 158 pp. \$2.35. (Cat. No. S1.111:973).

The Washington Summit: General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the United States, June 18-21, 1973. Documentation relating to that visit reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin of July 23, 1973. Pub. 8733. European and British Commonwealth Series 79. 63 pp. 85¢. (Cat. No. S1.74:79).

United States Troop Levels in Europe. This Current Foreign Policy series pamphlet is the text of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush's testimony on July 25, 1973, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organizations. Pub. 8737. European and British Commonwealth Series 80. 7 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S1.74:80).

Aviation—Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in Iceland. Agreements amending the agreement done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as amended. TIAS 7633. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7633).

National Guard Modernization Program. Memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 7634. 8 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7634).

Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations on Behalf of Third Parties. Agreement with Guatemala. TIAS 7636. 4 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7636).

Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation—Regulations. Protocol, with regulations, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7637. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7637).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Korea amending the agreement of April 12, 1973. TIAS 7638. 3 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7638).

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)—Monitoring Premises and Installations. Agreement with Paraguay. TIAS 7639. 5 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7639).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan relating to the agreement of May 6, 1970, as amended and extended. TIAS 7640. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7640).

Consular Relations. Convention with the Hungarian People's Republic. TIAS 7641. 89 pp. 90¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7641).

Consular Relations. Convention and protocol with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 7642. 85 pp. 85¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7642).

Consular Relations. Convention and protocol with the Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 7643. 52 pp. 55¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7643).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with El Salvador amending the agreement of April 19, 1972. TIAS 7644. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7644).

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products With Macao. Agreement with Portugal correcting the agreement of December 22, 1972. TIAS 7645. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7645).

Economic Assistance for Relief and Rehabilitation. Agreements with Bangladesh amending the agreement of May 30, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7646. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7646).

Whaling—International Observer Scheme. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 7647. 16 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7647).

Trade in Cotton Textiles With Macao. Agreement with Portugal amending the agreement of December 22, 1972. TIAS 7648. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7648).

Cultural Relations—Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields. General agreement, with annex, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7649. 44 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7649).

Cooperation in Agriculture. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7650. 13 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7650).

Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7651. 11 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7651).

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Atomic Energy—Scientific and Technical Cooperation for Peaceful Uses. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7655. 12 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7655).

US-USSR Chamber of Commerce. Protocol with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7656. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7656).

Commercial Facilities. Protocol with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7657. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7657).

Air Transport Services. Protocol with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the agreement of November 4, 1966, as amended. TIAS 7658. 13 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7658).

Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle Atlantic Ocean. Agreement with the Polish People's Republic extending and amending the agreement of June 13, 1970, as extended. TIAS 7659. 59 pp. 60¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7659).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Ireland amending the agreement of February 3, 1945, as amended. TIAS 7660. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7660).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Ireland. TIAS 7661. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7661).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Ireland. TIAS 7662. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7662).

Fisheries—Consideration of Claims Resulting From Damage to Fishing Vessels or Gear and Measures to Prevent Fishing Conflicts. Protocol with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adding annex II to the agreement of February 21, 1973. TIAS 7663. 15 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7663).

Fisheries—Certain Fisheries Problems on the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7664. 22 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7664).

Mutual Defense Assistance—Cash Contribution by Japan. Arrangement with Japan relating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. TIAS 7665. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7665).

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products With Macao. Agreement with Portugal amending the agreement of December 22, 1972. TIAS 7666. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7666).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Colombia amending the agreement of April 24, 1973. TIAS 7667. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7667).

Atomic Energy. Amendment to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 7668. 13 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7668).

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Brazil. TIAS 7669. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7669).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan amending the agreement of September 21, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7670. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7670).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sri Lanka (Ceylon) amending the agreement of July 19, 1962. TIAS 7671. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7671).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia. TIAS 7672. 11 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7672).

Cooperation in Combating Illicit International Traffic in Narcotics and Other Dangerous Drugs—Grant of Equipment and Commodities. Agreement with Lebanon. TIAS 7673. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7673).

Tracking Station. Arrangement with Canada supplementing the agreement of December 20, 1971, and February 23, 1972. TIAS 7678. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7678).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on November 20 confirmed the following nominations:

O. Rudolph Aggrey to be Ambassador to the Republic of Senegal and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia.

William H. Donaldson to be Under Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance Programs.

Carlyle E. Maw to be Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

John M. Thomas to be an Assistant Secretary of State [for Administration].

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Nov. 26-Dec. 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to November 26 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 413 of November 16.

No.	Date	Subject
*425	11/26	Donaldson sworn in as Under Secretary for Security Assistance (biographic data).
*426	11/27	Maw sworn in as Legal Adviser (biographic data).
*427	11/29	Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, organizational session, New York, Dec. 3-14.
*428	11/29	U.S. and Egypt extend cotton textile agreement.
*429	11/29	U.S. and Pakistan amend cotton textile agreement.
*430	11/29	S. Jay Walker, professor of English and chairman of black studies program, Dartmouth, to lecture in West Africa.
*431	11/30	Rush: House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
*432	11/30	Kissinger: letter to Nobel Peace Prize Committee.
+433	11/30	Kissinger: remarks at reception honoring Chiefs of Mission, Nov. 29.

* Not printed.

+ Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXIX • No. 1800 • December 24, 1973

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OF DECEMBER 6 753

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXIX, No. 18

December 24, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 6

Press release 442 dated December 6

Secretary Kissinger: With your agreement, ladies and gentlemen, I thought we could do the press conference in two parts. As you know, some appointments were announced at the White House— [Interrupted by sound of tape recorder rewind.] I have known about the Washington Post all along [laughter], but this is the first time they carry it into a press conference [laughter].

Mr. [Murrey] Marder: We are doing a tape on you, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought this was a tape of one of your editorial conferences. [Laughter.]

Mr. Marder: No—that would come through much more clearly. No need to stop.

Secretary Kissinger: Not on your editorial page.

Some appointments were announced at the White House this morning. I thought I'd go over those briefly for the benefit of this group, take some questions about those appointments, and then go on to the substantive part, if that is agreeable to you.

Now, with respect to the announcements that were made at the White House today, a total of nine nominations were announced—three ambassadorial and six departmental.

The President has nominated the following as Ambassadors: David Popper as Ambassador to Chile, David Newsom as Ambassador to Indonesia, and Walter Stoessel as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Popper is currently Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. In this position, he did a distinguished job in handling the Middle East at the United Nations from this end.

He is a Foreign Service officer with the rank of Career Minister and served previously as Ambassador to Cyprus.

David Newsom, who is currently Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, is being nominated to succeed Francis Galbraith as Ambassador to Indonesia. As you know, Ambassador Newsom has served admirably in his current position in bringing the importance of Africa to the attention of the country and in conducting his office in a manner which won him the award, the 1973 Rockefeller Public Service Award yesterday, of which the Department of State is extremely proud.

As Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the President is nominating Walter Stoessel, an old friend—if I may say so, student—from Harvard. He has had extensive experience in European and Soviet affairs since entering the Foreign Service in 1942. His nomination underlines the importance we attach to the ambassadorship in the Soviet Union.

Now, turning to departmental appointments. As Counselor of the Department of State, the President intends to nominate Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is a class 1 Foreign Service officer, has been a close associate of mine on the National Security Council staff. Prior to that, he has held a number of positions in the Department of State. He was recently confirmed by the Senate Finance Committee for the position of Under Secretary of Treasury. He will work as Counselor obviously on matters—such matters as may be assigned to him—but he will particularly concentrate on European relations, SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR), the sort of problems he worked on also previously.

As Ambassador at Large, the President is nominating Robert McCloskey, presently Ambassador to Cyprus. I do not have to introduce Ambassador McCloskey to this group. He will be given various negotiating responsibilities and other assignments on an ad hoc basis. In addition, he will have overall supervision of the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bureau of Congressional Relations, and the Office of Press Relations.

As Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the President is nominating Donald B. Easum, presently Ambassador to Upper Volta, with considerable experience in both African and Latin American affairs, and one of the ablest young Foreign Service officers.

As Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, the President is nominating Arthur Hartman to succeed Walter Stoessel. Mr. Hartman is presently Deputy Chief of Mission to the European Community, worked in the State Department Secretariat, and has wide experience in European affairs and a good background in economic matters.

As Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, the President is nominating William B. Buffum, presently Ambassador to Lebanon. He has had exceptional experience in the U.N. and international organization affairs.

As Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, the President is nominating Thomas Enders to succeed Willis C. Armstrong. Mr. Armstrong has served as the head of this Bureau with distinction since he returned from retirement in 1972.

Mr. Enders is presently our Chargé in Phnom Penh, one of the ablest young Foreign Service officers, who has, under extremely difficult conditions, performed in a remarkable fashion in Phnom Penh. He has also an exceptional record in the economics field.

I would like to say a word about two fine officers who have elected to resign from their posts. William Casey, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, has informed me of his intention to assume the position of President of the Export-Import Bank. As you

know, this is a most prestigious and important post, one well suited for a man of such exceptional talents as William Casey. I regret that he is departing, but wish him every success in his new assignment.

Joseph Sisco's resignation as Assistant Secretary of State and retirement from the Foreign Service was announced yesterday. I need hardly emphasize how deeply I regret his departure. His career has been characterized by tireless work and splendid performance. In the last two months, Mr. Sisco has been an invaluable source of strength for this country, for the President, for the Department, and for me personally. He has agreed to remain in his present assignment for another several months before going on to assume the presidency of Hamilton College.

I intend to recommend to the President individuals to succeed Messrs. Casey and Sisco in the near future.

Now I will be glad to take some questions on personnel, and then I will go on to substantive questions. Do you want to wait for that?

Q. A question on personnel. You had expected to name an Ambassador to Tokyo shortly. What's the outlook for that now?

Secretary Kissinger: I nearly said within a week. [Laughter.] We consider the Embassy in Tokyo one of the most important assignments in the government, and we are looking for the best man. We are not yet ready to make an announcement.

Q. Has the President withdrawn Mr. Sonnenfeldt's nomination as Under Secretary so there won't need to be a vote in the Senate? And will he have to be confirmed by the Senate for the new job?

Secretary Kissinger: He will have to be confirmed by the Senate for the new job. He will be put before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and after that the entire Senate will have an opportunity to vote on Mr. Sonnenfeldt; and we are confident that a man of his distinction will be confirmed rapidly.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there is now no Ambassador to Sweden, or even a DCM. Is it your intention to fill that post?

Secretary Kissinger: I promised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we would review the question of relations with Sweden at the time that we are reviewing all other ambassadorial appointments. And I will keep that promise.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in the light of Mr. Sisco's distinguished service, can you tell us what efforts were made to hold him, to retain him?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Sisco felt that he was—of course Mr. Sisco should speak for himself. My understanding is that Mr. Sisco felt that he was at a time in his life where if he ever was going to make a change to a senior administrative position in academic life this was the appropriate moment to do it and maybe the last moment to do it. I attempted to dissuade him from this. He has assured me that it was only the importance of the assignment on which he was working that made him hesitate.

I can only emphasize again that I'm losing a trusted colleague and a valued friend. But I'm also certain that he will be consulted frequently.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you explain how Secretary Shultz was persuaded to defer taking Mr. Sonnenfeldt as his Under Secretary of the Treasury and what criteria were behind the administration's decision to take him into the Department of State instead?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, as those of you who know him can confirm, is not exactly a chattel that gets passed from hand to hand, and he has been known to express strong views about what he would intend. So finally the decision was left up to Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

It was thought that, given the extraordinary importance that we attach to the SALT talks, to the MBFR discussions, and to our relationship with Europe, and given the policy of having some individuals on the 7th floor responsible for the range of issues

of interdepartmental significance, Mr. Sonnenfeldt had unique qualifications for that position.

I'm delighted that I managed to persuade him to accept this position. Secretary Shultz would have been delighted, as he should have been, to have Mr. Sonnenfeldt associated with him at the Treasury, but he recognized also that Mr. Sonnenfeldt can make a very major contribution here.

Middle East Peace Conference

Now let me turn to substance. Let me make a few comments on the Middle East and on my forthcoming trip, and then let me answer your questions.

On the Middle East, the last time I met with this group I indicated that we might be able to make a formal announcement as to the time and place of the conference in a relatively brief period of time. I seem to have an obsession with weeks, and I think I indicated that it would be done in a week.

The fact is that we consider it extremely probable that the conference will begin on December 18 in Geneva. There are some technical details to be worked out as to the form of invitation, as to the nature of the invitations, and matters of this kind. We believe them to be relatively easily soluble, and we're in touch with the parties now as well as with the Soviet Union and the [U.N.] Secretary General to work out the appropriate procedure. But we have no reason at this point to doubt that the conference will take place in the manner in which I have indicated.

We believe that once the conference starts, a negotiating process will be underway which, dealing first with issues of a military nature and then turning to the overall settlement, will bring about a settlement in accordance with Resolution 242. And the United States, as I have stated repeatedly, will use its influence to bring about such a settlement.

With respect to my trip to the NATO meeting, obviously there has been some disagreement. Equally clearly, the Atlantic

alliance remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy, and I'm going there with the attitude that the need for starting and for giving a new impetus of Atlantic relationship remains and that the United States will spare no effort to inject new vitality, creativity, and hope into the Atlantic relationship. I'm not going in an attitude of confrontation and acrimony.

I'll be glad to answer questions.

Q. In light of the breakoff of kilometer 101 talks, the Israeli forces being in a high state of alert, the continued oil squeeze, what reasons, as specifically as you can be, do you have for expecting a constructive peace conference in Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: The kilometer 101 talks concerned the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. And while we regret that they have been broken off, we believe that the issues that were raised at this conference are soluble and can be dealt with particularly when other countries can play a more active role in relation to them.

The high state of alert of both sides is, to a considerable extent, produced by the military dispositions that now exist. Both sides have their forces in the rear of the other. And both sides are in danger of imminent encirclement if military operations resume. Therefore the penalty for being surprised is extremely serious. This calls attention to the fact that there is a need of a separation of forces that reduces this danger. And I believe that the experience of the last two months will have brought this home to both of the parties.

With respect to the oil embargo, I have stated our position at the last press conference, which is that we understand the Arab point of view. The United States prior to October 6 perhaps did not see the situation with the same degree of urgency as some of the Arab countries. And we can understand also the decisions that were made during military operations.

Now that the United States is taking an active part in the negotiations and has affirmed that it will work for an implementa-

tion of Security Council Resolution 242, we continue to believe that discriminatory measures against the United States and pressures are no longer appropriate, and we are talking in that sense to those Arab nations with which we are in contact.

The Atlantic Alliance

Q. Mr. Secretary, you've spoken with regard to your NATO visit, the obvious disagreements which exist there. Of course you've got the biggest piece of real estate pulled out of there some time ago, as far as the military went, France. Now you've had the damage—if such is the right word—damage done by the different view some of the NATO countries took of the Middle East situation than we did.

My question is, how easy—and this is difficult to say, I know—but how easy do you think that this can be repaired? And how much will it depend not on what you do at NATO now but what you do at Geneva later?

Secretary Kissinger: First, it is clear, as I pointed out last time, that there are a number of significant disagreements in the alliance—some of them produced by style, some of them produced by the fact that some of our allies have been absorbed with bringing about European unity while we have naturally put more emphasis on Atlantic unity, and some of them produced by a different view with respect to Middle East policy.

I believe that we will be able in the discussions—taking the last point first—on the Middle East to make clear that this was not a difference in tactics but perhaps a different assessment as to what was at stake—the relationship between what was at stake to the energy crisis, and the possibilities that existed for individual action.

I believe that the discussions that may take place at NATO can contribute to clarifying the points of view. In any event, whatever happens at the NATO meeting can only be the beginning of a process; it cannot bring about a final resolution.

Now, obviously what happens in the Mid-

dle East—even more importantly, the perceptions of the two sides about the relationship of what happens in the Middle East to their energy problem—will greatly affect the vitality of the relationship in the long term. We believe that the energy problem is accentuated by the Arab-Israeli conflict but that it has much deeper sources, the most important of which is that demand has outrun the incentives for supply and that it is an aspect of the rapid industrialization of the developed nations.

Resumption of "Kilometer 101 Talks"

Q. Mr. Secretary, we were told earlier this week that the 101 talks might be resumed by week's end. Now probably something has happened to change your estimate of that; and we hear that the Israeli Defense Minister may be delayed in getting to Washington to talk to you. And we hear about reports today of Israeli and Egyptian planes being shot down. What has happened, and do you think it now likely that the cease-fire could come apart and jeopardize the holding of that conference?

Secretary Kissinger: In a situation in which the forces are as closely mixed as they are and in which we of course do not control the decisions of either side, any prediction is somewhat hazardous. We do not believe that the cease-fire will come apart and that the conference will be jeopardized. But I must repeat: I must add the caveat that we do not of course control the decisions.

As for the delay of the arrival of the Israeli Defense Minister, all I have is the news ticker. I don't know what caused it. We have not been officially informed that he is in fact delaying his arrival; and I expect to get some official notification, if there is a delay in his meeting with me, which was scheduled for tomorrow, later in the day.

The resumption of the 101 talks really depends on the assessment both sides make of what should be done in the 101 talks and what should be done later at the conference. This is no conclusive indication of the difficulty of making progress; it may simply be

a decision as to the venue at which some of these issues will be discussed.

Q. Sir, do you expect the 101 talks to resume before December 18, or do you think that whole operation will be transferred to Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure whether they will be resumed. It is one of the issues we want to discuss. At any rate, the subject matter of those talks—if the talks are not resumed before Geneva—will of course require the most urgent consideration at Geneva.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you have two job descriptions but basically this single function of being the architect of U.S. foreign policy, I'm wondering if Henry Kissinger, as Secretary of State, now finds himself at odds with Henry Kissinger of the NSC on the question of what is properly held secret. And this is by way of asking if the Secretary of State is now prepared to tell the nation in precise detail the reasons for the October alert when perhaps the chief of the Security Council is not.

Secretary Kissinger: You're trying to institutionalize schizophrenia. [Laughter.]

The hesitation about going into all the details was produced by the fact that we did not think that it would be helpful in the present situation, when we're trying to bring about a settlement cooperatively with the Soviet Union, to re-create a spirit of confrontation of a rather intense 36-hour period.

As many news reports have pointed out, we formed the view, on the basis of evidence that seemed to us conclusive, that there was a possibility of a unilateral Soviet move in the Middle East. And this was reinforced by certain communications that we received.

A military alert, moreover, should be clearly understood. We went from defense condition V to defense condition III—which is that defense condition I is imminence of hostilities. So this was not a very high state of alert; it is the state of alert in which the Pacific Command is at all times. So there was no additional alert taken in the Pacific.

The Strategic Air Command is always in defense condition IV, so that was only a slight increase in its readiness. And all an alert does is to prepare our forces in case they would be needed; it has no other practical consequence.

It was produced by what we thought would have been a very significant move, the first time that Soviet combat forces were introduced into an area not contiguous to the Soviet Union and for reasons not connected with the preservation of a Socialist regime. And therefore it was a matter taken extremely seriously.

We have never published the details of correspondence between the President and the General Secretary, because if we once start this process every exchange will be written from the point of view of its impact later. And we have given as much of our reasoning as we could, and we have given a more detailed chronology to certain congressional committees.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to get back, if I could, for a moment to the oil situation, which is such a vital concern of the American people. There have been a number of reports in the last day or so that there may be consideration of a phased return of oil supplies to the United States in return for a phased Israeli withdrawal. Now, you yourself are reported to have indicated to Egyptian President Sadat on your last trip that any Middle East settlement is likely to take a fairly long period of time, perhaps as long as a year or two. In view of that, is the phased-withdrawal idea the best hope that the American people have of getting a return of these vital oil supplies?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, when I saw President Sadat, we were alone. And what you are referring to is a conversation at a dinner party with an Egyptian editor of a somewhat enthusiastic frame of mind. You cannot conclude from that that this is necessarily the discussion I had with President Sadat.

We have not engaged in a public discussion as to the methods by which the oil

embargo might be mitigated, because we recognize that this is also a difficult problem for the Arab countries that have to make the decision.

Our basic philosophy was stated in the last press conference here, which is that we do not think it is helpful for us to negotiate, prior to a conference which will address these questions, a separate agreement relating oil to particular issues at the conference table. And I have stated our general philosophy earlier.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you detected any change in the Arab policy on oil?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we will have to let events speak for themselves. You all heard Minister Yamani [Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth] when he appeared yesterday. And while we are in the process of engaging in these discussions, before my trip I don't think I want to speculate on that.

War Powers Legislation

Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject—we have seen a resurgence of military activity in Viet-Nam. Do you foresee any possible introduction of U.S. combat forces in Viet-Nam, either through use of the war powers legislation or through any other form of current or future legislation?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the war powers legislation, there has been speculation that the war powers legislation supersedes existing legislation. It is a question that was asked of me in executive session in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I promised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we would make a legal study. Our Legal Adviser has concluded that the war powers legislation does not supersede any existing legislation, and we will notify the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to that effect in a formal letter.

Therefore any military action that would be contemplated would be taken only in accordance with the provisions of both the

joint resolution and existing legislation—in other words, would be fully discussed by the Congress.

Q. Does that mean, sir, that if there was a decision by the administration to reintroduce forces that it would seek new legislation or simply consult over the existing status. I don't quite follow you—because the existing legislation, I believe, does foreclose the reintroduction of any U.S. combat forces into Indochina.

Secretary Kissinger: Without congressional approval—that is correct. And that is what we would seek.

Q. Would that require new legislation, in your judgment?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it would require whatever form the Congress expresses its approval. But we do not foresee this as an imminent possibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with the confirmation of a new Vice President, there is increased congressional discussion about the possibility of impeachment of the President or of the President possibly resigning. How does this discussion of impeachment and resignation affect the conduct of foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have pointed out at two previous press conferences that the constant—to the degree that the authority of those who have the constitutional responsibility for conducting foreign policy is being drawn into question by whatever process, it complicates the task of foreign policy and it creates long-term dangers.

I might say one other thing—one thing to Mr. O'Leary [Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington Star-News], which is that as Secretary of State, as I said in my confirmation hearing and as I have attempted to practice, I do recognize the importance of openness and of maximum disclosure.

Q. May I follow this up. You mentioned Sheikh Yamani. When he came out I think he said that once Israel had agreed to a timetable and begins to pull back, the restrictions on the oil shipments would be grad-

ually eased. It seems it may be an ambiguous statement. How do you understand that? Does Israel have to agree to the total pull-back although only taking initial steps before the shipments are partially resumed?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think also that the Minister pointed out that we both expressed our views frankly and I believe he said “constructively,” which usually means that we did not necessarily agree to each other's formulas precisely.

Soviet Union in Middle East Diplomacy

Q. Two brief questions. One, the Soviet Union has more or less slipped into the background of the Middle East diplomacy.

Secretary Kissinger: Has done what?

Q. Has more or less slipped into the background of the Middle East diplomacy. What sort of helpful role are they playing in this conference between the Israelis and the Arabs?

The second question is, I noticed in your explanation of departmental appointments that you frequently used the word “young” and that indeed many of the people you are appointing are relatively junior Foreign Service officers. Are you signaling something to the senior Foreign Service officers?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first question—as I pointed out at previous press conferences, the Soviet Union, as I suppose all participants in the diplomacy in the Middle East, has various incentives produced by their existing associations. We did not consider some of the actions that the Soviet Union has taken constructive. We believe that in setting up the conference, and in helping to define possible agendas, participation, framework, the Soviet Union has played a constructive role. A settlement in the Middle East cannot be carried out without the Soviet Union, the principal supplier of arms to several of the participants—and given its close association with and friendship with several of the countries. And if the Soviet Union attempted to push extremist solutions,

it would make a settlement extremely difficult.

Now, up to now most of the discussions have been procedural. And I cannot form a final judgment as to what the Soviet Union will do once the conference has actually opened. As far as we are concerned, we will try to give a maximum encouragement to a moderate course, and we will cooperate if a moderate position is adopted. And if the behavior in the procedural phase is carried over into the substantive phase, then I think it will be extremely helpful.

As far as the departmental appointments are concerned, I stated from the beginning that it is one of my principal objectives in coming to the Department of State not simply to conduct foreign policy effectively from my office but to create a tradition in the Foreign Service and a discipline so that future administrations can rely on this organization and so that the debate that has gone on on where the locus of foreign policy responsibility should be will be settled by the professionalism, the discipline, and the dedication of the existing institution. And therefore I am trying to see to it—and my associates, the new Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the Director General of the Foreign Service, are fully supporting it—to see to it that younger officers are promoted rapidly and get into key positions. There is no disrespect to other officers, who will be judged on their performance and not on their age.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you and other officials have pointed out that the United States is the one country in touch with all sides in the Middle East. You also pointed out in your last press conference, which you quoted here, that if the oil embargo continues for any length of time the United States would have to consider countermeasures. Would the United States consider withdrawing from Middle East diplomacy if this oil embargo continues?

Secretary Kissinger: The particular answer to which you refer occurred about two-thirds through the press conference as a re-

sponse to questions. It was not volunteered by me.

What the United States might do if other countries treat it unreasonably, or what we consider unreasonably, we will leave until that situation arises.

We believe very strongly that a constructive settlement in the Middle East will not result from an attitude of confrontation between the Arabs and the United States, but from an attitude of cooperation between the United States and Arab countries. And this is the attitude with which we are approaching the negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you perceive is going to be the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the conference? Do you expect them to participate from the start of the conference, or do you leave this to the parties to decide?

Secretary Kissinger: The question of the Palestinians has at least three aspects. One is, who speaks for the Palestinians in general? Secondly, what is their relationship at the conference to Jordan, to Israel, and the other parties? And thirdly, what are the concrete terms that are going to be advanced for the solution of the Palestinian question?

Our view is, with respect to the participation of the Palestinians and the role they might play at the conference, that this would best be settled by the parties at the conference. With respect to the specific terms, this of course also will have to be discussed at the conference. Some relationship will have to be found between the rights of Palestinians, to which the United States has made reference in several international documents, and the limitations of absorption in the mandated territory of Palestine.

Mr. Gwertzman [Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times].

Q. A year ago at this time you were deeply engaged in Viet-Nam negotiations. It was rather secret, with a sort of semipublic aspect to it. How do you find yourself at this time in the Middle East diplomacy—what differences do you find in the two situations,

and do you expect once the negotiations start that there will be both a highly secret aspect as well as a sort of public forum?

Secretary Kissinger: Anyone who has to negotiate with three Vietnamese and five Middle East parties in one year qualifies for some sort of medical help after some period.

But there are a number of differences.

In Viet-Nam we were one of the principal parties, and our actions could directly control major decisions. In the Middle East, this is not the case. In Viet-Nam, the issues, while extremely complex, were nevertheless rather finite. In the Middle East, they affect many other nations, and they have even greater complexities than they do in Viet-Nam.

Procedurally, I would assume that once the conference organizes itself, there will be formal sessions and less public negotiations. And if my experience is any indication, the real progress is apt to be made in the less public forums.

Guarantees in Middle East

Q. Dr. Kissinger, yesterday we were told in response to a question at the daily briefing that you might, in the end, find mutually acceptable the notion that the ultimate guarantee of a peace agreement might be a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force in the Middle East, and making the distinction that—

Secretary Kissinger: He was running some sort of shop there that I didn't know about—

Q. But making the distinction that we are talking about a new arrangement after a peace agreement—not the UNEF or UNTSO [United Nations Emergency Force; United Nations Truce Supervision Organization]—is it possible that in the end, a joint U.S.-Soviet peace force might occur to you to be a mutually—or acceptable from your side?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to undermine the self-confidence of Mr. Vest [George S. Vest, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations], but I haven't actually

read the text of that particular remark.

We are prepared to consider the question of guarantees in its broadest sense, and we are willing to examine any idea that any of the parties might put forward as to what would constitute adequate guarantees.

We believe, however, that the issue of guarantees can be faced in detail only after a settlement has been reached, and on security arrangements between the parties; that is to say, such issues as demilitarized zones, joint inspection teams, and so forth, that might constitute the body of the security arrangements between the parties. Then we will know what it is that outside countries should guarantee.

Now the question of U.S. and Soviet guarantees, or anybody else's guarantee, has two aspects: one, the formal guarantee; second, the force that might be used to implement it.

We are prepared to consider—I said to “consider,” not necessarily to agree—either individual or joint guarantees.

As to the permanent stationing of U.S. and Soviet forces in the Middle East, we are somewhat dubious. We do not rule it out totally, but we are reluctant to get into this, and our position there was expressed at the Security Council discussions that formed the UNEF. But I think we can make a more reasonable decision on the nature of guarantees after the other elements of the settlement are in place.

Maintenance of Viet-Nam Settlement

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your earlier peacekeeping effort, or peacemaking effort, in Viet-Nam and Indochina, there appears to be some question whether it will be able to hold together under “nibbling” operations and one thing and another. Would you give us your assessment, please, of what might be expected there?

Secretary Kissinger: In Indochina?

Q. In Indochina.

Secretary Kissinger: There is always when one discusses Indochina or any other settlement—one has to understand that no

settlement is self-enforcing. It is not possible to write an agreement whose terms in themselves guarantee its permanence. Any agreement will last if the hostility of the parties is thereby lessened, if the parties have an incentive to observe it and/or if the parties pay a penalty for breaking it.

If those three conditions are not met, no matter what the terms of the agreement there is a tendency toward erosion. In Viet-Nam, in civil war conditions, the hostility of the parties does not significantly lessen. The incentives and penalties have been affected by many events of the past year, with which you are familiar.

So at this moment a great deal depends on the perception of the two sides of the existing military balance. And we have succeeded with a settlement—not in guaranteeing necessarily a permanent peace, but in moving the decision to a Vietnamese decision, which is what we always said our objective was. And we believe that there is a possibility of maintaining the peace within that framework.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, following up the remark that you just made, you spoke of "civil war" conditions in Viet-Nam. Does this mean that the United States now regards the hostilities between North and South Viet-Nam as a civil war?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The conditions in Viet-Nam—the psychological conditions are those of a civil war in the sense that they are people of the same general nationality fighting for the control of political power.

And the conflict between the Saigon government and the NLF [National Liberation Front] is the civil war part of it. We of course consider the infiltration of North Vietnamese forces, in total violation of article 7 of the agreement, an international event and not a civil war action.

U.N. "Consensus" on Korea

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to turn to the question concerning Korea.

Quite accidentally, in the wake of your recent trip to Asia, a trip through Peking,

Tokyo, and Seoul, the United Nations General Assembly adopted what is called a consensus statement last month—actually delaying the discussion of Korea for another year, but at the same time assigning the task of resolving the Korean question to the Koreans themselves alone.

Now, I would like to have your assessment about the U.N. decision. How do you think the North and South Koreans themselves could resolve their own questions without taking what the United Nations—while the United Nations, is it still deeply involved in the Korean question? For example, by keeping the United Nations Command there.

And my second question is, quite recently senior State Department officials often referred to an alternative to the cease-fire agreement, including William—Under Secretary William Porter and Ambassador John Scali, who almost successively said that they could become willing to explore such an alternative to the present cease-fire agreement—what does the State Department have in mind, in referring to that alternative?

Secretary Kissinger: We have encouraged and we continue to encourage the talks between North and South Korea that started, leading at first, we hope, to mitigating the conditions of confrontation that exist on the Korean Peninsula and perhaps ultimately to a political solution.

The consensus resolution did not take the United Nations out of concern with the question of Korea. It deferred a debate this year, and no doubt in subsequent years the issue can be re-raised by either of the parties that feels that inadequate consideration has been given to their views.

We consider the consensus resolution a constructive step taken by both sides, in which a partial progress was made on some issues such as the UNCURK [United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea] issue and in which some other issues were left for further discussion and later elaboration—and particularly those that concerned the two Korean parties themselves.

As my two associates pointed out, we do

not have a closed mind on arrangements that were made 20 years ago, and we are prepared to discuss them—first, of course, with our ally in Korea and then with other interested parties—to see how they can be adapted to current conditions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you attach special importance to your trip through Syria in view of the question of the Israeli prisoners of war?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United States of course believes that a release of prisoners of war is an essential part of the cease-fire agreement, and we have made our view known to the parties. As to the specific topics that will be raised on particular stops, I don't think it would be appropriate for me to discuss them.

Secretary Kissinger Honors Washington Diplomatic Corps

*Remarks by Secretary Kissinger*¹

Ladies and gentlemen: The reason for this event is that in the standard operating procedure of the State Department, the new Secretary of State is supposed to be introduced to the diplomatic corps at an early opportunity. I had a party in New York for the U.N. Permanent Representatives and other distinguished visitors—and 36 hours afterward, the war in the Middle East broke out. That has made me a little bit reluctant to have another affair.

Of course I know why my associates arranged this—because being familiar with my retiring nature, they thought there was no other way for me to become acquainted with you all.

Now, we have on this occasion invited not

only the diplomats but Congressmen and Senators as well. Congressmen and diplomats have at least this in common: They both report home about what goes on in Washington. As Dean Acheson used to say, he had never read a report in which the writer lost an argument.

Now, I expect that after tonight Congressmen will relate that diplomats were drinking openly and talking secretly, while the diplomats will cable home that the Congressmen were talking openly but drinking secretly.

Washington is a city that has evoked mixed enthusiasm among those who, like us, voluntarily or involuntarily take up residence here. President Kennedy reportedly called it a town of southern efficiency and northern charm.

Foreign visitors have often looked upon the town with a jaundiced eye. Nearly a century ago, James Bryce, once British Ambassador to Washington, called it a "city without commerce or manufactures," where "political intrigue and semipolitical intrigue is the only gainful occupation." He had seen nothing.

Bryce spent much of his life seeking to understand America and Americans and seeking to convey this understanding to a non-American audience. With the knowledge he gained, he said that if a hundred times he was disheartened by something about America, "a hundred times the recollection of the abounding strength and vitality of this nation chased away these tremors."

Like De Tocqueville before him, Bryce not only gave others an appreciation of America; he also gave Americans an understanding of themselves.

We are not so presumptuous as to expect others to follow in Bryce's footsteps as chroniclers of this nation. But we do want others to know what Bryce knew—that from Washington alone, it is impossible to appreciate fully the vitality, the durability, and the diversity of this nation.

In our Congress, which is represented here, we have an institution that can provide diplomats as well as Secretaries of State with that knowledge.

¹ Made at a reception hosted by Secretary Kissinger at the Department of State on Nov. 29 honoring the diplomatic corps (press release 433 dated Nov. 30).

It is important that we all meet here because we are at one of those rare moments in history where it is possible to bring about a new international order and a new period of peace. We hear a great deal at this time of war and conflict about balance of power and the necessity of strength. And of course the security of nations is of paramount importance. But the predominant goal of our age is to move from a peace based on security to a peace based on a sense of community, in which all nations have a share and which all nations want to keep because they consider it their own.

This is the principal task this administration has set for itself. It is a task that will not be finished in one administration and which must be carried on by our successors, and it is therefore a challenge that we believe is bipartisan in nature within this country and which cannot be completed without the participation and, I may say, the enthusiasm of other countries.

We believe that we cannot fail, for history is replete with opportunities unused and challenges ignored. It is the responsibility of all our governments to assure that the future does not recall our period of stewardship with the words of the poet:

Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Towards the door we never opened

Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you here tonight with us in assuring that what will echo in memory will be the magnitude of what we strove for, not the failure of our spirit, and that future generations will remember that we moved the world over a new threshold into an era of stability and peace.

United States Mourns Death of David Ben-Gurion

David Ben-Gurion, former Prime Minister of Israel, died at Tel Aviv on December 1. Following are texts of a statement issued by President Nixon and a message sent by Secretary Kissinger to Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel that day.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON

White House press release dated December 1

It was with the deepest sorrow that I learned of the death of David Ben-Gurion.

With courage, love, and determination, David Ben-Gurion worked to establish the modern State of Israel. As we move forward in the struggle for justice and peace, we take from the example of his life increased conviction that cause will triumph.

The people of America join with the people of Israel in mourning the passing of a gallant man. As we shared his ideals and hopes, not only for Israel but for all mankind, so we share in their loss.

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER TO PRIME MINISTER MEIR

Press release 435 dated December 3

DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER: In sadness, I convey the deepest sympathy of America. David Ben-Gurion carried the hopes of his people into the hearts of ours. We shall not forget him.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

A New Era in U.S.-Latin American Relations

Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush¹

I am greatly honored to have been invited to address this distinguished group of leaders in the private sector. As you know, much of my working life has been in the world of business and with an international emphasis. So I feel particularly at home addressing this group.

I have now spent over four years in government, first in Germany and more recently in Washington. I recall that when I was in the private sector, I used to get impatient at times with "those people down in Washington." I couldn't understand why those bureaucrats couldn't solve some of our problems quicker. The solutions seemed pretty obvious to me. After becoming a government official myself, I was surprised to see how suddenly the problems had become much more difficult.

I would like to talk to you today about relations between the United States and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and would like to suggest to you how our policy toward the Americas fits into the President's general approach to foreign affairs. What we have been trying to accomplish in our relations in the hemisphere is consistent with the very successful conduct of our foreign policy in other parts of the world.

Before discussing this administration's policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, a little history might help us put things in perspective.

Our relations with Latin America have been close and, for the most part, con-

structive. That is not to say that the course of those relations has always been smooth. Generally speaking, the closer people live together, the more contact they have with one another, the more likely it is that there will be problems. We see this in families and in communities. But it is also true that the rewards of belonging to a family and a community are very great.

I think it is a tribute to the nations of this hemisphere that we have been able for more than a century to face our common problems in a spirit of conciliation and cooperation. Indeed, the countries of the Americas have constructed over time a series of treaties, agreements, and institutions that have broken new ground in international relations.

This achievement has been all the more remarkable because one of the difficult facts of life in the Western Hemisphere has been that one nation—our own—has achieved political, economic, and military power to a degree which has overshadowed that of all other American Republics. The inter-American system has been by and large successful over the years in reconciling the greater power and resources of the United States with the principle that all members of the inter-American community are sovereign and equal states.

This achievement of the inter-American community has been based upon a consensus that the relationship between the United States and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean has been of value to all parties.

For the Latin Americans, the relationship has afforded them the protection of the

¹ Made before the Council of the Americas at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 5 (press release 440).

United States against military aggression from outside the hemisphere. It has also provided them with economic assistance from the United States.

From the U.S. point of view the relationship has also provided benefits. The other American nations have stood by the United States in its global struggles. The United States has also valued the inter-American relationship because through it we have been able to pursue our national interests by means of consultation, negotiation, and compromise rather than by unilateral action.

I am aware that some people would add to the list of U.S. benefits American economic penetration. In my judgment this is a misreading of history. U.S. policy toward Latin America has traditionally been dictated by strategic and political considerations. Our economic expansion in the Western Hemisphere, as elsewhere, has been spontaneous.

Changes on the Global Scene

As I have said, the success of the inter-American system has been based upon a consensus among the members of the system as to the principles and goals which should govern their relationships with one another and particularly the relationship between the United States and the rest of the American community. I think it is fair to say, however, that the rapid changes that have taken place in the world in recent years have tended to erode the Western Hemisphere consensus. Let me quickly review some of these changes on the global scene and how they have affected inter-American relations.

—First, with the success of President Nixon's policy of *détente* with major adversaries, the threat of aggression or subversion from outside the hemisphere has seemed in the eyes of many Latin Americans to have receded.

—Second, new doctrines about national security have taken hold in many Latin American countries. These new concepts hold that national security depends primarily upon their countries' economic and social development and only secondarily on conventional defenses against foreign military invasion. This has led some Latin Americans to the

view that economic cooperation which they receive from the United States should be obligatory and unconditional.

—Third, there are some Latin American nations whose economic development has been so rapid that they are moving out of the ranks of the underdeveloped and closer to the status of developed countries. In other words, there is much greater diversity among Latin American nations in regard to their needs and objectives with regard to the United States.

For our part, our attitudes toward Latin America have also been affected by the changes in the world, in the hemisphere, and in our own position. We have come to realize that we no longer have a monopoly on economic power and that our resources are not unlimited. The rise of Western Europe and Japan to the status of economic superpowers means that Latin America and the Caribbean should look not just to the United States but to all developed countries to provide the extra resources that the region needs for its development.

We have also come to appreciate the difficulty in devising one monolithic policy or set of policies for a group of 24 countries whose stages of political, economic, and social development are so diverse and whose relations with us vary so widely.

Finally, we have come to recognize that we cannot separate our many interests in the area one from another, that what happens in one arena—the seizure of a fishing boat or the expropriation of an American enterprise—affects our interests in another arena—economic development, for example.

If I were to sum up these changing perspectives in Latin America and the United States, I would say that Latin America's perception of its relationship with the United States has been shifting rapidly away from traditional security and political interests to focus on greater and broader economic interests at the same time that the U.S. ability to provide even greater and unconditional economic benefits has been declining. The possibilities for misunderstanding in this situation are evident.

Moreover, there has been for many years a growing dissatisfaction among Latin Americans and North Americans with the paternalistic aspects of their relationship. The dilemma which the American Republics have faced for some time has been how to reconcile Latin America's increasing needs for development assistance, new technology, and expanding foreign markets with the desire on both sides of the Equator to do away with any U.S. paternalism which might be associated with the provision of that assistance.

Administration's Response to the Challenge

These trends were already at work when President Nixon assumed office in 1969. Although some of these changes were at best dimly perceived at that time, the President, with his intuitive grasp for the underlying currents in international affairs, saw the challenge. In his landmark speech on Latin America in October 1969 he faced that challenge squarely. He called for an end to paternalism in the relations between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean. He asked for a new kind of relationship—a mature partnership.

This approach of the President to relations with the rest of the Americas has been entirely consistent with his general foreign policy. This policy is based upon the following principles:

1. Cooperation between the United States and its allies must be based upon a mutual perception of common interests, not a patron-client relationship.
2. Nations should take the lead in resolving those problems which are of primary concern to themselves. The United States cannot take more responsibility for another nation's problems than that nation itself is willing to take.
3. The role of the United States should be supportive. That is, it should supplement the efforts of other nations, not dominate them.
4. Our objectives can best be achieved through negotiation rather than confrontation.

The implications of this approach for U.S.

relations with Latin America and the Caribbean were spelled out by the President in his 1969 address. They can be summed up as a greater degree of Latin American initiative and much less U.S. suggestions or direction as to Latin Americans' political, economic, and social policies. The President pledged continued and broader U.S. support for Latin American development. This support, however, was to be based upon a recognition by both sides of mutual rights and obligations, rather than some sort of *noblesse oblige* by the United States.

The President's address of four years ago was a statement of intention on our part and a series of goals. The most important goal was a new relationship based on equality. The President did not—indeed, could not—provide a blueprint as to how this new relationship was to be achieved. That would have to be worked out as the United States and Latin America faced specific issues. In a sense, the past four years have been a search—a quest by the United States and the other countries of the hemisphere for a new basis for their relationship.

We must be frank to recognize that that search has at times been impeded by events. There have been problems on both sides:

—With the decline of the security threat in Latin America, the U.S. public has not seen clearly the basis for massive U.S. interest and involvement in the area.

—Our economic difficulties, particularly the deficits in our balance of payments and of trade and the devaluation of the dollar, have reduced congressional support for economic assistance. These problems also have caused a delay in introducing trade legislation of benefit to Latin America.

—Preoccupation in the United States with crises in other parts of the world has tended to hamper the dialogue between North American and Latin American leaders, and yet a dialogue is essential if a new relationship is to be forged.

—Sometimes our Latin American friends have not given sufficient weight to the enormous problems the United States has had to face in recent years. They have tended at

times to cling to old ways and old assumptions. When the United States has not responded promptly and fully to their demands, some have charged us with willful neglect or disinterest. Some have attempted to use inter-American agreements to legislate, rather than negotiate, U.S. policies.

Toward a New Dialogue

These problems in working out a new relationship with our friends and allies in Latin America and the Caribbean have not gone unnoticed by this administration. At the President's request, Secretary Rogers visited eight countries in Latin America and the Caribbean last May. He talked fully and frankly with the leaders of the region.

When Secretary Kissinger was nominated for his present post, he put Latin America high on his agenda and said so to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his hearings. He said he intended to reinvigorate our relations with the Latin American countries. Only a few days after his confirmation, the new Secretary spoke to a number of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors from Latin America and the Caribbean during the United Nations General Assembly in New York. He told them that he was undertaking an in-depth review of our policies and programs in Latin America, and he invited them to a dialogue on the issues in U.S.-Latin American relations.

The response to the Secretary's invitation to a dialogue was rapid and gratifying. At the initiative of several Foreign Ministers and particularly the Colombian Foreign Minister, a meeting was held in Bogotá in mid-November to discuss an agenda for the new dialogue with the United States. From our observation, the tone of the discussions at Bogotá was elevated and constructive. The agenda which the Latin American and Caribbean Ministers and their representatives have proposed faces difficult issues in their countries' relations with the United States frankly and squarely.

But the issues are posed as subjects for dialogue and negotiation, not recrimination or confrontation. The Foreign Minister of

Colombia met with the Secretary in Washington last week to present to him the agenda agreed upon at Bogotá and to invite the United States to add to that agenda. It has been agreed that the Secretary and his colleagues from Latin America and the Caribbean will meet in Mexico early next year to begin what we fully expect will be a continuing dialogue on the great issues facing the Americas.

The new relationship between the United States and the other members of the American community can only be worked out as specific issues are faced, discussed, and resolved. I can tell you that the President, the Secretary of State, and I are personally committed to a vigorous effort to do our part in making the new dialogue fruitful.

In this connection, I would like to express the appreciation of the administration to this Council for its constructive efforts to make an input to the U.S. Government's review of its Latin American policy. The recommendations which you have recently made and the study groups you have created are a valuable contribution.

Interdependence and Reciprocity

It is not my purpose today to try to outline the form and content of the new relationship in detail. But I do believe that the President's basic foreign policy approach which I have outlined earlier provides the basis for a few comments on some principles which might guide the new U.S.-Latin American relationship. I would sum up those principles in two words: interdependence and reciprocity.

First, interdependence: Interdependence is not dependence. Interdependence is each party in the relationship needing the others and feeling that need with comparable intensity.

In the past Latin America may have felt its need of the United States more intensely than we have felt our need of Latin America. We *have* needed Latin America, but that need was partly in hard-to-measure, almost intangible terms of psychic security—knowing that Latin America was “on our side.” Latin America's need for us, in contrast, has

been in the concrete visible terms of trade, aid, and military protection—hence the seeming dependence in the relationship.

It does not take much imagination these days to see how that situation will change.

Latin America is an important source of raw materials. In the old days that was a problem for Latin America. The supply of primary commodities chronically tended to outrun demand, and the producing countries searched for ways to avoid depressed prices. The old days have gone—perhaps forever. This country needs Latin American raw materials, food, and energy resources.

This country also needs expanding markets for its exports. It used to be that the balance of payments took a poor second place to our domestic economy. We have learned the hard way that we have to give priority to keeping our balance of payments healthy. Latin America already is an important market for U.S. exports—the most important market outside Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. Several of the Latin American countries rank among our top 12 export customers. Equally important, if Latin America as a region can fulfill its aspirations for sustained economic growth, its import needs may well grow faster than those of developed countries.

Finally, we are increasingly looking to earnings on our foreign investment to make up some of the balance of payments gap. Over 18 percent of U.S. private foreign investment is located in Latin America.

So, ladies and gentlemen, we need Latin America's raw materials and its markets. Latin America, in turn, needs our capital, our technology, and our markets. In addition to these economic ties between the United States and Latin America, there are bonds of friendship and of common values which date back to the founding of our nations.

I suggest to you that this mutual interdependence should provide the underpinnings for a new, equal, mature relationship.

This leads me to my second principle: reciprocity.

Reciprocity is a *sine qua non* between equals. It is fundamental in a relationship of equality that each side believes that its interests and rights are being respected by the other side. If the countries of Latin America take the position that because of their relative weakness the United States should not expect reciprocity, they will be perpetuating a paternalistic relationship.

Let me emphasize that I am not suggesting that the United States expects to receive a *quid pro quo* in kind for every economic benefit it extends to Latin America. We have already agreed that in trade, for example, less developed countries should not be required to reciprocate fully trade concessions from the developed countries.

What I am suggesting is that when we believe a legitimate American interest is being jeopardized or injured by a Latin American government's action we should be given an opportunity to seek some redress of our grievances.

In the vast majority of cases, we do receive that consideration and our interests are given fair consideration. But conflict situations have arisen in which there were important principles at stake on both sides and in which we have felt that we were being asked to sacrifice our interests without any willingness to make concessions on the other side.

We do not expect that our view will always prevail, but we do believe we should be afforded the same consideration that a Latin American government would expect to receive should the situation be reversed. That is true reciprocity.

Interdependence and reciprocity: These are principles which guide American foreign policy, and they provide a firm basis for the new dialogue and the new era in U.S.-Latin American relations.

Department Testifies on Arab Oil Embargoes

Following is a statement by George M. Benskys, Director, Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 29.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify about the supply and price effects of the Arab oil embargoes and production cutbacks. This is my first appearance before a congressional committee since I assumed my present position. I trust this will be but the beginning of my opportunities to share information and views with those of you in Congress interested in the international aspects of the energy problem.

I think it might be useful to begin by briefly tracing the sequence of events which has led to the current oil supply disruption. My treatment here and further on in this statement will be basically factual. On October 17, eleven days after the fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), meeting in Kuwait, decreed the imposition of oil embargoes and cutbacks in support of the Arab effort to regain territory lost in the 1967 conflict. These Arab producers agreed (1) to reduce overall production by at least 10 percent with further 5 percent cuts promised for each succeeding month, (2) to embargo all exports to the United States, and (3) to reward "friendly" nations by assuring them of continuing oil supplies at their monthly averages for the first nine months of this year.

Most, if not all, Arab producers either complied with or exceeded the Kuwait guidelines and also drew up lists of friendly and nonpreferred nations for supply purposes. Saudi Arabia, the predominant Arab oil exporter, took the lead, followed by Kuwait, the number-two Arab supplier. Together they were accounting for about 60 percent of total daily Arab oil exports.

Later, at another meeting in Kuwait on November 4, the Arab use of the oil weapon was further expanded to a 25 percent cutback in production with an additional 5 percent scheduled for December 1 and every month thereafter until Arab political demands are met.

In the interim between the two meetings in Kuwait, the Netherlands and South Africa were also put on the list of those totally embargoed. Though there have been indications to this effect, it remains uncertain whether Portugal is also embargoed.

As a further uncertainty, I should add that only a very few Arab countries have revealed either the identity of those "friendly" nations who will receive oil at previous average rates or those "unfriendly" or "nonpreferred" nations who will have to share pro rata any oil remaining from reduced production after the "friendly" countries are supplied. However, it is clear that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are treating France, the United Kingdom, and Spain as friendly and therefore preferred governments.

More recently there have been press reports of some easing of the oil pressure. First, Western European countries, with the exception of the embargoed Netherlands, have reportedly been spared the 5 percent cut scheduled for December. Then, even more recently, there have been indications that Japan has been spared this same cut. The

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

5 percent reduction due in January presumably remains scheduled.

Before looking at our own supply losses, let me note that these latter days of November are seeing the arrival of the last of the tankers that loaded Arab crude prior to the Arab government production cuts and export embargoes. So the buffer of the 30 days or so of oil always on the high seas between the Persian Gulf and the United States, Europe, and Japan has been used up.

As a result of these cutbacks and embargoes the world's availability of oil has been reduced by over 5 million barrels per day (bbl/d), amounting to about 10 percent of world consumption. The next 5 percent production cut could bring the worldwide loss to over 6 million bbl/d, or about 12 percent of the non-Communist world's winter demand.

We estimate that our imports from Arab producers in 1973, both directly from them in the form of crude and indirectly as products via third-country refineries, have been on the average as follows:

<i>Supplier</i>	<i>Volume (in thousands of bbl/d)</i>
Saudi Arabia	600
Abu Dhabi	150
Kuwait	150
Iraq	50
Libya	350
Algeria	150
Other Arab countries	150
TOTAL	1,600

In other words, about 25 percent of all American oil imports, or 10 percent of our total oil consumption, came from the Arab producers. I might add that the above figures are of actual pre-embargo imports and do not reflect the loss of more than 500,000 bbl/d of heating oil that we had hoped to import this winter from European refineries to help meet shortages which already threatened us before the Arab embargo. These statistics also do not include about 300,000 bbl/d in losses of overseas supplies to our military forces, which now must be made up from domestic sources. There will also be some decrease in normal shipments from Canada,

as our northern neighbor seeks to divert some of its western production, perhaps up to 100,000 bbl/d, to its import-short eastern Provinces.

Thus, taken all together, the Arab oil boycott will deprive the United States of between 2.5 and 3 million bbl/d of oil this winter, or up to 17 percent of our estimated winter demand of 18.5 million bbl/d.

Unfortunately, the possibilities for compensating for the effects of the embargo and cutback from non-Arab sources are virtually nil, as these producers are already operating at capacity production levels. We probably can expect to receive through the winter months total oil imports averaging about 4 million bbl/d, as against our projected required rate of 7 million bbl/d. Almost 70 percent of this reduced quantity would come from Latin America (predominantly Venezuelan crude) and Canada, with most of the remainder arriving from Nigeria, Iran, and Indonesia.

The Japanese supply situation is nearly as bad as ours at the moment. Japan is wholly dependent on imported oil, and 40 percent of it comes from Arab sources. We estimate that by midwinter Japan's import loss will run about 15 percent of its consumption of about 6.2 million bbl/d. However, this percentage will grow to about 20 percent of consumption in late winter as progressive monthly cutbacks take their toll. Japan's own shortfall estimates are more pessimistic than ours, ranging between 20 percent now and 30 percent by the end of the winter. The Japanese Government points out the fact that 70 percent of its energy consumption is oil and therefore that the negative impact on its industrial production and employment will be more severe than in other consuming countries.

It is difficult to generalize about the impact on Western Europe, as some countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Spain have been officially dubbed "friendly" by the Saudis and other Arab producers. Other West Europeans, such as West Germany and Italy, are not given preference by the Saudis and have to share remaining available oil, which of course means import reductions.

The Dutch are, as I said earlier, totally embargoed. By midwinter we expect the overall West European shortfall to stand at 3 million bbl d, or 15 percent of consumption, which has been estimated at 19.5 million bbl d. Taken as a whole, Western Europe receives about 73 percent of its oil from Arab sources.

It might be more useful at this point to sketch the predicament of a few key European nations rather than continuing to generalize.

Even though the United Kingdom and France, as friendly nations, will continue to receive Arab oil at the same levels prevailing earlier in 1973, there is no provision for growth in demand during the winter months. Therefore France predicts a 10 percent shortfall, with greater losses in heating oil, and the United Kingdom anticipates cuts of up to 15 percent. Both the United Kingdom and France receive 70-80 percent of their oil from Arab producers.

Under normal circumstances the Dutch, who are totally embargoed, import for refining for reexport and domestic use about 2 million bbl d, of which 1.3 million bbl d, or 65 percent, are of Arab origin. Dutch domestic consumption is about 700,000 bbl d, 75 percent of which usually comes from non-Arab sources. Therefore about 25 percent of Dutch domestic demand will be lost this winter, and the country's substantial reexport trade will also be greatly reduced.

West Germany, Europe's largest oil consumer, will also bear the brunt of production cutbacks. Germany normally imports about 3.2 million bbl d, of which 70 percent comes from Arab producers. A further complication is that 20 percent of Germany's crude oil and a significant amount of its products are imported via Rotterdam. There remain uncertainties as to what extent the embargo of the Netherlands Rotterdam facilities will affect Germany's imports. However, the German Government figures that its losses will be 15-20 percent of consumption during the winter.

Faced with this developing shortage situation, the West European governments have chosen thus far to resort to individual emer-

gency programs focused on reducing consumption by banning Sunday driving, reducing speed limits, cutting back on outdoor lighting, limiting supplies to customers of fuel oil and other short-supply products, and preparing for rationing should that become necessary. These governments have not yet agreed that they should put into action the emergency oil-sharing arrangement that they have available in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This arrangement, which was utilized during the 1956 and 1967 Arab oil disruptions, also provides for the use of international oil industry supply and transportation expertise in the form of an International Industry Advisory Body. The emergency oil-sharing arrangement covers only the European members of the OECD.

The Japanese have moved to handle their oil losses by instituting a mandatory conservation campaign, including a 10 percent cut in energy use by major industries to be accomplished in December. They are also working on legislation to enable government fuel allocation and rationing.

Mr. Chairman, I will end my statement with some facts on the price effects. During the first days of last month's war, an international oil company team met in Vienna with Persian Gulf Arab oil ministers to begin renegotiation of the oil price agreements reached in Tehran in 1971. Two meetings were sufficient to indicate that the companies' price increase offer was too low for the oil ministers, who felt that oil-product price increases and general inflation since 1971 required a very substantial rise in the prices of their crude oil. These same ministers got together the day before the Arab decisions on supplies which I discussed earlier and unilaterally announced price increases that work out to a rise of 70 percent in posted prices. Other oil-exporting countries have since moved to raise their prices to reflect the Persian Gulf increases.

The current politically imposed cutbacks in oil supplies have substantially worsened the already tight sellers' market, and we find long lines of buyers willing to pay ever higher prices for the limited amounts of

crude available for direct sale by producer governments. For example, current bidding for a relatively small quantity of Nigeria's sought-after low-sulfur crude has pushed offering prices up to over \$10 a barrel. Assuming this is an f.o.b. price, it compares with \$3.65 for a representative more sulfurous Persian Gulf crude.

The companies have recently sought to convince OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil ministers that the current imbalance of international oil supply and demand makes reliance on market prices, especially spot sales of limited amounts, too damaging to consuming countries. Therefore the companies proposed negotiation of a more rational pricing system that would balance out the producers' general inflation concerns with the financial concerns of the consumers of their oil. The OPEC oil ministers continue to take the position that further crude price increases are justifiable considering the rapid rise in prices of commodities they import from the consuming countries and the high taxes imposed by the consumer governments on petroleum products, especially gasoline. These ministers have indicated that new posted prices would be established by January 1, if not before.

The effects on the United States and other major consumers of the October price increase alone is substantial. Although our figures are not yet complete, preliminary analysis indicates that our 1974 oil import bill could reach \$12 billion, of which almost \$3 billion would be caused by the October price rises. This assumes of course that the Arabs are exporting oil to us again in 1974. By way of comparison, our 1972 oil imports ran \$7 billion, and this year we are expecting to import about \$9 billion worth of oil. The cost to the Japanese is estimated at about \$3 billion and to Western Europe at about \$8 billion. The impact of steep rises in oil prices since 1971 on the less developed countries is very substantial and very negative in terms of their development. These trade figures will be balanced out in varying degrees in the different industrial consuming countries depending on export increases and capital flows generated by increased incomes.

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.N. Dissolves UNCURK and Defers Other Korean Questions

Following is a statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on November 15 by U.S. Representative John Scali, together with the text of a consensus adopted by the committee on November 20 and by the Assembly on November 28.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 111 dated November 15

We are discussing the situation in Korea, an item which has been on the agenda of the United Nations in one way or another since 1947. We are presented in this 28th General Assembly with a historic opportunity to make fundamental progress toward resolving the problems that have defied us for so long.

I must frankly admit to some disappointment at the tone of much of the debate thus far. I think we should all remember that, whatever the positions we, the various members of the United Nations, may take with respect to this complex problem, the Korean Peninsula is an area where many thousands of men of many nationalities have fought, bled, and died in loyalty to the different purposes or conflicting objectives they and their countries were serving. We are dealing here with most sensitive human and political problems, problems that have been hallowed by the sacrifices of our fellow men on both sides of the issue. It seems to me that we owe it to the memory of those on both sides to deal with the special matter before us in a spirit of dignity, of restraint, and with compassion.

Some of the speeches we have already heard were regrettably full of gross distortion and intemperate language. This one-

sided rhetoric was hardly in keeping with a subtitle of the item before us: "Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea." Unhappily, it seems the fashion of some of our members to indulge themselves in this kind of abusive oratory as standard fare. I have no intention of replying in kind or of refuting in detail the distortions of fact and history which others have sought to put before us as representing truth.

Let me say instead: I am impressed with the positive approach taken this morning by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Korea. Minister Kim was constructive and conciliatory, not contentious. He looked forward toward peace and reunification, not backward toward confrontation and division.

I have noted that one speaker yesterday told us of the wishes and desires of—and I quote him—"the entire Korean people." It is not clear to me who has authorized another delegation to speak "for the entire Korean people." Is not the principle behind this Assembly's invitation to the two Foreign Ministers that they are thereby enabled to speak for "the entire Korean people"? I think it would be best to let the representatives of the two parts of Korea speak for themselves.

My delegation sees no profit for anyone in refighting the Korean war each year here in the General Assembly. The United Nations archives possess a vast library of speeches and documents bearing witness to those sad events of the past.

I think it profits us little to listen to uninformed or biased accounts of the origins and resolution of that conflict. There are, I know, countries where history can be rewritten to suit the needs of the moment, but the past remains unchanged. The real facts are unchallengeable.

The United Nations brought peace to Korea, and has contributed to its maintenance for 20 years. Is there any state represented here today which is in a position to guarantee, given the current state of relations between the parties concerned, that this peace would be maintained without the United Nations? I think not.

Certainly the situation in Korea has

changed greatly for the better in the past several years. In 1971 the Republic of Korea initiated talks between its Red Cross Society and that of North Korea. In 1972, again on the initiative of the Republic of Korea, talks were opened between the two governments. These negotiations culminated in the joint communique on July 4 of that year in which both sides agreed to work for the ultimate reunification of Korea by peaceful means and to establish a joint coordinating committee for that purpose.

In recognition of these promising steps, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has recommended that its mandate be terminated. My delegation believes this recommendation should be accepted. My delegation pays special tribute to the members of UNCURK for the valuable and honorable service they have performed, performed so well, in fact, as to eliminate the need for the continuation of the Commission.

All this represents progress to a degree that few would have believed possible a short time ago. But let us not delude ourselves. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is not normal. We would not be here discussing it if it were. North and South Korea are divided by a demilitarized zone, not a normal international boundary. The armistice agreement insures respect for this zone. The armistice in turn is monitored by a Military Armistice Commission, which is comprised of the Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the U.N. Command, the three signatories of the armistice. Such a structure may not be the ideal one to preserve peace and foster reconciliation in Korea, but it would be foolhardy in the extreme to impair its operation before a better alternative is put in its place. My government stands ready to work with the parties concerned and the members of the Security Council to see whether an improved arrangement can indeed be devised.

To clear up one possible misconception, I should note that U.S. military forces are stationed in Korea on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

We are ready to withdraw these forces any-time at the request of the Republic of Korea or whenever the conditions for a lasting peace in the area have been fulfilled.

We need not despair of conditions for such a peace being fulfilled. The Republic of Korea, in June of this year, announced a constructive and conciliatory policy which everyone genuinely interested in the peaceful unification of Korea can only applaud.

Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of sincere regret to many that North Korea does not appear to be ready to assume the privileges and responsibilities of U.N. membership at this time, despite the fact that they recently insisted on observer status in our organization. But we, as reflected in the resolution which we are cosponsoring, would be the last to force full membership upon them. However, we believe all here would wish it made clear that their absence from this body is self-imposed, and not a result of any unwillingness on the part of the U.N.'s membership to see them sitting among us.

For the many reasons I have just cited, my delegation supports the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.645. This resolution represents a sincere effort on the part of all its sponsors to frame a consensus acceptable to the broad mass of the U.N.'s membership. Both this resolution's tone and its content are reasonable. In putting this draft forward, its sponsors are genuinely seeking to encourage movement on the Korean issue in a direction acceptable to all parties concerned. I am confident that the great majority of us here favor conciliation rather than confrontation. It is this positive spirit of conciliation which has inspired draft resolution 645.

TEXT OF CONSENSUS¹

It is noted with satisfaction that a joint communiqué was issued by the North and the South of

¹ U.N. doc. A/9341, par. 21; on Nov. 20 the chairman of Committee I read out the text of a consensus arrived at after consultations with the cosponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.644 and A/C.1/L.645, both of which were consequently not put to a vote; the General Assembly on Nov. 28 adopted the text as representing the consensus of its members.

Korea on 4 July 1972, which provides for the following three principles on the reunification of Korea:

(a) The reunification of the country should be achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its interference;

(b) The reunification of the country should be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against the other side;

(c) Great national unity should be promoted.

It is the general hope that the South and the North of Korea will be urged to continue their dialogue and widen their many-sided exchanges and co-operation in the above spirit so as to expedite the independent peaceful reunification of the country.

The General Assembly decides to dissolve immediately the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, as amended. Signed at Quebec October 16, 1945. Entered into force October 16, 1945. TIAS 4803, 5229, 5506, 5987, 6421, 6902, 7274.

Resumption of membership: People's Republic of China, April 1, 1973.

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6594). Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973.

Acceptance deposited: United States, November 30, 1973.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris, July 24, 1971.¹

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.¹

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain interna-

¹ Not in force.

tional organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.¹
Extended to: British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Grenada, Isle of Man, Saint Helena, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Seychelles, September 6, 1973.

Customs

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva January 15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, 1960; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6633.

Accession deposited: Jordan, November 8, 1973.

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.¹

Signature: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a statement), October 18, 1973.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Jordan, November 9, 1973.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970.¹

Ratified by the President: November 27, 1973 (with declarations).

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: People's Republic of China (with a declaration), October 5, 1973.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.

Accession deposited: Honduras, November 14, 1973.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement regarding disposal of U.S. Government excess property in Australia. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra November 9, 1973. Entered into force November 9, 1973.

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 6, 1973 (TIAS 7711). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca November 1 and 24, 1973. Entered into force November 24, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

Belgium

Consular convention. Signed at Washington September 2, 1969.

Ratifications exchanged: December 6, 1973.

Enters into force: January 5, 1974.

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of December 20, 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz November 9, 1973. Entered into force November 9, 1973.

Ecuador

Agreement on immunities and privileges for the U.S. Inter-American Geodetic Survey mission. Signed at Quito November 23, 1973. Entered into force November 23, 1973.

Mexico

Agreement concerning the provision of four helicopters and related assistance by the United States to help Mexico in curbing traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico December 3, 1973. Entered into force December 3, 1973.

International Committee of the Red Cross

Grant agreement to provide assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Geneva November 1, 1973. Entered into force November 1, 1973.

Romania

Joint statement concerning relations between the United States and Romania. Signed at Washington December 5, 1973. Entered into force December 5, 1973.

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington December 4, 1973. Enters into force one month after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

Agreement regarding fisheries in the western region of the middle Atlantic Ocean, with related letter. Signed at Washington December 4, 1973. Entered into force December 4, 1973.

Agreement relating to civil air transport, with related letters. Signed at Washington December 4, 1973. Entered into force provisionally December 4, 1973; definitively, upon the date of written notification from Romania that its constitutional requirements concerning entry into force of international agreements have been fulfilled.

Sri Lanka

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of October 27, 1967 (TIAS 6405). Signed at Colombo November 23, 1973. Entered into force November 23, 1973.

Viet-Nam

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of July 8, 1970 (TIAS 6983). Signed at Saigon November 9, 1973. Entered into force November 9, 1973.

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No.	Date	Subject
*434	12 3	Program for the official visit of Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania.
*434A	12 5	Addendum to program.
435	12 3	Kissinger: message to Prime Minister Meir of Israel on the death of David Ben-Gurion, Dec. 1.
*436	12 4	U.S. and Romania sign air transport agreement (rewrite).
*437	12 4	U.S. and Romania sign fisheries agreement (rewrite).
*438	12 4	Advisory Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs, Dec. 11-15.
*439	12 5	Aggrey sworn in as Ambassador to Senegal and to The Gambia (biographic data).
440	12 5	Rush: Council of the Americas.
*441	12 5	U.S. educators visit Poland, Dec. 1-17.
442	12 6	Kissinger: news conference.
*443	12/6	Newsom receives Rockefeller Public Service Award, Dec. 5.
*444	12 7	Cancellation of meeting of Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.
*445	12 7	U.S. delegation to ministerial meeting of NATO, Brussels, Dec. 10-11.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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December 31, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

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The United States and a Unifying Europe: The Necessity for Partnership

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you this evening because, like most Americans, I am seized by a mixture of pride and terror when invited to appear before a British audience. In my particular case, and without any reflection on this distinguished assemblage, it is probably more terror than pride; for there is no blinking the fact—it is there for all to hear—that my forebears missed the Mayflower by some 300 years.

Our two peoples have been more closely associated than any other two nations in modern history—in culture and economics, in peace and in war. We have sometimes disagreed. But the dominant theme of our relationship in this century has been intimate alliance and mighty creations.

In 1950, while the Atlantic alliance was considering a continuing political body, my great predecessor Dean Acheson spoke to this society. Describing the travails of creation, Acheson noted that a “strange and confusing dissonance has crowded the trans-Atlantic frequencies.” But he added that this “dissonance flows from the very awareness that difficult decisions must be made and is a part of the process of making them.”

Again today America and Western Europe find themselves at a moment of great promise and evident difficulty, of renewed efforts to unite and old problems which divide. It is a time of both hope and concern for all of us who value the partnership we have built together. Today, as in 1950, we and Europe

face the necessity, the opportunity, and the dilemma of fundamental choice.

The Year of Europe

Because we have a historical and intimate relationship, I want to speak tonight frankly of what has been called the “Year of Europe”—of the difficulties of 1973 and the possibilities of 1974 and beyond.

Last April the President asked me to propose that Europe and the United States strive together to reinvigorate our partnership. He did so because it was obvious that the assumptions on which the alliance was founded have been outstripped by events:

—Europe’s economic strength, political cohesion, and new confidence—the monumental achievements of Western unity—have radically altered a relationship that was originally shaped in an era of European weakness and American predominance.

—American nuclear monopoly has given way to nuclear parity, raising wholly new problems of defense and deterrence—problems which demand a broad reexamination of the requirements of our security and the relative contribution to it of the United States and its allies.

—The lessening of confrontation between East and West has offered new hope for a relaxation of tensions and new opportunities for creative diplomacy.

—It has become starkly apparent that the great industrialized democracies of Japan, Europe, and North America could pursue di-

¹ Made before the Pilgrims of Great Britain at London on Dec. 12 (press release 452).

vergent paths only at the cost of their prosperity and their partnership.

These historic changes were occurring in a profoundly changed psychological climate in the West. The next generation of leaders in Europe, Canada, and America will have neither the personal memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic alliance of its founders. Even today, a majority on both sides of the Atlantic did not experience the threat that produced the alliance's creation or the sense of achievement associated with its growth. Even today, in the United States over 40 Senators consistently vote to make massive unilateral reductions of American forces in Europe. Even today, some Europeans have come to believe that their identity should be measured by its distance from the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic we are faced with the anomalous—and dangerous—situation in which the public mind identifies foreign policy success increasingly with relations with adversaries while relations with allies seem to be characterized by bickering and drift.

There exists, then, a real danger of a gradual erosion of the Atlantic community which for 25 years has insured peace to its nations and brought prosperity to its peoples. A major effort to renew Atlantic relations and to anchor our friendship in a fresh act of creation seemed essential. We hoped that the drama of the great democracies engaging themselves once again in defining a common future would infuse our Atlantic partnership with new emotional and intellectual excitement. This was the origin of the initiative which came to be called the "Year of Europe."

Let me lay to rest certain misconceptions about American intentions:

—The President's initiative was launched after careful preparation. In all of our conversations with many European leaders during the winter and spring of 1972-73 there was agreement that Atlantic relations required urgent attention to arrest the potential for growing suspicion and alienation between Europe and America.

—We do not accept the proposition that

the strengthening of Atlantic unity and the defining of a European personality are incompatible. The two processes have reinforced each other from the outset and can continue to do so now. The United States has repeatedly and explicitly welcomed the European decision to create an independent identity in all dimensions, political and economic. Indeed, we have long—and more consistently than many Europeans—supported the goal of political cohesion.

—We have no intention of restricting Europe's international role to regional matters. From our perspective, European unification should enable Europe to take on broader responsibilities for global peace that ultimately can only contribute to the common interest. The American initiative was meant to mark Europe's new preeminence on the world scene as well as within the North Atlantic community.

A comprehensive reexamination of all aspects of our relationship, economic, political, and military, is imperative. It is a fact that our troops are in Europe as a vital component of mutual defense. It is also a fact—indeed, a truism—that political, military, and economic factors are each part of our relationship. In our view, the affirmation of the pervasive nature of our interdependence is not a device for blackmail. On the contrary, it is the justification for conciliatory solutions. For the specialized concerns of experts and technicians have a life of their own and a narrow national or sectarian bias. The purpose of our initiative was to override these divisive attitudes by committing the highest authority in each country to the principle that our common and paramount interest is in broadly conceived cooperation.

The European Identity

Since last April Europe has made great strides toward unity—particularly in political coordination. The United States strongly supports that process. But as an old friend we are also sensitive to what this process does to traditional ties that, in our view, remain essential to the common interest.

Europe's unity must not be at the expense

of Atlantic community, or both sides of the Atlantic will suffer. It is not that we are impatient with the cumbersome machinery of the emerging Europe. It is rather the tendency to highlight division rather than unity with us which concerns us.

I would be less than frank were I to conceal our uneasiness about some of the recent practices of the European Community in the political field. To present the decisions of a unifying Europe to us as *faits accomplis* not subject to effective discussion is alien to the tradition of U.S.-European relations.

This may seem a strange complaint from a country repeatedly accused of acting itself without adequately consulting with its allies. There is no doubt that the United States has sometimes not consulted enough or adequately—especially in rapidly moving situations. But this is not a preference; it is a deviation from official policy and established practice—usually under pressure of necessity. The attitude of the unifying Europe, by contrast, seems to attempt to elevate refusal to consult into a principle defining European identity. To judge from recent experience, consultation with us before a decision is precluded, and consultation after the fact has been drained of content. For then Europe appoints a spokesman who is empowered to inform us of the decisions taken but who has no authority to negotiate.

We do not object to a single spokesman, but we do believe that as an old ally the United States should be given an opportunity to express its concerns before final decisions affecting its interests are taken. And bilateral channels of discussion and negotiation should not be permitted to atrophy—at least until European political unity is fully realized. To replace the natural dialogue with extremely formalistic procedures would be to shatter abruptly close and intangible ties of trust and communication that took decades to develop and that have served our common purposes well.

The United States recognizes the problems of a transitional period as Europe moves toward unity. We understand the difficulty of the first hesitant steps of political coordination. But we cannot be indifferent to the tend-

ency to justify European identity as facilitating separateness from the United States; European unity, in our view, is not contradictory to Atlantic unity.

For our part, we will spare no effort to strengthen cooperative relationships with a unifying Europe, to affirm the community of our ideals, and to revitalize the Atlantic relationship. That was the purpose of our initiative last April. It remains the central goal of our foreign policy.

The Common Challenge

The leaders of the European Community meet this week. They will consider the nature of European identity; no doubt they will adopt common policies and positions. In the light of this important meeting, let me outline the position of the United States:

—Détente is an imperative. In a world shadowed by the danger of nuclear holocaust, there is no rational alternative to the pursuit of relaxation of tensions. But we must take care that the pursuit of détente not undermine the friendships which made détente possible.

—Common defense is a necessity. We must be prepared to adjust it to changing conditions and share burdens equally. We need a definition of security that our peoples can support and that our adversaries will respect in a period of lessened tensions.

—European unity is a reality. The United States welcomes and supports it in all its dimensions, political as well as economic. We believe it must be made irreversible and that it must strengthen transatlantic ties.

—Economic interdependence is a fact. We must resolve the paradox of growing mutual dependence and burgeoning national and regional identities.

We are determined to continue constructive dialogue with Western Europe. We have offered no final answers; we welcome Europe's wisdom. We believe that this opportunity will not come soon again.

So let us rededicate ourselves to finishing the task of renewing the Atlantic community.

First, let us complete the work before us;

let us agree on a set of declarations equal to the occasion so that they may serve as an agenda for our governments and as an example and inspiration for our peoples.

Second, let us then transform these declarations into practical and perceptible progress. We will restore mutual confidence if our policies begin to reinforce rather than work against our common objectives. And let us move quickly to improve the process of consultation in both directions. The U.S. Government made concrete suggestions in this regard at the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers in the North Atlantic Council.

But let us also remember that even the best consultative machinery cannot substitute for common vision and shared goals; it cannot replace the whole network of intangible connections that have been the real sinews of the transatlantic and especially the Anglo-American relationship. We must take care lest in defining European unity in too legalistic a manner we lose what has made our alliance unique: that in the deepest sense Europe and America do not think of each other as foreign entities conducting traditional diplomacy, but as members of a larger community engaged, sometimes painfully but ultimately always cooperatively, in a common enterprise. The meeting to which the Foreign Ministers of the Community were courteous enough to invite me marks a significant step forward in restoring the intangibles of the transatlantic dialogue.

Let us put false suspicions behind us. The President did not fight so hard in Congress for our troops in Europe, for strong defenses, for a conciliatory trade bill, for support for allies around the world; he did not strive so continually to consult on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and develop common positions on MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions]; he did not stand up so firmly to challenges in crises around the world—suddenly to sacrifice Western Europe's security on the altar of condominium. Our destiny, as well as the full strength of our military power, is inextricably linked with yours.

As we look into the future we can perceive

challenges compared to which our recent disputes are trivial. A new international system is replacing the structure of the immediate postwar years. The external policies of China and the Soviet Union are in periods of transition. Western Europe is unifying. New nations seek identity and an appropriate role. Even now, economic relationships are changing more rapidly than the structures which nurtured them. We—Europe, Canada, and America—have only two choices: creativity together or irrelevance apart.

The Middle East and Energy

The Middle East crisis illustrates the importance of distinguishing the long-range from the ephemeral. The differences of recent months resulted not so much from lack of consultation as from a different perception of three key issues: Was the war primarily a local conflict, or did it have wider significance? Has the energy crisis been caused primarily by the war, or does it have deeper causes? Can our common energy crisis be solved by anything but collective action?

As for the nature of the Middle East conflict, it is fair to state—as many Europeans including your Foreign Secretary have—that the United States did not do all that it might have done before the war to promote a permanent settlement in the Middle East. Once the war began, the United States demonstrated great restraint until the Soviet effort reached the point of massive intervention. Once that happened, it became a question of whether the West would retain any influence to help shape the political future of an area upon which Europe is even more vitally dependent than the United States. We involved ourselves in a resupply effort not to take sides in the conflict but to protect the possibility of pursuing after the war the objective of a just, permanent settlement which some of our allies have urged on us ever since 1967.

At the same time, we must bear in mind the deeper causes of the energy crisis: It is not simply a product of the Arab-Israeli war; it is the inevitable consequence of the

explosive growth of worldwide demand out-running the incentives for supply. The Middle East war made a chronic crisis acute, but a crisis was coming in any event. Even when prewar production levels are resumed, the problem of matching the level of oil that the world produces to the level which it consumes will remain.

The only long-term solution is a massive effort to provide producers an incentive to increase their supply, to encourage consumers to use existing supplies more rationally, and to develop alternate energy sources.

This is a challenge which the United States could solve alone with great difficulty and that Europe cannot solve in isolation at all. We strongly prefer, and Europe requires, a common enterprise.

To this end, the United States proposes that the nations of Europe, North America, and Japan establish an Energy Action Group of senior and prestigious individuals with a mandate to develop within three months an initial action program for collaboration in all areas of the energy problem. We would leave it to the members of the Nine whether they prefer to participate as the European Community.

The Group would have as its goal the assurance of required energy supplies at reasonable cost. It would define broad principles of cooperation, and it would initiate action in specific areas:

- To conserve energy through more rational utilization of existing supplies;

- To encourage the discovery and development of new sources of energy;

- To give producers an incentive to increase supply; and

- To coordinate an international program of research to develop new technologies that use energy more efficiently and provide alternatives to petroleum. The United States would be willing to contribute our particular skills in such areas as the development of the deep seabed.

The Energy Action Group should not be an exclusive organization of consumers. The producing nations should be invited to join it from the very beginning with respect to

any matters of common interest. The problem of finding adequate opportunity for development, and the investment of the proceeds from the sale of energy sources, would appear to be a particularly important area for consumer-producer cooperation.

As an example of a task for the Energy Action Group, I would cite the field of enriching uranium for use in nuclear power reactors. We know that our need for this raw material will be great in the 1980's. We know that electric utilities will wish to assure their supply at the least possible cost. We know that European countries and Japan will wish to have their own facilities to produce at least part of their needs for enriched uranium. Such plants require huge capital investment. What could be more sensible than that we plan together to assure that scarce resources are not wasted by needless duplication?

The United States is prepared to make a very major financial and intellectual contribution to the objective of solving the energy problem on a common basis. There is no technological problem that the great democracies do not have the capacity to solve together—if they can muster the will and the imagination. The energy crisis of 1973 can become the economic equivalent of the sputnik challenge of 1957. The outcome can be the same. Only this time, the giant step for mankind will be one that America and its closest partners take together for the benefit of all mankind.

We have every reason of duty and self-interest to preserve the most successful partnership in history. The United States is committed to making the Atlantic community a vital positive force for the future as it was for the past. What has recently been taken for granted must now be renewed. This is not an American challenge to Europe; it is history's challenge to us all.

The United Kingdom, we believe, is in a unique position. We welcome your membership in the European Community—though the loosening of some of our old ties has been painful at times. But you can make another historic contribution in helping develop between the United States and a unifying Eu-

rope the same special confidence and intimacy that benefited our two nations for decades. We are prepared to offer a unifying Europe a "special relationship," for we believe that the unity of the Western world is essential for the well-being of all its parts.

In his memoirs Secretary Acheson described the events of his visit to London in the spring of 1950. He described the need of his time for an "act of will, a decision to do something" at a crucial juncture.

We require another act of will—a determination to surmount tactical squabbles and legalistic preoccupations and to become the master of our destinies. We in this room are heirs to a rich heritage of trust and friendship. If we are true to ourselves, we have it in our power to extend it to a united Europe and to pass it on, further enriched and ennobled, to succeeding generations.

The Nobel Peace Prize: Symbol of the Quest for Peace

Statement of Secretary Kissinger¹

The Nobel Peace Prize is as much an award to a purpose as to a person. More than the achievement of peace, it symbolizes the quest for peace. Though I deeply cherish this honor in a personal sense, I accept it on behalf of that quest and in the light of that grand purpose.

Our experience has taught us to regard peace as a delicate, ever-fleeting condition, its roots too shallow to bear the strain of social and political discontent. We tend to accept the lessons of that experience and work toward those solutions that at best relieve specific sources of strain, lest our neglect allow war to overtake peace. To the realist, peace represents a stable arrangement of power; to the idealist, a goal so preeminent that it conceals the difficulty of finding the

means to its achievement. But in this age of thermonuclear technology, neither view can assure man's preservation. Instead, peace, the ideal, must be practiced. A sense of responsibility and accommodation must guide the behavior of all nations. Some common notion of justice can and must be found, for failure to do so will only bring more "just" wars.

In his Nobel acceptance speech, William Faulkner expressed his hope that "man will not merely endure: he will prevail." We live today in a world so complex that even only to endure, man must prevail—over an accelerating technology that threatens to escape his control and over the habits of conflict that have obscured his peaceful nature.

Certain war has yielded to an uncertain peace in Viet-Nam. Where there was once only despair and dislocation, today there is hope, however frail. In the Middle East the resumption of full-scale war haunts a fragile cease-fire. In Indochina, the Middle East, and elsewhere, lasting peace will not have been won until contending nations realize the futility of replacing political competition with armed conflict.

America's goal is the building of a structure of peace, a peace in which all nations have a stake and therefore to which all nations have a commitment. We are seeking a stable world, not as an end in itself but as a bridge to the realization of man's noble aspirations of tranquillity and community.

If peace, the ideal, is to be our common destiny, then peace, the experience, must be our common practice. For this to be so, the leaders of all nations must remember that their political decisions of war or peace are realized in the human suffering or well-being of their peoples.

As Alfred Nobel recognized, peace cannot be achieved by one man or one nation. It results from the efforts of men of broad vision and good will throughout the world. The accomplishments of individuals need not be remembered, for if lasting peace is to come it will be the accomplishment of all mankind.

With these thoughts, I extend to you my most sincere appreciation for this award.

¹ Read at the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony at Oslo on Dec. 10 by Thomas R. Byrne, Ambassador to Norway (press release 448).

North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting Held at Brussels

Secretary Kissinger was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the regular ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Brussels December 10–11.¹ Following are a statement made by Secretary Kissinger upon his arrival in Brussels on December 8, the transcript of a news conference he held at NATO Headquarters on December 11, and a final communique issued at the close of the meeting that day.

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Press release 446 dated December 10

I am delighted that my first stop in Europe as Secretary of State is in Brussels, which is the heart of both European unity and Atlantic unity.

This NATO meeting, in its 25th year since the founding of NATO, comes at a very important moment. The Europe of today is very different from the Europe of 1949, and it will play a role that its unity and its affluence entitle it. The United States, in its attempt to build a structure of peace and to put East-West relations on a new basis, has made an initiative toward Europe to redefine our relationship in the light of these new conditions. This dialogue is continuing and has not been without stress. I intend to pursue it in my conversations here in Brussels. With whomever I will speak among my colleagues, I will stress that the Atlantic alliance remains the cornerstone of American foreign policy. But I shall also emphasize that a new act of vision is necessary so that it can remain the cornerstone of our common endeavor.

¹For names of other members of the U.S. delegation, see press release 445 dated Dec. 7.

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE

Press release 450 dated December 11

Ladies and gentlemen: I thought I'd meet with you briefly to answer a few questions. I have read some of the dramatic accounts of great confrontations, and I wanted to say a word about the spirit in which we came here and where I think we stand.

There have been many changes in Atlantic relationships and in world affairs since the creation of the alliance 25 years ago. The United States took an initiative earlier this year proposing that the relationships within the Atlantic community be reexamined and be adapted to the dramatically changed circumstances of the 1970's. This discussion has proceeded and within NATO has produced a draft document submitted by France which gives promise of significant progress. I came here in order to discuss with our closest allies the problems and the opportunities that are produced by these changed circumstances—by détente, by the emergence of the European Community as a political entity, by the changed situation in the field of weapons, by conditions in other parts of the world. Obviously there were some frank exchanges, and points of view were openly expressed; but I think we have all gained a better understanding of each other's positions. I think we have made progress toward the objectives that we have sought, and I think the alliance is stronger for having had this meeting.

Now I'd be glad to take a few questions.

Q. [Inaudible.]

Secretary Kissinger: The question of a meeting with the Nine is agreed to in principle, but there is a procedural problem of finding a time when all the Ministers, partic-

ularly those who are not in NATO, can come. But there is no problem in principle about it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will this be in Brussels this afternoon or some other time?

Secretary Kissinger: If the meeting takes place—and it is really now only a purely technical question—the meeting will be in Brussels. But I'd like to stress that my colleagues have agreed that it would be natural for the Secretary of State to meet with the Nine, and if for any technical reason it doesn't happen now, it will happen soon.

Q. Mr. Secretary, before leaving Washington you made a distinction between European and Atlantic unity. Do you think the two are or could become incompatible?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not make a distinction between European and Atlantic unity. There are sometimes implications in statements that there is such a distinction. The United States believes that European unity and Atlantic unity can reinforce each other and have reinforced each other, and the United States strongly supports European unity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the June 22 agreement with the Soviets does not negate the NATO agreement in any way, and if it was not invoked at the beginning of the Mideast crisis, what function does the agreement of June 22 serve now? ²

Secretary Kissinger: The agreement of June 22 specifically excludes the alliance obligations in, I believe, article VI, and therefore there is no question about the agreement superseding any alliance obligations. The contrary is the case. The purpose of the agreement is to reinforce in a formal manner certain rules of conduct operating as restraints prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and it establishes very clearly, as I pointed out in the briefing I gave when the agreement was signed, that the way to prevent nuclear war is to prevent all wars. It is to be

seen as a code of conduct, not as a description of a method of warfare.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you been able in your talks here to narrow the differences with the Europeans on the Middle East questions, and have you gotten support for the negotiations in Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: It's an interesting phenomenon—where I look one way and the voice comes from the other direction. I am interested to know by what principle that operates.

Now, those of you who are veterans of NATO meetings, which I am not, will not assume that the opportunity for dialogue at the formal sessions is extreme; and secondly, I did not come to the NATO meeting to obtain support for our Middle East policy. Our Middle East policy is to attempt to bring about a just and lasting peace by helping the parties to resolve the conflict and to implement Security Council Resolution 242. I believe that this is an objective shared by all of those who have concern for peace in the world and for peace in the Middle East. But we did not specifically ask for an endorsement of our policies by NATO; but of course we had individual discussions with individual Ministers in the intervals between monologues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that you've had a chance to talk with your NATO allies, what is your feeling about their impression of the United States and the Soviet Union together trying to solve not only the Middle East problem but a number of the others that beset the whole world?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a mistake to consider these meetings, or at least this meeting, since it's the only one I've attended, as an arena of titanic confrontation. The problem that is posed by the relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union has many aspects. At the time of the formation of the NATO alliance, the Soviet threat seemed pervasive and the world was relatively simpler, when all issues could be seen in terms of an imminent military onslaught.

² For text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1973, p. 160.

Under present circumstances, with the increase of extremely destructive weapons on both sides, we believe—and I have to assume our European allies agree—that there exists an obligation to prevent the dangers of a nuclear holocaust. It is an obligation that circumstances impose especially on those countries that possess the most destructive arsenals. Obviously this creates problems of intellectual adjustment, and sometimes it involves problems of adjustment to specific circumstances. We owe our European allies respect for their sensibilities so that they do not feel they have become the objects of policy. And there was general agreement in the discussions that the process of consultation within the alliance, particularly in these circumstances, must be strengthened. The United States expressed its willingness to do so and made specific proposals to accomplish this end.

Maybe I'll take one more question.

Q. Returning back to the Middle East again, I want to know your opinion about the Israelis' theory of secured borders by occupying other countries' territories and retaining them. Don't you think that this, in principle, will be the beginning of an international world anarchy?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has repeatedly stated that it stands for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and that there must be a settlement that will be acceptable to all of the parties. What will emerge as acceptable should not be defined by me at the very beginning of this process.

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE

Press release 453 dated December 12

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 10th and 11th December, 1973.

2. Ministers considered international developments since their previous meeting in June. They drew encouragement from the continuing development of both bilateral and multilateral East-West contacts over a wide field. They recognized, however, that international peace remains fragile and stressed once again the importance for the Alliance of maintaining

to the full its defensive and deterrent military capacity.

3. Ministers recalled their decision in June to examine the relationship between the countries of the Alliance in the light of the profound changes which were taking place in every field of international activity. They noted that examination of these changes had led to substantial progress towards agreement on a joint declaration on Atlantic relations. They agreed that this important work should be pursued to a successful conclusion. Such a declaration, reflecting a perspective commensurate with the challenges of the future, would serve to guide the Alliance in its vital tasks of maintaining peace, improving East-West relations and promoting greater security and well-being.

4. Ministers reaffirmed that the solidarity of the Alliance, and thereby its success in maintaining effective deterrence and reliable defense were the foundations of continuing progress towards detente. In this perspective, they will continue to maintain the fullest possible exchange of views and information, and close consultation and cooperation, in a spirit of mutual trust, on all problems of common concern. They instructed the Council in permanent session to consider the most appropriate means of ensuring the full effectiveness of this consultation.

5. Ministers reviewed events in the Middle East. They welcomed the establishment of a UN Emergency Force and noted with satisfaction progress towards the holding of a peace conference. They reaffirmed the support of all their Governments for the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and they expressed their over-riding concern to see a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. Ministers further took note of the report by the Council in permanent session on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions given at their previous meeting. Ministers invited the Council in permanent session to continue to keep the situation under review and to report further.

6. Ministers reviewed developments in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They noted that, following the Ministerial Meeting in Helsinki at which the agenda for the Conference had been approved, the methodical work which had taken place thus far in Geneva had been successful in bringing about the thorough examination of specific issues which, in their view, was essential if the Conference was to lead in due course to satisfactory results. They reaffirmed the determination of their Governments to continue to pursue the negotiations constructively, having regard to the importance of all of the subjects under discussion, in particular in the field of human contacts.

7. Ministers noted that the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted simultaneously as members of the United Nations in September 1973. They reaffirmed their view that satisfactory development of the relations

between the two German states, taking into account the special situation in Germany, can make a significant contribution to the further relaxation of tensions in Europe.

8. As regards Berlin, Ministers paid particular attention to the experience so far gained in the application of the Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September, 1971. They reaffirmed their conviction that the strict observance and full application of this agreement make possible a satisfactory solution of practical questions in the interest of the people of Berlin and constitute a condition for lasting detente and stability in Europe.

9. Ministers representing countries which participate in NATO's integrated defense program welcomed the opening, on 30th October, of the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR] which they had proposed. They considered a report by Allied negotiators in Vienna, and noted that the talks were proceeding in a businesslike way. They instructed the Council in permanent session to continue its work on the negotiations.

10. These Ministers recalled that, as agreed on 28th June at the preparatory consultations in Vienna, the general objective of the negotiations would be to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. To this end the Allied negotiators in Vienna have proposed the establishment of approximate parity between the two sides, in the form of a common ceiling for overall ground force manpower on each side in the area in which reductions would take place, having regard to combat capability. They have also proposed a first phase agreement providing for reductions of Soviet and US ground forces in the area. These Ministers reaffirmed their resolve, on the basis of the agreed Allied approach to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions including associated measures, to strive for an outcome which was both balanced and equitable, and which would ensure undiminished security for all parties.

11. These Ministers reaffirmed the need to maintain and improve Allied Forces in Europe, and expressed their conviction that reductions should take place only in the context of MBFR. They also recognized that the maintenance of United States Forces in Europe at their present level calls for a common effort on the part of the Allies to achieve a solution to the financial problems which the United States consequently faces. To this end, these Ministers reaffirmed the decisions taken by the Defense Ministers and expressed their support for the statements contained in paras. 9-12 of the communique of the Defense Planning Committee issued on 7th December, 1973.

12. Ministers expressed appreciation for the continuing efforts undertaken by the United States in SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] towards

a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. They took note of the Declaration on the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed on 21st June, 1973, including, in particular, the recognition of each side's equal security interest.³

13. In noting the progress reported by the Chairman of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), Ministers welcomed the start on cooperation in the development of supplemental energy sources through the use of solar and geothermal energy, and in the disposal of hazardous wastes and toxic industrial effluents. Ministers took note of the CCMS International Road Safety Resolution, and the CCMS guidelines on National Planning for Regional Development. Ministers expressed satisfaction at the practical work of the CCMS in such other fields as air and water pollution, health care and urban transportation.

14. The Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to consider and decide on the date and place of the next session of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, taking into account that 1974 will mark the 25th anniversary of the signing of the treaty.

Approval of Weapons Systems for Korea, Turkey, and Jordan

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION No. 74-5¹

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION—THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, TURKEY AND JORDAN

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 28, 1973.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 504(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, I hereby determine that the furnishing of sophisticated weapons systems in FY 1974 to the Republic of Korea, Turkey and Jordan is important to the national security of the United States.

You are requested on my behalf to report this Determination to the Senate and the House of Representatives as required by law.

This Determination shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.



³ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 158.

¹ 38 Fed. Reg. 31811.

African Development and U.S. Foreign Policy

Address by David D. Newsom

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

When I became Assistant Secretary for African Affairs nearly four and a half years ago it was my hope that, if I could do nothing else, I could help to sustain and increase America's effort in the development of Africa. We cannot be meaningful to Africa unless we respond to its great needs for economic development. That hope has not been fully realized. I have had to say "no" to African requests far more than I have been able to say "yes." I want to explore with you today why I think this has been so and to suggest some approaches to reverse the present trend.

Let us begin by examining what we have done.

From July 1, 1969, to June of this year, official U.S. development aid to Africa has totaled \$1.1 billion. Such official aid includes loans and grants of the Agency for International Development, Peace Corps programs, and loans and grants of agricultural commodities under Public Law 480.

The peak period was the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, when the annual total was \$323.9 million. This was the highest level of assistance to Africa since FY 1969. The lowest period was during the fiscal year which ended this past June, when the total dropped to \$234.8 million.

The major reason for this sharp decline in the last fiscal year was the shortage of food products for our worldwide P.L. 480 programs. This led to drastic reductions in food sales through long-term loans and somewhat

lesser reductions in our food donation programs. The greatest decline was in North Africa.

The four-year U.S. total (FY 69-72) of \$1.132 billion represented 18.5 percent of all assistance (\$6.13 billion) to Africa from Western bilateral sources.

Assistance in one form or another went to 36 African countries over the past several years. The three largest recipients of our economic aid were Ethiopia, Morocco, and Tunisia, although there has been a gradual shift in assistance levels recently toward the poorer countries of Africa. The total list of aid recipients includes nations of widely different systems and policies, ranging from traditional regimes to Socialist countries like Tanzania and Guinea.

We have, admittedly, faced a special problem in the African expectations of what the United States might do. In part this stemmed from comparisons with the Marshall plan (although this was a very different sort of problem) and comparison with what we have done for others, such as east Asian countries and Israel.

There are many in this audience, I am sure, who share my wish that the United States could do more. Why can't we? What are the obstacles to our doing more in Africa? In my experience, there are six attitudes found in this country that inhibit a greater effort.

Let me make these remarks totally non-partisan by saying that these same views were current 10 years ago when I was in the African Bureau under a different administration. These attitudes range over:

¹ Made before the annual meeting of the African Studies Association at Syracuse, N.Y., on Nov. 2.

1. We shouldn't be in the development aid business at all.

2. Africa is not really important to us.

3. Let the Europeans do it.

4. Let multilateral organizations do it.

5. Let private enterprise do it.

6. Africans can't really use the aid.

I want to make clear in citing these I am not giving an official position nor a personal view. I am giving you what I hope is a realistic list of points of view of individuals both inside and outside government, encountered when we talk about increasing our aid to Africa. No one should be under the illusion that doing more for Africa is a simple matter of Executive fiat.

Let us examine these six.

We begin with the fact that the American people—at least as they express their will through the Congress—are not enthusiastic about long-range commitments to economic development in less developed countries of the world.

The position which many developing countries have taken, in the name of nonalignment, on matters of interest to this country has also had its effect on public and congressional opinion toward foreign aid.

As the task of justifying official assistance to any part of the world becomes more difficult each year, Africa suffers along with the rest. Domestic priorities, emphasis on foreign aid failures, our inability to decide what we really expect of foreign aid, all contribute to our difficulties. Well-meaning critics, even though they may basically believe in economic assistance, feed the negative forces.

Even among Members of Congress, including some members of the Black Caucus who have otherwise demonstrated a keen interest in our African policy, there are those who have consistently voted against foreign aid. Some of them voted for the foreign aid bill this year only because it contained emergency relief funds for the drought-stricken countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

In 20 years of foreign aid, Congress has never permitted an administration to make unqualified long-term commitments.

Excluding Latin America, there are 55

countries which can be considered less developed. Since 1966, we have been limited by Congress to 20 countries in which we can have bilateral capital development projects in any one year.

We are one year behind in fulfilling our financial commitment to the International Development Agency (IDA), the essential soft-loan window of the World Bank.

We are behind in our commitments to the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. We have provided nothing yet to the new Special Fund of the African Development Bank.

Although our dollar contribution to world development represents 40 percent of the total, we rank 12th in the world in terms of our per capita contribution.

The attitude toward technical assistance is somewhat better. Since the days of President Truman's point 4, our people have generally supported the idea that we should share our techniques with the developing world. The advent of the Peace Corps gave new expression to this feeling.

We are permitted to have bilateral technical assistance programs in any year in 40 countries outside of Latin America. There is no limit to Peace Corps activities other than budgetary and the desire of the developing countries to have Peace Corps missions.

Humanitarian assistance alone seems capable of commanding unqualified enthusiasm among Americans. Our deep concern for the starving, the homeless, the sick, translates itself into a major effort each time there is a flood, an earthquake, a drought. Frequently it may transcend the desire of the affected country itself. Unfortunately, that enthusiasm does not extend to the longer range, more difficult, more complicated task of helping the affected country remove the basic conditions which bring about the floods, the disease, the drought.

As I am sure you are aware, outside of clearly identified groups—members of our black community, some businessmen, church leaders, and scholars—who share an enthusiasm for the continent, American interest in Africa has been very limited.

One talks of a "priority" for Africa, but no administration can create a priority in foreign affairs that is not supported by a substantial segment of the American people. No administration can make drastic revisions in the priorities of foreign policy set by history, involvement, and public attention. Historically, whatever we may think should be the case, the fact is that as a nation we have not been as aware of or involved in Africa as we have been in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The fact that this is the case today, however, does not mean the situation cannot change with growing awareness of that continent's nearness and importance to us.

European and Multilateral Assistance

Closely related to the limited interest in Africa in this country is the feeling that Africa is largely a European preserve. There is of course some justification for this view.

The European relationship to Africa is far older than ours. Europe today provides substantial amounts of official development aid. The Development Fund (European Community) and the European Investment Bank, for example, have provided a billion dollars in aid to Africa over the past five years. During the period FY 68-72, France provided \$2.4 billion and the United Kingdom \$774 million. Other countries have made available an additional \$2 billion.

It is natural that Americans, feeling the pressures of both domestic and other foreign needs, might ask why the United States needs to play a role in a continent already receiving so much from traditional sources. The total amount Africa receives from all sources, in fact, gives it the highest per capita input of aid of any continent. In addition to aid received from Western Europe, Africa in the last five years has received \$383 million from the Soviet Union and \$1.4 billion from other Eastern Europe countries and China.

The questioning of the need for an American role in African development arises also when one looks at the growing role of the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

During the next four years, the World Bank reportedly will be putting over \$1 billion into Nigeria alone. As of June 30, 1973, the Bank's cumulative commitment to Africa stands at \$2.8 billion, while soft-term commitments from IDA now exceed \$1.2 billion. We make a substantial contribution to the Bank's capital. In FY 72 we contributed \$320 million to IDA, the soft-loan window of the World Bank, and \$86 million to the United Nations Development Program. Why should we have a separate U.S. program?

There are several reasons why we should not leave Africa entirely to others. The independent African nations wish to diversify their economic relationships. The forms and conditions of the assistance received from the traditional European sources are not always the most beneficial to true development. European aid, like our own, is declining. And finally, there are nations in Africa which had no metropole and have traditionally looked to us for assistance. For our part, the United States needs diplomatic contact. We have a clear and compelling interest in the natural resources and markets of Africa on terms consistent with Africa's independence. We need energy fuels and minerals. We need development and expanding markets for our products.

We get little credit for our contribution to multinational organizations. We are not identified with what they do, nor do we seek identification. We respect the World Bank and the UNDP as truly international organizations. If we have specific interests in an identifiable U.S. response to Africa's development, however, our contribution to these agencies will not suffice.

Private Enterprise and Development

There are those who say, let private institutions and private enterprise carry out the U.S. obligation to African development.

Private institutions have done a great deal, both in cooperation with government and independently. This will continue, but it is doubtful if by their nature and by the resources available to them such private institutions can fill the needs set out by the African countries.

Private enterprise has a role to play, a substantial role. I have been impressed, in my visits to Africa, with the contributions made in many areas by enlightened U.S. private enterprise. Where a clear mutual interest in African development is recognized, private enterprise can be more effective than government in obtaining capital, in the rapid development of infrastructure, the training of managers and skilled workers, and the creation of a sustaining support to the economy. Not all countries in Africa, however, have either the markets or the resources to attract private enterprise. Even some that do need official assistance to create the basic conditions which can attract the private investor or the trader.

Private enterprise is limited by its own natural reluctance to take risks in countries or situations of potential instability. While one can argue that political instability in actuality does not necessarily disrupt private enterprise arrangements, the threat of disruption and the threat of nationalizations have significant psychological effects.

Private enterprise also suffers in some areas from an image of past practices. There have been arrangements negotiated in the past, and particularly during the colonial period, which gave few benefits to the people of the country. This image is changing, and where private enterprise is most successful today, it is operating on a basis consistent with the independence and sovereignty of the African country. In many cases this is a partnership effort with special attention to the improvement of the management and technical skills of the African employees.

In and of itself, trade is the most important source of foreign exchange for developing nations. Export earnings account for nearly four-fifths of their total foreign exchange resources. For most developing countries, a 1 percent increase in exports equals a 7 percent increase in aid. Expansion of trade opportunities stimulates efficiency and self-sustaining growth. Given a choice, most developing countries prefer to earn foreign exchange through exports rather than to borrow development assistance or accept

foreign investment. It is more satisfying to their sense of independence, and it avoids adding to their growing debt and transfer burden.

Africa's Use of U.S. Aid

Now we come to the question of Africa's use of our aid.

Aid inevitably involves differences of view between donor and receiver. Economic development often invades the most sensitive aspects of another society because it inevitably brings about change in that society. Because aid also requires an infusion of resources, it necessitates a determination of the priority uses for these resources. This often involves the aid donor directly in internal policies and conflicts.

Further, the donor has his own set of rules to govern the resources he allocates. In the case of our Congress, there is a body of law going back 25 years which sets forth a complexity of requirements regarding reporting, restrictions, interest rates, conduct, priorities, and funds. In addition, development specialists, longtime students of the intricate process of development, have their own views of how a country should use its funds.

Throughout the history of our aid to Africa, there have been continual adjustments between what we have wanted, what we have seen as the need, and what the Africans have wanted and seen. As laudable as the principle may be that we be guided by what the Africans want, it has not always been possible in a program authorized and funded by an elected legislature. There are therefore built-in differences over:

—Large impressive impact projects often desired by political leaders versus smaller projects considered more feasible and more practical by the economic planner.

—Projects in an area of political importance versus those, perhaps more economically feasible, elsewhere.

—Those of interest to a particular individual or leadership group versus those which "get to the people."

Much of the criticism of Africa's use of aid arises from these conflicts.

There are other problems. African decisionmaking is often slow, and opportunities may be lost. Officials in some highly centralized countries may be reluctant to take the necessary decisions. The African nation may not be able to sustain a project once it is completed. Corruption is not unknown.

In administering our development aid, the lack of response or support on the part of African nations and the differences with them over priorities have sometimes presented major problems in justifying our assistance.

Yet there is another side. Much of this implies that we must pass judgment on the political priorities or internal pressures of another government, another society. Do we really know that the priorities we lay down for them are necessarily better than their own? I have never been sure.

How much should we involve ourselves in such judgments? We cannot ignore the tendency of Americans to measure other societies against our own image and to see progress only in our terms. At the same time, our people more and more resist the kind of direct involvement which might create that kind of progress. We cannot have it both ways.

There are endemic problems in many developing countries: a lack of motivation, a languor produced by underdevelopment, a lack of resource base, different views toward corruption and favoritism. These are part of underdevelopment. We cannot refuse to assist in development by virtue of the conditions which make that assistance necessary.

Need for Informed Support

If the trend is away from an appreciable official U.S. role in African development, what can be done to reverse that trend? Speaking from the personal experience of the past four years, I have five suggestions:

—We can work together to offer constructive and informed support for a foreign aid program.

—We can work toward a clearly identifiable U.S. program for Africa.

—We can increase the coordination within

the private realm and between the private realm and the government.

—We can seriously evaluate other economic actions significant for Africa.

—We can render greater help to the Africans in tapping the total resources of our society for the benefit of their own development.

Let me take each in turn.

As I've said before, foreign aid is in trouble. The latest authorizing legislation passed the Senate by 12 votes and the House by five votes. The Senate figure is the lowest ever voted by that body. The two bills are now in a Senate-House conference, and the resulting compromise figure may be higher. The appropriation measure has not even reached the floor of either House, and the fiscal year is nearly half over. Many in Congress tell me that the future of the foreign aid program beyond next year is doubtful.

The foreign aid program is an easy target for criticism. It has few domestic constituents. We are inhibited both at home and abroad from stressing the degree to which it benefits our own economy, an area where a real basis for justification does lie. To gain support, it has sought to achieve several sometimes conflicting objectives; it has fully satisfied no one.

The recipient nations, who frequently entertain greater expectations of the United States than can be realized, criticize the program more often than they praise it. They seek more acceptable terms, often without understanding the difficulties we face in the Congress in setting the terms we have. Often their complaints are echoed by American citizens unaware of congressional realities. Some, in a misguided way, seem to feel that such criticism will help the program in this country. As I've already pointed out, such criticism and lukewarm praise from abroad merely intensify the opposition.

Criticism by slogan or cliché serves little purpose and does not take the place of an objective assessment of the problem. The repetition of catch phrases like "benign neglect" and "low priority" will not get the action that can be achieved by a precise, informed, targeted, and sympathetic approach.

The allocation of America's resources to the developing world, as is foreign policy in general, is an intricate process involving the Congress, the President, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the Treasury, and at times, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The process deserves to be studied to a greater extent by those who wonder why we do not have a more substantial response or by those who wish to further such a response.

As one contribution to this effort, the Department initiated a scholar-diplomat exchange in 1969, a program in which some of you have participated. Twice a year we invite a group of academics from American universities to spend a week with us in the African Bureau sharing offices with desk officers, looking through our reporting and observing our activities. We also send our officer to visit participating campuses to continue this dialogue. I believe this has been a helpful and, hopefully, enlightening process.

Meaningful U.S. Response to Africa

It has long been my opinion that a fully meaningful official response by this country to Africa's development will require ultimately a congressionally backed program specifically for Africa and representing a recognition of this country's special interests and attachments to that continent.

In many ways, Africa presents us with unique opportunities for a constructive development effort. Our history gives us fewer political complications of the type that has made aid to other areas of the world less popular. More than 10 percent of our population is of African origin, which increasingly feels ties to the African Continent. In the response to the drought conditions in the nations of west Africa we have seen a major effort by the black community suggesting its growing awareness of and sense of identity with both the needs and the possibilities for help in Africa.

If a special "alliance for progress" for Africa does not seem immediately possible,

the new foreign aid legislation currently under consideration in the Congress provides a good basis for a meaningful U.S. response to Africa. It emphasizes areas of particular importance to the African countries: agriculture, population and health, and education and human resources. It makes special financial provisions for the least developed countries, of which 16 are African. In addition, the House version contains a provision for special development problems which will enable a greater flexibility in dealing with Africa's problems. The proposed legislation, moreover, removes the country limitations, which have been particularly restrictive in Africa.

This country is wasteful in its use of resources. There is, in my opinion, more that we could do through improved coordination between government, private institutions, and private companies in tapping all our resources and making them more effective in our response to Africa. As it is now, except where institutions, universities, foundations, or corporations are on a U.S. Government contract, there is no formal coordination or exchange of information among them.

I raised this in a seminar in New York recently and suggested that a Council for African Development be formed with representatives of the U.S. Government and private institutions interested in Africa to exchange information on our respective programs. While some of the participants thought this might have merit, others made it quite clear that many universities and private foundations would find it difficult, as a matter of policy, to work with the government to this extent. I quite appreciate their reservations, but I believe that each would benefit from a greater knowledge of the plans and possibilities of the other.

I include private companies in this thought because they have many possibilities for a contribution to development, not only through investment but through expanded training. U.S. corporations do a great deal of this in Latin America. The Department recently financed a study to see whether similar activities on the part of private enterprise might be possible in Africa. The study

agreed that these possibilities existed but did not believe that the creation of a new instrument was justified. With the growing U.S. investment in Black Africa, however, the possibility of such contributions by U.S. companies remains, and many are already doing so.

Trade, Investment, and Commodity Agreements

Aid is not the only route to economic development. Such factors as trade, investment, and commodity agreements may, in the future, become more significant to the developing world than aid.

A whole range of issues, such as debt rescheduling, policies on commodities, our attitude toward such institutions as the African Development Bank, our attitude toward generalized preferences, our trading practices, come up as separate issues in our complex government. They have not been normally seen as a part of our total relationship to the development of Africa. The time has come when both government and the academic world can profitably look at these issues as a major determinant in years to come of our contribution to developing Africa.

The African nations, as developing countries, are becoming increasingly conscious of the effect on them of the policies of the developed countries. The dramatic new economic alignments which are coming about as a result of Britain's entry into the Common Market and the resulting negotiations between Africa and the EEC [European Economic Community] have served to bring this into focus. Devaluations and currency fluctuations have increased the cost of development. While prices of basic commodities produced by developing countries have risen, the countries remain conscious that these commodities are vulnerable to market conditions over which they have little control. They are pressing for commodity agreements which will give them greater security in terms of price and supply. While we have not opposed commodity agreements, we have been unable to accept the provisions of some and, most recently, of that on cocoa. We find

ourselves as a major consuming country on the other side from the African producers of raw products.

In spite of inevitable divergencies of interest, we need to do more to help the African nations take advantage of what the United States can provide—in aid, in trade, in investment, in policies favorable to the development of Africa.

We need to encourage them, first, to tell the story of their development. Africa still suffers from the Tarzan image. Individual African nations have been effective in erasing this picture of backwardness, but a more concerted, continental effort needs to be made. Africa has much to show and to tell after 15 years of independence—of positive progress and of positive needs.

It is not enough just to tell the story. African nations need help in presenting their possibilities to America. We are a vast super-market, and the average customer does not know how to buy or where to look. There is, in my experience, no single clearinghouse to which an African nation, for example, can bring investment opportunities and receive advice on how to pursue them and how to present them.

The African nations also need help in understanding how to deal with the U.S. Government. African governments in general are highly centralized. So are most of the European governments with whom they are accustomed to deal. The authority of most African Presidents approaches the absolute. Our government, by contrast, is a government of adjustment among many elements, the Congress, the executive departments, independent agencies, and various subdivisions within each. We can help the Africans to be more effective in presenting their needs by helping them to a greater understanding of how our own government works.

As an example of the kind of misunderstanding that can arise, an African chief of state was here to visit the President recently. The President expressed his willingness to help the nation concerned but, as is usual in such high-level conversations, did not go into details. When the ministers accompanying

the chief of state met later with those of us in the State Department and AID, they were surprised and disappointed at the limitations we had to describe on that help. They could not understand why, if the President had indicated his general support, the matter was still so complicated.

Not long ago we were involved in negotiating a major energy deal with an African country. A decision by the Federal Power Commission, an independent regulatory agency, was crucial. The African representatives had great difficulty in understanding that the President could neither order a decision nor intervene in the process.

While there have been bright spots in the development of Africa, African needs are still enormous. These needs are coming into dramatic focus just as the resources available from the developed world are in decline. If the United States is to respond to this situation, it requires a concerted effort by all of us convinced of the importance of our ties with the African Continent.

U.S. Announces Pledge of Funds to UNRWA for 1974

Following is a statement by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations, made on November 30 in the ad hoc committee of the General Assembly for the announcement of voluntary contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

USUN press release 123 dated November 30

The Middle East and its people have been much on our minds during this General Assembly. The past two months have been marked by, first, the tragic new outbreak of fighting, then the cease-fire arranged through the Security Council, and soon—we all fervently hope—peace talks which will lead to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Negotiations will not be easy. Yet we believe

that today, more than at any time in recent years, there is a solid basis for optimism. Dedicated men of good will from many nations are at work. We are confident they can succeed and that we can look forward to a new era of peace and understanding and justice throughout all the Middle East.

UNRWA's role now, and for the immediate foreseeable future, will continue to be of the greatest importance. We all are aware of the dedicated work of Commissioner General [Sir John] Rennie and his staff. We also are aware of the acute financial problem UNRWA faces, its urgent need for additional funds. Today at this pledging conference we are pleased to be able to announce our pledge of \$23.2 million to UNRWA for 1974. As in the past, our contribution will be subject to the conditions imposed by section 301(C) of the Foreign Assistance Act, and it is made with the proviso that it not exceed 70 percent of government contributions to the Agency.

Besides this pledge for 1974, an additional appropriation of \$2 million for UNRWA educational programs currently is being considered by the U.S. Congress.

The United States continues to support the search for peace. And we firmly believe that this peace must include a just settlement of the refugee problem. Our pledge to UNRWA testifies to our interest and concern for this terribly difficult question. But more important, today it has become symbolic of our belief that a new and better day is dawning in the Middle East.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1973 on Government Activities in Field of Marine Sciences. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the report. H. Doc. 93-159. October 1, 1973. 133 pp.

Department of State Appropriation Authorization. Conference report to accompany H.R. 7645. H. Rept. 93-563. October 9, 1973. 11 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Amendment to article V, 1, of the constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization, as amended, to increase the number of Council seats. Adopted at the 17th session of the conference of the FAO, Rome, November 10-29, 1973. Entered into force November 16, 1973. TIAS 4803, 5229, 5506, 5987, 6421, 6902, 7274.

Amendment to article XIV, 3(b), of the FAO constitution, as amended, concerning participation of nonmember states in FAO bodies and meetings. Adopted at the 17th session of the conference of the FAO, Rome, November 10-29, 1973. Entered into force November 26, 1973. TIAS 4803, 5229, 5506, 5987, 6421, 6902, 7274.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

Ratification deposited: Ghana, December 12, 1973.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Accession deposited: Ghana, December 12, 1973.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, November 21, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Ratification deposited: Zaïre, November 19, 1973.

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.¹

Accession deposited: Dahomey, November 6, 1973.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.¹

Accessions deposited: Dahomey, November 6, 1973;

Fiji, November 21, 1973; Kuwait, November 7, 1973 (with a declaration).

Ratifications deposited: Argentina, November 16, 1973; Norway, November 12, 1973.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.¹

Signature: Hungary, December 14, 1973.

Publications

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between states. Done at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1961; for the United States, June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439.

Ratification deposited: Central African Republic, July 20, 1973.

Satellite Communications System

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Signature: Ministry of Transport and Communications for Ghana, December 12, 1973.

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Ghana, December 12, 1973.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.

Admission as an associate member: Papua New Guinea, September 10, 1973.

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973.

Notification of approval: India, September 26, 1973.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: United States, December 7, 1973.

BILATERAL

Viet-Nom

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 (TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon November 20, 1973. Entered into force November 20, 1973.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$16.35; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$14.50; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 20¢ each.

Bulgaria	Cat. No. S1.123:B87	
	Pub. 7882	8 pp.
Morocco	Cat. No. S1.123:M82	
	Pub. 7954	8 pp.

World Environmental Quality—A Challenge to the International Community. This publication discusses what is being done worldwide to better the state of the environment; what knowledge has thus far been acquired; specific pollution problems on land and sea; and the costs involved in repairing present and future damage to the environment. Pub. 8730. General Foreign Policy Series 280. 38 pp. 65¢. (Cat. No. S1.71:280).

Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam. Joint communique with the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam and joint communique with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam implementing the agreement and protocols of January 27, 1973. TIAS 7674. 45 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7674).

North Atlantic Ocean Stations. Protocol amending the agreement of February 25, 1954, as amended. TIAS 7679. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7679).

Social Security. Agreement with Switzerland. TIAS 7681. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7681).

Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Australia extending the agreement of October 16, 1968. TIAS 7682. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7682).

Peace Corps. Agreement with Bahrain. TIAS 7684. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7684).

Defense—Support of United States Activities at the Churchill Research Range. Agreement with Canada extending the agreement of November 16 and December 18, 1970. TIAS 7686. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7686).

Construction of Military Facilities. Agreement with Saudi Arabia extending the agreement of May 24 and June 5, 1965, as extended. TIAS 7687. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7687).

Economic Assistance for Relief and Rehabilitation. Agreement with Bangladesh amending the agreement of May 30, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7689. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7689).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam amending the agreement of August 29, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7690. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7690).

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447	12 10	Warren Robbins, African Art Museum director, lectures in Africa.
448	12 10	Kissinger: statement on award of Nobel Peace Prize.
449	12 10	Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Jan. 10-11.
450	12 11	Kissinger: news conference, Brussels.
451	12 12	Rush: Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago.
452	12 12	Kissinger: Pilgrims of Great Britain, London.
453	12 12	NATO ministerial meeting communique, Dec. 11.
454	12 13	Kissinger: arrival remarks, Algiers.
455	12 14	Meeting of U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Board on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Dec. 10-11.

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